New York Law Review

Tag: appeal

  • Summerville v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 427 (2000): Automatic Stays for Government Entities Pending Appeal

    Summerville v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 427 (2000)

    A governmental entity is entitled to a new automatic stay each time it files a notice of appeal or moves for leave to appeal, even if a prior automatic stay has lapsed due to failure to comply with CPLR 5519(e).

    Summary

    In a personal injury action against the City of New York, the Court of Appeals addressed whether a governmental entity obtains a new automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a) when it appeals or seeks leave to appeal an adverse order, even if its original stay lapsed under CPLR 5519(e). The Court held that the City did obtain a new automatic stay when it moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, despite failing to preserve its initial stay. The Court reversed the lower court’s order accelerating payments on the judgment, finding that the City’s payments were not untimely due to the successive automatic stays.

    Facts

    Plaintiff sued the City for personal injuries. A jury awarded damages, which the trial court reduced. A structured judgment was entered in May 1997. The City appealed, triggering an automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a)(1). The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the damages for pain and suffering and ordering a new trial on those damages unless Plaintiff stipulated to a reduced award. Plaintiff stipulated, and an amended judgment was entered on July 6, 1999, requiring the City to make a lump sum payment and purchase an annuity contract. Plaintiff requested satisfaction of the judgment. On August 5, 1999, the City moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff moved for accelerated payment of the judgment under CPLR 5044. The Appellate Division denied the City’s motion for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for accelerated payment, reasoning that the City’s initial automatic stay had lapsed, and the City had delayed payments. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a governmental entity obtains a new automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a) when it appeals or moves for leave to appeal from an adverse order, even if it failed to continue its original automatic stay under CPLR 5519(e).

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 5519(a)(1) applies to all appeals and motions for leave to appeal, and CPLR 5519(e) only addresses the continuation of an original stay, not the possibility of obtaining a new one.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPLR 5519(a)(1) grants an automatic stay to governmental entities pending an appeal or motion for leave to appeal, without limiting its applicability to initial appeals. The Court stated that “CPLR 5519 (a) (1) does not limit availability of a governmental appellant’s automatic stay to appeals to the Appellate Division, but by its terms applies to all appeals and motions for leave to appeal, including those to this Court.” CPLR 5519(e) provides for the continuation of an original stay, but does not preclude a governmental entity from obtaining a new stay if the original one lapses. The Court stated, “subdivision (e) merely provides for the ‘[c]ontinuation of [an original] stay,’ allowing an appellant to retain a stay arising from a first stage appeal without interruption by appealing or seeking leave to appeal to a higher appellate court within the five-day time frame specified therein.” This interpretation aligns with the policy of stabilizing the effect of adverse determinations on governmental entities and preventing disbursement of public funds pending appeal. Even if the City’s first stay lapsed, it obtained a new one when it moved for leave to appeal. Because of the automatic stays, the City’s payments were not untimely under CPLR 5044. The Court emphasized that, “Motion for a stay denied as unnecessary on the ground that the municipal respondents’ motion for leave to appeal in this court provides an automatic stay’ under CPLR 5519 (a) (1).” The Court found no violation of the statutory obligation to provide an annuity contract because there was never a period of time in which a stay had lapsed for as much as 30 days. The determination of whether a payment is made in a timely fashion depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Here, in view of the relatively short periods of time in which the City’s obligation to make the initial lump sum payment was not stayed, the City’s failure to make a lump sum payment of the magnitude involved here cannot be held to be untimely as a matter of law.

  • People v. Mattison, 75 N.Y.2d 745 (1989): Abatement of Criminal Prosecution Upon Defendant’s Death

    People v. Mattison, 75 N.Y.2d 745 (1989)

    A defendant’s death during the pendency of a direct appeal abates the appeal and all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception.

    Summary

    The defendant committed suicide while his appeal was pending. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal and directed the County Court to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s death abated the appeal and all proceedings from the prosecution’s inception. The court reasoned that death prevents the enforcement or reversal of the conviction and effective appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant, Mattison, was convicted of a crime. He appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division as a matter of right. While the appeal was pending, Mattison committed suicide.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division dismissed Mattison’s appeal and remitted the case to the County Court with directions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment. The People appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Mattison’s suicide should be deemed a waiver or forfeiture of his right to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s death during the pendency of a direct appeal to the Appellate Division abates the appeal and all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception, requiring the conviction to be vacated and the indictment dismissed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the death of the defendant places him beyond the court’s power to enforce or reverse the judgment of conviction, thereby preventing effective appellate review of the validity of the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Mintz, 20 NY2d 753, to support its holding. The court reiterated the principle that a defendant’s death during a direct appeal renders the appeal moot and requires the dismissal of the indictment. The court reasoned that death prevents effective appellate review. As the court stated in Mintz, “If affirmed, the judgment of conviction could not be enforced and, if reversed, there is no person to try. Therefore, the appeal should not be heard but, since it cannot be heard, it can never be determined whether the judgment of conviction would stand, and this requires that the judgment of conviction be vacated and the indictment dismissed.”

    The People argued that the defendant’s suicide should be considered a waiver or forfeiture of his right to appeal. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant waives their right to appeal through other actions. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment, emphasizing that the defendant’s death rendered the appellate process ineffective.

  • People v. Farinaro, 36 N.Y.2d 284 (1975): Right to Counsel on Appeal for Traffic Infractions

    People v. Farinaro, 36 N.Y.2d 284 (1975)

    There is no constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether indigent defendants have a right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions. In these consolidated cases, the defendants were convicted of traffic infractions and sought assigned counsel for their appeals. The Court held that neither the U.S. Constitution, the New York Constitution, nor state statutes mandate the assignment of counsel in such cases, especially when the defendant no longer faces imprisonment. The Court reasoned that traffic infractions are qualitatively different from criminal prosecutions where imprisonment is a potential outcome, distinguishing them from cases requiring counsel.

    Facts

    Defendants were convicted of traffic infractions in the trial court. In one case, the defendant pleaded guilty, and in the other two, the convictions followed trials. Each defendant had assigned counsel at the trial level. The defendants then sought to appeal their convictions and requested the assignment of counsel at public expense for the appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants of traffic infractions. The defendants then appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing they were entitled to assigned counsel for the appeal. The Appellate Term denied their request. The cases then went before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether indigent defendants have a constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal from a conviction for a traffic infraction, where the defendant no longer faces the possibility of imprisonment.

    Holding

    No, because there is no statutory or constitutional right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s orders, holding that there is no statutory right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions under New York’s County Law § 722-a and CPL 170.10, subd. 3, par. (c). The Court relied on its prior holding in People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, which established that the New York State Constitution does not require assigning counsel in such prosecutions. The Court distinguished Argersinger v. Hamlin, which mandated counsel where a conviction could lead to imprisonment, noting that the defendants in these cases no longer faced imprisonment. The court stated, “It is not persuasive to extrapolate ‘equal protection reasoning to such abstract “rights to appeal” from convictions for traffic infractions, without any showing of merit or likelihood of merit. This is especially true where the defendant no longer faces any loss of liberty, but is only exposed to adverse ‘points’ in the event of future traffic infractions.” The Court reasoned that if a defendant had counsel at trial, they or their lawyer should be able to suggest any errors meriting appeal. The Court also noted the situation is “even more ludicrous” when a defendant pleads guilty and then tries to appeal. The court emphasized that the possibility of accumulating points on a driver’s license as a result of the infraction does not create a compelling equal protection argument for assigning counsel on appeal.

  • People v. Del Rio, 16 N.Y.2d 163 (1965): Effect of Deportation and Parole Agreement on Appeal Rights

    People v. Del Rio, 16 N.Y.2d 163 (1965)

    A defendant who accepts a commutation of sentence and parole, conditioned on remaining outside the jurisdiction, forfeits the right to appeal the underlying conviction.

    Summary

    Del Rio was convicted of murder. While his appeal was pending, he accepted a commutation of his sentence and parole, conditioned on his deportation to Cuba and agreement never to return to the United States. The New York Court of Appeals held that by accepting these terms, Del Rio abandoned his right to appeal. The court reasoned that because Del Rio was no longer within the jurisdiction and had agreed to remain outside it, his appeal would be futile, as he would not be available for a new trial if one were ordered. This decision underscores the principle that a defendant cannot simultaneously seek to overturn a conviction while accepting the benefits of a conditional release that requires their absence from the jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Francisco Molina del Rio was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 years to life in prison.

    While his appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, the U.S. Department of Justice sought his release to secure the release of American citizens imprisoned in Cuba.

    The Governor of New York commuted Del Rio’s sentence, contingent on his voluntary acceptance of the terms, which included deportation to Cuba and a promise never to return to the United States.

    Del Rio signed a parole release agreement, accepting these conditions, and was deported to Cuba.

    Despite being in Cuba, Del Rio later requested that his appeal be pursued.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Del Rio of murder in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals initially dismissed Del Rio’s appeal as moot after he was deported.

    The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal based on mistaken information that Del Rio had not consented to the commutation and deportation.

    Upon learning that Del Rio had voluntarily accepted the commutation and deportation terms, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who accepts a commutation of sentence and parole, conditioned on remaining outside the jurisdiction, retains the right to appeal the underlying conviction.

    Holding

    No, because by accepting the commutation and parole with the condition that he remain outside the United States, Del Rio waived and abandoned his right to appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in People v. Genet, which held that court proceedings on behalf of a person charged with a felony cannot be taken unless the defendant is in actual or constructive custody.

    The court acknowledged differing views on whether an appeal should be dismissed or suspended when a defendant absconds, but noted a consensus that an absconding defendant-appellant may not have the appeal heard.

    The court reasoned that hearing the appeal would be futile because if a new trial were ordered, Del Rio would not be present to answer further.

    The court distinguished this case from Eighmy v. People, which held that acceptance of a pardon does not deprive a defendant of the right to appeal, because Del Rio’s case involved a condition of exile from the state, making his situation analogous to escaping or absconding.

    The court stated that Del Rio, “in consideration of the commutation of his long sentence and of his release from prison solemnly agreed that he would go at once to Cuba and never again enter the United States. He has ever since been in Cuba and from Cuba he has written his lawyer that he desires the appeal to be pressed. The difficulty with the latter request is that, in reason and on the precedents, he must be held to have abandoned the appeal and deliberately to have waived and foregone his right to have the appeal heard and decided.”

  • People v. Brown, 13 N.Y.2d 201 (1963): Coram Nobis Unavailable When Mental Competency Was Previously Adjudicated

    People v. Brown, 13 N.Y.2d 201 (1963)

    Coram nobis is not available to challenge a conviction based on a claim of mental incompetence at trial when that issue was raised, considered, and decided by the trial court, and the defendant had the opportunity to appeal that determination.

    Summary

    Brown was convicted of first-degree robbery. During the trial, his attorney raised concerns about Brown’s mental competency. The trial judge, relying on his observations and psychiatric reports, found Brown competent. Brown appealed, arguing the denial of a psychiatric exam was error, but the conviction was affirmed. Later, Brown sought a writ of error coram nobis, claiming he was insane during the trial. The Court of Appeals held that coram nobis was inappropriate because the issue of Brown’s mental competency had already been raised and decided during the trial, and he had the opportunity to appeal that decision. Coram nobis is not a substitute for direct appeal.

    Facts

    Brown was indicted for first-degree robbery and initially found unfit to stand trial due to insanity, resulting in his commitment to Matteawan State Hospital. After being certified as sane, he was returned for trial. During the trial, Brown exhibited outbursts, leading his counsel to suggest he might be mentally deranged and requesting a psychiatric examination. The trial judge denied these motions, relying on personal observations and psychiatric reports indicating Brown was competent.

    Procedural History

    1. Brown was convicted of first-degree robbery in Westchester County Court.
    2. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the denial of a psychiatric examination was erroneous; the Appellate Division affirmed.
    3. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied.
    4. Brown, while confined in Dannemora State Hospital, petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming insanity during the trial and sentencing; the Westchester County Court denied the petition without a hearing.
    5. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the coram nobis petition.
    6. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether coram nobis is an appropriate remedy to challenge a conviction when the defendant claims mental incompetence at the time of trial, but the issue of competence was raised, considered, and decided by the trial court and was subject to direct appeal.

    Holding

    No, because coram nobis is not a substitute for direct appeal when the issue of the defendant’s mental state was already raised and decided by the trial court, and the correctness of that determination could have been tested on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that coram nobis is an “emergency measure born of necessity” and not a substitute for an appeal or a motion for a new trial. It is available only when no other avenue of judicial relief exists. The court distinguished cases where the issue of mental condition was not presented at trial and could not have been raised on appeal, making coram nobis the only available remedy (e.g., People v. Boundy). Here, the question of Brown’s mental capacity was central during the trial. The judge considered psychiatric reports and his own observations before concluding Brown was competent. The court stated that even if the judge’s evaluation was incorrect, it doesn’t warrant using coram nobis to revisit an issue already decided and reviewable on direct appeal. The court also noted that Brown’s subsequent certification as mentally ill after his conviction should have been raised via a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, not coram nobis. The court emphasized that “coram nobis ‘may not be used as a vehicle for an additional appeal or a belated motion for a new trial.’”