New York Law Review

Tag: Appellate Reversal

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Licitra, 47 N.Y.2d 554 (1979): Interruption of Sentence After Appellate Reversal

    47 N.Y.2d 554 (1979)

    A criminal defendant’s sentence is interrupted for the purpose of computing sentence credit during the period of their release from detention between an intermediate appellate court’s reversal of their conviction and the subsequent reinstatement of that conviction by the highest state court.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant should receive sentence credit for the time spent out of custody following an appellate division’s reversal of his conviction, which was later overturned by the Court of Appeals itself. The court held that the defendant’s sentence was interrupted during the period of his freedom between the reversal and the reinstatement of his conviction. This decision rested on the principle that the defendant had been accorded a period of freedom to which he was ultimately not entitled, and therefore should not receive credit toward his sentence for that time.

    Facts

    The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed his conviction and dismissed the indictment, leading to his release from custody on May 4, 1978. Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the appellant’s conviction on July 9, 1979. The appellant sought sentence credit for the 14-month period between his release and the reinstatement of his conviction.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the appellant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the original conviction. The appellant then appealed the denial of sentence credit for the time he was free.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 430.10 precludes treating a defendant’s release following the reversal of his conviction by the Appellate Division as an interruption of his sentence, thus entitling him to sentence credit for the period between the Appellate Division’s decision and the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was ultimately determined not to be entitled to the freedom he experienced during that time, and therefore should not receive credit towards his sentence for that period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s argument that only explicit statutory language mentioning the interruption of a sentence would suffice to create an exception under CPL 430.10. The court noted that the Appellate Division’s reversal and dismissal were actions specifically authorized by statute (CPL 470.15, 470.20, 470.45), leading to the defendant’s lawful discharge from custody. However, the court emphasized that its subsequent reversal meant the defendant had been “accorded a period of freedom to which we ultimately determined he was not entitled.” The court distinguished the case from situations involving a defendant’s voluntary misconduct (e.g., parole violations, escape), stating, “[a]n assertion that he should be deemed to be serving a sentence while he was free pursuant to statutory entitlement flies in the face of reality.” The court effectively reasoned that, while the initial release was legally authorized, the subsequent reversal nullified the basis for that release, making it unfair for the defendant to receive sentence credit for that time. The court stated that, “[i]n effect defendant was accorded a period of freedom to which we ultimately determined he was not entitled…there is no sufficient reason why the running of his sentence should not be tolled during the period he enjoyed what proved to be an undeserved benefit.”

  • People v. Graham, 36 N.Y.2d 633 (1975): Double Jeopardy and the Effect of Appellate Reversals on Retrial

    People v. Graham, 36 N.Y.2d 633 (1975)

    An appellate court’s reversal of a conviction for legal insufficiency acts as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, barring retrial on that charge unless the reversal is itself overturned on further appeal; however, a subsequent grant of a new trial by a higher court does not automatically reinstate charges dismissed on a prior appeal.

    Summary

    Graham was initially convicted of second-degree murder, but the Appellate Division reduced it to first-degree manslaughter due to insufficient evidence. The Second Circuit then ordered a new trial, finding a constitutional violation. The People sought to retry Graham for second-degree murder, but he argued double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial for second-degree murder was barred because the initial Appellate Division decision finding insufficient evidence acted as an acquittal on that charge. The federal court’s order for a new trial did not resurrect the dismissed charge. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reduction of the second conviction to manslaughter, ordering resentencing.

    Facts

    Graham was indicted for first-degree murder in 1961 and convicted of second-degree murder.
    The Appellate Division found insufficient evidence to support a murder conviction but sufficient for first-degree manslaughter and modified the conviction accordingly.
    Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.
    The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division’s summary reduction of the conviction violated Graham’s constitutional right to a jury trial, ordering a new trial.

    Procedural History

    1961: Graham convicted of second-degree murder.
    1964: Appellate Division reduces conviction to first-degree manslaughter.
    Federal Court orders new trial.
    Trial court allows retrial for second-degree murder.
    Graham is reconvicted of second-degree murder.
    Appellate Division reduces the second conviction to first-degree manslaughter, citing double jeopardy.
    Both sides appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division’s initial order setting aside the second-degree murder conviction for legal insufficiency is equivalent to an acquittal, thus barring retrial under double jeopardy principles.
    2. Whether the Federal court order granting a new trial effectively reversed the Appellate Division’s prior dismissal of the second-degree murder charge.
    3. Whether Graham’s conviction for manslaughter in the first degree should be reversed and dismissed based on double jeopardy or lack of a proper trial on that specific charge.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because an order setting aside a conviction for legal insufficiency acts as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.
    2. No, because an order granting a new trial does not automatically resurrect a charge previously dismissed on appeal unless explicitly stated.
    3. No, because Graham’s initial conviction for the lesser included offense of manslaughter was affirmed by the Appellate Division, and the federal court’s granting of a new trial does not preclude retrial on that charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the People can appeal an order setting aside a conviction, if that order is not reversed, the defendant cannot be retried on the charge. The critical question is whether the federal court order reversed the Appellate Division’s initial order. The court clarified that the Appellate Division’s order involved two separate determinations: the reversal and dismissal of the second-degree murder charge and the affirmation of the manslaughter conviction. The federal court order granting a new trial nullified the latter but did not expressly resurrect the former.

    The court rejected the argument that a grant of a new trial completely wipes the slate clean. CPL 470.55(1) explicitly states that an appellate reversal and dismissal of a charge remains in effect even if a new trial is granted on other counts, unless the dismissal is expressly reversed at the final appellate level.

    The court distinguished Fong Foo v. United States, clarifying that only the portion of the Appellate Division’s order relating to the second-degree murder charge was equivalent to an acquittal. The manslaughter conviction was affirmed initially, and the subsequent federal court order merely allowed for a new trial on that lesser charge. Because the proof at the second trial was sufficient to establish guilt of manslaughter, the Appellate Division’s reduction of the conviction was deemed appropriate, consistent with federal court’s suggestion of a new sentencing.