New York Law Review

Tag: anonymous tip

  • People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014): Anonymous Tips and Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014)

    An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability under the totality of the circumstances or satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for police stops based on anonymous tips. The Court of Appeals considered three separate cases with similar fact patterns. In Argyris and DiSalvo, the Court upheld the vehicle stops based on a 911 call reporting a gun in a car. In Johnson, the court suppressed evidence from a stop initiated by a 911 call about a possible intoxicated driver. The key issue was whether the anonymous tips provided reasonable suspicion for the stops. The majority found the Argyris/DiSalvo tip reliable but the Johnson tip unreliable, though different justices disagreed on the appropriate standard to apply (totality of the circumstances vs. Aguilar-Spinelli). The decision underscores the complexities of relying on anonymous tips for law enforcement action and the ongoing debate in New York regarding the proper legal framework for assessing the reliability of such tips.

    Facts

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: An anonymous 911 caller reported seeing men put a gun in a black Mustang. Police located the car and stopped it, finding weapons. </p>
    <p>Johnson: An anonymous 911 caller reported a possible intoxicated driver in a blue BMW. A deputy stopped the car after observing a minor traffic violation outside his jurisdiction.</p>

    Procedural History

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: The trial court initially granted a motion to suppress but reversed itself on reargument. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
    <p>Johnson: The Town Court denied a motion to suppress. County Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the accusatory instrument.</p>

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop.

    2. What standard should be used to determine the reliability of an anonymous tip: totality of the circumstances or the Aguilar-Spinelli test?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the tip had sufficient indicia of reliability (Argyris/DiSalvo) but no, because the tip was unreliable (Johnson).

    2. The court did not come to a consensus. Four judges found reasonable suspicion, agreeing that the tip in Argyris/DiSalvo was reliable and the tip in Johnson was not; Smith and Pigott, JJ., favored the totality of the circumstances test and Abdus-Salaam and Graffeo, JJ., favored the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Read, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion stating, essentially, the anonymous tips must contain “predictive information”. Rivera, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion emphasizing that predictive information must be provided in the tip.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority memorandum opinion stated that regardless of whether they apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, record support exists for the lower courts’ findings that the stops were lawful in Argyris and DiSalvo. They stated that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants’ vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. The absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability under these circumstances.

    Smith, J., concurring, argued that the Aguilar-Spinelli test needlessly complicates reasonable suspicion analysis and that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable.

    Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring, advocated for the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, suggesting that hearsay information cannot provide an officer with probable cause unless the hearsay report reveals a reliable basis for the informant’s knowledge and shows that the informant is generally credible. Furthermore, the determination of whether a tip provides the police with probable cause or reasonable suspicion depends on the quality of the tip’s description of the crime itself, as opposed to its statements regarding the suspect’s physical appearance and non-criminal conduct.

    Read, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, emphasized the importance of predictive information in anonymous tips. She stated, “We have held that an anonymous tip supplies reasonable suspicion only if it ‘contains predictive information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’ (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]; see generally Rivera dissenting op at 14-18 [discussing Moore]).”

    Rivera, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, argued that anonymous tips must contain predictive information to justify forcible stops and that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring the informant is reliable and there is a basis for the knowledge of the informant’s tip, should be used. "[A]n anonymous tip must ‘contain[] predictive information — such as information of criminal behavior — so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’" (

  • People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006): Anonymous Tip Plus Evasion Insufficient for Reasonable Suspicion

    6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006)

    An anonymous tip, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; reasonable suspicion requires predictive information or observation of suspicious conduct.

    Summary

    Police officers, responding to an anonymous tip about a Black male with a gun, approached the defendant, who matched the description and began walking away. The officers drew their guns and ordered him to stop. The defendant then reached towards his waistband, and a subsequent search revealed a firearm. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the gun should have been suppressed because the initial gunpoint stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip, lacking predictive information, and the defendant’s act of walking away did not establish the necessary level of suspicion for a forcible stop under established Fourth Amendment principles.

    Facts

    On November 12, 1997, police officers received an anonymous radio call regarding a dispute involving a Black male with a gun, described as approximately 18 years old, wearing a gray jacket and red hat.
    The officers arrived at the scene within one minute and observed the defendant, who matched the description, but no dispute was in progress.
    As the officers approached, the defendant began to walk away.
    Without any verbal inquiry, the officers drew their guns and ordered the defendant to stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the gun.
    Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s movement toward his waistband justified the frisk.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, combined with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a forcible stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because an anonymous tip lacking predictive information, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; such a stop requires a higher level of suspicion based on predictive information from the tip or independent observation of suspicious conduct by the officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the four-level test from People v. De Bour, which distinguishes between permissible police encounters based on the level of suspicion. Here, the gunpoint stop constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.
    An anonymous tip alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion unless it contains predictive information that allows police to test the tip’s reliability, as established in Florida v. J.L. and People v. William II. The Court emphasized, “[R]easonable suspicion ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
    Defendant’s act of walking away from the police, while potentially generating a common-law right of inquiry, did not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop. The Court noted that “[T]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them . . . without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (quoting People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728 (1992)).
    Elevating a common-law inquiry to a forcible stop based solely on walking away would eliminate the “right to be let alone.” Additional information or observations of suspicious conduct are necessary to justify a forcible stop.
    The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the combination of the anonymous tip and evasion created reasonable suspicion, asserting that a forcible stop requires more than just the possibility of a crime; it requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.

  • People v. William II, 98 N.Y.2d 93 (2002): Anonymous Tips and Reasonable Suspicion for Stop and Frisk

    98 N.Y.2d 93 (2002)

    An anonymous tip, even with a detailed description of a suspect, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk unless it includes predictive information that demonstrates the tipster’s knowledge or is corroborated by independent police observation of suspicious conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an anonymous tip, providing a description of an individual allegedly carrying a weapon, provides reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk. In People v. William II, police acted on an anonymous tip to stop and frisk a suspect and his companions. In People v. Rodriguez, police stopped a vehicle based on a tip describing a passenger. The Court held that without predictive information or independent corroboration of illegal activity, the anonymous tips did not justify the police intrusions. This decision reinforces the principle that reasonable suspicion requires more than just a description; it demands reliability in the assertion of illegality.

    Facts

    In William II, police received an anonymous tip that “Will” was involved in a recent drive-by shooting, providing a physical description and location. Officers found a person matching the description, Cruz, with two companions, including William II. Despite observing that Cruz was not dressed in a way that could conceal a weapon, police ordered him to be frisked. William II fled. The suppression court noted the officer had no reason to believe Cruz handed William II the weapon. William II was apprehended, and a search of his backpack revealed marihuana and drug paraphernalia.

    In Rodriguez, police received an anonymous report of a light-skinned male Hispanic in a checkered shirt carrying a gun. Two hours later, they spotted Rodriguez, who matched the description, entering a car. They stopped the car, and Rodriguez dropped a gun from the window.

    Procedural History

    In William II, the County Court denied William II’s motion to suppress evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the gun. The Appellate Division reversed, and the People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip providing a description of an individual allegedly carrying a weapon, without predictive information or independent corroboration of suspicious behavior, constitutes reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk.

    2. Whether a traffic stop based solely on an anonymous tip describing a passenger in the vehicle is justified when there is no independent indication of criminal activity.

    Holding

    1. No, because the anonymous tip lacked predictive information or independent corroboration of illegal activity to provide reasonable suspicion for attempting to frisk William II.

    2. No, because without more, the tip could not provide reasonable suspicion to stop the car.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Florida v. J.L., which held that an anonymous tip requires reliability in its assertion of illegality, not just in identifying a person. The Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion requires a “quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand”. In William II, the tip lacked predictive information, and police observed that Cruz could not have concealed a weapon. Moreover, there was no reason to believe the weapon was transferred to William II. The Court quoted Terry v. Ohio, stating that the inquiry is “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Since the initial stop was unjustified, the evidence obtained was inadmissible.

    In Rodriguez, the Court found the stop unlawful based solely on the anonymous tip. The Court also determined that the gun could not be deemed abandoned because the stop itself was illegal, directly connecting to the unlawful stop. The court pointed to the arresting officer’s testimony who stated that he did not know it was a gypsy cab when he first stopped the vehicle.

  • People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988): Anonymous Tip Justifying a Stop and Frisk

    People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988)

    An anonymous tip, corroborated by independent observations, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, coupled with the presence of the suspect in a high-crime area at night, can establish a sufficient predicate for a police officer to conduct a pat-down frisk for weapons.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, holding that the arresting officer’s frisk, which revealed a .22 caliber revolver, was justified. The officer acted on an anonymous tip describing a black male with a gun at a specific location, wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon hooded sweatshirt. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer found the defendant, who matched the description, among a group of people. The court reasoned that the corroborated tip, combined with the circumstances (nighttime in a high-crime area), provided reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk for the officer’s safety and the safety of others.

    Facts

    An anonymous tip was received describing a black male with a gun at the intersection of South Fifth Avenue and West Third Street in Mount Vernon. The tipster stated that the man was wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon sweatshirt with a hood. The arresting officer arrived at the location and observed approximately 25 people. The defendant was the only person who matched the description provided in the anonymous tip. The officer approached the defendant and directed him to place his hands on the hood of a nearby car. The officer then conducted a pat-down frisk of the defendant’s outer clothing, which resulted in the discovery of a .22 caliber revolver.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after pleading guilty. The defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer’s frisk was not justified. A suppression hearing was held where the circumstances of the arrest and frisk were examined. The trial court upheld the search and seizure. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police observation, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, is sufficient to justify a police officer’s pat-down frisk of the suspect for weapons, particularly when the suspect is found in a high-crime area at night.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the anonymous tip, and the encounter occurred at night in a high-crime area, creating a reasonable basis to believe the suspect was armed and posed a threat to the officer and others in the vicinity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals weighed the degree of intrusion against the circumstances. The court cited People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, emphasizing that any inquiry into police conduct must balance the intrusion against the precipitating and attending circumstances. The court also cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, which holds that a frisk for weapons is permissible when an officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed. The court emphasized the officer’s duty to investigate the report, citing People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 374, and People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 270. The court highlighted the corroboration of the anonymous tip through the officer’s independent observations, referencing People v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832. The court noted the late hour and the location being a high-crime area, citing People v. Bronston, 68 N.Y.2d 880, 881, and People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 902. The court stated that because there was evidence to support the hearing court’s finding that there was a sufficient predicate for the officer’s interference with the defendant to secure the safety of the officer and others, the court’s review process was at an end, citing People v. Jones, 69 N.Y.2d 853, 855. The court determined that, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were reasonable and justified to ensure safety, therefore affirming the lower court’s decision to allow the evidence.

  • People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980): Justification for Stop and Frisk Based on Anonymous Tip

    People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980)

    An anonymous tip, when corroborated by independent observation of the suspect matching the tip’s description in the specified location, can provide reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk.

    Summary

    In People v. Benjamin, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a stop and frisk based on an anonymous tip. Police officers, acting on a tip that a man matching a specific description and carrying a gun was in a nearby building, encountered the defendant who fit the description in the location indicated. The defendant failed to respond to the officers’ questions, leading them to conduct a pat-down search, which revealed a loaded pistol. The court held that the corroborated anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and frisk, emphasizing the immediacy and specificity of the information received and the officers’ prompt corroboration.

    Facts

    On April 17, 1978, two police officers were on foot patrol in a New York City apartment complex. An unidentified person approached them and reported seeing a man with a gun in the hallway of the adjacent building. The informant described the man as white, 20-22 years old, and wearing a brown, short-waisted jacket. Within approximately 20 seconds, the officers entered the hallway and observed the defendant, who was the only person present and matched the description provided by the informant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with a crime related to the possession of the weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence (the gun) arguing that the stop and frisk was unlawful. The suppression court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Division affirmed this determination, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated by the police’s observation of a suspect matching the tip’s description in the location specified, provides reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers independently verified the descriptive details provided in the anonymous tip, and the defendant’s silence in response to questioning further contributed to a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the police officers acted on specific information concerning an individual with a gun in a particular location. The officers corroborated the anonymous tip within seconds by observing the defendant, who matched the description, in the exact location provided. The court highlighted the immediacy of the situation and the potential danger involved. The defendant’s silence when asked to identify himself and explain his presence further heightened the officers’ suspicion. The court implicitly balanced the individual’s right to privacy against the public’s interest in safety and crime prevention. The court found that the totality of the circumstances – the corroborated tip, the defendant’s presence in the specified location, and his failure to respond to questioning – provided the requisite reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. The court stated that the suppression court’s determination, affirmed by the Appellate Division, was not erroneous as a matter of law.

  • People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980): Justification for Stop and Frisk Based on Radio Call and On-Site Observation

    People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 25 (1980)

    A police officer’s right to frisk a suspect depends on whether a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of a stop and frisk. Police received a radio call about men with guns at a specific location. Upon arriving, they observed the defendant making a suspicious movement, reaching towards his waistband. The officer, fearing the defendant had a gun, conducted a pat-down search, revealing a loaded weapon. The New York Court of Appeals held that the totality of circumstances, including the radio call and the defendant’s behavior, provided reasonable suspicion for the frisk, reversing the Appellate Division’s suppression order. The court emphasized that officers need not ignore potential threats to their safety and can act based on reasonable inferences from observed behavior.

    Facts

    Officer Loran, while on patrol, received a radio report about men with guns at a certain location. Arriving at the scene, he saw a group of approximately 30 people. The defendant, standing on the sidewalk, stepped backward toward the curb and reached under his jacket towards his waistband with both hands. Officer Loran, fearing the defendant might have a gun, ordered him to keep his hands in view and conducted a pat-down, which revealed a loaded handgun.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the frisk violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant then pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence should have been suppressed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down search of the defendant, based on a radio report of men with guns at a specific location coupled with the defendant’s suspicious movements upon the officer’s arrival.

    Holding

    Yes, because considering the totality of the circumstances—the radio call reporting men with guns and the defendant’s act of stepping back while reaching towards his waistband—there was reasonable suspicion to justify the limited intrusion of a pat-down search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while an anonymous tip alone is insufficient for a stop and frisk, it can be considered along with other factors. The court emphasized that a police officer is not required to ignore potentially dangerous behavior simply because the initial radio call was insufficient to justify a search. The court stated, “A police officer directed to a location by a general radio call cannot reasonably be instructed to close his eyes to reality— neither the officer nor justice should be that blind.”

    The court found the defendant’s action of stepping back while reaching towards his waistband to be a significant factor. The court recognized the common knowledge that handguns are often carried in the waistband. It reasoned that a law-abiding person typically does not make such movements. Requiring the officer to assume the defendant’s conduct was innocent would be unrealistic and would put the officer at unnecessary risk. As the court stated, “It would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where an anonymous tip is the only basis for police action. Here, the officer’s observations at the scene provided additional justification for the frisk. The court cited Terry v. Ohio, emphasizing the officer’s need to protect himself and others when he has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.

    The court concluded that, considering all the circumstances, there was an “ample measure of reasonable suspicion” to justify the pat-down, reversing the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171 (1978): Search of Probationer Based on Anonymous Tip

    People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171 (1978)

    A probationer is constitutionally entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a search based solely on an anonymous tip, without any prior indication of unreliability, is unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s person, locker, and car, based solely on an anonymous tip, violated the probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court emphasized that while probationers have diminished expectations of privacy, they are still entitled to protection against unreasonable searches. The court found the search unreasonable because the probationer had not previously demonstrated unreliability, the source of the information was unknown, and the probation officers had ample time to obtain a warrant. The court also noted that state law required a court order for such a search unless incident to taking the probationer into custody.

    Facts

    Defendant Jackson was sentenced to five years of probation after pleading guilty to a weapon charge. About a year and a half later, Sergeant McBurney received an anonymous tip that Jackson, an employee at Xerox, possessed a weapon and was dealing drugs. The informant described Jackson’s car and license plate number. McBurney verified the car’s registration and Jackson’s probation status. McBurney informed Jackson’s probation officer, Petrovick. Petrovick and his supervisor decided to search Jackson at his workplace. They arrived at Xerox with McBurney, searched Jackson’s person, locker, and car, and found a handgun in the car.

    Procedural History

    A probation revocation proceeding was initiated, and Jackson was indicted for possessing a dangerous weapon. At the probation revocation hearing, Jackson challenged the legality of the search. The trial court upheld the search, revoked Jackson’s probation, and sentenced him to imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. Jackson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a probation officer’s search of a probationer, his locker, and his car, based solely on an anonymous tip and without a warrant or exigent circumstances, violates the probationer’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the search was unreasonable in light of the probationer’s constitutional rights, the lack of prior unreliability, the anonymous source of the tip, and the failure to obtain a warrant as required by state law when no exigent circumstances existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that probationers, like parolees, are entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, although their status is relevant in determining the reasonableness of a search. The court cited CPL 410.50, which requires reasonable cause to believe a defendant violated a condition of the sentence before a search is authorized. The court distinguished this case from People v. Huntley, where the parole officer had personal knowledge of the defendant’s parole violations. In this case, there was no indication Jackson had been unreliable. The court noted the probation officer’s investigation, which began with “a wholesale search of the defendant, his locker and his automobile” was extreme, especially given the lack of urgency and the availability of other investigative methods. The court held that to uphold the search would undermine the probationer’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court pointed out the probation officers failed to obtain a court order before the search despite having ample time to do so, violating the procedure outlined in CPL 410.50. As the court stated, “The CPL does not provide for a search of a probationer or his property without a court order except as incident to taking the probationer into custody”. Because Jackson was not taken into custody, and no exigency justified bypassing the warrant requirement, the search was deemed unlawful. The court emphasized that the probation officers were in their office, which was one floor above the court where the defendant was sentenced, meaning “Under the circumstances there was more than enough time to submit the matter to the court as required by the statute.”

  • People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 53 (1967): Anonymous Tip and Probable Cause for Search

    People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 53 (1967)

    An anonymous tip, even if it accurately describes a suspect and their location, is insufficient on its own to establish probable cause for a search and seizure without independent indicia of the informant’s reliability or independent verification of the tip’s substance beyond easily observable details.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an anonymous tip provided sufficient probable cause for police to search and arrest the defendant, Horowitz. The police received an anonymous call detailing Horowitz’s location, physical description, and the fact that he possessed stolen bonds in a brown paper bag. Upon finding a man matching the description, the police searched him and found the bonds. The court held that the anonymous tip, even when corroborated by the defendant’s appearance and location, lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish probable cause. The case was remitted for a hearing to determine if the police had additional evidence to support probable cause beyond the tip itself. The court emphasized the need for evidence demonstrating the informer’s reliability, not just the accuracy of the description.

    Facts

    A police lieutenant received an anonymous phone call stating that a man named Bernie Horowitz, described as tall, heavy, bald, and carrying a brown paper bag with stolen U.S. savings bonds and pornographic material, would be at the New York Times Building mailroom. The lieutenant relayed this information to an arresting officer. The officer found Horowitz at the mailroom, matching the anonymous description and carrying a brown paper bag. The officer identified himself, asked Horowitz his name, and obtained the bag, which contained stolen bonds. Horowitz was then arrested.

    Procedural History

    Horowitz was arrested and charged with possession of stolen property. He moved to suppress the bonds as evidence, arguing they were obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Horowitz pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. Horowitz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated only by the suspect’s physical appearance and location matching the description, provides sufficient probable cause for a search and seizure.

    Holding

    No, because the accuracy of the description alone does not establish the reliability of the informant or the truthfulness of the information regarding the stolen bonds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the police verified the details of the anonymous tip regarding Horowitz’s appearance and location, this did not establish the reliability of the informant or the veracity of the claim that Horowitz possessed stolen bonds. The court distinguished this case from cases where the informant’s reliability was established through prior accurate tips or through independent police investigation corroborating the substance of the tip. The court emphasized that “[a]ll that this amounts to is that the anonymous informer described the defendant correctly and had the right man as the sequel proved when he was found to have the stolen bonds in his possession. That is not the kind of evidence necessary to prove the reliability of the informer.” The court cited People v. Coffey and other cases emphasizing the need for evidence of the informant’s past reliability. The court also distinguished this case from People v. Montague, where police officers had independent knowledge of facts constituting probable cause. The court, referencing People v. Malinsky, remitted the case for a hearing to determine if the police possessed any evidence, beyond the anonymous tip, to establish probable cause. The court acknowledged its previous adherence to People v. Defore, favoring admissibility of evidence even if illegally obtained, but recognized the current commitment to the exclusionary rule established in Mapp v. Ohio. The controlling principle is that the arresting officer does not need to know the reliability of the informer if acting on the direction of another officer with sufficient information to constitute probable cause.

  • People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967): Anonymous Tips and ‘Stop and Frisk’ Exception

    People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335 (1967)

    An anonymous tip, if sufficiently detailed and corroborated by observation, can provide reasonable suspicion to justify a “stop and frisk” for weapons, especially when public safety is at risk.

    Summary

    The case addresses the legality of a search and seizure based on an anonymous tip. Police received an anonymous call stating a youth at a specific location possessed a loaded gun. Upon arrival, the police found someone matching the description and immediately searched him, finding the gun. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search under the “stop and frisk” doctrine, finding that while the anonymous tip alone might not establish probable cause for arrest, the corroborated details provided reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and, given the potential danger, to immediately search him for the weapon, even among a group of children.

    Facts

    Detective Delaney received an anonymous phone call at the police station. The caller stated that a white male youth was at the corner of 135th and Jamaica Avenue with a loaded .32 caliber revolver in his left jacket pocket. The caller described the youth as eighteen years old, with blue eyes, blond hair, wearing white chino-type pants. Delaney went to the location and observed someone who matched the description perfectly. The youth (Taggart) was standing in a group of children who had just finished bowling. Delaney crossed the street, took Taggart by the arm, placed him against the wall, and retrieved the revolver from his left-hand jacket pocket. Delaney did not observe any bulge in Taggart’s pocket prior to the search.

    Procedural History

    Taggart was arrested and charged with possession of a pistol. He moved to suppress the evidence (the pistol). The Criminal Court, Queens County (Schreckinger, J.) denied the motion. Taggart pleaded guilty and was committed to Elmira Reception Center, and adjudged a youthful offender. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip, without more, provides reasonable grounds for a search and subsequent arrest.
    2. Whether, even if the anonymous tip did not provide reasonable grounds for an arrest, the search was valid under New York’s “Stop and Frisk” law (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a).

    Holding

    1. No, because the information received from the anonymous caller was not substantiated by sufficient indicia of reliability beyond the defendant’s mere presence at the specified location.
    2. Yes, because the detective had a reasonably based suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime and that he possessed a dangerous weapon, justifying the stop and immediate search under the exigent circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the anonymous tip alone might not constitute “reasonable grounds” for a search incident to an arrest under traditional standards (citing People v. Malinsky and People v. Coffey), the search was justified under the “Stop and Frisk” law. The Court relied on the fact that the detective corroborated the details of the tip: Taggart’s appearance matched the description. The court reasoned the detective had a reasonable suspicion that Taggart was committing a crime which justified the initial stop. Moreover, the court emphasized the potential danger: Taggart was suspected of possessing a loaded weapon among a group of children, creating exigent circumstances that justified an immediate search rather than a preliminary frisk. The court acknowledged the potential dangers of relying on anonymous tips but emphasized that the police action was related to a matter gravely affecting personal and public safety. The court distinguished this case from those involving sumptuary laws or offenses of limited public consequence. The court noted that the Constitution forbids “unreasonable” searches, and what is reasonable is determined by the circumstances. The majority stated, “To tolerate unconstitutional action as a matter of necessity… but then to reject use of the evidence obtained, is hardly a proper way to justify illegal conduct as necessary”.