New York Law Review

Tag: Appellate Procedure

  • Stevens Constructors, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R., 27 N.Y.2d 55 (1970): Adequacy of Appendix on Appeal

    Stevens Constructors, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R., 27 N.Y.2d 55 (1970)

    An appellate court should not affirm a judgment solely because an appellant’s appendix is deemed insufficient; instead, the court should direct the appellant to submit a further appendix or risk dismissal of the appeal if a sufficient appendix is not filed within a specified time.

    Summary

    Stevens Constructors, Inc. appealed a judgment against it, claiming fraudulent misrepresentations induced it into a construction contract with Long Island Railroad. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, solely because Stevens’ appendix was insufficient to determine the issues. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that affirming solely due to an inadequate appendix defeats the purpose of the appendix system, which aims to reduce costs by including only necessary parts of the record. The Court of Appeals instructed that the Appellate Division should have directed Stevens to supplement the appendix or face dismissal of the appeal.

    Facts

    Stevens Constructors, Inc. entered into a construction contract with Long Island Railroad. Stevens subsequently sued, alleging fraudulent misrepresentations induced them into the contract. A judgment was entered in favor of Long Island Railroad. Stevens appealed, but the Appellate Division deemed the submitted appendix insufficient.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a judgment for damages against Stevens Constructors, Inc. Long Island Railroad’s counterclaim and third-party claim were disallowed. The Appellate Division affirmed based solely on the inadequacy of Stevens’ appendix. Stevens then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment solely on the ground that the appellant’s appendix was insufficient to permit determination of the questions raised on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because affirming solely due to an inadequate appendix defeats the purpose of CPLR 5528, which aims to reduce the cost of appeals by encouraging parties to include only necessary portions of the record. The proper procedure is to direct the appellant to submit a further appendix or face dismissal if they fail to do so within a specified time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the appendix system, as outlined in CPLR 5528, was designed to reduce the cost of printing records on appeal. The court noted that paragraph 5 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 5528 provides that an appellant’s appendix shall contain “only such parts of the record on appeal as are necessary to consider the questions involved, including those parts the appellant reasonably assumes will be relied upon by the respondent”. While acknowledging the appendix was insufficient, the court found that affirming the lower court’s decision was an inappropriate penalty. The court stated, “The most effective guarantee against an inadequate appendix, of course, is an attorney’s desire to supply the court with all material necessary to convince it to adopt his client’s position.” The Court suggested the proper remedy would have been for the Appellate Division to direct Stevens to submit a further appendix or dismiss the appeal if a sufficient appendix was not filed within a specified time. The court reasoned that harsher penalties could defeat the purpose of CPLR 5528 by encouraging advocates to submit unreasonably lengthy appendices to avoid the extreme consequence of an affirmance based on a mistaken belief about what portions of the record are needed.

  • Farley v. Union Ferry Co., 97 N.Y. 189 (1884): Appellate Review of Discretionary Orders

    Farley v. Union Ferry Co., 97 N.Y. 189 (1884)

    Appellate courts generally do not review lower court orders that rest within the lower court’s discretion, as appellate jurisdiction is primarily confined to questions of law, except where specifically authorized by statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses the appealability of a lower court order that opened a default judgment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the order, being discretionary, was not appealable. The defendant, Farley, sought to open a judgment entered against him in 1862 due to his failure to appear or answer. The lower court granted this request, allowing Farley to defend the case. The Union Ferry Co. appealed, arguing that the Code of 1877 allowed appeals from orders made after judgment, even if discretionary. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that discretionary orders are generally not reviewable by appellate courts.

    Facts

    A judgment was entered against Farley in 1862 following his default in appearance or answering a claim related to a deficiency on a mortgage sale. The judgment was not officially docketed until April 1874. Farley claimed he only became aware of the judgment shortly before his application to reopen the case in December 1876. He argued for the judgment to be opened so he could defend the claim.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term granted Farley’s motion to open the default judgment, allowing him to answer and defend the original action. The Union Ferry Co. appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals then considered whether the Special Term’s order was appealable, given its discretionary nature.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an order opening a default judgment, which rests in the discretion of the lower court, is appealable to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    No, because the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is generally confined to the review of questions of law, and discretionary orders are not typically reviewable unless specifically authorized by statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the decision to open the default judgment was within the discretion of the lower court and that no abuse of discretion was evident. The appellant’s argument that the Code of 1877 allowed appeals from all orders made after judgment was rejected. The court referred to Section 1337 of the Code of 1877, which indicates that appeals from orders made after judgment bring up questions not resting in discretion. The court highlighted that its jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing questions of law, except where specific authorization exists. The court reasoned that entertaining appeals from orders resting in discretion would overstep its defined role. The court stated that “the reason for not entertaining appeals from orders resting in discretion was not founded upon the express restrictions of the Code, but upon the character of the jurisdiction of this court, which is confined to the review of questions of law, except where specially authorized.” Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, reinforcing the principle that discretionary orders are generally not appealable.