New York Law Review

Tag: Arrington v. New York Times Co.

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Newsworthiness Exception to Privacy Rights

    55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    The use of a person’s photograph in connection with a newsworthy article or matter of public interest does not constitute use for trade or advertising purposes under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, even if the publication seeks to increase circulation and profits, unless the photograph lacks a real relationship to the article or the article is an advertisement in disguise.

    Summary

    A professional model sued New York Magazine for using his photo in its “Best Bets” column without his consent, claiming violation of his statutory right to privacy and common-law right of publicity. The magazine featured the model wearing a bomber jacket, noting its price and availability at certain stores. The Court of Appeals held that the magazine’s use of the model’s photo fell under the “newsworthiness exception” to the Civil Rights Law because the article concerned a matter of public interest—fashion—and was not an advertisement in disguise. The Court clarified that in New York, the right of publicity is encompassed within the statutory right to privacy, thus no separate common law claim exists.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, a professional model, agreed to model for a fall fashion article in New York Magazine. One photo from the session was used in the magazine’s “Best Bets” column, featuring a bomber jacket, its price (approximately $225), and where it could be purchased (Barney’s, Bergdorf Goodman, Bloomingdale’s). Plaintiff contended that he only agreed to model for the September 7 fall fashion article and did not consent to the August 31 “Best Bets” column use.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, New York Magazine. The Appellate Division reversed, finding factual questions regarding whether the photograph was used for trade purposes and whether the article was an advertisement in disguise. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s picture for trade or advertising purposes within the meaning of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 when it published his picture in the “Best Bets” column without his consent?
    2. Whether New York recognizes a common-law right of publicity independent of the statutory right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51?

    Holding

    1. No, because the article was a newsworthy item of public interest and was not an advertisement in disguise.
    2. No, because in New York, the right of publicity is encompassed within the statutory right to privacy under the Civil Rights Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that New York’s statutory right to privacy, as codified in Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, exclusively governs privacy rights in the state. The Court acknowledged the historical context originating from Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., leading to the enactment of the statute to protect individuals from unauthorized commercial exploitation of their likeness. While the statute applies broadly to any unauthorized use of a person’s image for trade or advertising, it contains an exception for newsworthy events or matters of public interest, reflecting constitutional concerns for freedom of the press. This “newsworthiness exception” extends to consumer interest articles, including fashion news. The Court stated, “[A] ‘picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.’” The Court found the bomber jacket article to be a newsworthy item, even though the photograph was posed, because the public interest lay in the availability of the clothing item itself. The fact that the magazine sought to increase circulation and profits was not determinative. The plaintiff’s claim that the article was an advertisement in disguise, based on the inclusion of price and store information and the fact that those stores had previously advertised in the magazine, was deemed speculative and insufficient to overcome summary judgment. The Court also rejected the notion of a separate common-law right of publicity in New York, holding that the statute encompasses such rights.

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits of Privacy Claims Absent Statutory Violation

    55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    In New York, a cause of action for invasion of privacy is strictly limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, precluding common-law claims for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sued over portrayals in books and a movie, claiming invasion of privacy and defamation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that New York does not recognize a common-law right to privacy beyond the statutory protections in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibit the use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes without consent. Since the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures were not used, no cause of action existed under the statute. The defamation claims were not addressed in this motion to dismiss and remained for later consideration.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, for commercial gain, portrayed them with detailed accuracy in books and a movie represented as true stories. They asserted that the portrayals were so accurate regarding their physical characteristics and activities that they were effectively identified, leading to an invasion of their privacy.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought suit alleging invasion of privacy and defamation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion regarding the invasion of privacy claim, but the appellate division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s order dismissing the invasion of privacy claim, while the defamation claims were not part of this appeal and remained for future proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State recognizes a common-law right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity, beyond the protections afforded by Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy is limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, and does not extend to common-law claims based on unreasonable publicity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy failed because Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law exclusively govern such claims in New York. These sections prohibit using a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for commercial purposes without consent. Since the defendants did not use the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures in the books or movie, there was no violation of the statute. The court explicitly stated, “whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with respect to the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in consequence of unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has been no recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.” The court reinforced the idea that any expansion of privacy rights in New York must come from the legislature, not the courts. The court distinguished this case from defamation claims, which were not addressed by the motion to dismiss and remained open for future litigation. This underscores the court’s strict interpretation of the statutory limits on privacy claims, leaving potential plaintiffs with limited recourse in situations where their likeness or identity is not directly exploited.