New York Law Review

Tag: Anti-Discrimination Law

  • Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council, 79 N.Y.2d 227 (1992): Limits on Liability for Inciting Discrimination

    79 N.Y.2d 227 (1992)

    Advocacy against a group, even if it urges others to discriminate, does not constitute aiding, abetting, or inciting discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law or Civil Rights Law unless a direct connection exists between the advocacy and actual discriminatory conduct.

    Summary

    Jews for Jesus sued the Jewish Community Relations Council, alleging that a memorandum circulated by the Council urging rabbis to dissuade churches and catering establishments from renting space to Jews for Jesus constituted unlawful discrimination. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Council’s actions did not violate state anti-discrimination laws because the memorandum did not directly cause any discriminatory acts. The court reasoned that the memorandum was too far removed from potential unlawful conduct to be considered incitement, as it was directed at religious associates, not those capable of carrying out discriminatory acts.

    Facts

    The Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) distributed a memorandum to Long Island rabbis concerning the activities of Jews for Jesus. The memo identified Jews for Jesus as a Hebrew-Christian organization seeking to convert Jews to Christianity and urged the rabbis to contact Christian colleagues and catering establishments, asking them to disapprove or deny space to Jews for Jesus. No evidence showed that any recipient took action based on the memorandum, nor that any facility discriminated against Jews for Jesus.

    Procedural History

    Jews for Jesus filed suit, alleging violations of New York’s Civil Rights Law and Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court initially denied motions for summary judgment, but upon renewal, granted the JCRC’s motion, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the distribution of a memorandum urging religious associates to discourage others from providing services or space to a religious organization constitutes aiding, abetting, or inciting discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law and Civil Rights Law, even absent a showing of actual discriminatory conduct resulting from the memorandum.

    Holding

    No, because the memorandum was not directed to those in a position to carry out discriminatory practices and did not establish a sufficiently direct link between the speech and any potential discriminatory action. The conduct was too far removed to be considered incitement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on whether the JCRC’s actions constituted aiding, abetting, or inciting discrimination under Executive Law § 296(6). The Court assumed, without deciding, that attempting to incite discrimination was prohibited under the statute. However, the Court concluded that the memorandum did not violate the statute because it was directed at religious associates, not those capable of denying access to facilities. The Court reasoned that the JCRC’s conduct did not provide or attempt to provide assistance to those who could have denied access to Jews for Jesus. Moreover, the Court found that the JCRC’s actions did not rise to the level of incitement because the connection between the speech (the memorandum) and the potential discriminatory action was too attenuated. The Court emphasized that the memo asked associates to ask others to engage in prohibited conduct, which is not direct enough to establish incitement. The Court also dismissed claims under the Civil Rights Law, finding no denial of access to public accommodations or evidence that the memorandum aided or incited such a violation. Judge Kaye concurred, stating that while the statute was ambiguous, the better interpretation proscribes attempts to discriminate, not attempts to incite discrimination, and would dismiss the complaint on those grounds.

  • New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211 (1987): Defining ‘Distinctly Private’ Clubs Under Anti-Discrimination Law

    New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211 (1987)

    A municipality can define ‘distinctly private’ for purposes of its anti-discrimination laws, even if the state’s general human rights law doesn’t provide a specific definition, as long as the local law is consistent with the state law’s broader purpose and doesn’t conflict with existing state regulations or policies.

    Summary

    The New York State Club Association challenged New York City’s Local Law No. 63, which defined criteria for determining whether a private club was truly ‘distinctly private’ and thus exempt from the city’s anti-discrimination laws. The law stated that clubs with over 400 members providing regular meal service and receiving business-related payments from non-members were not ‘distinctly private.’ The Association argued the law was inconsistent with the state’s Human Rights Law and violated members’ constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the local law, finding it consistent with the state law’s purpose of preventing discrimination and a valid exercise of the city’s police power. The court reasoned that the state’s failure to define ‘distinctly private’ allowed the city to create its own definition to address specific local concerns.

    Facts

    New York City enacted Local Law No. 63 to address discrimination in private clubs. The law defined a club as not ‘distinctly private’ if it had more than 400 members, provided regular meal service, and received payments from non-members for business purposes. The New York State Club Association, representing numerous private clubs, sued the city, arguing the law was unconstitutional. Many of these clubs, according to the plaintiff’s affidavit, were intentionally organized along national origin, religious, ethnic, and gender lines.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Club Association initiated the lawsuit immediately after the Mayor signed Local Law No. 63, seeking a judgment declaring the law unconstitutional. The lower courts upheld the law. The New York State Club Association then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Local Law No. 63 is inconsistent with the State Human Rights Law, violating the “home rule” provision of the New York State Constitution?

    2. Whether Local Law No. 63 violates the club members’ rights to privacy, free speech, and association under the Federal Constitution?

    Holding

    1. No, because the State’s failure to define ‘distinctly private’ indicates a legislative intent to allow local governments to enact definitions consistent with the broad term and the local law supplements but does not contradict the state law.

    2. No, because the law does not unduly infringe on the club members’ freedom of intimate association, as it considers objective characteristics of the organizations, and any infringement on free speech rights is justified by the compelling governmental interest in eliminating discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the state’s Human Rights Law did not preempt the field of anti-discrimination legislation and that the city had the authority to regulate in this area as long as the regulation was consistent with state law. The court distinguished this case from situations where local laws prohibit what is permissible under state law, noting that the state’s Human Rights Law did not mandate an exemption for clubs meeting the criteria in Local Law No. 63. The court stated: “Indeed, the State’s failure to define the term ‘distinctly private’ suggests a legislative intent to allow local governments to enact pursuant to the municipal home rule power definitions that are not inconsistent with the meaning of this broad term.”

    Regarding the constitutional challenge, the court found that the law did not violate the members’ rights to privacy, free speech, or association. The court applied the Supreme Court’s framework from Roberts v. United States Jaycees, noting that the city’s interest in eliminating discrimination was a compelling governmental interest that justified any incidental infringement on protected rights. The court quoted Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) stating that the City has a compelling interest in assuring to women and minorities equal access to “advantages” and “privileges” such as “‘[leadership skills, * * * business contacts and employment promotions’”. The court also emphasized that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose, affecting only clubs that were large and engaged in substantial business-related activities with non-members.