New York Law Review

Tag: arrears

  • Dox v. Tynon, 90 N.Y.2d 166 (1997): Child Support Arrears Cannot Be Waived by Inaction

    Dox v. Tynon, 90 N.Y.2d 166 (1997)

    Under New York law, a custodial parent’s inaction in demanding or enforcing child support payments does not constitute a waiver of their right to collect child support arrears, as retroactive modification of child support arrears is prohibited.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a custodial parent can waive their right to child support arrears simply by not demanding payment or seeking enforcement for an extended period. The New York Court of Appeals held that such inaction does not constitute a waiver. The court emphasized that statutory amendments have increasingly restricted judicial power to modify accumulated child support arrears, placing the burden on the paying spouse to seek a reduction in support obligations proactively. The decision reinforces the state’s policy of ensuring that children receive the financial support ordered by the court.

    Facts

    Judy Dox and Timothy Tynon divorced in 1983, with Tynon ordered to pay $25 per week per child in support. After a few months, Tynon stopped making payments in October 1983. For the next 11 years, Dox did not request payment or attempt to enforce the support order. In November 1994, Dox sought a judgment for $28,875 in arrears and an upward modification of support. Tynon argued that Dox had waived her right to support in exchange for his agreement not to interfere in her life or seek visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court rejected Tynon’s waiver argument and directed him to pay the arrears and increased support for the younger child. The Appellate Division modified, finding that Dox had waived her right to collect arrears due to her delay in seeking payment and her financial ability to support the children. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a custodial parent’s failure to demand or seek enforcement of child support payments for 11 years constitutes an implied waiver of their right to collect the accumulated child support arrears, given the statutory framework governing modification and enforcement of child support obligations.

    Holding

    No, because the statutory framework in New York prohibits retroactive modification of child support arrears, and allowing such an implied waiver would undermine the legislative intent to guarantee full payment of court-ordered child support.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory history of child support enforcement in New York. Prior to 1980, courts had discretion to reduce or cancel arrears. However, amendments from 1980 to 1987 shifted the burden to the obligated spouse to seek prospective relief from support requirements before default. The Support Enforcement Act of 1986 created a special category for child support arrears, barring any reduction or cancellation, regardless of whether the defaulter had good cause for failing to seek modification prior to their accumulation.

    The court emphasized that the legislative intent was to preclude “‘forgiveness’ of child support arrears to ensure that respondents are not financially rewarded for failing either to pay the order or to seek its modification.” (Governor’s Mem Approving L 1986, ch 892, 1986 NY Legis Ann, at 361). The court distinguished between express and implied waiver, noting that there was no finding of an express agreement altering support obligations. Each missed payment constituted a default, and the subsequent silence and inaction did not retroactively forgive those defaults. To allow implied waiver would be “tantamount to placing the burden back on child support recipients to initiate enforcement proceedings” which would defeat the legislative intent.

    The Court noted that while a Statute of Limitations typically circumscribes a recipient’s ability to delay enforcement, Tynon failed to assert this defense before the Family Court. The court concluded, “If a party obligated to pay child support wishes to avoid making payment, such as where his or her financial circumstances have deteriorated, that party must make an affirmative request for relief’ (Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law § 244, at 752).

  • McNulty v. McNulty, 61 N.Y.2d 921 (1984): Arbitrability of Support Modification Disputes

    McNulty v. McNulty, 61 N.Y.2d 921 (1984)

    When a separation agreement contains a clear and unequivocal arbitration clause covering support modification, the arbitrator, not the court, determines whether a specific dispute, including one involving arrears, falls within the scope of that clause.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a dispute over arrears in support payments, which accumulated before arbitration was invoked, should be decided by the courts or by an arbitrator. The Court of Appeals held that because the arbitration clause in the separation agreement expressly covered support modification, the arbitrator should decide whether the specific dispute, including the arrears, was a proper subject for arbitration. The Court also determined that by filing a cross-motion to compel arbitration, the defendant effectively commenced arbitration proceedings.

    Facts

    The parties, formerly married, had a separation agreement containing an arbitration clause. This clause expressly covered the issue of downward support modification. A dispute arose regarding arrears in support payments. The defendant (presumably the payor) filed a cross-motion to compel arbitration of the dispute. The plaintiff (presumably the payee) argued that the arrears were a sum certain under Domestic Relations Law § 244 and therefore not subject to arbitration.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator, not the courts, should determine the arbitrability of the arrears dispute given the broad arbitration clause in the separation agreement.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a dispute over arrears in support payments, accumulated before the invocation of an arbitration clause in a separation agreement, is a proper subject for arbitration when the agreement’s arbitration clause expressly covers support modification.
    2. Whether the use of the phrase “either party may submit such dispute to arbitration” limits the aggrieved party to a choice between arbitration and abandonment of the claim.
    3. Whether filing a cross-motion to compel arbitration constitutes effectively commencing arbitration proceedings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the arbitration clause in the parties’ separation agreement expressly, directly, and unequivocally covered the issue of downward support modification.
    2. Yes, because the phrase should be interpreted to limit the aggrieved party to a choice between arbitration and abandonment of the claim.
    3. Yes, because in view of the arbitrability of this dispute, the defendant effectively commenced arbitration with his cross motion to compel arbitration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the arbitration clause in the separation agreement was broad enough to cover the dispute over support modification, including the arrears. The Court relied on Bowmer v Bowmer, 50 NY2d 288, 293, and Gangel v DeGroot, 41 NY2d 840, 841. Because the arbitration clause was sufficiently broad, the question of whether the specific dispute was arbitrable was for the arbitrator to decide, citing Stillman v Stillman, 80 AD2d 356, 359, affd on opn below 55 NY2d 653.

    The Court further addressed the arrears issue, stating that once it is decided that arrears may be covered by the arbitration clause, the arbitrator is empowered to consider arrears even though they accumulated before the arbitration clause was invoked. Although the plaintiff argued that Domestic Relations Law § 244 made these arrears a sum certain impervious to challenge, the Court noted that even under § 244, the defendant is allowed to show that his failure to seek relief earlier was motivated by “good cause.” The Court held that the defendant should be allowed to make such a showing before the arbitrator.

    The Court also held that the defendant’s cross-motion to compel arbitration effectively commenced arbitration proceedings under CPLR 7503(a).

    The case emphasizes the strong policy in favor of arbitration, particularly when the arbitration clause is broad. It also highlights the principle that procedural issues, such as whether a party has “good cause” for delaying a challenge to support obligations, are generally for the arbitrator to decide once arbitrability is established.