New York Law Review

Tag: Air Carrier Liability

  • Haggard v. Pan American World Airways, 441 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1981): Consequences of Failure to Deliver Ticket Under Warsaw Convention

    Haggard v. Pan American World Airways, 441 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1981)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, an airline that fails to deliver a passenger ticket before accepting a passenger at the initial point of international travel cannot avail itself of the Convention’s liability limitations, even if a ticket is delivered later during the journey.

    Summary

    Robyn Haggard, a passenger on Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), was injured in a terrorist attack in Rome during a flight from New York to Saudi Arabia. Pan Am claimed the $75,000 liability limitation under the Warsaw Convention. The trial court found that Pan Am did not deliver a ticket to Haggard in New York and thus could not invoke the liability limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that delivery in Rome was sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ticket must be delivered before the initial acceptance of the passenger for the international flight to invoke the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention, and that the burden of proving delivery rests with the airline.

    Facts

    Robyn Haggard, a 16-year-old, was traveling on Pan Am from New York to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, with a stopover in Rome. While in Rome, the airplane was attacked by terrorists, and Haggard suffered severe burns. The trial court determined that Pan Am did not provide Haggard with a ticket before she boarded the flight in New York. Haggard sued Pan Am for injuries exceeding the Warsaw Convention’s liability limit.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that Pan Am’s failure to deliver a ticket in New York rendered the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitation inapplicable. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating Pan Am’s affirmative defenses and limiting the damages to $75,000, concluding that delivery of the ticket in Rome was sufficient. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for review of the factual determination regarding ticket delivery in New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an airline can invoke the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention when it fails to deliver a passenger ticket before accepting the passenger at the outset of international travel, but delivers the ticket later during the journey. Whether the burden of proving delivery of the ticket rests with the airline.

    Holding

    1. No, because subdivision 2 of Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention explicitly states that “if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.” The delivery must occur before the initiation of the first leg of the trip.
    2. Yes, because assertion of the Convention’s liability limitations is an affirmative defense and the airline is in the best position to show delivery, having access to its own records and copies of tickets sold.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the delivery of the ticket is a prerequisite for the airline to avail itself of the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitations. This requirement stems from the contractual nature of the passenger-carrier relationship; the ticket serves as evidence of the contract and ensures that both parties are aware of the terms, including liability limitations. The court emphasized the language of Article 3(2) of the Convention, which stipulates that the liability limitations do not apply if the carrier accepts a passenger without delivering a ticket. Citing Egan v. American Airlines, the court noted that the entire trip was considered a whole, and the ticket should have been delivered at the beginning of the journey. “The contract plays a role fundamental to the objectives of the Warsaw Conference. The obligations arising from the contract between the carrier and the passenger carry out the Conference goal that the rules of limited liability be known to both parties.”

    Regarding the burden of proof, the court held that the airline, as the party asserting the affirmative defense of limited liability under the Warsaw Convention, bears the burden of proving that it delivered the ticket to the passenger. The court stated, “inasmuch as the Warsaw Convention “Mandates the limitation unless ‘the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered’, there is no need for a carrier who claims the limitation to show more than the delivery of an appropriate ticket, and travel of the passenger thereunder.” The airline has better access to records and personnel who can verify ticket delivery, while the passenger may be deceased or severely injured, making it difficult to prove non-delivery. This aligns with the general principle that the party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. The court distinguished this from cases where the passenger alleges willful misconduct by the airline, where the burden of proof rightly falls on the plaintiff.

  • Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 34 N.Y.2d 406 (1974): Defining Willful Misconduct Under the Warsaw Convention

    34 N.Y.2d 406 (1974)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, a carrier’s liability limitations are waived only if damage is caused by willful misconduct, which requires more than just negligence, even gross negligence; it necessitates a conscious intent to do or omit doing an act from which harm results, or a pattern of behavior indicating a reckless disregard of the probable consequences.

    Summary

    Berner sued British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) to recover damages for the loss of a shipment of platinum, arguing BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention, thus precluding BCPA from utilizing the Convention’s liability limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held that while BCPA’s actions may have constituted negligence, they did not rise to the level of willful misconduct required to overcome the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized that the evidence, even viewed favorably to the shipper, failed to demonstrate a conscious intent to act improperly or a reckless disregard for probable consequences.

    Facts

    Berner shipped platinum via BCPA. Following a previous misdelivery incident (with eventual recovery), BCPA’s vice-president assured Berner that disciplinary actions had been taken and that employees were reminded to adhere to proper delivery procedures. However, a subsequent shipment was delivered to an impostor named Russo. Berner sued, claiming BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct. The evidence showed formal compliance with the carrier’s cargo traffic manual procedures, even though negligently performed. It was stipulated that the delivery to the impostor by BCPA employees, Saunders and Rubenstein, was not, standing alone, willful misconduct. There was no evidence presented that the manual procedures were insufficient if carefully followed, or that the security system was deficient.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of Berner, concluding that BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of willful misconduct as a matter of law. Berner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding of willful misconduct on the part of British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, thereby precluding the airline from availing itself of the Convention’s liability limitations.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the shipper, was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of willful misconduct or its equivalent as required by the Warsaw Convention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that while the evidence might support a finding of negligence, it did not demonstrate the heightened culpability required for willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized that Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention requires a showing that the damage was caused by the carrier’s willful misconduct or such default on its part as is considered equivalent to willful misconduct under the law of the court. The court noted the false assurance given by the carrier’s vice-president related to adherence to existing security procedures, not the inauguration of new ones. The evidence showed that the carrier had formally complied with the prescribed steps, even if negligently performed. The court also pointed to the stipulation that the delivery to the impostor, while negligent, was not, standing alone, willful misconduct. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the manual procedures, if carefully followed, were insufficient or that the carrier’s security system was deficient. The court held that, even considering the evidence in the aggregate and most favorably to the shipper, it was insufficient to prove willful misconduct as a matter of law. “Without undertaking a precise verbal definition of willful misconduct or its equivalent for the purposes of the Convention, we hold that the items of proof introduced, whether considered seriatim or in the aggregate, and viewed in the light most favorable to appellant shipper, while sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence, were insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the finding prescribed by the Warsaw Convention.”