New York Law Review

Tag: Assigned Counsel

  • Matter of Director of Assigned Counsel Plan v. Bodek, 87 N.Y.2d 191 (1995): Reviewability of Assigned Counsel Compensation Orders

    87 N.Y.2d 191 (1995)

    Orders determining compensation for assigned counsel or expert services in indigent criminal cases are generally considered administrative in nature and not subject to judicial review on the merits by an appellate court, despite the technical appealability of such orders.

    Summary

    This case concerns the appealability and reviewability of compensation orders for expert services provided to indigent defendants. The Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan challenged orders compensating a social worker at a rate exceeding statutory guidelines. The Court of Appeals held that while such orders are technically appealable, they are essentially administrative and not subject to judicial review on the merits. The court reasoned that appellate courts are ill-equipped to assess the trial court’s discretionary choices and that any abuse should be addressed through administrative channels, but also suggested a potential need for regulatory review power.

    Facts

    Hillel Bodek, a certified social worker, was appointed by the Supreme Court to provide services to indigent defendants in several criminal cases. The court ordered the City of New York to pay Bodek $100 per hour. In most cases, the court found “extraordinary circumstances” to justify exceeding the statutory compensation limit of $300 per case. The Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan requested reconsideration, citing budget constraints and a lower hourly rate established by the Chief Administrator of the Courts. The requests were denied.

    Procedural History

    The Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan appealed the Supreme Court’s compensation orders. The Appellate Division consolidated the appeals and affirmed, acknowledging the technical appealability but declining to review the merits based on Matter of Werfel v Agresta. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether orders determining compensation for assigned counsel or expert services pursuant to County Law § 722-c are subject to judicial review on the merits by an appellate court.

    Holding

    No, because such orders are essentially administrative in nature and, therefore, not amenable to judicial review on the merits by an appellate panel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the rationale in Matter of Werfel v Agresta, which held similar orders unappealable, had been weakened by subsequent cases. However, it maintained that even if technically appealable, these compensation orders are not subject to *justiciable* review. The court reasoned that trial courts are better positioned to evaluate the circumstances under which services were rendered, making appellate review impractical. The court stated that to the extent the trial courts’ unreviewable discretion produces truly anomalous consequences or patterns of abuse in particular situations, the problem can and should be addressed through the available administrative tools. A concurring opinion argued for the need for a regulatory review power to prevent unilateral and unchecked trial court action in public services and fiscal matters, suggesting that the Appellate Division or the Chief Administrative Judge should have explicit oversight. The concurring opinion noted that the lack of judicial review or appropriate check-and-balance of unilateral trial court action in these public services and public fiscal matters is unfortunate. As this case demonstrates, substantial fiscal consequences to a municipality are in play, as well as serious inter- and intra-branch tensions and contests relating to completely unchecked power of the purse and compensation authority.

  • People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965): Duty to Inform Defendant of Right to Assigned Counsel

    People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965)

    In courts of special sessions, defendants must be informed of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford an attorney; a mere statement of the right to counsel and an offer to send a message to an attorney the defendant names is insufficient.

    Summary

    Three underage defendants were arrested for stealing apples and brought before a Justice of the Peace without legal representation. After being informed of their right to counsel but not of the possibility of assigned counsel if they could not afford one, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to imprisonment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants did not effectively waive their right to counsel because they were not informed of their right to assigned counsel. The court emphasized that merely informing defendants of their right to counsel and offering to contact an attorney they name does not constitute a sufficient waiver, especially for indigent defendants. This case highlights the necessity of ensuring that defendants understand their right to assigned counsel, especially in minor criminal cases.

    Facts

    Three defendants, all under 21, were caught stealing apples from an orchard around 10:30 p.m.
    The orchard owner filed an information stating the stolen apples were worth about $2.
    Shortly after midnight, the defendants were brought before a Justice of the Peace.
    None of the defendants were represented by an attorney.
    They pleaded guilty after a brief proceeding.
    None of them had prior convictions.
    Each was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment and a $25 fine, resulting in 55 days imprisonment due to inability to pay the fine.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were initially convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court.
    They appealed to the County Court, arguing they were deprived of their right to counsel.
    The County Court rejected their arguments except for the excessiveness of the sentence.
    The County Court modified the judgments, reducing the imprisonment to time already served (about 7 days).
    The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants, in the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, were deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to counsel, particularly given the lack of explicit information about their right to assigned counsel if indigent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court failed to adequately inform the defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they could not afford an attorney, rendering their waiver of counsel ineffective. The court’s statement about the right to counsel and sending a message to a lawyer they name did not adequately inform them of the possibility of court-assigned counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, particularly for indigent defendants, referencing Gideon v. Wainwright. It stated that simply informing a defendant of their right to counsel and offering to send a message to an attorney they name does not constitute an effective waiver, especially for young, inexperienced defendants. The court highlighted that the Justice of the Peace did not inform the defendants that the court would assign an attorney if they could not afford one. The court cited People v. Marincic, emphasizing that the opportunity to have counsel must be real and reasonable, not a mere “formulistic recital of ‘law language.’” The court also noted the historical basis for the right to assigned counsel in New York, even before statutory codification. The court approved of the ruling in People v. Brantle, which emphasized that the proffer of aid of counsel “should be made in clear and unequivocal terms.” The court rejected the argument that the applicable statute for Courts of Special Sessions (Code Crim. Pro., § 699) does not require informing a defendant of the right to assigned counsel, stating that there is little real difference between § 699 and § 308 (which explicitly requires asking about and assigning counsel on indictment). The court dismissed concerns about the impracticality of assigning counsel in Special Sessions Courts, noting the large number of attorneys in the state. The decision underscored that a waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, which requires informing defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford one. The court reasoned that without informing defendants of the right to assigned counsel, any waiver is likely not intelligent, especially when dealing with young, unexperienced defendants in a stressful situation.