New York Law Review

Tag: Animal Law

  • Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006): Liability for Harm Caused by Domestic Animals

    6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006)

    The owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal only if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities.

    Summary

    Larry Bard, a carpenter, was injured by a bull while working on a dairy farm owned by Reinhardt Jahnke. Bard sued Jahnke, alleging strict liability and negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Jahnke, holding that the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal only if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. The Court rejected Bard’s argument that an owner has a general duty to protect others from the normal dangerous characteristics of domestic animals, absent prior knowledge of the animal’s specific vicious tendencies.

    Facts

    Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, was asked to help repair cow mattresses at Reinhardt Jahnke’s dairy farm. Jahnke owned a dairy bull named Fred, who roamed freely in the “low cow district” of the barn. Fred had never previously injured anyone. Bard, while working on the mattresses, was attacked by Fred and sustained serious injuries. Jahnke was not aware that Bard would be working on the farm that day.

    Procedural History

    Bard sued Jahnke, alleging strict liability and negligence. Supreme Court granted Jahnke’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Jahnke was not liable because he did not know or should not have known of the bull’s vicious propensities. Bard appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal if the owner did not know and had no reason to know of the animal’s vicious propensities.

    Holding

    No, because liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier v. Zambito: the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal’s vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Collier v. Zambito, which held that the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. Vicious propensities include the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of others. The Court noted that knowledge of vicious propensities can be established by proof of prior acts, but also by something less, such as evidence that the animal had been known to growl, snap, or bare its teeth. However, the court stated, “Here, Fred had never attacked any farm animal or human being before September 27, 2001. He had always moved unrestrained within the limits of the barn’s low cow district, regularly coming into contact with other farm animals, farm workers and members of the Jahnke family without incident or hint of hostility. He had never acted in a way that put others at risk of harm. As a result, Bard cannot recover under our traditional rule.”

    The Court rejected Bard’s argument that Jahnke was negligent in failing to restrain Fred or to warn non-farm personnel of his presence, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, Comments g and h. The court stated, “But this is no different from arguing that Jahnke was negligent in that he should have known of Fred’s vicious propensities because—as plaintiffs’ expert put it—’bulls, in particular breeding bulls, are generally dangerous and vicious animals.’” The court declined to hold that particular breeds or kinds of domestic animals are dangerous, and therefore when an individual animal of the breed or kind causes harm, its owner is charged with knowledge of vicious propensities. The court emphasized that liability is determined solely by the rule articulated in Collier.

  • Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d 444 (2004): Establishing Knowledge of a Dog’s Vicious Propensities

    Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d 444 (2004)

    To establish liability for harm caused by a domestic animal, the plaintiff must prove that the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, which is not demonstrated merely by showing the animal was confined or barked at people.

    Summary

    Matthew Collier, a 12-year-old boy, was bitten in the face by Cecil, a mixed-breed dog owned by Charles and Mary Zambito. The dog was usually confined to the kitchen when guests were present because he barked. On the night of the incident, Mrs. Zambito invited Matthew to approach the leashed dog after he came out of the bathroom, and the dog lunged and bit him. Collier sued, alleging the Zambitos knew or should have known of Cecil’s vicious propensities. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s alleged vicious propensities, reversing the Appellate Division dissent and dismissing the claim. The court emphasized the need to show more than confinement or barking to prove vicious propensities.

    Facts

    The Zambitos owned Cecil, a beagle-collie-rottweiler mix, and typically confined him to the kitchen with a gate when they were away or had visitors because he barked. On December 31, 1998, Matthew Collier, a guest of the Zambitos’ son, went downstairs to use the bathroom. Cecil began barking, so Mrs. Zambito leashed the dog. After Matthew came out of the bathroom, Mrs. Zambito invited him to approach Cecil, who she said knew him from prior visits. As Matthew approached, Cecil lunged and bit Matthew’s face. Cecil had never threatened or bitten anyone before, to the parties’ knowledge. He was considered a family pet.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied both the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissal and the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability, finding a factual issue regarding the defendants’ knowledge of Cecil’s vicious propensities. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no issue of fact as to the defendants’ awareness of Cecil’s propensities. Two justices dissented. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s vicious propensities, such that they could be held liable for the dog’s actions.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Cecil had vicious propensities that were known, or should have been known, to the defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that an owner of a domestic animal is liable for harm caused by the animal if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. Vicious propensities include any propensity to act in a way that might endanger others. Knowledge of vicious propensities can be proven by prior similar acts that the owner knew about, or evidence of growling, snapping, or baring teeth. The court distinguished this case, stating, “But nothing in our case law suggests that the mere fact that a dog was kept enclosed or chained or that a dog previously barked at people is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it had vicious propensities.” Here, Cecil was a family pet, not a guard dog. He was confined to the kitchen only because he barked at guests, not because the owners feared he would harm them. The court noted the plaintiff himself was not afraid of the dog and testified that the dog was friendly. The fact that the owner invited Matthew to approach the dog showed that she did not expect the dog to attack. The court stated, “Once such knowledge is established, an owner faces strict liability for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities.” However, the behavior exhibited by Cecil did not rise to the level of apparent viciousness required to impute knowledge to the owners.

  • Colarusso v. Dunne, 672 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1996): Establishes Dog Owners’ Liability for Injuries Caused by Unrestrained Dogs

    Colarusso v. Dunne, 672 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1996)

    New York law imposes a duty on dog owners to restrain their dogs, and a violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large can be evidence of negligence if the dog’s unrestrained behavior causes injury.

    Summary

    This case concerns a child injured when a car swerved to avoid a dog in the street. The central issue is whether the dog owner’s violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large constitutes evidence of negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that such an ordinance violation could indeed be considered evidence of negligence, reversing the lower court’s decision. The court reasoned that local ordinances reflect public policy, and their violation is relevant to determining negligence when the ordinance aims to prevent the type of accident that occurred.

    Facts

    The defendant’s dog, while previously secured on an enclosed porch with a latched aluminum door, escaped. The manner of escape (whether the dog released himself or was released by another) is unknown. The dog ran into the street. A car braked to avoid hitting the dog and consequently struck a child on a bicycle, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the dog owner for negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the negligence claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the common-law presumption of negligence for unattended domestic animals does not apply to dogs. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the negligence cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the presence of a dog in the street, in violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large, gives rise to a presumption or inference of negligence on the part of the dog’s owner.

    Holding

    Yes, because a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large reflects a community’s public policy, and a violation of that ordinance is relevant evidence of negligence if the violation proximately causes injury of the type the ordinance was designed to prevent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that local ordinances reflect a locality’s public policy. The ordinance in question explicitly aimed to protect the health, safety, and well-being of persons and property from the dangers of uncontrolled dogs. The court stated, “That current statement of public policy on the question is surely entitled to some recognition by the courts.” The Court distinguished dogs from other animals by noting the existence of state and local laws specifically aimed at restraining dogs, signaling a departure from earlier expectations that dogs could roam freely. The court rejected the argument that extending a presumption of negligence to dog owners would necessarily extend to owners of other animals like cats or birds, because there were no comparable laws for those animals. The Court emphasized that while the dog owner presented evidence suggesting the dog was well-behaved and had never escaped before, these factual issues were for a jury to determine, making summary judgment inappropriate. Quoting Ugarriza v Schmieder, the Court reiterated that summary judgment is improper when there are genuine issues of material fact. The dissent argued in favor of reinstating the negligence cause of action, noting that the ordinance was aimed at preventing the precise type of accident that occurred. The dissent also emphasized that ordinances restricting dogs from running at large are sufficiently common that state law authorizes the seizure of dogs found to be in violation of such laws.

  • People v. Dunn, 28 N.Y.2d 667 (1971): Establishing Responsibility for Animals “Running at Large”

    People v. Dunn, 28 N.Y.2d 667 (1971)

    The term “run at large” in relation to domestic animals requires evidence of generalized wandering or running, not merely isolated instances of an animal being on a neighbor’s property, to establish quasi-criminal responsibility.

    Summary

    Dunn was convicted of disorderly conduct for allowing her cats to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance after her cat was found on a neighbor’s (who was also a policeman) lawn on two occasions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunn was responsible for violating the ordinance. The court clarified that the term “run at large” implies a more generalized pattern of wandering, not isolated instances.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    Dunn owned a cat. A neighbor, who was also a policeman, observed Dunn’s cat on his lawn on two separate occasions. Dunn’s property was fenced in. The neighbor initiated a prosecution against Dunn, alleging she violated a village ordinance by allowing her cats to “run at large”.

    Procedural History

    The Village Court convicted Dunn of disorderly conduct. Dunn appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and dismissed the information against Dunn.

    Issue(s)

    Whether two isolated instances of a cat being on a neighbor’s lawn are sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cat’s owner “allowed” the cat to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance, thereby establishing quasi-criminal responsibility.

    Holding

    No, because the term “run at large” requires a more generalized pattern of wandering or running of animals than merely being present on a neighbor’s property on two isolated occasions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecution failed to prove Dunn’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the information alleged Dunn “did allow two cats to run at large.” The court found that the mere ability of the cat to get over or through the fence on two occasions was insufficient to establish personal quasi-criminal responsibility. The court then addressed the meaning of “run at large,” stating: “Additionally, the term ‘run at large’ in relation to domestic animals does not normally mean that an animal is found on a neighbor’s property in an isolated instance. The term has had a consistent judicial construction to mean a more generalized wandering or running of animals”. The court cited precedent to support this interpretation. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.