People v. Buongermino, 34 N.Y.2d 206 (1974)

Airport security searches, including the use of magnetometers, are constitutionally permissible when conducted to prevent air piracy, provided individuals voluntarily consent to further searches after initial screening or are otherwise not compelled to board the aircraft.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of predeparture airport security searches. Defendants Buongermino and Kuhn argued that airport security measures violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the searches were permissible because both defendants voluntarily consented to the searches. The court reasoned that the governmental interest in preventing air piracy outweighed the minimal intrusion of magnetometer searches. The decision clarified that while a magnetometer search itself is permissible, a subsequent personal search requires consent, and refusal to consent only bars boarding, not further search beyond preventing boarding.

Facts

Buongermino was subjected to a predeparture search at Kennedy International Airport where signs were posted indicating searches were possible and announcements were made to that effect. After waiting in line and observing others being frisked, he was asked if he “would mind being searched” and consented. A bulge was found in his pocket, which contained marijuana. Kuhn triggered a magnetometer at LaGuardia Airport. An agent requested identification, and then asked if Kuhn would consent to a search, to which he agreed. A pat-down revealed a cigarette package containing a hypodermic syringe and heroin.

Procedural History

Buongermino was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a dangerous drug, and Kuhn was convicted of criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument, both in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court affirmed both convictions.

Issue(s)

1. Whether predeparture airport security searches violate the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers.
2. Whether the consent to be searched at an airport can be considered free and voluntary absent being informed of the right to refuse the search.
3. Whether the use of a magnetometer constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Holding

1. No, because under the circumstances, the defendants voluntarily consented to the search.

2. No, because voluntariness is a question of fact determined from all circumstances; knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor but not a prerequisite to voluntary consent.

3. No, because the governmental interest in preventing air piracy outweighs the minimal intrusion into personal privacy.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that a defendant can waive Fourth Amendment rights and consent to a search. The prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness, which is a question of fact. The court found no evidence of inherently coercive tactics by security officers in either case. The court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, stating that knowledge of the right to refuse is not a prerequisite for establishing voluntary consent. The court distinguished between consent and waiver, noting that a “knowing and intelligent waiver” is required only when a defendant waives rights to preserve a fair trial, whereas Fourth Amendment consent need not meet this strict standard. The court acknowledged that while the magnetometer constitutes a search, its minimal intrusion is justified by the overwhelming governmental interest in preventing air piracy. The court quoted Camara v. Municipal Court, emphasizing the importance of balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails. Immediate action is required to prevent hijack attempts, making search warrants impractical. The court clarified that a further personal search requires consent after a magnetometer is triggered. Refusal to consent bars boarding, but no further search is justified, as the individual no longer poses an immediate hijacking threat. The court cited Chimel v. California, affirming that contraband found during a valid search is admissible as evidence.