New York Law Review

Tag: Apportionment of Damages

  • Chianese v. Meier, 98 N.Y.2d 270 (2002): Apportionment of Damages in Negligence Claims Involving Intentional Torts

    Chianese v. Meier, 98 N.Y.2d 270 (2002)

    In a negligence action against a landlord for inadequate security, CPLR Article 16 permits apportionment of damages between the negligent landlord and the intentional tortfeasor who directly caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a tenant, was attacked in her apartment building. She sued the landlord, alleging negligent security. The jury found the landlord 50% liable and the attacker 50% liable. The trial court set aside the apportionment, but the Appellate Division affirmed based on an exception for “actions requiring proof of intent.” The New York Court of Appeals modified, holding that CPLR Article 16 allows apportionment in this case. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim was based on the landlord’s negligence, not the attacker’s intent, and that denying apportionment would contradict the purpose of Article 16, which is to protect low-fault defendants.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was attacked in her apartment. She noticed that the building’s front and security doors were open upon arriving home. The attacker, Adger, was later apprehended and convicted. Plaintiff sued the building owner and managing agent, alleging inadequate security.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, finding material issues of fact. After trial, the jury apportioned liability 50-50 between the defendants and Adger, the attacker. The trial court then set aside the apportionment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding an exception under CPLR 1602(5). The Court of Appeals modified, reinstating the jury’s apportionment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a negligence action against a landlord for inadequate security, CPLR 1602(5) precludes apportionment of damages between the negligent landlord and the intentional tortfeasor who attacked the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff’s claim is based on the landlord’s negligence, not the attacker’s intent, and CPLR 1602(5) does not apply to preclude apportionment in this scenario.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPLR Article 16 was enacted to remedy inequities created by joint and several liability on low-fault defendants. Section 1601 modifies the common-law rule, making a tortfeasor whose fault is 50% or less liable only to the extent of their share of the non-economic loss.

    The court stated that the plaintiff’s complaint asserted only negligence as the basis for the defendant’s liability. “Because plaintiff’s negligence claim is not an ‘action requiring proof of intent,’ section 1602 (5) on its face does not apply to preclude apportionment of liability.” The court further reasoned, “That a nonparty tortfeasor acted intentionally does not bring a pure negligence action within the scope of the exclusion.”

    The court distinguished Section 1602(5) from Section 1602(11), which deals with parties acting knowingly or intentionally and in concert. The Court also noted that the legislative history of CPLR Article 16 indicated its purpose was to protect low-fault landowners and municipalities. Interpreting the statute to deny apportionment based on the third-party’s intent would create the very inequity Article 16 was meant to eliminate.

    The Court rejected the argument that evidence of prior complaints about the building’s security doors being left open constituted constructive notice. The court held that the evidence of prior complaints was sufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific recurrence on the day of the assault on plaintiff.

  • Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553 (1973): Indemnification and Apportionment of Damages

    Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553 (1973)

    When a party delegates responsibility for an activity to another through contract, and an accident occurs related to that activity, the party to whom the duty was delegated may be fully liable and indemnification may apply, precluding apportionment of damages.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a jury returned an inconsistent verdict, finding a property owner liable for negligence while simultaneously exonerating the contractor responsible for snow and ice removal at the property. The Court held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent. If the property owner’s liability was based in tort, and the contractor had a contractual obligation to indemnify the property owner or had been delegated all responsibility for the activity causing the accident, there should be no apportionment of damages under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the complaint, and granted a new trial.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs sued Humble Oil and Refining Co. (Humble) and Scarsdale Landscaping, Inc. (Scarsdale) for damages related to an accident. Humble had contracted with Scarsdale for snow and ice removal and sanding services. The contract included a clause where Scarsdale agreed to indemnify and hold Humble harmless from any loss or damage connected with the work performed. The jury found Humble liable for negligence but exonerated Scarsdale.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict finding Humble liable but exonerating Scarsdale. Humble had filed a third-party complaint against Scarsdale, seeking indemnification. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the complaint, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the jury verdict was inconsistent in holding Humble liable for negligence while exonerating Scarsdale, given Scarsdale’s contractual obligation to indemnify Humble or the delegation of responsibility for snow and ice removal.

    Holding

    Yes, because Scarsdale had a contractual obligation to indemnify Humble, or because Humble had delegated all responsibility for whatever caused the accident to Scarsdale. In such a situation, there should be no apportionment of damages.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the jury’s verdict inconsistent. The court reasoned that if Humble’s liability to the plaintiffs was based on tort, then Scarsdale’s liability to Humble could be based on contract (the indemnity agreement) or tort (negligent performance of the delegated duty). The court cited Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. concerning apportionment of damages among tortfeasors. However, the court emphasized that Dole did not apply where Humble was entitled to recover from Scarsdale either based on the contractual indemnity clause or because Humble had delegated all responsibility for the condition that caused the accident to Scarsdale. In such cases, there should be no apportionment of damages; Scarsdale would be fully liable to indemnify Humble. The court directly referenced its prior decision in Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 Y 2d 553, 563, 565-566, noting the principles established therein. The court stated that the charge of the court, with respect to the rule of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. (30 Y 2d 143), was error, because if Humble were entitled on its third-party complaint to recover either on contract indemnity or because it had delegated to Scarsdale all responsibility for whatever caused the accident, there would be no apportionment of damages.

  • Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972): Apportioning Damages Among Joint Tortfeasors

    Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972)

    Under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive.”

    Summary

    Willis Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane on a construction site contacted high-tension wires owned by Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO). Kelly sued LILCO and Herrick Manor, Inc. (Herrick), the general contractor. Both defendants cross-claimed against each other. The jury found both defendants negligent, and the trial court dismissed the cross-claims, finding both actively negligent. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that damages should be apportioned based on relative fault, and remanding the case for the trial court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court emphasized this new rule does not affect a plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor.

    Facts

    LILCO owned and maintained high-tension wires along Clinton Avenue. Herrick was the general contractor for an apartment building being constructed near these wires. Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane contacted the wires, causing him to be electrocuted. LILCO knew about the construction but took no protective measures regarding the wires. Herrick’s president knew of the danger posed by the wires and requested LILCO to insulate them but did not warn the workers, including Kelly, of the danger, even when he saw the crane moving towards the wires.

    Procedural History

    Kelly and his wife sued LILCO and Herrick. Both defendants filed cross-claims against each other. The jury found both LILCO and Herrick negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed both cross-claims, finding each party actively negligent. Herrick appealed the dismissal of its cross-claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. Herrick appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive”.

    Holding

    Yes, damages should be apportioned based on the relative fault of each tortfeasor because to require a tortfeasor who is only slightly negligent to pay the same amount as a more negligent co-tortfeasor is inequitable and unjust.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rule established in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., which permits the apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of the nature of their concurring fault. The court found that the previous rule, which prevented a defendant found guilty of “active” negligence from recovering from another negligent party, was inequitable. The court stated, “To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault.” This refinement of the contribution rule does not affect the plaintiff’s right to recover the total amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the relative degrees of negligence or fault and the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court clarified that this case addresses contribution between joint tortfeasors and does not concern issues like vicarious liability where the active-passive dichotomy would still apply.