New York Law Review

Tag: Appellate Counsel

  • People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999): Right to Counsel on Appeal

    93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999)

    A defendant has a right to counsel on a People’s appeal, and the Appellate Division must ensure the defendant is represented or has waived counsel as a matter of record before proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel during the People’s appeal to the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in deciding the appeal without ensuring the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived that right. The defendant had retained counsel for trial, but was unrepresented on appeal after his conviction was set aside and the People appealed. The Court emphasized that the State has the ultimate duty to inform a defendant of their right to appellate counsel and to provide counsel if the defendant is indigent. The case was remitted for a new appeal with representation.

    Facts

    Defendant Garcia was convicted of first-degree burglary and robbery after a jury trial. The trial court granted Garcia’s motion to set aside the verdict, finding the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. The court informed Garcia that the People had a right to appeal and urged his trial counsel to discuss the implications of a People’s appeal with him. The People filed a notice of appeal. Garcia’s trial counsel informed the People that Garcia had not retained them for the appeal and sent letters to Garcia’s last known address referencing a conversation informing him of the consequences of the People’s appeal.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially set aside the jury verdict. The People appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, First Department. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstated the jury verdict, and remanded the case for sentencing, noting that there was “no appearance for respondent.” Subsequently, the case was remanded to the Supreme Court for sentencing, at which point Garcia obtained assigned counsel. Garcia then appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing he was denied his right to counsel on the People’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred by proceeding with the People’s appeal without ensuring that the defendant was represented by counsel or had waived his right to counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division had the obligation to ensure that the defendant was represented or had waived counsel on the record. The absence of representation, without a valid waiver, violated the defendant’s right to counsel on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a defendant has a right to counsel on a People’s appeal, especially where imprisonment is a potential outcome. The Court stated, “ ‘where imprisonment threatens, constitutional guarantees as to counsel must apply’ ” (quoting People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110, 116). The court reasoned that the ultimate duty of informing the defendant of this right rests with the State, not just delegated to a member of the bar, quoting People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, 133: “we do not believe that an indigent defendant can lose his right to appeal simply because the State delegates its responsibility to a member of the Bar to pass along the requisite information.” The Appellate Division had the responsibility to ensure representation or a valid waiver on the record. By proceeding without counsel and without ascertaining a waiver, the Appellate Division failed in its duty. The court also noted that meaningful appellate advocacy requires “the single-minded advocacy of an appellate counsel” (citing People v. Emmett, 25 N.Y.2d 354, 356), which a bare record cannot replace. The Court of Appeals also advised the Appellate Divisions to implement uniform rules to ensure defendants are informed of their right to counsel on appeal.

  • People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987): Establishing Coram Nobis as Remedy for Ineffective Appellate Counsel

    People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987)

    When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the proper procedural vehicle for review is a writ of error coram nobis, brought in the intermediate appellate court where the alleged deficiency occurred, until the legislature enacts a specific statutory remedy.

    Summary

    Rickey Bachert was convicted of burglary, criminal trespass, and petit larceny. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Bachert collaterally attacked his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise prosecutorial misconduct and challenge repugnant verdicts. The trial court denied the motion, citing a lack of jurisdiction under CPL 440.10. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that CPL 440.10 could incorporate ineffective appellate counsel claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that coram nobis in the appellate court is the appropriate remedy. The Court emphasized that CPL 440.10 is not designed for appellate counsel ineffectiveness claims and urged the legislature to create a comprehensive statutory remedy.

    Facts

    Rickey Bachert was convicted of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, and petit larceny after a jury trial.

    Bachert appealed the conviction, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.

    Bachert then moved to vacate the judgment in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to counsel’s failure to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct and challenge the verdicts as repugnant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Bachert’s motion to vacate, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under CPL 440.10 to review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    The Appellate Division reversed and remitted for further proceedings, concluding that CPL 440.10 (1)(h) could be broadly construed to incorporate ineffective appellate counsel claims.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 440.10 is the appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge a judgment of conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 440.10 does not encompass claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; the proper procedure is a common-law coram nobis proceeding brought in the appellate court where the alleged ineffective assistance occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 440.10(1)(h) addresses whether the *judgment itself* was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Appellate courts do not render judgments of conviction, they only affect them.

    The Court also found that a motion for reargument (CPL 470.50) is not an acceptable solution, as it is not appropriate for raising new questions. The Court noted that the time frame for making reargument motions would lead to disparate treatment and that reargument is not traditionally perceived as providing the fresh examination required for alleged deprivations of counsel.

    The Court stated that the writ of error coram nobis is the best available remedy in the circumstances, citing its history and flexibility. The Court referenced prior expansions of the writ’s scope, noting it had “not hesitated to expand its scope when necessary to afford the defendant a remedy in those cases in which no other avenue of judicial relief appeared available.” People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 93-94 (1961).

    The Court held that coram nobis proceedings should be addressed in the court which rendered the order from which relief is sought. “Where, as here, it is the Appellate Division’s order that is questioned, the application should be to that court”. People ex rel. Douglas v. Vincent, 50 N.Y.2d 901, 905 (1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting).

    The Court noted its “discomfiture” with the absence of a comprehensive statutory mechanism and invited the Legislature’s prompt attention to the problem.

  • People v. Douglas, 48 N.Y.2d 547 (1979): Availability of Coram Nobis for Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

    People v. Douglas, 48 N.Y.2d 547 (1979)

    A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may seek relief via a common-law coram nobis proceeding, allowing for a hearing on disputed facts outside the original record.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether a defendant can challenge the effectiveness of their appellate counsel in state court, even after their direct appeal has been decided. Douglas sought habeas corpus relief, claiming his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a key issue on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy, but a common-law coram nobis proceeding could be available, allowing for a factual hearing on the ineffectiveness claim. The dissent argued that the court should explicitly direct the transfer of the case to the Appellate Division for consideration under its common-law coram nobis jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Douglas was convicted after a trial where self-defense was a central issue.

    On appeal, his assigned counsel filed a brief that was only seven pages long and failed to address the self-defense issue.

    Douglas then sought habeas corpus relief, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially concluded a means of presenting the issue existed.

    The Appellate Division reversed, denying habeas corpus relief.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding habeas corpus was inappropriate.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, is entitled to a hearing in state court to determine the validity of that claim.

    Whether common-law coram nobis is an available and appropriate procedure for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in New York.

    Holding

    No, habeas corpus relief is not appropriate; however, a common-law coram nobis proceeding may be available because this allows for a factual hearing on issues outside the original record.

    Yes, common-law coram nobis is an available procedure to test whether a defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of their right to counsel on appeal because CPL article 440 was not intended to abolish the common-law writ in situations not covered by the article.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while habeas corpus might not be the appropriate avenue, the state constitution guarantees the right to counsel. Therefore, a procedure must exist to address claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

    The court highlighted the availability of common-law coram nobis, a mechanism traditionally used to address deprivations of the right to counsel. “Considered as a common-law matter, there is no question that coram nobis is available, indeed is the exclusive remedy, to test the question whether defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to counsel.” The court acknowledged that CPL article 440, which incorporates coram nobis procedure, might appear to limit its application. However, the court interpreted the statute narrowly, concluding that it was not intended to abolish the common-law writ in situations not explicitly covered by the article.

    The dissent emphasized the importance of providing a clear procedural path for defendants alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Meyer noted a “strong prima facie indication of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” in this case. He argued that the court’s decision would effectively force defendants to seek relief in federal courts, which would address the issue via federal habeas corpus. The dissent advocated for transferring the case to the Appellate Division for consideration under its common-law coram nobis jurisdiction.

    The dissent also quoted People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497, 501, 503, noting that “constitutional limitations * * * perforce override any statutory distributions of judicial power or appealability” and that “no procedural or jurisdictional problem intervenes if only because the constitutional mandates * * * are paramount and controlling over any statutory distribution of judicial power, appealability, and reviewability.”

    The dissent cited to People v Lampkins, 21 NY2d 138 that the common-law use of the writ can determine whether defendant was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.