New York Law Review

Tag: Apartment Building

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002): Duty to Retreat in Multi-Dwelling Buildings

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)

    In determining whether a defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense within a multi-unit dwelling, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant exercised exclusive possession and control over the area in question.

    Summary

    Hernandez, a building superintendent, was convicted of manslaughter after fatally shooting a visitor in the lobby of his apartment building. At trial, Hernandez argued self-defense, claiming the victim attacked him. He requested a jury instruction stating he had no duty to retreat because the incident occurred in his “dwelling.” The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that common areas like lobbies and stairwells in multi-unit dwellings are not considered part of a person’s “dwelling” for the purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i), unless the defendant exercises exclusive control over that area.

    Facts

    Hernandez was the superintendent of a six-story apartment building, residing in a first-floor apartment. He shot and killed James Carter, a guest of a tenant, in the building. Witnesses testified that Hernandez used racial slurs against Carter after Carter complained about needed repairs. An altercation ensued on the stairwell. Hernandez retrieved a sawed-off shotgun from his apartment and shot Carter. Hernandez claimed Carter attacked him in the lobby and that the gun discharged accidentally during the struggle. The building had a history of drug activity, and the front door was often broken.

    Procedural History

    Hernandez was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying Hernandez’s request for a jury instruction that he had no duty to retreat because the lobby and stairwell of his apartment building constituted part of his “dwelling” under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the lobby and stairwell of a multi-unit apartment building, absent evidence of the defendant’s exclusive possession and control over those areas, do not constitute part of the defendant’s “dwelling” for purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “dwelling” in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i) refers to a person’s residence, and its definition must consider various living arrangements. The critical factor is the extent to which the defendant exercises exclusive possession and control over the area. The Court distinguished the definition of “dwelling” under Penal Law article 140 (burglary offenses), which includes common areas in multi-unit buildings, noting that § 35.20 explicitly refers to the definitions in article 140, while § 35.15 does not. Quoting from People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240 (1914), the Court acknowledged the traditional rule that a person assailed in their dwelling has no duty to retreat. However, it emphasized that this exception applies only to areas under the defendant’s exclusive control. The Court found that because the lobby and stairwell were used by all tenants and their guests, Hernandez did not have exclusive possession and control over those areas. The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s reasoning that focused on the security of the building, stating that the duty to retreat should not depend on how well-protected the area is, but rather on the extent of exclusive control. The court stated: “the determination of whether a particular location is part of a defendant’s dwelling depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question.”

  • Ansonia Associates v. Ansonia Residents’ Assn., 66 N.Y.2d 1032 (1985): Agency Authority to Classify Buildings Under Rent Stabilization Law

    Ansonia Associates v. Ansonia Residents’ Assn., 66 N.Y.2d 1032 (1985)

    The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) has the authority to classify buildings as hotels or apartment houses under the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), and such classification is a prerequisite to determining whether specific units are exempt from RSL coverage.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of New York City’s Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) and the rights of tenants to lease renewals. The landlord sought to terminate tenancies, claiming the building was a hotel with decontrolled units. The tenants argued it was an apartment building subject to RSL. The Court of Appeals held that the DHCR has the express authority to classify buildings as hotels or apartment houses, and this classification must occur before determining if individual units are exempt based on rental ceilings. The lower courts erred in ruling on exemption before DHCR classification.

    Facts

    The defendant, Ansonia Associates, served 30-day notices to the plaintiff tenants, terminating their tenancies on July 28, 1983. Ansonia Associates argued that the tenants occupied decontrolled dwelling units within a hotel and thus lacked lease renewal rights. The tenants, Ansonia Residents’ Association, commenced an action seeking a judgment declaring the building an apartment building subject to RSL coverage. They also requested referral to the Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) for a determination of the building’s status under RSL.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the tenants’ motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the landlord’s cross-motion to dismiss, finding the building exempt from RSL. The Appellate Division affirmed. Subsequently, the DHCR determined in an unrelated proceeding that the building was an apartment house subject to RSL coverage. The tenants moved for reargument before the Appellate Division, submitting the DHCR ruling, but the motion was denied. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the DHCR has the authority under Section YY51-3.1 (b) of the Rent Stabilization Law to classify buildings as hotels or apartment houses, and whether this classification is a necessary prerequisite to determining if individual units are exempt from RSL coverage under Section YY51-3.1 (a).

    Holding

    Yes, because Section YY51-3.1 (b) expressly vests authority in the DHCR to classify buildings as hotels or apartment houses, and this classification must precede any determination of exemption under Section YY51-3.1 (a).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the lower courts misinterpreted Section YY51-3.1 of the Rent Stabilization Law. The court emphasized that Section YY51-3.1 (b) explicitly grants the DHCR the power to classify buildings as either hotels or apartment houses. The court stated that the DHCR’s classification is a necessary first step before applying the rental ceiling exemption in Section YY51-3.1 (a). The court reasoned that “a determination that certain hotel units are exempt can be made, pursuant to section YY51-3.1 (a), only after the building has been classified as a hotel by DHCR under subdivision (b).” The court rejected the argument that the DHCR’s authority was limited to units previously covered by RSL before the 1983 amendment. The practical implication of this ruling is that landlords cannot unilaterally declare their buildings as hotels and deny tenants RSL protections without prior DHCR classification. The determination of whether tenants have renewal rights depends on the DHCR’s initial classification of the building. This case clarifies the agency’s role and ensures consistent application of the Rent Stabilization Law.