New York Law Review

Tag: amnesia

  • Sawyer v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328 (1986): Expert Testimony Required for Amnesia Claim in Negligence Cases

    Sawyer v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328 (1986)

    In a negligence action where the plaintiff claims amnesia due to the defendant’s actions, expert testimony is required to establish the amnesia and its causal relationship to the defendant’s fault before the jury can apply a lesser degree of proof in evaluating the plaintiff’s claim.

    Summary

    Sawyer sued Dreis & Krump for injuries sustained while operating a press brake. Sawyer claimed he lost his memory of the incident. The trial court instructed the jury on the “amnesia rule,” allowing them to apply a lesser burden of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for Sawyer, holding that expert testimony is required to prove the amnesia and its causal link to the defendant’s actions. The court also addressed the admissibility of prior accident evidence and the appropriate jury charge regarding industry safety standards (ANSI standards), finding errors in both.

    Facts

    Sawyer, an experienced press brake operator, was injured while working on a machine manufactured by Dreis & Krump. He claimed he lost his memory of the events leading to the injury. Sawyer contended he reached under the ram to secure slipping metal and accidentally activated the machine. Dreis & Krump argued Sawyer was operating the machine improperly, causing the metal to slip and his hand to be pulled under the ram. The set-up procedure required the use of L-shaped stops at the back of the bed to secure the metal but Dreis & Krump contended that Sawyer set the stops improperly, without using a scrap piece of metal to measure. Plaintiff’s foreman heard metal fall, and found the plaintiff conscious but quiet, saying, “I finally done it.”

    Procedural History

    Sawyer sued Dreis & Krump, who then impleaded Sawyer’s employer, Cambridge Filter Corporation. The jury found in favor of Sawyer, apportioning fault equally between Dreis & Krump and Cambridge Filter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the question of Sawyer’s amnesia to the jury without expert testimony establishing the condition or causally relating it to the accident.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting Sawyer’s engineering expert to testify how the accident happened.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Sawyer’s cross-examination of Dreis & Krump’s witnesses about other accidents with the press.
    4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on the weight to be accorded industry safety standards (ANSI).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because amnesia is a medical condition beyond the understanding of laymen, and expert testimony is required to prove the condition by clear and convincing evidence.
    2. Yes, because the expert’s opinion was based on facts not established by the evidence.
    3. Yes, because Sawyer failed to establish that the prior accidents were similar to his.
    4. Yes, because the ANSI standards were not conclusive on the issue of negligence, and the jury should have been so instructed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while a plaintiff with amnesia is held to a lesser degree of proof, they must still establish a prima facie case, and the jury cannot presume due care. The court emphasized that “[b]ecause loss of memory is easily feigned, before plaintiff may receive the benefit of the rule, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing his condition.” The court reasoned that amnesia, like most medical conditions, requires expert evidence to establish its existence and causal relationship to the defendant’s actions. Without such evidence, a jury of laypersons cannot adequately evaluate the effects of trauma or the symptoms verifying the loss of memory. The court cited Koehler v Schwartz, 48 NY2d 807 as precedent. The Court determined that the expert testimony was required to determine if the loss of memory was “real and not feigned”.

    The court also found the expert’s testimony on how the accident occurred was speculative and lacked a proper factual foundation, noting the expert said that the metal slipped and plaintiff reached for it reflexively and stepped on the pedal, but the expert opinion was “based upon facts which were not established by the evidence”. The court found the evidence about prior accidents was improperly admitted because the plaintiff did not show the prior accidents were similar.

    Regarding the ANSI standards, the Court cited Trimarco v Klein, 56 NY2d 98, holding that industry standards can be considered as “some evidence of negligence if it first found that the standards set forth in the booklet represented the general custom or usage in the industry,” but also that the jury should have been instructed that such standards were not conclusive.

  • People v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 204 (1976): Reasonable Doubt When Prosecution Contradicts Its Own Witness

    People v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 204 (1976)

    When the prosecution’s case relies heavily on a single witness whose testimony is substantially contradicted by the prosecution itself and the physical evidence, and where the prosecution fails to disprove a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction cannot stand as a matter of law.

    Summary

    Mary Reed was convicted of manslaughter and felony weapon possession. The prosecution’s case hinged on the testimony of a barmaid who claimed Reed shot Banks after he threatened her with a razor. However, the prosecution impeached its own witness by highlighting inconsistencies between her testimony and a prior statement, as well as contradicting her account with physical evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the prosecution substantially undermined the credibility of its key witness and failed to adequately disprove Reed’s justification defense of self-defense.

    Facts

    John Banks was found dead with a gunshot wound in the Cloud Nine Bar. The barmaid, Claretta Mitchell Booker, testified that Banks, after arguing with Reed, followed her with a razor in hand, leading Reed to shoot him in self-defense. However, the prosecution introduced evidence suggesting the razor was found in Banks’ pocket, contradicting Booker’s testimony. A .25 caliber pistol was found outside the bar. Reed’s pocketbook with a rent receipt in her name was found in the bar’s kitchen.

    Procedural History

    Reed was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the first degree and possession of a weapon. She appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her amnesia. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove Reed’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the contradictions in their key witness’s testimony and the failure to disprove the justification defense.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution’s case relied heavily on a single witness whose testimony was substantially contradicted by the prosecution itself, and because the prosecution failed to disprove the justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prosecution significantly undermined the credibility of its own witness, Claretta Mitchell Booker, by highlighting inconsistencies between her testimony and a prior written statement. The prosecution also presented physical evidence that contradicted Booker’s version of events, specifically regarding whether the victim had a razor in his hand. The court noted, “it is at the very least a questionable situation where a prosecution witness, put upon the stand to testify to the circumstances of a shooting, is contradicted by the prosecutor in almost every facet of her testimony—save one.” The court also stated that “guilt in such a case cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the testimony of such a witness, who is, evidently, either from moral or mental defects, irresponsible.” Citing People v Ledwon, 153 N.Y. 10 (1897). The court held that the prosecution failed to disprove Reed’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Penal Law § 25.00(1). While not determinative, the court also noted the trial court erred in preventing the defendant from presenting medical evidence of amnesia without first waiving her Fifth Amendment right. The Court concluded that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. McHale, 39 N.Y.2d 453 (1976): Amnesia and Competency to Stand Trial

    People v. McHale, 39 N.Y.2d 453 (1976)

    Amnesia, by itself, does not automatically render a defendant incompetent to stand trial, provided the defendant understands the charges and can assist in their defense with a reasonable degree of rationality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant with retrograde amnesia, unable to recall events surrounding the alleged crimes, is an “incapacitated person” unfit for trial under CPL 730.10(1). McHale, charged with attempted murder, reckless endangerment, and weapons possession, claimed amnesia due to a gunshot wound sustained during the incident. The court held that amnesia alone doesn’t equate to incapacity if the defendant understands the charges and can rationally assist in their defense. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision that McHale was fit to stand trial and that his guilty plea to a reduced charge was voluntary, emphasizing the overwhelming evidence against him and the safeguards implemented to ensure fairness.

    Facts

    Defendant McHale was indicted for attempted murder and related charges stemming from an incident on June 15, 1971. Eyewitness accounts and photographic evidence indicated McHale, appearing intoxicated, fired a shotgun and rifle at bystanders and police. He was shot by police during the incident, sustaining a head injury that resulted in partial blindness, partial deafness, and retrograde amnesia, preventing him from recalling events between cleaning a gun at home and waking up in the hospital.

    Procedural History

    McHale moved for a determination of his fitness to proceed to trial under CPL 730.10(1). After examinations, the court found him generally mentally fit except for the memory loss. The court ruled McHale was fit for trial, ordering the District Attorney to provide all relevant evidence to the defense, subject to safeguards outlined in Wilson v. United States. McHale subsequently pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment in the first degree in satisfaction of the indictment, with a promised sentence not exceeding four years. He appealed the order arguing that the amnesia rendered him unfit for trial and his guilty plea involuntary.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s inability to remember the events constituting the crime, due to amnesia, renders the defendant unfit to assist in their own defense as contemplated under CPL 730.10(1) or under the due process or equal protection clauses.

    Holding

    No, because amnesia alone does not automatically equate to incapacity if the defendant understands the charges and can assist in their defense with a reasonable degree of rationality. The court found that McHale’s plea was voluntary, given the overwhelming evidence against him and the extensive precautions taken by the trial court to ensure he understood the implications of his plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 730.10(1) primarily addresses a defendant’s present mental state at the time of trial, focusing on their ability to comprehend and rationally assist counsel. The court cited Dusky v. United States, emphasizing the requirement of “sufficient present ability to consult with [their] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether [they have] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [them].” The court acknowledged the growing body of law on amnesia and competency, noting that no reported case has held amnesia alone to constitute mental incapacity to stand trial. The court adopted a case-by-case approach, emphasizing fairness, and pointing out that the trial court made McHale’s trial subject to the Wilson v. United States tests. The court determined that McHale’s trial could be fair, given the evidence available to him, and the possibility of arguing intoxication. The court emphasized that an order finding the defendant unfit for trial solely due to amnesia would result in outright release and that McHale was able to understand the proceedings. The court suggested a procedure for future cases where amnesia is claimed, involving a CPL 730.10(1) motion, a determination by the judge whether a fair trial is likely, and the option for the defendant to proceed to trial (followed by a motion for evaluation of fairness) or plead guilty.

  • Schechter v. Klanfer, 28 N.Y.2d 228 (1971): Standard of Proof for Amnesiac Plaintiffs in Negligence Cases

    Schechter v. Klanfer, 28 N.Y.2d 228 (1971)

    In a negligence action, a plaintiff who suffers amnesia as a result of the defendant’s actions, preventing them from recalling the events surrounding the injury, is held to a lesser degree of proof than a plaintiff who can testify about the incident.

    Summary

    Robert Schechter, a 14-year-old, sustained amnesia and other severe injuries after a motorboat collision. He sued Robert Klanfer, the operator of the other boat, for negligence. The trial court initially instructed the jury to hold Schechter to a lesser degree of proof due to his amnesia, but later withdrew the instruction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in withdrawing the instruction. The court reasoned that an amnesiac plaintiff, like a deceased plaintiff, is unable to provide their version of events and therefore should benefit from a relaxed standard of proof, provided the amnesia is convincingly demonstrated to be a result of the defendant’s actions. This lesser burden, however, does not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence and freedom from contributory negligence.

    Facts

    On August 25, 1964, Robert Schechter and Alice Stone were involved in a motorboat collision. Schechter was operating his father’s boat with Stone as a passenger. Stone testified that a boat operated by Klanfer struck Schechter’s boat. Schechter claimed to have no memory of the events due to a head injury sustained in the collision, resulting in amnesia. Schechter suffered a fractured skull, arm, and jaw, and was comatose for several days after the incident.

    Procedural History

    Schechter sued Klanfer for negligence in the trial court. The trial court initially instructed the jury to apply a lesser standard of proof for Schechter due to his amnesia, but withdrew the instruction following the defendant’s objection. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Schechter appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Schechter then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff in a negligence action, who suffers amnesia as a result of the defendant’s actions, is entitled to a jury instruction that they are held to a lesser degree of proof than a plaintiff who can testify to the events.

    Holding

    Yes, because an amnesiac plaintiff, like a deceased plaintiff, is unable to describe the events leading to the injury, thus warranting a lesser burden of proof, provided that the amnesia is convincingly demonstrated to be a direct result of the incident caused by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Noseworthy v. City of New York, which holds that in a death case, the plaintiff is not held to as high a degree of proof as when the injured plaintiff can describe the occurrence. The court extended this principle to amnesiac plaintiffs, reasoning that their inability to testify is analogous to that of a deceased plaintiff. The court acknowledged the risk that amnesia could be feigned and thus specified that the jury must be clearly convinced, based on medical and other evidence, that the plaintiff genuinely suffers from amnesia, that the injuries sustained were a substantial factor in causing the amnesia, and that the amnesia was a direct result of the accident.

    The court quoted Cameron v. Dooley, stating, “There is at least some analogy between the situation here and that in the case where one of the drivers was killed in an accident, the only difference being that the version of one as to what happened is left untold because of death, and in this case the narrative is destroyed by the amnesia. Under such circumstances we should closely scrutinize whatever other evidence there may be which will shed light upon the manner in which the accident occurred” (p. 131).

    The court emphasized that the lesser burden of proof does not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to present a prima facie case of negligence and freedom from contributory negligence. The jury must still base its findings on evidence. However, in this case, the court found that the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, thus making the lesser burden of persuasion applicable. The court emphasized that the circumstances testified to by Alice Stone, that Robert drove the boat in a straight line, at a speed of four miles an hour, and with the boat lights on, were relevant on the issue of contributory negligence. It also could have found defendants negligent upon Alice’s testimony of the speed and course of the Klanfer boat.