New York Law Review

Tag: Arbitrator’s Power

  • Matter of Silverman (Benmor Coats) and Norris v. Cooper, 57 N.Y.2d 298 (1982): Enforceability of Arbitration Awards and Limitations on Arbitrator Power

    Matter of Silverman (Benmor Coats) and Norris v. Cooper, 57 N.Y.2d 298 (1982)

    An arbitration award can only be vacated when the arbitrator exceeds their power as explicitly defined in the arbitration clause itself, and the challenging party has preserved the objection.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the scope of an arbitrator’s power and the circumstances under which a court can vacate an arbitration award. The Court of Appeals held that a party participating in arbitration waives the right to challenge the award as exceeding the arbitrator’s power unless the limitation is explicitly stated in the arbitration clause or fairly implied and the party raises the issue before the lower court. The court emphasizes a strong policy favoring arbitration finality, limiting judicial review of arbitration awards to instances where the arbitrator’s power is clearly circumscribed by the arbitration agreement itself.

    Facts

    Matter of Silverman (Benmor Coats): Silverman’s estate sought arbitration against Benmor Coats for failing to make payments on a subordinated loan as per a settlement agreement. The agreement contained an arbitration clause for disputes regarding payment obligations, subject to creditor consent. The arbitrator ordered principal payments without explicitly addressing creditor consent.

    Norris v. Cooper: Norris, a former distributor, sought arbitration against Cooper for breach of contract regarding profit-sharing from a distributorship. The agreement stipulated that the company accountants’ determination of after-tax profits was final. The arbitrator awarded Norris $750,000 for “disposition of assets,” a decision Cooper challenged as exceeding the arbitrator’s power since it should have been determined by the accountants.

    Procedural History

    Matter of Silverman (Benmor Coats): The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Benmor Coats appealed, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his power by ordering repayments without creditor consent.

    Norris v. Cooper: The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Cooper appealed, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his power by awarding damages related to asset disposition, which should have been determined by the accountants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a party waives its right to challenge an arbitration award as exceeding the arbitrator’s power by participating in the arbitration without seeking a stay.

    2. Whether an arbitrator exceeds their power by making an award that allegedly violates a limitation not explicitly stated in the arbitration clause (Silverman) or by intruding into an area designated to be determined by accountants (Norris).

    3. Whether, in the case of Silverman, the creditors were necessary parties to the confirmation proceeding.

    Holding

    1. No, because participating in the arbitration does not waive the right to challenge the award if the challenge is based on the arbitrator exceeding their power as defined in the arbitration clause.

    2. No in Silverman, because the arbitration clause was broad and lacked explicit limitations. No in Norris, the appellant waived the right to appeal on the specific grounds alleged.

    3. No, because the award does not inequitably affect the creditors, and they retain their rights under the subordination agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPLR Article 75 reflects the legislature’s intent that arbitration be a final and binding process. Judicial review is strictly limited. “The only basis upon which an award can be vacated at the behest of a party who participated in the arbitration…is that the rights of that party were prejudiced by…that the arbitrator exceeded his power”.

    Any limitations on the arbitrator’s power must be expressly included in the arbitration clause. “To exclude a substantive issue from arbitration, therefore, generally requires specific enumeration in the arbitration clause itself of the subjects intended to be put beyond the arbitrator’s reach.” Absent such explicit limitations, arbitrators are not bound by substantive law or rules of evidence and can “do justice as he sees it”.

    While a party generally waives a challenge to the arbitrator’s power by not seeking a stay of arbitration, this does not preclude a post-arbitration challenge if the party asserts the limitation in opposition to confirmation or as the basis for vacating the award. However, the specific argument supporting the challenge must be raised before the lower court to be considered on appeal.

    In Silverman, the arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the dispute, and there was no express limitation on the arbitrator’s power. Further, the creditors were not necessary parties because the award did not bind them or inequitably affect their rights.

    In Norris, the arbitration clause contained an exception for matters determined by the accountants. While Cooper could challenge the arbitrator’s intrusion into that area, he waived the specific argument that the accountants had implicitly determined the $3,000,000 payment was not profit by failing to include the $3,000,000 payment as profits in its financial statement for the period. By not raising this argument below, Norris had no opportunity to rebut it.

  • Matter of Felix v. New York City Transit Authority, 61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984): Public Officer’s Law and Arbitrator’s Power

    61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984)

    An arbitrator’s award in a disciplinary proceeding should be confirmed unless the arbitrator exceeded their powers; a guilty plea to a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, as opposed to a ‘crime,’ does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether an arbitrator exceeded their power by not ordering the dismissal of a New York City Transit Authority employee who pled guilty to disorderly conduct after being charged with official misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator did not exceed their power because a plea to disorderly conduct, a violation under the Penal Law, does not constitute a conviction of a crime involving a violation of oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30, which would mandate forfeiture of public office. The court emphasized the distinction between a ‘violation’ and a ‘crime’ as defined in the Penal Law.

    Facts

    A New York City Transit Authority employee (petitioner) was found guilty by an arbitrator of releasing an impounded car without authority and filing a false report, among other charges. The petitioner was initially indicted on a charge of official misconduct (Penal Law § 195.00) but pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). Considering the petitioner’s prior good record, the arbitrator imposed a penalty of suspension without pay, resulting in a loss of salary and holiday pay.

    Procedural History

    Special Term held that the arbitrator did not exceed their powers by not ordering the employee’s discharge. The Appellate Division agreed with Special Term’s decision. The City appealed, arguing that the employee forfeited their office under Public Officers Law § 30 due to the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitrator exceeded their powers by failing to order the petitioner’s discharge, given that the petitioner pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct after being indicted on a charge of official misconduct, and whether this plea triggered the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Holding

    No, because disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, not a ‘crime,’ and therefore does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30, which requires a conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of the oath of office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of Public Officers Law § 30 (subd 1, par e), which states that a public office becomes vacant upon a public officer’s conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of their oath of office. The court emphasized that the definition of a ‘crime’ is determined by the Penal Law. According to Penal Law § 10.00, a ‘crime’ is defined as a misdemeanor or a felony, explicitly distinguishing it from a ‘violation.’ Since disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under Penal Law § 240.20, it does not qualify as a ‘crime’ under Public Officers Law § 30.

    The court further reasoned that even though the petitioner was initially accused of acts violating their oath of office, they were only convicted of disorderly conduct. None of the acts falling within the definition of disorderly conduct are directly connected to a violation of the oath of office. The court acknowledged the practice of plea bargaining but reiterated that the forfeiture provision of Public Officers Law § 30 is triggered only by a ‘conviction’ of a crime, not a mere accusation or a plea to a violation. The court stated, “what triggers the forfeiture provision of section 30 is only a ‘conviction’. Though a guilty plea is a ‘conviction’ under that section, petitioner’s plea was to a violation rather than to a crime.”