New York Law Review

Tag: annulment

  • Romano v. Romano, 19 N.Y.2d 440 (1967): Time Limit as Element of Statutory Cause of Action

    Romano v. Romano, 19 N.Y.2d 440 (1967)

    When a statute creates a cause of action and simultaneously sets a time limit for bringing the action, the time limit is an integral part of the cause of action itself, not merely a statute of limitations, and the plaintiff must demonstrate compliance with the time limit as part of their case.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sought to annul her marriage based on the defendant’s fraudulent representations, alleging she left him promptly upon discovering the fraud. Although the fraud was discovered in 1950, she did not commence the action until 1964. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the statutory time limit for commencing an annulment action based on fraud is an inherent element of the cause of action or merely a statute of limitations. The Court held that the time limit is an integral part of the statutory cause of action. Therefore, the plaintiff’s failure to bring the action within the prescribed time barred her claim, even though the defendant defaulted.

    Facts

    The parties married on January 6, 1950. The plaintiff alleged that her consent to the marriage was obtained through the defendant’s fraudulent representations. She left the defendant in August 1950, promptly upon discovering the alleged fraud. The action for annulment was commenced in November 1964, over 14 years after she discovered the fraud.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the action. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the three-year period for commencing an action to annul a marriage for fraud is part of the cause of action itself. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the time limit for commencing an action to annul a marriage based on fraud, as specified in the Domestic Relations Law and CPLR, is an inherent element of the cause of action or merely a statute of limitations that must be affirmatively asserted as a defense.

    Holding

    No, because the action for annulment of marriage based on fraud is purely statutory, and the time limit is a qualification annexed to the created right, limiting the right as well as the remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that if a statute creates a cause of action and attaches a time limit to its commencement, the time limit is an ingredient of the cause of action. The Court emphasized that the action to annul a marriage is purely statutory, noting, “An action to annul a marriage is purely statutory”. It relied on the statutory language in Domestic Relations Law § 140(e), which states that an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud “may be maintained” within the limitations of time provided by the CPLR. Since the statute literally creates the cause of action, the time fixed in the statute must be treated as a qualification annexed to the created right. The court also noted that at the time of the fraud and discovery, the statute allowed such actions to be commenced “at any time,” but the 1955 amendment requiring commencement within a reasonable time was not met, as this action was commenced more than nine years after the amendment’s enactment. The Court quoted Osbourne v. United States, stating, “Generally, where a statute creates a cause of action which was unknown at common law, a period of limitation set up in the same statute is regarded as a matter of substance, limiting the right as well as the remedy.” This principle dictates that the time requirement is a condition put by law upon a substantive right. Therefore, the plaintiff’s failure to commence the action within the prescribed time barred her claim, even though the defendant defaulted.

  • Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954): Effect of a Void Remarriage on Alimony Obligations

    Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954)

    A former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is not revived even if the remarriage is later declared void, provided the wife has a statutory right to seek support from her second, albeit invalid, marriage partner.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a husband’s alimony obligations to his ex-wife are reinstated after her subsequent marriage is declared void. The separation agreement stipulated alimony would cease upon the wife’s remarriage. When the wife’s second marriage was annulled, she sought to revive her ex-husband’s alimony payments. The court held that because New York law (Domestic Relations Law § 236) allows a court in an annulment action to order the second husband to support the wife, the first husband’s obligation remains terminated. The rationale hinges on the policy consideration that the wife has an avenue for support from her second “husband,” thus negating the need to revive the first husband’s duty.

    Facts

    Mr. Gaines and Ms. Jacobsen entered into a separation agreement where Mr. Gaines agreed to pay alimony until Ms. Jacobsen remarried. Ms. Jacobsen subsequently remarried, and Mr. Gaines ceased alimony payments. The second marriage was later annulled because Ms. Jacobsen’s second husband had a living wife at the time of the marriage. Ms. Jacobsen then sought to reinstate alimony payments from Mr. Gaines.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Jacobsen, reinstating Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the annulment of the second marriage did not revive Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is revived when the remarriage is subsequently annulled.

    Holding

    No, because New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 allows a court, in an annulment action, to direct the husband to provide support for the wife, eliminating the need to revive the prior husband’s obligation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from its prior decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366 (1929), where alimony was reinstated after the annulment of a subsequent marriage. The critical difference was the enactment of Civil Practice Act § 1140-a (now Domestic Relations Law § 236) between the two decisions. This statute empowers courts to order support for a wife in an annulment action. The court reasoned that because the wife now has a legal avenue to seek support from her second husband (even if the marriage was void), the need to revive the first husband’s obligation is eliminated. The court stated, “Today, through the operation of section 1140-a, the wife can receive support from the husband of the annulled marriage, where ‘justice requires,’ and there is no more reason to revive the obligation of the first husband—a stranger to the annulment—than there would be if the marriage were terminated by divorce.” The court emphasized the policy consideration that the law should avoid imposing a double burden on the first husband when the wife has recourse for support from her second marriage. This decision effectively limits Sleicher to situations where the wife has no statutory right to support from the annulled marriage partner. The dissenting opinion argued that because in this specific case the second husband had died after commencement of the litigation, section 1140-a would be of no avail to the wife, and therefore the holding in Sleicher should control.

  • Svenson v. Svenson, 27 N.Y.2d 131 (1970): Annulment Based on Concealed Fanatical Beliefs

    Svenson v. Svenson, 27 N.Y.2d 131 (1970)

    A marriage can be annulled if one party fraudulently conceals a fanatical belief so repugnant that it renders the marital relationship unworkable, and the other party would not have consented to the marriage had they known the truth.

    Summary

    This case concerns a wife’s attempt to annul her marriage based on her husband’s fraudulent concealment of his fanatical anti-Semitic beliefs and Nazi past. The wife alleged that her husband hid these beliefs during their courtship and revealed them only after the marriage, making the relationship unworkable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the wife’s amended complaint stated a valid cause of action for annulment because if proven, the concealed beliefs were so repugnant and fundamental that they negated the wife’s consent to the marriage.

    Facts

    The parties married in New York City in June 1963, and the wife filed for annulment in April 1964. The wife alleged that before the marriage, the husband concealed that he had been an officer in the German Army and a member of the Nazi party during World War II. She further claimed he was fanatically anti-Semitic, supported the extermination of Jewish people, and would require her to shun her Jewish friends. The wife alleged she relied on the husband’s apparent lack of fanaticism and would not have married him had she known the truth.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially denied the husband’s motion to dismiss the wife’s amended complaint. However, the Appellate Division reversed, finding the alleged fraud was not vital to the marriage relationship. The wife appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the wife’s allegations that the husband fraudulently concealed his fanatical anti-Semitic beliefs and Nazi past before the marriage, which were revealed after the marriage and made the relationship unworkable, state a cause of action for annulment.

    Holding

    Yes, because if the facts alleged in the wife’s complaint are true, the trier of fact could conclude that there was no reality to the wife’s consent to the marriage, as the concealed beliefs were so repugnant and fundamental that the wife would not have married the husband had she known the truth.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a pleading should be construed liberally, with all allegations assumed to be true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss. The court reviewed prior annulment cases, noting that fraud justifying annulment must be material to the degree that, had it not been practiced, the deceived party would not have consented to the marriage. Citing Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477 (1933), the court reiterated that a lack of reality in consent makes a marriage voidable. The court distinguished the allegations in this case from mere disagreements or disappointments, finding that the wife’s allegations of fanatical anti-Semitism and support for genocide, if true, were so extreme and repugnant that they negated the essence of the marital relationship. The court stated, “Allowing the pleading the broad construction to which it is entitled under the law, defendant had not merely been a member of the Nazi party…but also, as an individual, he was fanatically anti-Semitic and supported the extermination of the Jewish people.” The court concluded that the wife should have her day in court to prove her allegations, as a trial could determine that the concealed facts went to the essence of her consent to marry the husband. The Court directly quoted Justice Loreto from Special Term: “‘These are more than distasteful beliefs; they are absolutely repugnant and insufferable…A fraud with respect to such beliefs, inducing marriage, is one affecting a vital aspect of the marital relationship…It might well be found to be ‘material to that degree that, had it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage’”

  • Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916): Limits on Committee’s Power to Annul Marriage of Incompetent

    Walter v. Walter, 217 N.Y. 439 (1916)

    The committee of an incompetent person’s property and person cannot maintain an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage on the ground of lunacy unless explicitly authorized by statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the committee of an incompetent person can bring an action to annul the incompetent’s marriage based on lunacy. The plaintiffs, relatives and committee of Herman N. Walter, an incompetent, sought to annul his marriage to the defendant. The court held that while relatives or a next friend could bring such an action under specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the committee of the incompetent’s person and property lacked the statutory authority to do so. The decision rests on the principle that actions to annul marriages are purely statutory and that the statute’s enumeration of authorized parties excludes others, like the committee. This clarifies the limits on a committee’s power and underscores the need for explicit statutory authorization to act in such matters.

    Facts

    Herman N. Walter, an incompetent person, married the defendant. Plaintiffs, relatives of Walter, were also appointed as the committee of his person and estate. As relatives and the committee, the plaintiffs brought an action to annul the marriage, arguing Walter was a lunatic at the time of the marriage.

    Procedural History

    The lower court held that the plaintiffs, in their capacity as the committee, could not maintain the action to annul the marriage. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals, where the central issue was whether the committee of an incompetent person’s estate could bring such an action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the committee of the person and property of an incompetent may, as such, maintain an action to annul the marriage of the incompetent on the ground that he was a lunatic, absent explicit statutory authorization.

    Holding

    No, because the right to bring an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory, and the relevant statutes (Sections 1747 and 1748 of the Code of Civil Procedure) enumerate specific parties who may bring such an action, excluding the committee of the incompetent’s person and property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that actions to annul a marriage are purely statutory creations. Quoting Stokes v. Stokes, the court emphasized that “an action to annul a marriage is purely statutory.” While equity jurisdiction to annul marriages existed independently of statute, the statutes now expressly define who can bring such actions. The relevant sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1747 and 1748, specify who may bring an action to annul a marriage based on lunacy: relatives of the lunatic, the lunatic after restoration to sanity, or, if no relative brings the action, a next friend of the lunatic. The court applied the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Because the statutes specifically list who can bring the action, the committee, not being among those listed, is excluded. While Section 2340 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally allows a committee to maintain any action the incompetent could have maintained, the court found that this general provision did not override the specific provisions of Sections 1747 and 1748, which explicitly designate who can bring an action to annul a marriage. The court emphasized that if the legislature intended to include the committee, it would have explicitly stated so in the statute. The court concluded that the general words of section 2340 do not enlarge the specific provisions of sections 1747 and 1748 and that these cover cases for which provision had not already been specifically made.