New York Law Review

Tag: Architectural Malpractice

  • R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 538 (2004): Statute of Limitations for Architectural Malpractice Claims

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 538 (2004)

    When a claim against an architect arises from their failure to exercise due care in performing professional services, the claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice, regardless of whether the claim is framed as a breach of contract based on an express contractual provision mirroring the architect’s professional obligations.

    Summary

    McKinsey & Company hired R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (K&H) for office design. After the project’s completion, McKinsey alleged K&H failed to comply with fire protection requirements mandated by the Connecticut Building Code, breaching an express contractual clause. McKinsey demanded arbitration more than three years after project completion. K&H sought a stay, arguing the three-year malpractice statute of limitations barred the claim. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the claim fundamentally alleged professional negligence, the three-year statute applied, even with an express contract term mirroring professional obligations, thus barring the claim.

    Facts

    In January 1998, McKinsey & Company, Inc. contracted with R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (K&H) for architectural and interior design services. A clause in the contract required K&H to ensure all plans complied with applicable building codes. The Stamford Building Department issued a certificate of occupancy in November 1998. In April 2002, McKinsey claimed K&H failed to provide code-compliant fire protection, necessitating McKinsey to incur costs to remedy the defect. McKinsey then sought arbitration.

    Procedural History

    K&H initiated a special proceeding to stay arbitration, arguing the claim was time-barred under the three-year malpractice statute of limitations. The Supreme Court denied the petition, characterizing the claim as a breach of contract and subject to a six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the claim was subject to the three-year malpractice statute of limitations, irrespective of being framed as a contract breach. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claim against an architect for failing to comply with building codes, based on an express contractual provision requiring such compliance, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice, or the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract.

    Holding

    No, because the essence of the claim is that the architect failed to perform services in a professional, non-negligent manner, which falls under the definition of malpractice, and is therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations regardless of whether the claim is based on an express contractual provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPLR 214(6) was amended to ensure that malpractice claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, irrespective of whether the underlying theory is contract or tort. The legislative intent was to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the malpractice statute by framing malpractice claims as contract breaches. The Court noted that while McKinsey argued the case differed due to an express contractual provision, compliance with building codes is inherent in an architect’s professional obligations. The Court reasoned that “Making such ordinary obligations express terms of an agreement does not remove the issue from the realm of negligence…nor can it convert a malpractice action into a breach of contract action.” Allowing the claim would undermine the legislative purpose of the amendment to CPLR 214(6). The pertinent inquiry is whether the claim is essentially a malpractice claim. Because K&H did not guarantee a particular result beyond its professional obligations, the claim remained a malpractice action and was time-barred. As the court stated, “where the underlying complaint is one which essentially claims that there was a failure to utilize reasonable care or where acts of omission or negligence are alleged or claimed, the statute of limitations shall be three years if the case comes within the purview of CPLR Section 214 (6), regardless of whether the theory is based in tort or in a breach of contract”.

  • R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, 473 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1984): Necessity of Expert Testimony in Architectural Malpractice

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, 473 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1984)

    In architectural malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether the architect deviated from that standard, unless the alleged malpractice falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate.

    Summary

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects sued McKinsey & Company for architectural malpractice, alleging unreasonable delays in responding to building department objections. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish architectural malpractice in this case because the alleged negligence involved delays in responding to objections rather than defective plans, which is outside the competence of a lay jury. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was insufficient to establish proximate cause between the delays and the project’s failure.

    Facts

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (plaintiff) sued McKinsey & Company (defendant) alleging architectural malpractice. The claim was based on protracted delays in responding to objections raised by the New York City Department of Buildings, rather than the submission of defective architectural plans. The plaintiff contended that these delays led to the failure of the construction project.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the case at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether expert testimony is required to establish architectural malpractice when the alleged negligence involves protracted delays in responding to building department objections.
    2. Whether the expert testimony presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish proximate cause between the alleged delays and the failure of the construction project.
    3. Whether the defendant guaranteed the plaintiff that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because whether the delays in complying with the building department’s objections constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate.
    2. No, because the expert’s testimony was too vague and did not establish that the delays proximately caused the project’s failure.
    3. No, because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that expert testimony is required to support allegations of malpractice, except where the alleged act falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate. The court distinguished this case from those involving defective plans, noting that evaluating the reasonableness of delays in responding to building department objections requires specialized knowledge outside the common experience of jurors. The court stated, “Whether the allegedly inordinate delays of defendants in complying with objections of the building department constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate. Common experience and observation offer little guidance.”

    Regarding the sufficiency of the expert testimony, the court found that the expert’s opinion was too vague to establish proximate cause. The expert stated that there had been “an unusually long delay” between some or many of the objections and the responses. The court found that this left it to conjecture whether those unduly delayed responses in particular proximately caused the failure of the construction project. The court emphasized that the expert testimony did not imply that a competent architect would have timely complied with all the building department objections. The court stated that “the fact finder may not render a factual determination devoid of support. We do not believe that the expert testimony in this case is sufficient to enable the jury to infer reasonably that defendants’ undue delays proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”

    The court also found that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the department of buildings.