New York Law Review

Tag: Anonymous v. Andrews

  • Anonymous v. Andrews, 49 A.D.2d 423 (1975): Limits on Article 78 Proceedings in Criminal Matters

    Anonymous v. Andrews, 49 A.D.2d 423 (1975)

    Article 78 proceedings are generally not available to review alleged errors or defects in pending criminal actions, especially concerning prosecutorial misconduct, unless the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or exceeds its jurisdictional powers.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an Article 78 proceeding (prohibition) is an appropriate method to challenge alleged prosecutorial misconduct in a pending criminal case. The petitioner argued that the Special Prosecutor’s actions in simulating a crime to investigate corruption warranted terminating the perjury actions against him. The Court of Appeals held that Article 78 relief was inappropriate because the trial court had jurisdiction, and the alleged misconduct, while potentially relevant as a defense, did not divest the court of its fundamental power to hear the case. The Court emphasized that orderly procedure dictates that such challenges be raised within the existing criminal action, not through collateral proceedings.

    Facts

    A Special Prosecutor, investigating judicial corruption, orchestrated a simulated robbery (the “Vitale” case) without the knowledge of the court or the District Attorney. This simulation aimed to create a scenario where judges and intermediaries might solicit bribes. The petitioner was subsequently indicted for perjury based on testimony given during the investigation related to the simulated robbery. The petitioner sought to halt the perjury prosecution, arguing the Special Prosecutor’s deceptive tactics tainted the entire case.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the perjury prosecution. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, also seeking review of the denial of a motion made under Section 149 of the Judiciary Law (related to the conduct of the Grand Jury).

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is an appropriate method to review alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred outside the scope of the pending criminal action, where the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
    2. Whether the denial of a motion made pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 149 of the Judiciary Law is separately appealable.

    Holding

    1. No, because Article 78 proceedings are inappropriate to review errors or defects within a pending criminal action when the court has jurisdiction; the alleged misconduct should be raised as a defense within the criminal action itself.
    2. No, because the denial of such a motion is not separately appealable, and an Article 78 proceeding cannot be used to bypass this non-appealability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Article 78 relief (prohibition) is reserved for instances where a court acts outside its jurisdiction or exceeds its powers. Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over the perjury charges. The alleged prosecutorial misconduct, while concerning, did not affect the court’s fundamental power to hear the case. The Court emphasized the importance of orderly procedure in criminal matters, stating that challenges to evidence or prosecutorial tactics should be raised within the criminal action itself, such as through motions to suppress evidence. Allowing Article 78 proceedings in these circumstances would disrupt the established process and encourage piecemeal appeals. The court cited Matter of State of New York v. King, noting that even serious errors should be addressed through established criminal procedure. The Court also addressed the attempt to appeal the denial of the Judiciary Law motion, emphasizing that such intermediate determinations are not appealable and cannot be circumvented via an Article 78 proceeding. The court also declined to rule on the validity of a perjury prosecution where the proceeding was designed solely to produce perjury, stating this issue involved questions of fact and should be raised as a defense in the criminal action. The court acknowledged the disadvantages of delaying resolution of intermediate issues, but reiterated that criminal actions are designed to dispose of all issues within the action itself, discouraging appeals except from a final judgment. As Chief Judge Breitel stated, “[R]espect for the rule of law which would be required of the Special Prosecutor is appropriate here too. Hence, judicial restraint must be applied in this proceeding.”

  • Anonymous v. Andrews, 36 N.Y.2d 270 (1975): Evasive Testimony and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

    Anonymous v. Andrews, 36 N.Y.2d 270 (1975)

    Testimony coerced from a public employee by threat of job forfeiture can be used in a civil contempt proceeding for acts committed during the testimony, such as giving evasive answers, even if it cannot be used in a criminal prosecution for past crimes.

    Summary

    Two New York City policemen, subpoenaed to testify about police memo book entries, claimed they couldn’t remember the circumstances of the entries, despite acknowledging their handwriting. The Commissioner of Investigation sought to have them jailed for contempt. The Court of Appeals held that their responses were evasive and equivalent to refusing to answer. It further held that the officers’ testimony, though compelled under threat of job loss, could be used in a contempt proceeding for their evasiveness, distinguishing it from using such testimony in a criminal prosecution for prior wrongdoing.

    Facts

    Appellants, New York City policemen, were subpoenaed to testify before the Commissioner of Investigation regarding entries in police memo books. They were informed of their right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, but also that refusing to answer questions related to their duties would result in dismissal. They identified entries as their own, but claimed they could not remember the circumstances or purpose of the entries. The memo book form was relatively new, having been introduced in 1968. The investigator believed the entries were part of a common scheme among officers.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner moved for an order committing the appellants to jail for contempt. Special Term denied the motion, quashing the subpoenas, arguing the Commissioner lacked authority to grant immunity and thus could not compel testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petition for commitment, finding the responses evasive and a de facto refusal to answer without claiming privilege. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Were the responses given by the appellants so evasive as to amount to a refusal to answer a legal and pertinent question?
    2. If the responses were equivalent to a refusal to answer, can those responses be the basis for a contempt proceeding against appellants, given that the testimony was compelled under threat of job loss?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the appellants did not make bona fide efforts to answer the questions put to them and, consequently, refused to answer legal and pertinent questions without reasonable cause.
    2. Yes, because the exclusionary rule, designed to alleviate the adverse effects of unconstitutional coercion, does not bar the use of such compelled testimony in a contempt proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined the officers’ memory lapse regarding the memo book entries was incredible and obstructive to the investigation, especially given the relatively recent introduction of the form and the likely existence of a common scheme. Quoting United States v. Appel, the court stated, “If the witness’ conduct shows beyond any doubt whatever that he is refusing to tell what he knows, he is in contempt of court.”

    Distinguishing Garrity v. New Jersey, the court explained that Garrity addressed the use of compelled testimony in criminal prosecutions for crimes committed prior to the testimony. The present case concerned a contempt proceeding for acts (evasive answers) committed during the testimony. The court emphasized the general rule that statutory immunity doesn’t bar the use of compelled testimony in subsequent contempt proceedings.

    The court cited Wigmore: “the perjured utterance [or the utterance which amounts to a refusal to answer] is not ‘evidence’ or ‘testimony’ to a crime but is the very act of crime itself.” The court relied on People v. Tomasello and People v. Ianniello, which held that the exclusionary rule doesn’t prevent a defendant from being convicted of perjury or held in contempt based on grand jury testimony. The court reasoned that the exclusionary rules, like those in People v. Steuding and Garrity, aim to prevent coercion, but they do not shield a witness from the consequences of committing a new wrong (like contempt) while testifying.