New York Law Review

Tag: Apportionment of Liability

  • Artibee v. Home Place Corp., 28 N.Y.3d 216 (2017): Apportionment of Liability and Sovereign Immunity in Personal Injury Cases

    Artibee v. Home Place Corp., 28 N.Y.3d 216 (2017)

    CPLR 1601 does not allow a Supreme Court defendant to apportion liability to the State of New York in a personal injury case, as sovereign immunity prevents the claimant from obtaining jurisdiction over the state in Supreme Court, thus triggering the exception to apportionment.

    Summary

    In Artibee v. Home Place Corp., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant in a Supreme Court personal injury action could apportion liability to the State of New York, even though the plaintiff had also filed a claim against the State in the Court of Claims. The Court held that under CPLR 1601, apportionment was not permissible. The Court reasoned that sovereign immunity deprived the plaintiff of the ability to obtain jurisdiction over the State in Supreme Court. The Court emphasized the statute’s strict construction and legislative history to support its decision, ultimately reversing the Appellate Division’s modification that allowed for apportionment against the State.

    Facts

    Carol Artibee was injured when a tree branch fell on her vehicle while traveling on a state highway. She sued Home Place Corporation, alleging negligence for failing to maintain the tree. Artibee also filed a claim against the State of New York in the Court of Claims, alleging the Department of Transportation was negligent in maintaining the highway. Home Place moved to introduce evidence of the State’s negligence and requested a jury instruction to apportion liability between Home Place and the State. The Supreme Court initially denied the apportionment, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Procedural History

    The case began in Supreme Court, with Artibee suing Home Place Corporation. The Supreme Court denied Home Place’s motion for a jury instruction on apportionment of liability to the State, finding that CPLR 1601 did not permit apportionment against the State. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s ruling, holding that apportionment against the State was permissible. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in its order of modification.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPLR 1601 permits apportionment of liability to the State of New York in a Supreme Court personal injury action where sovereign immunity prevents the plaintiff from joining the State as a co-defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPLR 1601 does not allow apportionment of liability to the State in Supreme Court when the claimant cannot obtain jurisdiction over the State in Supreme Court due to sovereign immunity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of CPLR 1601(1). The statute modifies the common-law rule of joint and several liability and limits a joint tortfeasor’s liability for non-economic losses, provided that the tortfeasor is 50% or less at fault. The statute states that non-party tortfeasor’s relative culpability must not be considered in apportioning fault "if the claimant . . . with due diligence . . . was unable to obtain jurisdiction over such person in said action". The Court found that the restriction on Supreme Court imposed by sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, specifically citing the New York Constitution, which preserves the State’s historical sovereign immunity from suit. The Court emphasized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over claims against the State. As the Court stated, "[i]nasmuch as no claimant can obtain jurisdiction over the State in Supreme Court and the statute does not, by its terms, otherwise authorize the apportionment of liability against the State in that court, we agree with plaintiff that defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on apportionment in this action."

    The Court rejected Home Place’s argument that "jurisdiction" in the statute referred to personal jurisdiction. The Court held that reading "personal" into the statute would be an interpretation broader than the statutory language. The Court further stated that, as CPLR 1601 is a statute in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed, and by its terms, it does not specify that the inability to obtain jurisdiction must have a particular cause. Moreover, the Court emphasized that reading the word "jurisdiction" as limited to "personal jurisdiction" effectively renders meaningless the phrase "in said action [ ] or in a claim against the state" in CPLR 1601 (1).

    The Court also analyzed the legislative history, which did not support Home Place’s interpretation. The Court noted the statute’s purpose was to alleviate the liability insurance crisis and acknowledged the careful balance of interests that went into this statute. The Court reasoned that as the State is not insolvent, and that a defendant could seek contribution from the State in the Court of Claims. The Court concluded that a strict construction of the statute did not result in inequity and promoted equity.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the limits on apportionment of liability in New York personal injury cases involving the State. The ruling emphasizes that a defendant in Supreme Court cannot have the jury consider the State’s potential liability. The case suggests that if a defendant believes the State is liable, it must pursue its remedy through a claim for contribution in the Court of Claims. This will affect how attorneys analyze similar cases, particularly those involving governmental entities and their potential liability. Additionally, this ruling highlights the importance of understanding the interplay between sovereign immunity, the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction, and the apportionment rules set forth in CPLR 1601. This case also reinforces the impact of strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law.

  • Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 96 N.Y.2d 777 (2001): Interpreting Non-Delegable Duty Exceptions to Apportionment of Liability

    Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 96 N.Y.2d 777 (2001)

    CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that ensures a defendant with a non-delegable duty remains vicariously liable for the negligence of its delegates or employees, but does not automatically bar apportionment of noneconomic damages among joint tortfeasors.

    Summary

    Paul Faragiano was injured when the Jeep he was in crashed. He sued multiple parties, including the Town of Concord, alleging negligent road construction and maintenance. The Town sought apportionment of liability under CPLR article 16. Faragiano argued CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precluded apportionment because the Town had a non-delegable duty. The Court of Appeals held that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision preserving vicarious liability, not a bar to apportionment between the Town and other tortfeasors, unless the Town’s liability is vicarious for the negligence of a delegate, such as the contractor Midland Asphalt.

    Facts

    Seventeen-year-old Paul Faragiano was injured when a Jeep he was riding in veered off the road, rolled over, and struck a camper.
    Faragiano sued the driver of the Jeep, the owner of the camper, the contractor (Midland Asphalt) that resurfaced the road, and the Town of Concord.
    Faragiano alleged the Town negligently constructed and maintained the road, and Midland Asphalt negligently allowed oil or tar to build up on the road.

    Procedural History

    The Town asserted an affirmative defense, seeking apportionment of liability for noneconomic losses under CPLR article 16.
    Faragiano moved to amend the complaint, arguing CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precluded apportionment because the Town had a non-delegable duty.
    The Town cross-moved for partial summary judgment on its article 16 defense, arguing CPLR 1602(2)(iv) was a savings provision, not an exception to apportionment.
    Supreme Court granted Faragiano’s motion and denied the Town’s cross-motion, concluding the non-delegable duty barred limited liability under CPLR article 16.
    The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court certified the question of whether the order was properly made to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 1602(2)(iv) bars a defendant from seeking apportionment under CPLR article 16 when liability is based on a non-delegable duty or respondeat superior?

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that ensures a defendant under a non-delegable duty remains vicariously liable for the negligence of its delegates or employees, but does not automatically bar apportionment between joint tortfeasors unless the defendant’s liability is solely vicarious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 96 N.Y.2d 42, which addressed the interpretation of CPLR 1602(2)(iv).
    The Court rejected the argument that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) bars apportionment of noneconomic damages where liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty.
    The Court clarified that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision, preserving vicarious liability for the negligence of delegates or employees. Thus, while the Town can seek apportionment between itself and other joint tortfeasors for whose liability it is not answerable, to the extent the Town is vicariously liable for the negligence of Midland Asphalt, CPLR 1602(2)(iv) does preclude apportionment between them.
    The court quoted Lopes v. Rostad, 45 N.Y.2d 617, 623, stating a municipality owes a non-delegable duty to maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition. This emphasizes that the non-delegable duty does not, in itself, eliminate the possibility of apportionment under Article 16; rather, it affects the scope of vicarious liability retained by the municipality.
    The practical implication of this ruling is that municipalities and other entities with non-delegable duties can still benefit from the limitations on joint and several liability afforded by CPLR Article 16 when they are directly negligent, but remain fully liable for the negligence of those to whom they delegate the duty.

  • Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 96 N.Y.2d 42 (2001): Apportionment of Liability & Non-Delegable Duties

    Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 96 N.Y.2d 42 (2001)

    CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that preserves principles of vicarious liability and does not create an exception to the apportionment of liability under CPLR Article 16 for breaches of non-delegable duties.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant, whose liability arises from breaching a non-delegable duty, can seek to apportion liability with another tortfeasor under CPLR 1601, or whether CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes such apportionment. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that preserves vicarious liability principles, not an exception to apportionment. Thus, a defendant can seek apportionment even if their liability stems from a non-delegable duty. This clarifies that Article 16 aims to protect low-fault, “deep pocket” defendants, and reading 1602(2)(iv) as an exception would undermine that goal.

    Facts

    Neville Rangolan, an inmate at Nassau County Correctional Center, was assaulted by fellow inmate Steven King. Rangolan had previously acted as a confidential informant against King, and his file contained a warning not to house them together. A corrections officer negligently placed Rangolan and King in the same dormitory. Rangolan and his wife sued Nassau County, alleging negligence and violation of Rangolan’s Eighth Amendment rights.

    Procedural History

    The U.S. District Court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim but granted Rangolan judgment as a matter of law on the negligence claim, ordering a trial on damages. The District Court denied the County’s request to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages between the County and King, concluding that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) barred apportionment due to the County’s non-delegable duty. The jury awarded damages to Rangolan and his wife, which were later reduced. Both parties appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim but certified the question of CPLR 1602(2)(iv)’s interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tortfeasor, like the County, can seek to apportion its liability with another tortfeasor, like King, pursuant to CPLR 1601, or whether CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes such a defendant from seeking apportionment when the liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty.

    Holding

    No, CPLR 1602(2)(iv) does not preclude a tortfeasor like the County from seeking apportionment because it is a savings provision designed to preserve vicarious liability, not a blanket exception to the apportionment rule of Article 16.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPLR Article 16 modifies the common-law rule of joint and several liability to protect low-fault defendants. CPLR 1602(2)(iv) states that Article 16 should “not be construed to impair, alter, limit, modify, enlarge, abrogate or restrict…any liability arising by reason of a non-delegable duty or by reason of the doctrine of respondeat superior.” The court held this is a savings provision designed to preserve vicarious liability. The court emphasized that other exceptions within CPLR 1602 explicitly state that Article 16 “shall not apply,” while 1602(2)(iv) uses the language “shall not be construed,” indicating a different legislative intent. The court further reasoned that construing CPLR 1602(2)(iv) as a blanket non-delegable duty exception would render CPLR 1602(8), which specifically addresses non-delegable duties under Labor Law Article 10, redundant. The court stated, “The crafting of these exceptions and savings provisions reflects careful deliberations over the appropriate situations for a modified joint and several liability rule” (Governor’s Approval Mem). Therefore, the County is entitled to a jury charge on apportionment between itself and King. The court explicitly rejected interpretations in cases like Nwaru v Leeds Mgt. Co., 236 AD2d 252, and Cortes v Riverbridge Realty Co., 227 AD2d 430, which incorrectly assumed CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes application of CPLR 1601 without meaningful analysis. The court also clarified that their prior decisions in Morales v County of Nassau and Cole v Mandell Food Stores did not create a non-delegable duty exception to limited liability under Article 16.

  • Greenberg v. City of Yonkers, 37 N.Y.2d 907 (1975): Apportionment of Liability Despite Absence of Initial Negligence Finding

    Greenberg v. City of Yonkers, 37 N.Y.2d 907 (1975)

    A party can be found negligent for the purpose of apportionment of liability in a subsequent stage of a trial, even if the issue of their negligence was not initially submitted to the jury in the first stage focusing on a different theory of liability.

    Summary

    In this case, the plaintiffs initially litigated their claim against the defendant, Cyanamid, on a warranty theory, and evidence of Cyanamid’s negligence was excluded during the first stage of the trial. Cyanamid later argued that because it was not found negligent in the first stage, the jury could not find it negligent on the respondents’ cross-claims for apportionment of liability. The Court of Appeals held that this argument was without merit, especially since the trial court had emphasized that evidence of Cyanamid’s negligence was to be presented during the second stage of the trial for apportionment of liability. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs initially pursued their claim against Cyanamid based on a warranty theory.

    During the first stage of the trial, evidence regarding Cyanamid’s negligence was excluded.

    Later, Cyanamid argued that because no negligence was found against them in the initial stage, the jury could not find them negligent on cross-claims for apportionment of liability.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed evidence of Cyanamid’s negligence to be presented in the second stage of the trial, focused on apportionment of liability.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision based on the reasoning of Justice Shapiro.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party can be found negligent for apportionment of liability purposes in a later stage of a trial when evidence of their negligence was excluded during the initial stage focusing on a different theory of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the initial focus on a warranty claim and the exclusion of negligence evidence in the first stage of trial does not preclude a finding of negligence for apportionment of liability in a subsequent stage, especially when the trial court explicitly stated that negligence evidence would be presented during the second stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found Cyanamid’s argument to be without merit, emphasizing that the issue of Cyanamid’s negligence was explicitly reserved for the second stage of the trial, which was dedicated to the apportionment of liability. The court cited Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., indicating that contribution and apportionment principles allow for such a determination even if negligence was not the primary theory of liability initially pursued by the plaintiff. The court also noted that the trial court made it clear on multiple occasions that evidence of Cyanamid’s negligence would be presented during the second stage of the trial. The court affirmed based on the reasoning of Justice Shapiro in the lower court decision. The court explicitly stated that “This position is patently without merit (Dole v Dow Chem. Co., 30 NY2d 143; cf. Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553)”. The court cautioned against the trifurcation procedure utilized by the trial court, indicating that it is preferable to resolve issues of liability in a single stage of trial.

  • Gull Contracting Co., Inc. v. Esterly, 33 N.Y.2d 649 (1973): Derivative Liability After ‘Active-Passive’ Distinction Abrogation

    Gull Contracting Co., Inc. v. Esterly, 33 N.Y.2d 649 (1973)

    Even after the abrogation of the “active-passive” negligence distinction, a defendant derivatively liable due to the active negligence of an agent, employee, or contractor under its control can still seek full indemnity from the actively negligent party; furthermore, all active tortfeasors should have their relative liability determined.

    Summary

    This case concerns an automobile accident and the apportionment of liability among multiple defendants, including a contractor (Gull-Mac), the City of New York, and the driver and owner of the vehicle involved (the Esterlys). The Court of Appeals addressed whether the city, found derivatively liable, could be indemnified by the actively negligent contractor after the abrogation of the “active-passive” negligence doctrine in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. The court held that the city could still seek full indemnity and further directed the trial court to determine the relative liability between the active tortfeasors, Gull-Mac and the Esterlys, ensuring a fair allocation of responsibility based on their respective contributions to the accident.

    Facts

    An accident occurred involving a vehicle driven by Esterly. The accident also implicated Gull-Mac due to its actions or omissions at the construction site and the City of New York, potentially through its oversight or control of the site. The infant plaintiffs sued multiple parties including Gull Contracting Co., Inc. The jury found other defendants also contributed to the cause of the accident. The city’s liability stemmed from Gull-Mac’s negligence at the construction site it controlled. The parties agreed that the trial judge should determine the city’s right to indemnity on its cross claim against Gull-Mac.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the requests to charge the assumption of risk doctrine were deficient. The Court of Appeals reviewed the apportionment of liability between Gull-Mac and the City of New York, and considered a new argument regarding the relative liability of Gull-Mac and the Esterlys in light of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the abrogation of the “active-passive” negligence distinction in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. precludes a derivatively liable defendant (the City of New York) from seeking full indemnity from the actively negligent party (Gull-Mac)?

    2. Whether the case should be remanded for a determination of the relative liability between the active tortfeasors (Gull-Mac and the Esterlys) in light of the Dole decision?

    Holding

    1. No, because the abrogation of the “active-passive” distinction does not prevent a derivatively liable defendant from seeking full indemnity from the actively negligent party, especially when the active negligence arises from the actions of an agent, employee, or contractor under the derivatively liable party’s control.

    2. Yes, because fairness dictates that the relative liability of all active tortfeasors should be determined to ensure a proper apportionment of responsibility for the damages.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. eliminated the strict “active-passive” distinction for indemnity purposes, it did not eliminate the right of a derivatively liable party to seek full indemnity from the actively negligent party whose actions directly caused the harm. The court emphasized the commentary by David D. Siegel, noting that the abrogation does not disturb the principle that an actively negligent party can be held fully responsible when another party’s liability is merely derivative. The Trial Judge found that Gull-Mac created the hazard and that, in effect, the city’s liability was only derivative. Regarding the liability between Gull-Mac and the Esterlys, the court, citing Kelly v. Long Is. Light. Co., held that a determination of their relative liability was proper. The court stated, “We agree that this disposition would be proper (Kelly v. Long Is. Light. Co., 31 Y 2d 25, 29).” It directed the trial court to determine their respective degrees of fault on the existing record, ensuring that each active tortfeasor bears a responsibility proportionate to its contribution to the accident. This approach ensures a more equitable distribution of liability among all parties involved, reflecting their respective roles in causing the harm.

  • Federal Insurance Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 28 N.Y.2d 460 (1971): Apportioning Liability Between Insurers of Tractor-Trailer Combinations

    Federal Insurance Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 28 N.Y.2d 460 (1971)

    When separate insurance policies cover a tractor and trailer involved in an accident, and each policy excludes coverage for the other unless insured by the same insurer, contribution between the insurers should be proportionate to the respective accident limits of the policies.

    Summary

    This case addresses the apportionment of liability between the insurers of a tractor and trailer involved in an accident. The tractor’s insurer settled claims from injured bus passengers and sought contribution from the trailer’s insurer. The policies had clauses excluding coverage for each other under certain conditions, precluding concurrent insurance. The court held that contribution should be proportionate to the accident limits of each policy (tractor: $750,000, trailer: $300,000), resulting in the trailer’s insurer paying two-sevenths of the settlement, reflecting the ratio of its accident limit to the total accident coverage. The court reasoned that this approach aligns with precedents regarding contribution in the absence of specific policy provisions or statutes and provides certainty for insurers.

    Facts

    Jersey Truck Renters, Inc. owned a tractor, and B & B Truck Renters owned a semitrailer. Both were rented to Grand City, whose employee operated them as a unit. The tractor-trailer collided with a bus, injuring passengers. The tractor’s insurer, Federal Insurance, settled nine claims totaling $44,976.16. The tractor policy had limits of $500,000 per claim and $750,000 per accident. The trailer’s insurer, Employers Mutual, had policy limits of $100,000 per claim and $300,000 per accident. Employers Mutual conceded its obligation to contribute, but disputed the apportionment method.

    Procedural History

    The parties submitted the case on agreed facts to the trial court. The trial court initially ordered Employers Mutual to pay half of the settlement. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. Employers Mutual appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, contesting the apportionment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of concurrent insurance and specific policy provisions, the contribution between the insurers of a tractor and trailer involved in an accident should be divided equally, proportionately to the single claim limits, or proportionately to the accident limits of their respective policies.

    Holding

    No, contribution should be proportionate to the respective accident limits of the policies because this approach aligns with precedents and provides certainty for insurers in similar situations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the Vehicle and Traffic Law imposes joint and several liability on the tractor and trailer owners. However, the insurance policies contained exclusions that prevented concurrent coverage. The court relied on the principle that in the absence of statute or contrary policy provisions, insurers sharing a risk are entitled to contribution in proportion to the policy limits. The court reasoned that the stipulation by the insurers that they were “concurrently” liable suggested a preference for proportionate sharing. The court found that, “[n]otably, the insurers under the policies in suit show a preference for proportionate sharing in the ‘ ‘ other insurance ’ ’ clause applicable to concurrent insurance.” The court rejected equal sharing, stating: “Since there is no predominance of authority or analysis one way or the other it would seem better to follow precedents and principles most analogous.” The court emphasized the importance of certainty for insurers, noting that the apportionment method’s ultimate impact is reflected in premiums. They also noted that insurers are free to modify their policies to specify different apportionment methods. Because the settlements arose from a single accident, the court found that the relevant limits were the accident limits, not the per-claim limits. The court modified the Appellate Division’s order, directing contribution based on the ratio of the accident limits, resulting in Employers Mutual paying two-sevenths of the total settlement ($300,000/$1,050,000).