New York Law Review

Tag: assumption of risk

  • Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83 (2012): Primary Assumption of Risk Limited to Sponsored or Designated Venues

    Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83 (2012)

    The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, which can negate a defendant’s duty of care, is generally limited to sporting events, sponsored athletic or recreational activities, or activities at designated venues.

    Summary

    Robin Custodi was injured while rollerblading when she fell after her skate struck a two-inch height differential where a driveway met a drainage culvert. She sued the homeowners, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply because Custodi was not engaged in a sporting event, sponsored activity, or using a designated venue. The court emphasized the need to narrowly circumscribe the assumption of risk doctrine to avoid undermining comparative fault principles. The decision clarifies that landowners owe a general duty of care to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition for non-pedestrians like rollerbladers, absent specific circumstances invoking assumption of risk.

    Facts

    Robin Custodi, an experienced rollerblader, was rollerblading in her residential neighborhood. She navigated around a truck blocking the street by skating onto a driveway entrance to reach the sidewalk. She then attempted to re-enter the street using the Muffoletto’s driveway. As she neared the end of the driveway, her skate allegedly struck a two-inch height differential where the driveway met a drainage culvert, causing her to fall and break her hip.

    Procedural History

    Custodi sued the homeowners (Muffolettos) for negligence. The Supreme Court granted the homeowner’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint based on assumption of risk. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint, finding that assumption of risk did not apply and that there was a triable issue of fact regarding proximate cause. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applies to bar a negligence claim where the plaintiff was injured while rollerblading on a residential driveway and the injury was allegedly caused by a height differential between the driveway and a drainage culvert.

    Holding

    No, because the primary assumption of the risk doctrine is generally limited to sporting events, sponsored athletic or recreational activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits that take place at designated venues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of CPLR 1411, which established comparative negligence. The Court acknowledged that a limited form of assumption of risk, “primary” assumption of risk, survived CPLR 1411. This doctrine operates by negating the defendant’s duty of care to the plaintiff. However, the Court emphasized that the doctrine should be narrowly applied. The Court noted that prior cases applying assumption of risk involved sporting events or recreational activities sponsored or supported by the defendant, or occurring at a designated athletic or recreational venue. Citing Trupia v. Lake George Cent. School Dist., the Court stated that assumption of the risk “must be closely circumscribed if it is not seriously to undermine and displace the principles of comparative causation” (14 NY3d at 395). Extending the doctrine to injuries on streets and sidewalks would unduly diminish the duty of landowners to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Court distinguished the case from those involving designated recreational venues, emphasizing that the plaintiff was simply rollerblading in her neighborhood. The court stated, “As a general rule, application of assumption of the risk should be limited to cases appropriate for absolution of duty, such as personal injury claims arising from sporting events, sponsored athletic and recreative activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits that take place at designated venues.” The Court found it unnecessary to decide if any other exceptions existed. The Court emphasized that the defendants did not argue that their duty did not extend to altering the height differential, thus the negligence issue remained for litigation.

  • Bukowski v. Clarkson University, 19 N.Y.3d 353 (2012): Assumption of Risk in Collegiate Athletics

    Bukowski v. Clarkson University, 19 N.Y.3d 353 (2012)

    Participants in sports assume the inherent risks of that activity, and educational institutions have a duty to protect athletes from unassumed, concealed, or enhanced risks; less than optimal conditions do not necessarily negate assumption of risk.

    Summary

    A college baseball pitcher, injured when struck by a batted ball during indoor practice, sued the university and coach, alleging negligence due to poor lighting, a multi-colored backdrop, and the absence of a protective screen. The New York Court of Appeals held that the pitcher assumed the inherent risk of being hit by a batted ball. The court reasoned that the plaintiff, an experienced baseball player, was aware of the risks, appreciated their nature, and voluntarily assumed them by participating in the practice, even under less-than-ideal conditions.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Bukowski, a freshman pitcher at Clarkson University, was injured during indoor baseball practice when he was hit by a batted ball. The practice took place in a facility with a multi-colored backdrop and, allegedly, poor lighting. No protective L-screen was used during the practice. Bukowski, an experienced baseball player, had been recruited to play for the team. He had observed a previous practice without the L-screen.

    Procedural History

    Bukowski sued Clarkson University and his coach. The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. At trial, the court granted a directed verdict for the defendants, finding that Bukowski had assumed the risk. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The appeal reached the New York Court of Appeals based on a two-Justice dissent at the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a college baseball player assumes the risk of injury when participating in indoor practice under less-than-optimal conditions, specifically without a protective screen and with a distracting backdrop.

    Holding

    Yes, because the risk of being hit by a batted ball is inherent in baseball, and the plaintiff, an experienced player, was aware of the risk and voluntarily participated in the practice despite the conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of assumption of risk, stating that a participant in a sporting activity assumes the inherent risks of that activity when they are aware of the risks, appreciate their nature, and voluntarily assume them. The court emphasized that educational institutions must protect athletes from unassumed, concealed, or enhanced risks. However, the court also noted that less-than-optimal conditions do not necessarily negate assumption of risk.

    The court found that Bukowski, as an experienced baseball player, was aware of the risk of being hit by a batted ball, noting his testimony that he had seen other pitchers get hit. The court distinguished this case from those involving defective sporting equipment or violations of established safety protocols. The Court stated that, even if the backdrop and lighting were suboptimal, they did not create risks beyond those inherent in the sport. The court found that the defendants fulfilled their duty of making the “conditions as safe as they appear to be” (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]), and there were no concealed risks unknown to Bukowski.

    The Court also emphasized the social value of sports and the need to protect college athletics from crushing liability, stating that the injury was “simply the result of a ‘luckless accident arising from . . . vigorous voluntary participation in competitive . . . athletics’” (Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 659 [1989]).

  • Tkeshelashvili v. State, 17 N.Y.3d 157 (2011): Diver’s Recklessness as Sole Cause of Injury

    Tkeshelashvili v. State, 17 N.Y.3d 157 (2011)

    A plaintiff’s reckless conduct, such as diving into shallow water with awareness of fluctuating water levels, can be the sole legal cause of their injuries, absolving the defendant of negligence even if a duty to warn existed.

    Summary

    Mikhail Tkeshelashvili, a frequent visitor to Colgate Lake, dove from a dam spillway into shallow water and sustained severe injuries. He sued the State of New York, alleging negligence for failing to warn of the shallow water caused by leaks in the dam. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that Tkeshelashvili’s reckless conduct in diving into water he knew or should have known was shallow was the sole legal cause of his injuries. His prior familiarity with the lake and awareness of fluctuating water levels negated the State’s alleged negligence in failing to warn.

    Facts

    Tkeshelashvili frequently visited Colgate Lake, a shallow lake with a dam. He often dove from the dam’s spillway. On September 4, 2005, he dove headfirst from the spillway, striking his head on the lake bed and becoming quadriplegic. He knew the water level fluctuated and observed that the water was below the spillway’s top that day. The lake’s average depth was 4.6 feet, and at the spillway’s face, the water was approximately two feet deep on the day of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Tkeshelashvili sued the State, claiming negligence. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the State, finding Tkeshelashvili’s actions were the sole legal cause of his injuries. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State was negligent in failing to warn of the shallow water conditions at Colgate Lake, and whether that negligence was the proximate cause of Tkeshelashvili’s injuries, given his prior knowledge of the lake’s fluctuating water levels and his decision to dive headfirst into the water.

    Holding

    No, because Tkeshelashvili’s reckless conduct in diving into shallow water that he knew or should have known was too shallow was the sole legal cause of his injuries, absolving the State of liability, even assuming a duty to warn existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Tkeshelashvili’s prior experience with Colgate Lake and awareness of its fluctuating water levels negated any claim that the State’s failure to warn was the proximate cause of his injuries. The Court emphasized that “any warning would have only alerted him to what he already knew about the approximate water level in the vicinity of the spillway as a result of his familiarity with the depth of the lake’s water and the height of the spillway above the lake bed.” The Court cited Olsen v. Town of Richfield and other cases where a plaintiff’s reckless diving was deemed the sole legal cause of their injuries. It distinguished the present case from situations where the plaintiff lacked specific knowledge of the water’s depth. The court found that Tkeshelashvili acted recklessly: “The fact is, claimant engaged in reckless behavior when, on the date of the accident, he dove from the spillway into the dangerously shallow waters of Colgate Lake.” The Court effectively held that regardless of any negligence on the State’s part, Tkeshelashvili’s own actions superseded it. The Court also noted that there was no evidence the lake was leakier that day than normal, further weakening the negligence claim.

  • Trupia v. Lake George Central School District, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010): Limits on Assumption of Risk Defense

    Trupia v. Lake George Central School District, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010)

    The assumption of risk doctrine, which can negate a defendant’s duty of care, is primarily limited to athletic and recreational activities where the plaintiff has freely assumed a known risk, and should not be broadly applied to ordinary negligence claims, especially those involving the supervision of children.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the assumption of risk doctrine in New York negligence law. An infant plaintiff was injured while riding a bannister during a summer program. The defendant school district sought to amend its answer to include assumption of risk as a defense, arguing the plaintiff consented to the risks involved. The Court of Appeals held that the assumption of risk doctrine is primarily applicable to athletic and recreational activities, not to the general supervision of children. Extending the doctrine beyond these activities would undermine comparative negligence principles and an educational institution’s duty of care.

    Facts

    Luke Anthony Trupia, an infant plaintiff, attended a summer program administered by the Lake George Central School District. While at the program, Luke rode a bannister and fell, sustaining serious injuries. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligent supervision, claiming Luke was left unsupervised at the time of the accident. The defendants sought to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, arguing that Luke had previously fallen from a bannister and thus knew the risks.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to amend their answer. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, denying the motion for leave to amend. The Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion to amend their answer.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion for leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk in a negligence action based on a lack of supervision of a child.

    Holding

    No, because the assumption of risk doctrine is generally limited to athletic and recreational activities, and applying it to the general supervision of children would undermine the principles of comparative negligence and a school’s duty of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between assumption of risk and comparative negligence, noting that CPLR 1411 abolished assumption of risk as an absolute defense, replacing it with a system of comparative fault. However, assumption of risk has persisted as a means of limiting a defendant’s duty, based on the idea that a plaintiff who freely assumes a known risk negates the defendant’s duty to protect them from that risk. The court emphasized that the doctrine is most persuasively justified by its utility in facilitating free and vigorous participation in athletic activities, as stated in Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 657 (1989). The Court was concerned that extending the doctrine beyond these circumstances would undermine the legislative intent of comparative negligence under CPLR 1411 which applies to “any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death.” The Court also reasoned that applying assumption of risk in cases involving children would severely diminish an educational institution’s duty to supervise children adequately, because “Children often act impulsively or without good judgment—that is part of being a child; they do not thereby consent to assume the consequently arising dangers, and it would not be a prudent rule of law that would broadly permit the conclusion that they had done so.” The Court explicitly stated that the inference of assumption of risk “may not be made in their case, or for that matter where adults are concerned, except in the context of pursuits both unusually risky and beneficial that the defendant has in some nonculpable way enabled.”

  • Roberts v. Boys and Girls Republic, Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 889 (2008): Assumption of Risk in Recreational Activities

    10 N.Y.3d 889 (2008)

    Participants in recreational activities assume the inherent risks of those activities when they are aware of the potential dangers.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Linda Roberts was injured at a ballpark when struck by a baseball bat wielded by a player in an on-deck circle. She sued the Boys and Girls Republic, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that Roberts had assumed the risk of injury because she was aware of batting equipment and players swinging bats in the vicinity. The court relied on the principle that participants in recreational activities assume the inherent risks associated with those activities, especially when they have observed the potential dangers. This case highlights the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in the context of sporting events.

    Facts

    Linda Roberts was present at a ballpark. While there, she was struck by a baseball bat swung by a player who was in an off-field, on-deck batting circle. Roberts had observed batting equipment and players swinging bats in the area where the incident occurred.

    Procedural History

    Roberts sued Boys and Girls Republic, Inc. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s order. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff, injured by a baseball bat at a ballpark after observing players swinging bats, assumed the risk of injury, thereby precluding recovery for negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff observed batting equipment and players swinging bats in the area where the accident occurred, she assumed the risk of her injuries. The complaint was properly dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the doctrine of assumption of risk, which states that participants in recreational activities assume the risks inherent in those activities. The court emphasized that the plaintiff had conceded to observing batting equipment and players swinging bats in the area where she was injured. This awareness of the potential danger was crucial to the court’s finding that she had assumed the risk. The court cited Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471 (1997), and Trevett v City of Little Falls, 6 NY3d 884 (2006) in support of its decision. The court concluded that because the plaintiff was aware of the risks and voluntarily exposed herself to them, the defendant was not liable for her injuries. The court’s decision reflects a policy consideration of encouraging participation in recreational activities by limiting liability for inherent risks that are known and appreciated by participants. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions published with the decision.

  • Sammis v. Nassau/Suffolk Football League, 95 N.Y.2d 809 (2000): Impact of Comparative Fault on Duty of Care

    Sammis v. Nassau/Suffolk Football League, 95 N.Y.2d 809 (2000)

    The doctrine of assumption of risk does not automatically relieve a defendant of their duty of care; comparative fault principles may apply, requiring a fact-finder to assess the relative culpability of all parties involved.

    Summary

    Edwin Sammis sustained injuries while assisting Alex Caruana in removing a box from an elevated shelf. Sammis sued the Nassau/Suffolk Football League and others, alleging negligence. The lower courts granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that Sammis had assumed the risk of injury by helping Caruana. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in concluding that Sammis’s actions relieved the defendants of their duty of care. The Court of Appeals found that there were issues of fact as to comparative fault, and the case should be decided by a fact finder.

    Facts

    Edwin Sammis assisted Alex Caruana in removing a box from an elevated shelf in an equipment shed at the North Babylon Athletic Club.

    During the process, Sammis sustained injuries.

    Sammis and his wife sued the Nassau/Suffolk Football League and other related parties (excluding the Town of Babylon), alleging negligence.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

    Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and, *sua sponte*, granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint based on the doctrine of assumption of risk.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, modifying the Appellate Division’s order by denying summary judgment to defendants.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff’s act of helping another person remove an object from an elevated shelf automatically relieves the defendants of their duty of care, thereby entitling them to summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because comparative fault principles apply, requiring a fact-finder to assess the relative culpability of all parties involved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred in concluding that Sammis’s act of helping Caruana remove the box relieved the defendants of any duty of care or otherwise established the defendants’ entitlement to summary judgment. The Court clarified that assumption of risk does not automatically negate a defendant’s duty.

    The Court reasoned that issues of fact existed regarding comparative fault. CPLR 1411 dictates consideration of comparative fault.

    The Court emphasized that the record did not provide a basis for granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the question of the defendants’ liability, either. It was a matter for the jury.

  • Owen v. R.J.S. Realty Co., 79 N.Y.2d 967 (1992): Enforceability of Exculpatory Agreements at Recreational Facilities

    Owen v. R.J.S. Realty Co., 79 N.Y.2d 967 (1992)

    General Obligations Law § 5-326 renders unenforceable exculpatory agreements purporting to release owners or operators of recreational facilities from liability when a fee is charged for the use of the facility, and assumption of risk is not a viable defense where the defendant’s negligence created risks beyond those inherent in the sport.

    Summary

    Owen involved a race car driver’s death at a speedway. The plaintiff argued that a release signed by the driver was unenforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-326 because a fee was paid for access to the pit area, a necessary condition for participating in the race. The plaintiff further contended that the track’s dangerous design created risks beyond those inherent in auto racing. The Court of Appeals held that the release was unenforceable due to the fee paid for facility use and that a triable question of fact existed regarding whether the track’s design created additional, unassumed risks, thus precluding summary judgment for the defendants.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s decedent, a race car driver, died in an accident at the Orange County Fair Speedway. The decedent had signed a release purporting to exonerate the track owner and race promoter from liability. The decedent had paid a fee to access the pit area of the speedway, a necessary condition for participating in the race. Expert affidavits submitted by the plaintiff indicated that the track’s retaining wall contour, guardrail design, and barrel placement created a dangerous condition exceeding the usual risks of auto racing.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought suit against the track owner and race promoter. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the release signed by the decedent and the affirmative defense of assumption of risk. The trial court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, and subsequently to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether General Obligations Law § 5-326 applies to a fee paid for access to the pit area of a speedway, making a signed release unenforceable.
    2. Whether the affirmative defense of assumption of risk bars recovery when the defendant’s negligence allegedly created dangerous conditions beyond those inherent in the sport of auto racing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because admission to the pit area was a necessary condition to the decedent’s participation in the race, and a fee was paid for the use of the facility.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s submissions created a triable question of fact as to whether the defendants’ alleged negligence engendered additional risks that do not inhere in the sport and, if so, whether the decedent should be deemed to have assumed those risks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that General Obligations Law § 5-326 applies because the decedent paid a fee for the use of the recreational facility (the pit area), which was a necessary condition for participating in the race. This triggers the statute, rendering the release unenforceable. The court distinguished this case from Lago v. Krollage, where the fee was paid for membership in a race promotion organization, not for the use of a particular racetrack. Regarding assumption of risk, the Court cited Turcotte v. Fell, emphasizing that while participants assume inherent risks of a sport, they do not necessarily assume risks created by the negligence of the facility operator. The expert affidavits suggesting that the track’s design created unique and dangerous conditions beyond the usual risks of auto racing were sufficient to create a triable issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. As the court stated, the affidavits raised the question of whether “defendants’ alleged negligence, if any, engendered additional risks that ‘do not inhere in the sport’ and, if so, whether the decedent should be deemed to have assumed those risks by voluntarily participating in the race.”

  • строкscheuer v. Bauer, 67 N.Y.2d 43 (1986): Assumption of Risk in Recreational Activities

    Scheuer v. Bauer, 67 N.Y.2d 43 (1986)

    Participants in recreational activities, who place themselves in the path of a known and apparent risk, may be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury associated with that activity, thereby relieving other participants of a duty of care.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of assumption of risk in the context of a recreational activity. The plaintiff, a 15-year-old experienced baseball player, was injured when he was struck by an errant throw while standing near his friends who were playing catch. The New York Court of Appeals held that by placing himself in the vicinity of the ongoing game, the plaintiff assumed the risk of being hit by a misthrown ball, and therefore, the defendants owed him no duty of care. This decision highlights the principle that individuals engaging in or near recreational activities may be deemed to have accepted certain inherent risks.

    Facts

    Two boys, Bauer (14 years old) and Scheuer (15 years old), were playing catch on a city street at a distance of 25 feet. The plaintiff, also 15 and an experienced baseball player, approached the defendants during their game. He greeted and conversed with each of them as they continued playing catch. The plaintiff then moved behind Bauer and talked with other friends. Bauer threw the ball to Scheuer, who missed the catch. Scheuer retrieved the ball and threw it from 75 feet, and the errant throw struck the plaintiff in the mouth, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which held in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff voluntarily placed himself near an ongoing game of catch and was subsequently injured by a misthrown ball.

    Holding

    No, because by placing himself in the line of an ongoing game of catch between his friends, plaintiff put himself in danger of being struck by a misthrown ball and therefore assumed the risk. Thus, the defendants owed the plaintiff no duty of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, emphasizing the principle of assumption of risk. The court reasoned that the plaintiff, by knowingly positioning himself near an ongoing game of catch, placed himself in a foreseeable zone of danger. The court found that the plaintiff, an experienced baseball player, was aware of the inherent risks associated with the activity. By voluntarily placing himself in that situation, the plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by a misthrown ball. This assumption of risk negated any duty of care that the defendants might otherwise have owed to the plaintiff. The court’s decision reflects a policy consideration that participants in recreational activities should bear some responsibility for their own safety when they knowingly expose themselves to inherent risks. The court implicitly determined that imposing a duty of care in this situation would unduly burden recreational activities and discourage participation. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted in the memorandum decision.

  • Arbegast v. Board of Education of the South Colonie Central School District, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985): Spectator Injury and Assumption of Risk at Sporting Events

    Arbegast v. Board of Education of the South Colonie Central School District, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985)

    A spectator at a sporting event assumes the risks inherent in that sport, and a proprietor’s duty extends only to providing adequately protective screening for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire it, but this duty does not extend to those who voluntarily stand in unprotected areas.

    Summary

    A nine-year-old boy was injured by a hockey puck while standing in an unprotected area of a hockey rink. The plaintiff sued, alleging negligence in the rink’s design and lack of protective screening. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the rink owner breached a duty of care because the injured party voluntarily stood in an unprotected area. The court distinguished this case from cases involving baseball, emphasizing that the plaintiff offered no evidence of how the practical realities of baseball and hockey differ, so as to require protective screening around the entire rink. Moreover, the court reasoned that the injury was not a direct result of the bleacher’s placement, since the plaintiff was standing, not sitting, when injured.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s nine-year-old son was struck in the face by a hockey puck while watching a hockey game at the defendant’s rink. The rink had three and a half foot high dasher boards, with three-foot plexiglass sections above the boards behind the goals, extending to the blue lines. The sides of the rink between the blue lines had no plexiglass. Movable bleachers were on one side, and the plaintiff’s son was standing in front of the bleachers, next to a section of dasher boards without plexiglass above it.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the proprietor of a hockey rink has a duty to provide protective screening around the entire rink.
    2. Whether the defendant’s alleged negligence in the placement of bleachers was the direct cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff’s son.

    Holding

    1. The court did not decide whether a duty exists to provide protective screening around the entire rink because the plaintiff failed to present evidence distinguishing the realities of hockey from baseball, as established in previous case law.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s son was standing in an unprotected area, and not sitting in the bleachers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., which concerned baseball, but noted that the plaintiff provided no evidence demonstrating different safety requirements between baseball and hockey. The court stated, “plaintiff offered no evidence of how the practical realities of the sports of baseball and hockey differ and thus has failed to establish that the duty we defined in Akins is inapplicable.”

    Even assuming the defendant breached its duty to provide sufficient protected seating, the court found that the defendant’s negligence wasn’t a direct cause of the injury. The court reasoned that because the plaintiff’s son was standing, not sitting, the bleachers’ placement was irrelevant. The court observed, “Having made the decision to stand in an unprotected area, plaintiff’s son may not now be heard to complain that defendant’s seating arrangements were negligent when he has not asserted that there was no room to stand along the protected section of the dasher boards or that he was prevented from doing so.” The court emphasized that spectators assume certain risks inherent in attending sporting events and the proprietor’s duty is limited to providing sufficient protected seating for those who desire it.

  • Maddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270 (1985): Implied Assumption of Risk in Professional Sports

    Maddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270 (1985)

    A professional athlete who continues to participate in a sporting event despite being aware of a dangerous condition of the playing field assumes the risk of injury as a matter of law.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a professional baseball player, sued the City of New York and the Metropolitan Baseball Club after sustaining a knee injury when he slipped on a wet and muddy baseball field. The New York Court of Appeals held that by continuing to play despite knowing the field’s hazardous condition, the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s awareness of the wet and muddy conditions, coupled with his decision to keep playing, constituted implied assumption of risk, barring his recovery. The court distinguished the case from situations where the risk was unknown or enhanced by the defendant’s negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a New York Yankees outfielder, was injured at Shea Stadium (Yankees’ temporary home during renovations) when he slipped and fell in the ninth inning of a game. He attributed the fall to wet and muddy conditions on the field. The plaintiff had noticed the wetness and puddling and complained to the grounds crew. He later testified that his foot got stuck in a mud puddle. The previous night’s game had been cancelled due to the weather. The plaintiff sustained a severe knee injury that ended his career.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York (owner of Shea Stadium), the Metropolitan Baseball Club (lessee), the general contractor, architect, and consulting engineer. After depositions, several defendants moved for summary judgment based on assumption of risk. Special Term denied the motions. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a professional baseball player, injured due to a known dangerous condition of the playing field, is barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk?

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff, as a professional athlete, was aware of the wet and muddy condition of the field and the potential risk of injury, and his continued participation in the game constituted assumption of risk as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s deposition testimony established his awareness of the dangerous condition and the risk it posed. The court distinguished between express and implied assumption of risk, finding that the plaintiff’s case involved implied assumption of risk based on his conduct. The court emphasized that assumption of risk applies to any open and obvious condition inherent in the activity. The court rejected the argument that the single standard of reasonable care established in Basso v. Miller nullified assumption of risk as a defense. The court also stated “That the assumption doctrine ‘applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious condition of the place where it is carried on’”.

    The court further clarified that awareness of risk is to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the plaintiff, imputing a higher degree of awareness to a professional athlete. “It is not necessary to the application of assumption of risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results.” The court rejected the argument that the risk was enhanced by the failure to install proper drainage, noting that the plaintiff was aware of the mud and water. Although assumption of risk is generally a jury question, the court found that summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff’s own testimony established the defense, and he failed to present evidence that he was compelled to play despite the danger.