New York Law Review

Tag: Attachment of Right to Counsel

  • People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements After Attachment of Right to Counsel

    People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984)

    A statement made by a defendant after the right to counsel has attached, but which is genuinely spontaneous and not the product of police inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, is admissible in evidence.

    Summary

    Krom was arrested on a warrant for forging checks. After being informed of his rights, he declined to make a statement. While the arresting officer logged Krom’s arrest alongside those of his accomplices, Krom asked why he was charged with the same offense. The officer explained that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then made an incriminating statement, claiming he knew the checks were forged but didn’t fill them out himself. The New York Court of Appeals held that this statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of police interrogation or its functional equivalent, even though his right to counsel had attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument.

    Facts

    The defendant, Krom, was involved in a scheme to pass forged checks at local gas stations. Krom’s friends, King and Reilly, forged the checks, and Krom presented them for payment, after which the proceeds were divided among the three. On March 16, Krom was arrested on a warrant. At the police station, after being read his Miranda rights, Krom declined to make a statement. As the arresting officer entered Krom’s arrest information into a police log, following entries for King and Reilly, Krom inquired why he was being charged with the same offense as his companions. The officer responded that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then stated that he knew the checks were forged after a few had been passed, but he didn’t fill them out or sign them.

    Procedural History

    Krom moved to suppress his statement, arguing it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement was volunteered. A jury convicted Krom of multiple counts of possession of a forged instrument and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the statement was admissible as spontaneous.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement made by a defendant, after his right to counsel has attached upon the filing of an accusatory instrument and arrest on a warrant, is admissible if the statement was made in response to a brief, impersonal answer from a police officer and is deemed genuinely spontaneous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s statement was spontaneous and not the product of police inducement or interrogation, despite the attachment of his right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that under the New York Constitution, the defendant’s right to counsel attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument leading to the arrest warrant. This prevented the police from interrogating him or engaging in its functional equivalent in the absence of counsel. However, the court clarified that the rule “does not require the police to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement.” The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that volunteered statements are admissible if the defendant spoke with genuine spontaneity “and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The court distinguished this case from scenarios involving police questioning or lengthy informal discussions. Here, the officer’s response was a “brief and impersonal” answer to Krom’s question, and did not constitute an interrogation tactic. The court noted, “The question in such cases is whether the police conduct should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a statement from the defendant…and whether it can be said under the circumstances that the inculpatory statement was ‘made without apparent external cause.’” The court found no evidence that the officer deliberately prompted Krom’s question or that the officer’s answer went beyond the scope of the inquiry. The court likened the case to People v. Lynes, where a similar exchange was deemed spontaneous. Because there was support in the record for the lower court’s finding of spontaneity, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

  • People v. D’Angelo, 41 N.Y.2d 638 (1977): Attachment of Right to Counsel Before Formal Proceedings

    People v. D’Angelo, 41 N.Y.2d 638 (1977)

    The right to counsel does not automatically attach simply because a suspect is in police custody awaiting arraignment; it requires the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Summary

    D’Angelo was arrested and, before arraignment, interrogated by an Assistant District Attorney after waiving his Miranda rights. He made an inculpatory statement, which he later sought to suppress, arguing his right to counsel had attached due to being in custody awaiting arraignment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the right to counsel had not attached because no accusatory instrument had been filed, and the delay in arraignment was not a deliberate attempt to circumvent his right to counsel but rather to comply with the terms of a federal grant. The court also rejected the argument that a showup identification was the product of an illegal detention, finding that the defendant consented to return to the scene of the crime.

    Facts

    Following his arrest and processing at the New York County Criminal Courts Building, the arresting officers went to the early case assessment bureau to sign a complaint against D’Angelo.
    Assistant District Attorney Mullady, who was on duty at the bureau, asked the officers to bring D’Angelo to him before any complaint was drawn.
    Mullady identified himself and gave D’Angelo his Miranda warnings, which D’Angelo waived, agreeing to answer questions.
    During this interrogation, D’Angelo made an inculpatory statement.
    D’Angelo was also taken back to Nathan’s restaurant, the scene of the robbery, where a witness identified him in a showup.

    Procedural History

    D’Angelo sought to suppress the inculpatory statement and the showup identification.
    The lower courts denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether D’Angelo’s constitutional right to counsel had attached solely because he was in police custody awaiting arraignment, precluding interrogation without counsel.
    Whether the showup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal detention.

    Holding

    No, because no accusatory instrument had been prepared or signed, meaning no criminal action had commenced. Furthermore, there was no evidence the delay in arraignment was designed to allow for prearraignment interrogation or to deprive D’Angelo of his right to counsel.
    No, because D’Angelo consented to accompany the officers back to the restaurant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to counsel does not attach merely from being in custody awaiting arraignment. The critical factor is the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings, which, under CPL 1.20(17), requires the preparation and signing of an accusatory instrument. The court distinguished the case from situations where delays in arraignment are used to facilitate prearraignment interrogation, finding instead that the delay was for the independent purpose of conforming to the terms of a federal grant.

    Regarding the showup identification, the court deferred to the affirmed finding of fact that D’Angelo had consented to return to the restaurant. This consent negated any claim of illegal detention.

    The court emphasized that “no decision in our court so holds” that the right to counsel attaches merely because a defendant is physically in police custody awaiting arraignment. The court requires some formal step in the adversarial process before this right is triggered. The court implies that the focus should be on preventing deliberate attempts by law enforcement to circumvent the defendant’s right to counsel, not on creating a blanket rule that prohibits any questioning before arraignment.