New v. New, 417 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1980)

When determining eligibility for public assistance, transfers of assets made close to the time of application are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, but this presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing the transfer was for another legitimate purpose.

Summary

This case concerns the denial of public assistance to Mary New based on asset transfers to her son, Gunther, shortly before applying for assistance. Gunther claimed the money was always his, held in his mother’s name for protection. The court held that while the commissioner could have found the money was Gunther’s and not transferred to qualify for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered a statutory presumption that it was for that purpose. The court found substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s decision to deny assistance, given the account forms, commingled funds, and lack of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses.

Facts

Mary New applied for public assistance. Prior to her application, she transferred funds to her son, Gunther. Some of the funds deposited were hers, some accounts were in her name in trust for Gunther, and some were in their joint names. Gunther claimed all the money was his and he controlled the bank books. He stated his mother’s name was on the accounts to protect her if he died or became incapacitated. All accounts were transferred to Gunther’s name alone within two months of the application for assistance. Mary New had received reparations and Social Security payments in her own right over the years, and her funds and those of her son were commingled.

Procedural History

The Commissioner denied Mary New’s application for public assistance. The lower court reversed the Commissioner’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, confirming the Commissioner’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted further review.

Issue(s)

Whether the Commissioner’s determination to deny public assistance was supported by substantial evidence, considering the statutory presumption regarding asset transfers made shortly before applying for assistance.

Holding

Yes, because the transfer of accounts to Gunther’s name alone was made within two months of the application, triggering the statutory presumption that the transfer was to qualify for assistance. Furthermore, the form of the accounts, the commingling of funds, and the absence of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses provided substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s determination.

Court’s Reasoning

The court applied the statutory presumption that transfers made within two months of applying for assistance are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance. While the commissioner could have found that the money, or most of it, was in fact Gunther’s and that it was not transferred for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered the statutory presumption. The court reasoned that the form of the accounts (some in trust, some joint), the fact that Mrs. New received her own reparations and Social Security payments, the commingling of funds, and the lack of documentation regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses all supported the Commissioner’s decision. The court emphasized that the Commissioner was not required to accept the petitioner’s account and was not denied any procedural right. The court held that the Appellate Division did not err in confirming the Commissioner’s determination because it was supported by substantial evidence.