New York Law Review

Tag: alimony

  • O’Connell v. O’Connell, 74 N.Y.2d 926 (1989): Enforceability of Modifiable Foreign Judgments

    O’Connell v. O’Connell, 74 N.Y.2d 926 (1989)

    A New York court is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment that is not final under the laws of the issuing state, particularly if the judgment is modifiable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of a New Hampshire alimony judgment in New York. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the New Hampshire judgment was modifiable under New Hampshire law, New York was not constitutionally required to give it full faith and credit. The Court clarified that enforcing the foreign judgment under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i) did not transform it into a New York decree, and the Family Court’s powers are limited to the statute’s authorization. Once the alimony obligation expired under the terms of the New Hampshire decree, the New York Family Court lacked the authority to act further.

    Facts

    The petitioner sought an order from the New York Family Court to enforce a New Hampshire judgment regarding alimony. The New Hampshire judgment was for a fixed duration of three years. The petitioner sought enforcement under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i), which allows for the enforcement of foreign judgments. After the three-year period specified in the New Hampshire judgment expired, the petitioner attempted to extend the alimony payments, but the Family Court denied the request.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially granted the petitioner’s application to enforce the New Hampshire judgment. However, after the alimony obligation’s three-year term expired, the Family Court refused to extend the payments. The Appellate Division order was brought up for review. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court’s judgment and the Appellate Division order, holding that the New Hampshire judgment was not final and enforceable beyond its original terms.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York is constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a New Hampshire judgment for alimony when that judgment is modifiable under New Hampshire law.

    Holding

    No, because New York is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a foreign judgment that is not final under the laws of the issuing state, and the New Hampshire judgment was modifiable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that full faith and credit need not be extended to foreign judgments that are not final. Citing Barber v. Barber and Sistare v. Sistare, the Court emphasized that modifiable judgments are not considered final. Because New Hampshire law (NH Rev Stat Annot § 458:19) allows for the modification of alimony judgments, the New Hampshire judgment lacked the finality required for mandatory full faith and credit. The court emphasized that the Family Court’s powers are restricted to those authorized by statute, citing Matter of Silver v Silver. The Court stated that the enforcement order operated only to enforce the provisions of the foreign decree in accordance with its express terms and not to renew, extend or modify the alimony provision. As the Court noted, “upon the expiration of the underlying alimony obligation after three years, there was no longer any obligation in respect thereto under the terms of the order of the issuing State.” The Court distinguished between enforcing a foreign judgment under Family Court Act § 466 (c) (i) and modifying it under § 466 (c) (ii), noting that the petitioner only sought enforcement, not modification. The Court also pointed out that the mere enforcement of the alimony award by the New York Family Court could not extend the duration of the award under the law of New Hampshire. The Court made reference to Clevesy v. Clevesy from the state of New Jersey for additional support.

  • Di Bella v. Di Bella, 48 N.Y.2d 790 (1979): Constitutionality of Alimony Statutes and Preservation of Issues for Appeal

    Di Bella v. Di Bella, 48 N.Y.2d 790 (1979)

    An appellate court will not consider constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal, especially when the Attorney General has not been notified as required by statute, and factual determinations regarding alimony and counsel fees are outside the scope of appellate review.

    Summary

    In a divorce proceeding, the husband appealed the alimony and counsel fee awards, arguing that they were excessive and that sections of the Domestic Relations Law were unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Orr v. Orr. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that there was no basis in the record to eliminate alimony in futuro, and that the constitutional argument was not properly preserved for review as it was not raised in the trial court and the Attorney General was not notified. The court also stated that factual determinations regarding the alimony and counsel fees were outside its scope of review.

    Facts

    The husband and wife were involved in a divorce proceeding. The trial court granted the wife a divorce and awarded her alimony and counsel fees. The husband appealed, contending that the alimony award was excessive and that certain sections of the Domestic Relations Law were unconstitutional. The husband asserted he was unable to attend a scheduled hearing, but the court proceeded. The trial was conducted in two stages based on counsel agreement: first, entitlement to divorce, second, entitlement to alimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the wife a divorce and awarded alimony and counsel fees. The husband appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The husband then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division did not address the constitutional arguments raised by the husband. (71 AD2d 625)

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in determining there was no basis to eliminate alimony in futuro.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the husband’s request for an adjournment.
    3. Whether the awards of alimony and counsel fees were excessive.
    4. Whether sections 236 and 237 of the Domestic Relations Law are unconstitutional.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division correctly determined that the record lacked a basis for eliminating alimony in futuro.
    2. No, because the husband had ample opportunity to respond to the testimony and the hearing date had been previously set without objection.
    3. The Court of Appeals does not address this as such issues are outside the scope of review.
    4. No, because the constitutional issue was not raised in the trial court, and the Attorney General was not notified, precluding review by the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. Regarding alimony, the court found no error in the determination that there was no basis to eliminate alimony in futuro based on the record. As to the adjournment request, the court noted that the husband had ample opportunity to respond to testimony. The court declined to review the excessiveness of alimony and counsel fee awards, stating these were factual issues outside the scope of its review.

    Critically, the court refused to consider the constitutional challenge to the Domestic Relations Law. It emphasized that the issue was not raised in the trial court. Moreover, although the husband claimed to have raised it in the Appellate Division, he failed to notify the Attorney General as required by CPLR 1012(b) and Executive Law § 71. The court stated, “In this circumstance the constitutional arguments will not be considered in our court.” This is consistent with the general principle that appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

  • Hickland v. Hickland, 39 N.Y.2d 1 (1976): Establishing Alimony When a Spouse Voluntarily Reduces Income

    Hickland v. Hickland, 39 N.Y.2d 1 (1976)

    A spouse cannot avoid alimony obligations by voluntarily reducing their income, especially when the reduction appears to be a deliberate attempt to shield assets from the other spouse.

    Summary

    In a divorce case, the wife appealed the Appellate Division’s decision to strike an alimony award and grant the husband farming rights on land where the wife resided. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the alimony award. The court held that a husband cannot shirk his alimony duties by voluntarily reducing his income, especially when it seems designed to hide assets. The court emphasized the importance of the marital standard of living and the husband’s earning potential in determining alimony.

    Facts

    The parties married in 1946 and had two children. The husband, an engineer, earned $45,000 annually plus bonuses until 1968. In 1968, he convinced his wife to let him become a full-time farmer. The farming venture proved unprofitable. In 1969, after a tractor accident, the husband switched to freelance management consulting, earning at least $35,000 net annually until 1972. In 1972, during separation negotiations, he abandoned a $20,000 consulting assignment and claimed to be a full-time subsistence farmer, refusing consulting offers. He transferred his real estate and stocks to his sister without cash consideration, receiving instead a car, food, housing, benefits for his children, and a percentage of potential farm profits.

    Procedural History

    Special Term awarded the wife $50 per week in alimony and exclusive possession of the house and farmland. The Appellate Division reversed the alimony award and granted the husband the right to farm the land. The wife appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a husband can avoid alimony obligations by voluntarily reducing his income and transferring assets to a family member under a no-cash consideration agreement.
    2. Whether the wife’s income should be the primary determinant of alimony entitlement in a long-term marriage where the husband has a high earning potential.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the husband deliberately stripped himself of income to avoid his obligation to his wife, and his arrangement with his sister was an attempt to avoid his spousal support obligations.
    2. No, because in a long-term marriage, the marital standard of living and the husband’s demonstrated earning potential are important factors in determining alimony, even if the wife has some separate income.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the husband deliberately reduced his income and transferred assets to avoid alimony obligations. The court stated, “It is the actual marital standard of living, realistically appraised, which provides the basis for an award of alimony where the husband can afford to maintain that standard.” The court emphasized that the husband’s earning potential and the marital standard of living were critical factors, stating, “Under such circumstances, a husband is under an obligation to use his assets and earning powers if these are required in order to meet his obligation to maintain the marital standard of living.” The court rejected the argument that the wife’s income should be the primary factor, especially given the long duration of the marriage and the husband’s ability to earn a substantial income. It characterized the husband’s actions as a “ploy to put his assets beyond his wife’s reach.” The court modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Special Term’s alimony award of $50 per week, finding the denial of alimony to be an abuse of discretion.

  • Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632 (1975): Determining Alimony and Child Support Based on Earning Potential and Capital Assets

    Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632 (1975)

    In determining alimony and child support, a court can consider a spouse’s earning potential and capital assets, not just their reported income, and should not compel a long-term homemaker to seek employment without considering economic viability and the children’s best interests.

    Summary

    In a divorce action, the wife was initially granted permanent alimony and child support totaling $18,000 plus the family residence. The Appellate Division increased this to $31,000. The husband appealed, arguing the award exceeded his income, his capital resources shouldn’t be considered, and the wife should be compelled to work. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the increased award, holding that the husband’s earning potential and capital assets could be considered, and that the wife, a long-term homemaker, should not be forced to work without demonstrating economic viability and lack of detriment to the children.

    Facts

    The parties were married for 23 years before the husband abandoned the wife. The wife was 20 years old at the time of the marriage. They had five children, four of whom were under 21. The husband was a salesman with substantial real estate and securities holdings, estimated at nearly a million dollars, much of which was IBM stock inherited from his father. The husband portrayed himself as “property poor” due to low dividends and reliance on the stock as collateral. During the marriage, he claimed limited income and resisted household expenditures. However, he testified to spending $28,000 annually on the family, plus fringe benefits from his employer.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the wife a divorce on grounds of cruelty and abandonment, awarding her custody of the children, the family home, and a $10,000 repair fund. Based on the husband’s reported net income of $28,000, the court awarded $18,000 annually for alimony and child support. The Appellate Division modified, increasing the total award to $31,000. The husband appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether permanent alimony and support awarded against a husband may exceed his reported income.

    2. Whether a husband’s capital resources may be considered in fixing alimony and child support amounts.

    3. Whether the wife should be compelled to seek employment to help support herself and the children.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a court can consider a spouse’s earning potential and true economic status, not just their reported income, especially when the husband obscures his finances.

    2. Yes, because the father’s resources, rather than just net income, are the limit upon child support provision where he can afford more and the children’s interests justify the award. Capital assets are not exempt from maintaining the marital standard of living.

    3. No, because a wife who has been a long-term homemaker should not be forced into the workforce without demonstrating economic viability and lack of detriment to the children, especially where the husband acquiesced in her role as wife and mother for many years.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the husband’s own testimony indicated a higher standard of living than his reported income suggested. Despite his claim of $28,000 net income, evidence suggested his gross income was significantly higher. The court was not obligated to accept his claimed business deductions, especially when he invoked self-incrimination privileges regarding certain expenses. Citing Orenstein v. Orenstein, the court noted it is entitled to make an award based upon the wife’s proof of her needs when the husband obscures his true economic status.

    Regarding child support, the court emphasized that Domestic Relations Law § 240 allows support to be made “out of the property of either or both of its parents.” Therefore, the father’s resources are the limit on child support, not just his income, particularly when he can afford more. Referring to Swanton v. Curley, the court confirmed that a father’s resources dictate support when the children’s interests justify a higher award.

    The court distinguished this case from those where couples lived beyond their means, as the husband’s means allowed maintenance of the marital standard of living based on income. It drew an analogy to cases considering a husband’s earning capacity, stating that the husband could be required to make his assets earn income commensurate with their potential. His choice to let them grow for his future benefit did not obligate the court to honor that decision.

    Addressing the wife’s employment, the court acknowledged changes in the Domestic Relations Law requiring consideration of a wife’s ability to support herself. However, it emphasized that a woman who contributed to the marriage by raising children should not be penalized by being forced into the workforce after a long marriage. Quoting Phillips v. Phillips and Kover v. Kover, the court reiterated that the realities of long-term homemaking should be considered. The husband failed to demonstrate the economic viability of her employment or the lack of detriment to the children, as required by both the Domestic Relations Law and prior case law.

  • Matter of La Scala, 36 N.Y.2d 328 (1975): Family Court Jurisdiction Over Expired Alimony Decrees

    Matter of La Scala, 36 N.Y.2d 328 (1975)

    The Family Court lacks jurisdiction to modify a foreign divorce decree under Family Court Act § 466(c) when the alimony or support provision in that decree has already expired by its own terms.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to modify a Mexican divorce decree after the alimony provisions within that decree had expired. The wife sought to modify the decree to extend alimony payments beyond the original three-year term specified in the separation agreement (incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree). The Court of Appeals held that the Family Court’s jurisdiction under Family Court Act § 466(c) is limited to decrees with currently effective support provisions. Since the original alimony term had expired, the Family Court lacked the power to order new or continued support. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition, emphasizing that the Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute.

    Facts

    In 1970, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement where the husband agreed to pay the wife $1,250 per month for three years.

    The separation agreement was subsequently incorporated, but not merged, into a bilateral Mexican divorce decree.

    After the three-year alimony term expired, the wife initiated a proceeding in Family Court.

    The wife sought to modify the Mexican decree to require the husband to continue monthly payments of $1,250 until her death or remarriage.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the wife’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision.

    The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Mexican divorce decree, after the expiration of its specified alimony term, constitutes a decree “granting alimony or support” sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Family Court to enforce or modify the decree under Family Court Act § 466(c).

    Holding

    No, because the Family Court’s jurisdiction under Family Court Act § 466(c) is limited to decrees that have a currently effective support or alimony provision at the time the modification proceeding is commenced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its powers are defined strictly by statute.

    The court interpreted Family Court Act § 466(c) to require a currently effective support or alimony provision in the foreign decree for the Family Court to have jurisdiction to modify it. The court stated, “In our view it is not sufficient that the decree at one time provided for support or alimony payments.”

    The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind § 466(c) was to provide a quick remedy for spouses needing adjustments to existing support levels under foreign decrees, not to empower the Family Court to create new support obligations where none currently exist. The court stated, “We do not think that the Legislature intended to empower the Family Court to order support or alimony in a situation where the spouse is not currently entitled to any support or alimony at all under the existing foreign divorce decree.”

    The Court explicitly limited its holding to the narrow issue of Family Court jurisdiction and did not address any other issues raised by the parties, stating that resolution of those issues would be proper in another forum. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition.

  • Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954): Effect of a Void Remarriage on Alimony Obligations

    Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954)

    A former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is not revived even if the remarriage is later declared void, provided the wife has a statutory right to seek support from her second, albeit invalid, marriage partner.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a husband’s alimony obligations to his ex-wife are reinstated after her subsequent marriage is declared void. The separation agreement stipulated alimony would cease upon the wife’s remarriage. When the wife’s second marriage was annulled, she sought to revive her ex-husband’s alimony payments. The court held that because New York law (Domestic Relations Law § 236) allows a court in an annulment action to order the second husband to support the wife, the first husband’s obligation remains terminated. The rationale hinges on the policy consideration that the wife has an avenue for support from her second “husband,” thus negating the need to revive the first husband’s duty.

    Facts

    Mr. Gaines and Ms. Jacobsen entered into a separation agreement where Mr. Gaines agreed to pay alimony until Ms. Jacobsen remarried. Ms. Jacobsen subsequently remarried, and Mr. Gaines ceased alimony payments. The second marriage was later annulled because Ms. Jacobsen’s second husband had a living wife at the time of the marriage. Ms. Jacobsen then sought to reinstate alimony payments from Mr. Gaines.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Jacobsen, reinstating Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the annulment of the second marriage did not revive Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is revived when the remarriage is subsequently annulled.

    Holding

    No, because New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 allows a court, in an annulment action, to direct the husband to provide support for the wife, eliminating the need to revive the prior husband’s obligation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from its prior decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366 (1929), where alimony was reinstated after the annulment of a subsequent marriage. The critical difference was the enactment of Civil Practice Act § 1140-a (now Domestic Relations Law § 236) between the two decisions. This statute empowers courts to order support for a wife in an annulment action. The court reasoned that because the wife now has a legal avenue to seek support from her second husband (even if the marriage was void), the need to revive the first husband’s obligation is eliminated. The court stated, “Today, through the operation of section 1140-a, the wife can receive support from the husband of the annulled marriage, where ‘justice requires,’ and there is no more reason to revive the obligation of the first husband—a stranger to the annulment—than there would be if the marriage were terminated by divorce.” The court emphasized the policy consideration that the law should avoid imposing a double burden on the first husband when the wife has recourse for support from her second marriage. This decision effectively limits Sleicher to situations where the wife has no statutory right to support from the annulled marriage partner. The dissenting opinion argued that because in this specific case the second husband had died after commencement of the litigation, section 1140-a would be of no avail to the wife, and therefore the holding in Sleicher should control.

  • Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408 (1905): Alimony Obligations After Death of Payor

    Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408 (1905)

    Absent an explicit agreement or statutory provision to the contrary, the obligation to pay alimony generally ceases upon the death of the paying spouse, even if the decree directs security for payment.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether alimony payments ordered in a divorce decree continue after the death of the paying spouse. Wilson sued to foreclose on a mortgage securing alimony payments from her divorce. The defendant argued the alimony obligation ended with the ex-husband’s death. The court held that alimony, based on the marital duty of support, typically does not survive the payor’s death unless explicitly agreed upon or statutorily mandated. The requirement of security for alimony payments does not automatically extend the obligation beyond the payor’s life.

    Facts

    Wilson obtained a divorce from Balis Hinman, with the judgment awarding her $300 annually in alimony for life, payable monthly. The divorce decree required Hinman to secure the alimony payments with a mortgage on real estate. Hinman, along with the defendant (to whom Hinman allegedly fraudulently conveyed the property), executed the mortgage. Hinman subsequently died, and Wilson sought to foreclose on the mortgage, claiming default on payments accruing after his death.

    Procedural History

    Wilson sued to foreclose on the mortgage. The defendant demurred, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the alimony obligation ceased with Hinman’s death. The Special Term overruled the demurrer, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the obligation to pay alimony, as directed in a divorce decree, terminates upon the death of the paying spouse, even if the decree requires security for such payments.

    Holding

    No, because the court reasoned that alimony is rooted in the marital obligation of support, which generally does not extend beyond the death of the obligor unless explicitly stated in an agreement or statute; requiring security for payment does not, by itself, extend this obligation beyond the obligor’s life.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that alimony is a substitute for the marital right of support, and this right typically does not survive the death of the husband. A divorced wife’s rights should not exceed those she would have had if she had not been divorced (dower rights or inheritance share). The court distinguished Burr v. Burr, noting a different statute was at issue. The court relied upon Johns v. Johns, holding that alimony does not survive against the deceased husband’s estate. The court stated, “This section does not purport or assume to grant to the wife alimony for any longer period nor impose upon the husband or his estate any greater obligation than that awarded by the previous provisions of the decree; it is merely security for the performance of the obligation already imposed that the court is authorized to require.” The court acknowledged that parties could agree to alimony terms that bind the husband’s estate after death, but no such agreement existed here. The court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed the complaint.