New York Law Review

Tag: Article 78 Proceeding

  • Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978): Challenging Administrative Orders via Article 78 Proceedings

    Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978)

    Article 78 proceedings are generally not the proper mechanism to challenge administrative orders when direct appellate review is available, although a dissenting opinion argued for their use in compelling a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the propriety of using Article 78 proceedings under the CPLR to challenge the refusal of judges in the New York Civil Court to grant requests. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions, holding that Article 78 proceedings were not the appropriate avenue for challenging these refusals, as direct appellate review was available. The dissenting opinion argued that the judges’ actions were based on a peremptory administrative order, making Article 78 review in the nature of mandamus appropriate to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Facts

    Judges of the New York Civil Court refused certain requests. The petitioners initiated Article 78 proceedings to challenge these refusals. The basis for the judges’ denial was allegedly a peremptory administrative order issued by the Administrative Judge.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding the Article 78 proceedings were properly brought. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ orders and dismissed the petitions, determining that Article 78 was not the appropriate remedy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article 78 proceedings are the appropriate mechanism to challenge the refusal of judges in the Civil Court when such refusals are based on an administrative order and direct appellate review is available?

    Holding

    No, because direct appellate review is available, making an Article 78 proceeding inappropriate in this instance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority held that the petitioners should pursue direct appellate review rather than utilizing Article 78 proceedings. The dissenting opinion, however, contended that the judges’ actions were not discretionary but rather the ministerial execution of an administrative order. The dissent argued that this scenario aligns with the classic use of Article 78 in the nature of mandamus, which is used to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. The dissent noted that Article 78 is appropriate when seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. As stated by Judge Wachtler in dissent, “To the extent that the petitioners are seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law, this case presents an article 78 in the nature of mandamus in its most classic sense.” The majority believed appellate review would suffice; the dissent felt an Article 78 proceeding was required to address the administrative mandate directly.

  • Scranton v. Supreme Court, 36 N.Y.2d 704 (1975): Availability of Article 78 Proceeding for Speedy Trial and Double Jeopardy Claims

    36 N.Y.2d 704 (1975)

    A claim of denial of a speedy trial is not cognizable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit a District Attorney and Supreme Court Justices from proceeding on an indictment; however, a double jeopardy claim may be raised in such a proceeding.

    Summary

    Agnes Scranton sought to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with her indictment, arguing she was denied a speedy trial and that further prosecution would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment denying her petition. It held that a speedy trial claim is not reviewable via an Article 78 proceeding, but a double jeopardy claim is. However, it found that Scranton was not placed in jeopardy because a mistrial was declared after only three jurors were sworn in, and thus, CPL 40.30(1)(b) was not violated.

    Facts

    Agnes Scranton was indicted, and a trial commenced. After three jurors were sworn in, a mistrial was declared. Scranton then brought an Article 78 proceeding, seeking to prevent the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding with the indictment against her. She argued that her right to a speedy trial had been violated and that a subsequent trial would constitute double jeopardy.

    Procedural History

    Scranton initiated an Article 78 proceeding against the Supreme Court and the District Attorney. The Appellate Division rendered a judgment, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a claim of denial of a speedy trial is cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the District Attorney and Justices of the Supreme Court from proceeding on an indictment.
    2. Whether a claim of double jeopardy may be raised in a prohibition proceeding under CPLR Article 78.
    3. Whether the petitioner was placed in jeopardy when a mistrial was declared after three jurors had been sworn.

    Holding

    1. No, because prior decisions have established that Article 78 proceedings are not the proper vehicle for raising speedy trial claims.
    2. Yes, because previous cases have recognized the availability of prohibition proceedings for double jeopardy claims.
    3. No, because under CPL 40.30(1)(b), a person is not deemed to have been prosecuted unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all jurors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, citing Matter of Watts v. Supreme Ct. of State of N. Y., 28 Y 2d 714, Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, 27 Y 2d 432, 437, and Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 25 Y 2d 747, to support its holding that a speedy trial claim is not cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding. Regarding the double jeopardy claim, the court acknowledged that such claims could be raised in a prohibition proceeding, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 Y 2d 59, at p. 64; Matter of Kraemer v. County Ct. of Suffolk County, 6 Y 2d 363. However, the court found that Scranton had not been placed in jeopardy because CPL 40.30(1)(b) specifies that a person is not considered to have been prosecuted for double jeopardy purposes unless the trial proceeds to the point of swearing in all the jurors. Since only three jurors had been sworn in when the mistrial was declared, Scranton was not placed in jeopardy. The court stated: “The petitioner was not placed in jeopardy despite the fact that three jurors had been sworn before a mistrial was declared. (CPL 40.30, subd. 1, par. [b].)” The decision emphasizes the statutory requirement for double jeopardy to attach. This case provides practical guidance on the appropriate procedural vehicle for raising speedy trial and double jeopardy claims in New York and clarifies the point at which jeopardy attaches under CPL 40.30(1)(b).

  • Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. New York, 32 N.Y.2d 1 (1973): Statute of Limitations in Tax Refund Claims

    Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. New York, 32 N.Y.2d 1 (1973)

    When a tax statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or wholly inapplicable, a party may challenge it through a plenary action for moneys had and received, which is governed by a six-year statute of limitations that begins to run when judicial proceedings are instituted, not when an administrative claim is filed.

    Summary

    Marine Midland bank sought a refund of municipal taxes, arguing their levy was unconstitutional. The City denied the claim as untimely under the tax statute’s short limitations period. The bank then initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The court addressed whether the bank was bound by the statute’s time limits due to using the prescribed Article 78 remedy, or if it could pursue a common-law action for moneys had and received, subject to a longer statute of limitations. The court held that resorting to the statutory proceeding invoked its limitations, but the proceeding could be converted to a plenary action. The six-year statute of limitations, however, began when the judicial proceeding was initiated, not when the claim was filed, limiting the recoverable taxes.

    Facts

    Between 1963 and 1966, Marine Midland Bank paid commercial rent taxes to New York City, totaling $679,008.68. Each payment was made under protest, arguing that the tax, as applied to a national bank, violated the U.S. Constitution and federal law. Subsequent court decisions in cases involving other national banks supported the bank’s position, validating their claim of unconstitutional taxation. The bank applied for a refund on June 20, 1968, which the City Finance Administration largely denied on February 11, 1971, citing untimeliness under the statute’s 18-month or 6-month limitation periods. Only the last quarterly payment of $51,076 was refunded.

    Procedural History

    The bank initiated an Article 78 proceeding on March 11, 1971, to challenge the denial of its refund application. Separately, on June 18, 1971, the bank started a plenary action for moneys had and received. Special Term granted judgment to the bank, dismissing the city’s untimeliness argument. The Appellate Division modified the judgment only to adjust the interest rate, affirming the rest.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the bank, by pursuing an Article 78 proceeding prescribed by the tax statute, is bound by the statute’s short time limitations.
    2. Whether the Article 78 proceeding can be converted into a plenary action for moneys had and received.
    3. When the statute of limitations begins to run for a plenary action for moneys had and received in this context: upon filing the administrative claim or upon initiating judicial proceedings?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because resorting to the special proceeding prescribed by the statute subjects the bank to its limitations, including the time to file a claim and institute the proceeding.
    2. Yes, because under CPLR 103(c), courts may convert an improperly brought proceeding into a proper form, such as a plenary action, to avoid dismissal.
    3. Upon initiating judicial proceedings, because the filing of an administrative claim does not toll the Statute of Limitations governing a plenary action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the tax statute provided an exclusive remedy with specific time limitations, this exclusivity does not apply when the statute is challenged as unconstitutional or wholly inapplicable. In such cases, a common-law action for moneys had and received is available, governed by the six-year statute of limitations. The court invoked CPLR 103(c) to convert the Article 78 proceeding into a plenary action, emphasizing that courts should prioritize proper form over dismissal, especially when the statute’s constitutionality is questioned. However, the court clarified that the six-year limitation period begins when judicial proceedings are initiated, not when the refund application is filed. The court noted that the bank could have avoided the time bar by pursuing a plenary action earlier. “When a tax statute…is attacked as wholly inapplicable, it may be challenged in judicial proceedings other than those prescribed by the statute as ‘exclusive’…One method of collateral attack is a plenary action for moneys had and received.” Because the action was commenced in March 1971, only tax payments made within the six years prior to that date could be recovered. The case was remitted to Special Term to allow the city to assert a statute of limitations defense.

  • Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 25 N.Y.2d 243 (1974): Prohibition Does Not Lie for Grand Jury Selection Challenges

    Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 34 N.Y.2d 243 (1974)

    Prohibition is not the proper procedural vehicle for reviewing an alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process, unless the court exceeded its jurisdictional powers.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition is the appropriate method to challenge defects in the Grand Jury selection process. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition is not the proper vehicle unless the court lacked the power to proceed, distinguishing between a challenge to the power to empanel a Grand Jury and a challenge to the selection process itself. The Court emphasized that defects in the selection process, even those of constitutional dimension, can be waived and do not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

    Facts

    The specific facts regarding the alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process are not detailed in the opinion, as the Court did not reach the merits of the claim. However, the petitioner sought to challenge the legality of the Grand Jury based on how it was selected.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition to challenge the Grand Jury selection. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but solely on the procedural ground that prohibition was not the proper vehicle for the challenge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an Article 78 proceeding, in the nature of prohibition, is the proper method for reviewing an alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process.

    Holding

    No, because a determination in a criminal case is not reviewable in an Article 78 proceeding unless the court exceeded its jurisdictional powers. The power to proceed on the indictment existed; therefore, prohibition does not lie.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that prohibition is only appropriate when the court lacks the jurisdictional power to make a determination. It distinguished between a challenge to the court’s power to empanel a Grand Jury (e.g., exceeding its term, as in Matter of Seidenberg v. County Ct. of County of Rockland) and a challenge to the selection process of a properly ordered Grand Jury. The Court stated, “[A] claim that a Grand Jury was illegally impaneled because the court lacked the power to extend its term…must be distinguished from a claim that a Grand Jury, properly ordered, was illegally selected.”

    The Court emphasized that objections to the selection process can be waived, even if the alleged defect rises to constitutional dimensions (citing Davis v. United States). Therefore, the court had the power to proceed on the indictment, and prohibition was not the appropriate remedy. The Court explicitly declined to reach the merits of the underlying claim regarding the Grand Jury selection process, stating, “In view of this we need not, and do not, reach the merits.”

  • Matter of Soto v.NY State Tax Comm., 34 N.Y.2d 134 (1974): Rational Basis Review of Lottery Regulations

    Matter of Soto v. New York State Tax Commission, 34 N.Y.2d 134 (1974)

    When reviewing administrative agency actions, courts are limited to determining whether a rational basis exists for the agency’s decision, and should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency if such a basis is found.

    Summary

    Soto, a lottery ticket holder eligible for a bonus drawing, failed to register within the 18-day period prescribed by lottery regulations. The Tax Commission refused her late registration. Soto filed an Article 78 proceeding, claiming the refusal was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in favor of Soto, holding that the Tax Commission’s strict enforcement of the registration deadline was rational, given the need to process tickets and prepare for the drawing. The court deferred to the agency’s expertise, finding a reasonable basis for the rule and its application.

    Facts

    Soto held a 50-cent lottery ticket eligible for a bonus drawing based on matching digits with a winning ticket. Lottery regulations required eligible participants to register within 18 days of a preliminary drawing. Soto missed the registration deadline and attempted to register on the 19th day. The Tax Commission refused her registration as untimely. The registration requirement and deadlines were publicized in newspaper advertisements.

    Procedural History

    Soto filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Tax Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the petition, ordering the Tax Commission to accept Soto’s ticket. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Tax Commission’s refusal to accept Soto’s late lottery ticket registration was arbitrary and capricious, warranting judicial intervention under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.

    Holding

    No, because the Tax Commission’s strict enforcement of the registration deadline had a rational basis related to the administrative needs of processing tickets and preparing for the final bonus drawing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the broad rule-making powers delegated to the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance under Tax Law § 1305 to operate the state lottery. Judicial review of the Tax Commission’s actions is limited to determining whether a rational basis exists for the agency’s decision. The court found that the 18-day registration period was rationally related to the need to process tickets, prevent fraud, transport tickets, and prepare for the drawing. The court cited the affidavit of Deputy Assistant Attorney-General Kantor stating: “The three day period between the close of registration and the date of the final bonus drawing is necessary to assure that tickets which have been submitted are properly processed in preparation for the final bonus drawing.” The court noted that newspaper publication was a reasonable method of conveying information about drawing dates and registration periods, given the bearer nature of the lottery tickets. The Court explicitly stated that because a rational basis existed for the agency’s action, lower courts erred in substituting their judgment for that of the Tax Commission. The court found the regulations were not arbitrary and capricious. The Court emphasized judicial restraint in reviewing administrative actions, stating the agency’s determination should not be upset if a rational basis exists.

  • Lake George Steamboat Co. v. Blais, 30 N.Y.2d 48 (1972): Public Use Doctrine and Municipal Leases

    Lake George Steamboat Co. v. Blais, 30 N.Y.2d 48 (1972)

    A municipality cannot lease property acquired for public use to a private entity for private profit without specific legislative sanction.

    Summary

    Lake George Steamboat Co. challenged the Village of Lake George’s lease of a dock to Lake George Marine Industries, Inc., arguing it was an improper diversion of public land for private use. The land was granted to the Village by the State with restrictions for public park and dock facilities. Marine Industries operated sightseeing boats from the dock. The New York Court of Appeals held that the lease was invalid because it diverted public property to private use without explicit legislative approval. The court emphasized that municipalities must obtain clear legislative sanction before leasing property held in public trust for private profit, safeguarding against potential abuses.

    Facts

    The Village of Lake George received land grants from New York State. These grants restricted the land’s use to public park purposes and dock facilities for the benefit of the Village. The Village leased a portion of the dock to Lake George Marine Industries, Inc., a private corporation, for operating sightseeing boat tours. The lease allowed Marine Industries to use the dock for its commercial purposes, generating private profit.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners initiated an Article 78 proceeding to prevent the Village and Marine Industries from complying with the lease. Special Term nullified the lease, prohibiting the Village from leasing the dock. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the lease. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the Special Term’s order, invalidating the lease.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Village of Lake George could lease land, granted to it by New York State for public use, to a private corporation for commercial purposes without specific legislative sanction.

    Holding

    No, because a municipality cannot divert property held for public use to exclusively private purposes without clear legislative authorization.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the land was explicitly granted to the Village for public use, including public park and dock facilities. The lease to Marine Industries, a private corporation profiting from sightseeing tours, constituted a diversion of this public trust to a private purpose. The court emphasized that municipalities lack the inherent power to unilaterally convert public property to private use; such power is derivative from the legislature. “Sound public policy forbids that there should be any power to divert a part thereof to a private use, for, once such power being assumed, the dangers which may follow either from favoritism or ill-judgment may speedily hamper or practically destroy the fundamental purpose of the public use.” Absent explicit legislative authorization, the lease was deemed invalid. The dissent argued that a public purpose was served by the lease (providing a public benefit through private enterprise), but the majority insisted on a stricter standard of public use, requiring explicit legislative approval for any private commercial activity on land held in public trust.

  • Village of Solvay v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 23 N.Y.2d 405 (1968): Determining Proper Forum to Challenge Rate-Making Decisions

    Village of Solvay v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 23 N.Y.2d 405 (1968)

    An Article 78 proceeding is not the proper mechanism to review a rate-making decision of a public authority when the governing statute does not require notice or a hearing; however, such a proceeding can be converted to a declaratory judgment action, allowing judicial review of the rate increase for arbitrariness, discrimination, or violation of statutory standards.

    Summary

    The Village of Solvay and Lakeland Water District challenged a 64% water rate increase imposed by the Onondaga County Water Authority, arguing it was excessive. They initiated Article 78 proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that because the Public Authorities Law doesn’t provide for notice or a hearing regarding rate changes, an Article 78 proceeding was inappropriate. However, the Court also held that the proceeding should be converted to a declaratory judgment action, allowing the petitioners to challenge the rate increase on grounds such as arbitrariness or discrimination and allowing discovery.

    Facts

    The Onondaga County Water Authority, a public benefit corporation, raised water rates for the Village of Solvay and Lakeland Water District by 64% in August 1966. The Village and the Water District considered the increase excessive and arbitrary.

    Procedural History

    The Village and Water District filed Article 78 proceedings in the Supreme Court to challenge the rate increase. Special Term granted their motions for examination of the Water Authority’s officers and records, and for a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, but concluded that an Article 78 proceeding was not the correct procedure, holding that the court was authorized to treat the proceeding as an action for a declaratory judgment under CPLR 103(c). The Water Authority appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is the proper method to challenge the water rate increase imposed by the Onondaga County Water Authority.
    2. Whether, if an Article 78 proceeding is inappropriate, the court can convert the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action under CPLR 103(c).

    Holding

    1. No, because the Public Authorities Law does not provide for notice or a hearing in rate-making decisions, making the Authority’s action a legislative act not subject to Article 78 review.
    2. Yes, because CPLR 103(c) allows a court to convert an improperly brought civil judicial proceeding to the proper form if the court has jurisdiction over the parties, and a declaratory judgment action is a proper procedure to review a quasi-legislative act of an administrative agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Article 78 proceedings are generally not used to review legislative actions, and an administrative agency’s order fixing rates is considered a legislative act if no notice or hearing is required. Here, the Public Authorities Law expressly states that the Public Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the Water Authority’s rate-making decisions. Therefore, without a quasi-judicial proceeding for review, the rate increase is a legislative act not subject to Article 78. The court stated, “Neither the public service commission nor any other board or commission of like character, shall have jurisdiction over the authority in the management and control of its properties or operations or any power over the regulation of rates fixed or charges collected by the authority” (§ 1153, subd. 6).

    However, the Court emphasized that the petitioners were not without recourse. They could challenge the rate increase on grounds that the Authority acted beyond its authority, disregarded statutory standards, violated due process, or acted in a discriminatory manner.

    Addressing the conversion to a declaratory judgment action, the Court cited CPLR 103(c), which states that a civil judicial proceeding should not be dismissed solely because it was not brought in the proper form. Since the Supreme Court had jurisdiction and the proceeding was civil and judicial, it could be converted. The Court noted that a declaratory judgment action is a ‘proper procedure’ to review a quasi-legislative act. The Court found that the petitioners’ allegations that the rate increase was ‘excessive, arbitrary and capricious’ were sufficient to support a cause of action for declaratory judgment. Further, the court authorized discovery, stating that state agencies must provide disclosure as if they were a private person. However, the court found ordering a hearing before the Water Authority answered the complaint was premature.

  • Castaways Motel v. Schuyler, 24 N.Y.2d 120 (1969): Determining When a Government Decision is Final for Statute of Limitations Purposes

    Castaways Motel v. Schuyler, 24 N.Y.2d 120 (1969)

    For purposes of triggering the statute of limitations in an Article 78 proceeding, a government determination is not considered final and binding until the agency makes it explicitly clear that a particular requirement is a prerequisite for approval.

    Summary

    Castaways Motel applied for a land grant under the Niagara River. The New York State Power Authority conditioned its approval on Castaways signing a release of future claims. Castaways challenged this condition, arguing it was unlawful. The court addressed whether the Power Authority was a necessary party and whether the proceeding was timely commenced. The Court of Appeals held that the Power Authority was not a necessary party and that the proceeding was timely because the agency’s demand for a release was not initially presented as a non-negotiable condition. The Court emphasized that ambiguous communications from a public body should be construed against it to allow cases to be heard on their merits.

    Facts

    Castaways, a motel operator, sought a land grant under the Niagara River to benefit from a neighboring yacht club’s breakwall project. The New York State Power Authority’s approval was required for the grant. The Authority initially indicated that the project would not interfere with its projects but then required Castaways to sign a covenant releasing the state and the Authority from any future claims. This condition was not initially disclosed, and Castaways only learned of it later in the application process. Castaways had already spent $50,000 on the project by this time.

    Procedural History

    Castaways filed an Article 78 proceeding to compel the Commissioner of General Services (Schuyler) to issue the land grant without the release condition. The Special Term dismissed the petition as untimely. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the condition was unlawful but holding that the Power Authority was a necessary party that could no longer be joined due to the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Power Authority was a necessary party to the Article 78 proceeding.

    2. Whether the Article 78 proceeding was timely commenced under CPLR 217.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Power Authority’s interest was not inequitably affected since it had no valid basis to withhold consent after determining the project would not interfere with its operations.

    2. Yes, because the agency did not clearly communicate that signing the release was a non-negotiable condition until the second letter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Power Authority was not a necessary party because its rights would not be adversely affected by a determination in favor of Castaways. The court highlighted the policy of limiting indispensable parties to cases where a court’s determination will adversely affect the rights of non-parties. Given the Authority’s initial determination of non-interference, requiring it to consent to the grant without the release would not inequitably affect its interests.

    Regarding timeliness, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the second letter, where it was explicitly stated that signing the release was a prerequisite for the grant. The court emphasized that the initial letter was ambiguous and spoke of the “covenant requested” rather than required. The court noted the legislative history of CPLR 217, which rejected a provision that would have triggered the statute of limitations upon an “implied” refusal, to avoid unfairness. The court stated: “In drafting the section which is now the law, every attempt was made to avoid putting a party or his counsel in a position of having to guess when a ‘final and binding’ determination had been made. The burden was put on the public body to make it clear what was or what was not its determination.” The court concluded that any ambiguity created by the public body should be resolved against it to allow a determination on the merits.

  • State Commission for Human Rights v. Lieber, 23 N.Y.2d 253 (1968): Appealability of Orders in Special Proceedings

    23 N.Y.2d 253 (1968)

    An order in a special proceeding brought by the State Commission for Human Rights to enforce its order is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division, as it is treated as an appeal from a judgment in a special proceeding.

    Summary

    The State Commission for Human Rights appealed the dismissal of its appeal concerning an order denying its application to enforce its order against Sary Lieber. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, deeming the Special Term’s order an unappealable intermediate order. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the order was appealable as of right because the proceeding was not an Article 78 proceeding but a special proceeding to enforce the Commission’s order under Section 298 of the Executive Law. This distinction meant CPLR 5701(a)(1) applied, allowing an appeal as of right in a special proceeding.

    Facts

    The State Commission for Human Rights sought to enforce an order against Sary Lieber. The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the Commission’s application and vacated the Commission’s order, remitting the matter for a new hearing with proper notice. The Commission appealed this decision to the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the Commission’s application to enforce its order. The Appellate Division dismissed the Commission’s appeal, holding that the order of the Special Term was an intermediate order and not appealable as of right. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an order of the Supreme Court, Special Term, denying the State Commission for Human Rights’ application to enforce its order, vacating the Commission’s order, and remitting the matter for a new hearing, is appealable as of right to the Appellate Division.

    Holding

    Yes, because the proceeding was instituted by the Commission to enforce its order pursuant to Section 298 of the Executive Law, making it a special proceeding rather than an Article 78 proceeding. As such, it falls under the purview of CPLR 5701(a)(1), which allows appeals as of right in special proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from those involving Article 78 proceedings, where intermediate orders are not appealable as of right under CPLR 5701(b)(1). The court emphasized that this proceeding was initiated by the Commission to enforce its order under Section 298 of the Executive Law, which at the time, provided that Supreme Court determinations should be treated as appeals from a judgment in a special proceeding. CPLR 5701(a)(1) allows appeals as of right from any final or interlocutory judgment in an “action” originating in the Supreme Court. CPLR 105(b) defines “action” to include a special proceeding. The court reasoned that since this was not an Article 78 proceeding, the general language of 5701(a)(1) applied, making the order appealable as of right. The court stated, “At the time this proceeding was instituted, section 298 provided that the Supreme Court would have exclusive jurisdiction in such proceedings, and review from their determinations should be treated in the same manner as any appeal from a judgment in a special proceeding.” Thus, the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for a consideration of the merits, clarifying that the appeal should have been heard on its merits rather than dismissed on procedural grounds.

  • Donohue v. New York State Police, 19 N.Y.2d 395 (1967): Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Government Acts

    Donohue v. New York State Police, 19 N.Y.2d 395 (1967)

    A citizen-taxpayer lacks standing to challenge the validity of governmental acts (legislative or executive) unless they demonstrate a personal injury suffered as a result of those acts, distinct from the injury suffered by the public at large.

    Summary

    Donohue, a state trooper, brought an Article 78 proceeding challenging the constitutionality of a promotional examination for Sergeant of the State Police. Although he initially passed the exam, he was later dismissed from the force for insubordination. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Donohue lacked standing to maintain the proceeding. The Court emphasized that a citizen-taxpayer cannot challenge governmental actions without demonstrating a specific, personal injury distinct from the general public, reaffirming the principle that courts should not provide judicial interpretations of legislative or executive actions absent a concrete controversy affecting individual rights.

    Facts

    Donohue, a member of the New York State Police, took and passed a promotional examination for Sergeant.
    Subsequently, charges of insubordination were brought against him, and he was dismissed from the State Police.
    Prior to his dismissal, he initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the constitutionality of the promotional examination he had passed, as well as the Department Rules and Regulations under which the examination was held.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially dismissed the original application.
    After Donohue passed the exam, Special Term set aside Article 10 and the Sergeant examination, as well as a Lieutenant examination.
    The Appellate Division sustained the order annulling the Sergeant examination but declined to rule on the Lieutenant examination.
    The Court of Appeals granted cross-appeals and considered the issue of Donohue’s standing to bring the Article 78 proceeding.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a citizen-taxpayer has standing to challenge the validity of an executive act (such as a promotional examination by the State Police) without demonstrating a personal injury distinct from that suffered by the general public.

    Holding

    No, because a citizen-taxpayer must demonstrate a personal injury suffered as a result of the challenged governmental act to have standing; absent such injury, the courts will not intervene to provide judicial interpretations of legislative or executive actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in previous cases, including St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, that a citizen-taxpayer lacks standing to challenge governmental acts without showing a specific, personal injury. The court emphasized that Donohue’s passing of the examination initially, and subsequent dismissal for insubordination, demonstrated no personal injury stemming from the examination itself. The Court reasoned that allowing citizen-taxpayers to challenge governmental acts without demonstrating personal injury would improperly involve the judiciary in reviewing actions of the executive or legislative branches absent a concrete controversy affecting individual rights. The Court quoted Schieffelin v. Komfort, stating that the judicial branch does not have “general authority at the suit of a citizen as such to sit in review of the acts of other branches of government,” but may only act “when a controversy arises between litigants.” The Court distinguished the case from situations where the issue, though moot for the individual, affects the entire state or involves transactions likely to arise frequently, justifying judicial intervention. Because Donohue demonstrated no personal injury and the case did not fall within the exception for issues affecting the entire state, the Court reversed the Appellate Division and directed dismissal of the petition.