New York Law Review

Tag: Assigned Counsel Fees

  • Levenson v. Lippman, 6 N.Y.3d 320 (2005): Administrative Authority to Review Assigned Counsel Fees

    Levenson v. Lippman, 6 N.Y.3d 320 (2005)

    The Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts has the authority to promulgate rules allowing administrative judges to review and modify trial court orders regarding compensation for assigned counsel exceeding statutory limits, as this is an administrative matter within the Chief Administrative Judge’s supervisory power over the court system.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Chief Administrative Judge acted within constitutional authority by amending a rule to allow administrative review of trial court orders awarding compensation to assigned counsel above statutory limits. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment was valid. The court reasoned that assigning compensation to assigned counsel is an administrative act, not subject to judicial review. The Chief Administrative Judge has the constitutional and statutory authority to supervise the administration of the court system, including managing financial resources related to assigned counsel. The amended rule fills a gap in the process, allowing for administrative review of compensation awards that would otherwise be unreviewable, ensuring efficient court operations.

    Facts

    Several attorneys (plaintiffs) participated in the Assigned Counsel Plan, representing indigent defendants. Trial judges in five separate cases granted these attorneys compensation exceeding statutory limits, deeming “extraordinary circumstances” warranted higher hourly rates. Administrative Judge Scherer, appointed by the Chief Administrative Judge, reviewed these enhanced awards and reduced them to the statutory maximums based on an amendment to section 127.2(b) of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR 127.2 [b]). This amendment allowed an administrative judge to review such orders.

    Procedural History

    The attorneys sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that section 127.2(b) was unconstitutional. Supreme Court declared the amendment valid and upheld Judge Scherer’s modifications. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the amendment an unconstitutional transfer of appellate jurisdiction. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Chief Administrative Judge exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority by amending section 127.2(b) to permit administrative review of trial court orders awarding compensation to assigned counsel exceeding statutory limits?

    Holding

    Yes, because the Chief Administrative Judge has the authority to supervise the administration and operation of the court system, and assigning compensation to assigned counsel is an administrative act that is not subject to judicial review; therefore, the amendment to section 127.2(b) was a valid exercise of his power.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on prior cases, including Matter of Werfel v. Agresta and Matter of Director of Assigned Counsel Plan of City of N.Y. (Bodek), which established that compensation orders for assigned counsel are administrative acts not subject to judicial review. The Court reasoned that article VI, § 28 (b) of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law § 212 (1) grant the Chief Administrator broad supervisory powers over the court system. This includes adopting rules for the efficient and orderly transaction of business in trial courts (22 NYCRR 80.1). The allocation of financial resources for assigned counsel falls under this administrative purview. The Court stated that “[t]o the extent that the trial courts’ unreviewable discretion produces truly anomalous consequences or patterns of abuse in particular situations, the problem can and should be addressed through the available administrative tools.” The Court rejected the argument that section 127.2(b) violated article VI, § 30 of the New York Constitution by intruding on the Legislature’s authority because the legislature created a gap in administrative review which the Chief Administrator was permitted to fill.

  • Werfel v. Agresta, 36 N.Y.2d 624 (1975): Non-Justiciability of Assigned Counsel Fee Determinations

    Werfel v. Agresta, 36 N.Y.2d 624 (1975)

    Judicial determinations regarding compensation for assigned counsel in criminal cases, made within the statutory maximums, are generally not subject to judicial review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a petition seeking review of an assigned counsel fee determination. The court held that the assignment and compensation of counsel in criminal matters under County Law sections 722 and 722-b are administrative responsibilities internal to the judicial offices and are not subject to judicial review via civil or criminal proceedings. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose is to ease the burden on attorneys who willingly provide public service, and allowing judicial review of fee allowances would undermine this system.

    Facts

    An attorney, Werfel, was assigned to represent an indigent criminal defendant. After successfully representing the client, Werfel applied for compensation for his services as provided under County Law. The court awarded him a certain amount. Dissatisfied with the compensation, Werfel sought judicial review of the fee determination, arguing that the awarded amount was insufficient.

    Procedural History

    Werfel filed an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking to challenge the fee determination. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Werfel appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judicial determination regarding compensation for assigned counsel in a criminal case, made pursuant to County Law sections 722 and 722-b, is subject to judicial review in an Article 78 proceeding.

    Holding

    No, because fixing compensation for assigned counsel is an administrative responsibility internal to the judicial offices involved, and neither the criminal procedure law nor the civil practice law and rules provide a mechanism for judicial review of such determinations when the award is within the statutory maximums.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the process of assigning and compensating counsel in criminal matters is an administrative function performed within the judicial system. It emphasized that these responsibilities are internal to the courts and do not involve external adjudication or administration. The court stated, “They are not concerned with the performance of an adjudicative function or an administrative responsibility external to the management of the courts or the litigation in them.”

    The court further explained that neither the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) nor the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) provides a mechanism for judicial review in this context. The CPL does not provide for appeal or review of fee allowances made in completed criminal actions. The court noted that even if the matter were considered civil in nature, CPLR 7801 precludes obtaining a higher allowance than was originally awarded. The court highlighted the voluntary nature of assigned counsel work, stating, “The lawyers who participate do so willingly, in the highest traditions of the profession, knowing that the limited fees provided fall short of full, or even fair, compensation for their services.” They referenced People v Perry, 27 AD2d 154, 158. The court emphasized that the system is designed to ease the burden on lawyers providing this public service, and judicial review would undermine this system. The court acknowledged the possibility of seeking administrative adjustments through the Administrative Judges or the Administrative Board of the court system, but firmly rejected the notion of justiciable review of allowances made within the statutory limits. The court cited Matter of Fisher v Schenck, 39 AD2d 813, and Matter of Snitkin v Taylor, 276 NY 148, 153.