New York Law Review

Tag: Antommarchi right

  • People v. Flinn, 22 N.Y.3d 600 (2014): Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Right by Counsel

    People v. Flinn, 22 N.Y.3d 600 (2014)

    A defendant’s right to be present during bench conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived both implicitly by the defendant’s conduct and explicitly by defense counsel, even when the waiver is stated outside the defendant’s immediate hearing.

    Summary

    Flinn was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to jury selection, the trial judge informed the defendant that he was welcome to attend bench conferences. Defense counsel later stated, outside of the defendant’s hearing, that Flinn had waived his right to be present at these conferences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Flinn implicitly waived his Antommarchi right by not attending the conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement. The Court reasoned that attorneys can waive this right on behalf of their clients.

    Facts

    The trial judge informed Flinn that he was welcome to attend bench conferences during jury selection.
    During a bench conference, defense counsel stated that Flinn had waived his right to attend these conferences.
    Flinn did not attend any of the bench conferences during voir dire.

    Procedural History

    Flinn was convicted of attempted murder in the trial court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant validly waived his right under People v. Antommarchi to be present during bench conferences at which prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire, both implicitly through his actions and explicitly through his counsel’s statement made outside his hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant implicitly waived his right by choosing not to attend the bench conferences after being informed he was welcome, and explicitly waived it through his counsel’s statement to the court. The Court has repeatedly held that counsel can waive a client’s Antommarchi right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that Flinn implicitly waived his right, similar to the situation in People v. Williams, because he was informed he was “welcome to attend” the bench conferences and chose not to. The Court reasoned that the critical point was that Flinn understood he was free to attend if he wanted to.

    Regarding the explicit waiver, the Court relied on prior holdings in cases like People v. Velasquez and People v. Keen, stating that a lawyer may waive the Antommarchi right of their client. The Court dismissed the argument that the waiver was invalid because the lawyer’s statement was made outside Flinn’s hearing, emphasizing that lawyers are trusted to explain rights to their clients and accurately report the outcome of those discussions to the court. The Court stated, “[T]he premise of Velasquez and Keen is that a lawyer may be trusted to explain rights to his or her client, and to report to the court the result of that discussion.”

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Establishing Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived by counsel, and the trial court is not required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defendants’ rights to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors were violated. In People v. Foster, the Court held that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of his absence from a robing room conference. In People v. Velasquez, the Court found that the defendant validly waived his right to be present, even without a direct colloquy with the court. The Court affirmed both convictions, emphasizing that while a direct colloquy wasn’t required for a valid waiver, greater attention should be paid to recording a defendant’s presence or absence to avoid future disputes.

    Facts

    In People v. Foster, during jury selection, the trial court informed prospective jurors that those with concerns would be invited individually into the robing room with the attorneys. The transcript didn’t explicitly record Foster’s presence. In People v. Velasquez, after a bench conference, defense counsel stated, “Waived,” to which the court responded, “Antommarchi waived.” A prospective juror was questioned at a sidebar conference outside Velasquez’s presence.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions, with two justices dissenting in Velasquez. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Foster: Whether the defendant presented substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and establish his absence from a material stage of the trial.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences without a direct colloquy with the court.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Foster: No, because the defendant failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of court proceedings.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Yes, because a trial court is not required to engage the defendant in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    In People v. Foster, the Court relied on the presumption of regularity that attaches to judicial proceedings, which can only be overcome by substantial evidence. The Court stated that the absence of a specific record of the defendant’s presence, by itself, is insufficient to rebut this presumption. The Court declined to speculate based on the lack of explicit notation of presence.

    In People v. Velasquez, the Court held that defense counsel’s waiver, announced in open court, was sufficient. The Court reasoned that requiring a specific colloquy in every case would be overly burdensome. The court stated, “[T]here is no requirement that the Judge conduct a pro forma inquisition in each case on the off-chance that a defendant who is adequately represented by counsel . . . may nevertheless not know what he is doing” (quoting People v. Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 154 [1975]). The Court emphasized that the waiver occurred in the defendant’s presence, and the defendant didn’t object. The court emphasized, “While the better practice would have been to state the substance of the right being waived, nothing in the record calls into question the effectiveness of defendant’s waiver as announced by counsel…”

    The dissenting judge argued that a hearing should be held to determine if the defendants were present or made adequate waivers, as the record did not clearly show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be present during juror questioning. The dissent argued the presumption of regularity should not substitute for reconstructing the record.