New York Law Review

Tag: Arbegast v. Board of Education

  • Arbegast v. Board of Education of the South Colonie Central School District, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985): Spectator Injury and Assumption of Risk at Sporting Events

    Arbegast v. Board of Education of the South Colonie Central School District, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985)

    A spectator at a sporting event assumes the risks inherent in that sport, and a proprietor’s duty extends only to providing adequately protective screening for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire it, but this duty does not extend to those who voluntarily stand in unprotected areas.

    Summary

    A nine-year-old boy was injured by a hockey puck while standing in an unprotected area of a hockey rink. The plaintiff sued, alleging negligence in the rink’s design and lack of protective screening. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the rink owner breached a duty of care because the injured party voluntarily stood in an unprotected area. The court distinguished this case from cases involving baseball, emphasizing that the plaintiff offered no evidence of how the practical realities of baseball and hockey differ, so as to require protective screening around the entire rink. Moreover, the court reasoned that the injury was not a direct result of the bleacher’s placement, since the plaintiff was standing, not sitting, when injured.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s nine-year-old son was struck in the face by a hockey puck while watching a hockey game at the defendant’s rink. The rink had three and a half foot high dasher boards, with three-foot plexiglass sections above the boards behind the goals, extending to the blue lines. The sides of the rink between the blue lines had no plexiglass. Movable bleachers were on one side, and the plaintiff’s son was standing in front of the bleachers, next to a section of dasher boards without plexiglass above it.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the proprietor of a hockey rink has a duty to provide protective screening around the entire rink.
    2. Whether the defendant’s alleged negligence in the placement of bleachers was the direct cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff’s son.

    Holding

    1. The court did not decide whether a duty exists to provide protective screening around the entire rink because the plaintiff failed to present evidence distinguishing the realities of hockey from baseball, as established in previous case law.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s son was standing in an unprotected area, and not sitting in the bleachers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., which concerned baseball, but noted that the plaintiff provided no evidence demonstrating different safety requirements between baseball and hockey. The court stated, “plaintiff offered no evidence of how the practical realities of the sports of baseball and hockey differ and thus has failed to establish that the duty we defined in Akins is inapplicable.”

    Even assuming the defendant breached its duty to provide sufficient protected seating, the court found that the defendant’s negligence wasn’t a direct cause of the injury. The court reasoned that because the plaintiff’s son was standing, not sitting, the bleachers’ placement was irrelevant. The court observed, “Having made the decision to stand in an unprotected area, plaintiff’s son may not now be heard to complain that defendant’s seating arrangements were negligent when he has not asserted that there was no room to stand along the protected section of the dasher boards or that he was prevented from doing so.” The court emphasized that spectators assume certain risks inherent in attending sporting events and the proprietor’s duty is limited to providing sufficient protected seating for those who desire it.

  • Arbegast v. Board of Education of South New Berlin Central School, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985): Instructions on Contributory Negligence

    Arbegast v. Board of Education of South New Berlin Central School, 65 N.Y.2d 161 (1985)

    In a pre-1975 negligence action where contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery, the trial court’s failure to explicitly instruct the jury that “any negligence” on the plaintiff’s part bars recovery is not reversible error if the overall charge conveys that the plaintiff must be “free from contributing” to the injury for the defendant to be liable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the adequacy of jury instructions regarding contributory negligence in a pre-1975 negligence action. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence, and the defendant argued that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, which would be a complete bar to recovery under the law at the time. The defendant requested a specific jury instruction stating that *any* negligence by the plaintiff would preclude recovery. The trial court refused this specific instruction but charged the jury that the plaintiff had to be “free from contributing” to the injuries. The Court of Appeals held that while the requested charge was preferable, the given charge adequately conveyed the principle of contributory negligence; thus, there was no reversible error.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying negligence claim are not detailed in the opinion. The focus is solely on whether the jury was properly instructed regarding contributory negligence.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant requested a specific jury instruction on contributory negligence. The trial court refused the requested instruction. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a pre-1975 negligence action where contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery, the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that any negligence on the part of the plaintiff would bar recovery, when the court instead instructed the jury that the plaintiff must be “free from contributing” to the injury?

    Holding

    No, because while the requested charge was preferable, the overall charge given by the trial court adequately conveyed that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence would bar recovery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defendant’s requested jury instruction was the better and more precise statement of the law regarding contributory negligence. However, the court focused on the practical impact of the charge as a whole. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to exercise reasonable care and that the defendants would only be liable if the plaintiff was “free * * * from contributing to his injuries.” The Court reasoned that, in substance, the instruction given conveyed the same legal principle as the requested instruction. Although a more explicit statement might have been clearer, the court found that the charge, as given, sufficiently informed the jury that any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff would prevent recovery. The Court declined to reverse the trial court’s decision based on what it considered a non-prejudicial omission, emphasizing the “clear import of the charge given by the trial court.”