New York Law Review

Tag: Aiding and Abetting

  • Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017): Liability under the NYS Human Rights Law for Discrimination Based on Criminal Conviction

    Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, liability for employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction is limited to employers, while aiding and abetting liability can extend to non-employers.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three questions certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The case involved two former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc. who were fired after their criminal records revealed past convictions for sexual offenses. The court held that liability under NYSHRL § 296(15), which prohibits discrimination based on criminal convictions, is limited to employers, as defined by common-law principles that emphasize the power to control the employee. However, the Court found that NYSHRL § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, could extend liability to non-employers, even out-of-state entities, who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc., had prior convictions for sexual offenses. Astro contracted with Allied Van Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of Sirva, Inc. Under the contract, Astro was required to adhere to Allied’s guidelines, which included criminal background checks and automatic failure for employees with sexual offense convictions. After Sirva investigated the plaintiffs’ criminal records, Astro fired them. Plaintiffs sued Astro, Sirva, and Allied, alleging violations of the NYSHRL, among other claims.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied. The court granted summary judgment to Allied and Sirva, holding that § 296(15) applied only to employers and that Allied and Sirva were not the plaintiffs’ employers. The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the NYSHRL.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSHRL § 296(15), prohibiting employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction, limits liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer.”

    2. If § 296(15) is limited to an employer, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” under § 296(15)?

    3. Whether NYSHRL § 296(6), providing for aiding and abetting liability, applies to § 296(15) such that an out-of-state principal corporation that requires its New York State agent to discriminate in employment based on a criminal conviction may be held liable for the employer’s violation of § 296(15).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because NYSHRL § 296(15) incorporates Article 23-A of the Correction Law, which limits liability to employers, both public and private.

    2. Common-law principles, focusing on the employer’s power to control the employee in their work, determine whether an entity is an employer under § 296(15).

    3. Yes, because § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, extends liability to out-of-state non-employers who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that NYSHRL § 296(15) is limited to employers, finding that the statute’s language, legislative history, and incorporation of Article 23-A of the Correction Law all supported this interpretation. Article 23-A specifies that the prohibition applies to applications “at” an employer or to employment held. The Court noted that an employer has to consider exceptions under Correction Law § 752, making it clear that only employers could violate the statute. The court also found that when determining who constitutes an employer, common-law principles would apply, giving “greatest emphasis” to the alleged employer’s power to control the employee in their work. For the aiding and abetting claim, the Court found that § 296(6) applies to any “person,” and is not limited to employers. The purpose of this section, as expressed in legislative history, was to hold liable anyone who aids or abets discriminatory conduct, regardless of their status. The court cited a previous case, *National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights*, where the aiding and abetting provision was applied to a newspaper that was not an employer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of liability under the NYSHRL for employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. It confirms that non-employers can be held liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under NYSHRL § 296(6), even if they are not the direct employer, especially if they have significant control over an employer’s employment practices. Businesses, especially those with contractual relationships that influence employment decisions of other entities, must be aware of this potential liability. Attorneys should use the common-law test, and *GTE* factors, when determining if an entity is an “employer”. Moreover, the case highlights that the NYSHRL’s extraterritoriality provision can extend liability for discriminatory acts committed outside of New York if they impact New York residents.

  • People v. Corines, 4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005): Aiding and Abetting the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

    4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005)

    Education Law § 6512(1) permits the prosecution of any individual, licensed or unlicensed, who aids and abets an unauthorized individual in the practice of medicine.

    Summary

    Dr. Corines, a licensed physician, was convicted of aiding and abetting Ana Marie Santi, whose medical license was suspended, in the unauthorized practice of medicine. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Education Law § 6512(1) does not exempt licensed professionals from prosecution for aiding and abetting unlicensed individuals. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to absurd results. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, even without expert testimony, and rejected claims of juror misconduct.

    Facts

    Dr. Peter Corines owned and operated medical offices. Ana Marie Santi, a licensed physician whose license was suspended, worked for Corines. Santi administered intravenous lines to three patients before Corines performed surgical procedures. The patients testified to experiencing sensations consistent with anesthesia. The Attorney General charged both Corines and Santi with unauthorized practice of medicine, alleging Santi administered anesthesia without a license, and Corines aided and abetted her.

    Procedural History

    Corines and Santi were convicted on multiple counts of unauthorized practice of medicine. The Appellate Division initially remanded for a hearing on juror misconduct. After the hearing, the trial court upheld the verdict. The Appellate Division then affirmed the convictions on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Education Law § 6512(1) exempts licensed physicians from prosecution for aiding and abetting the unauthorized practice of medicine.
    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for unauthorized practice of medicine and aiding and abetting, absent expert testimony on the effects of anesthesia.
    3. Whether the trial court’s response to a jury inquiry during deliberations was adequate.
    4. Whether alleged juror misconduct warranted setting aside the verdict.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to unreasonable and absurd results.
    2. Yes, because the jury could reasonably infer from the patient’s testimony and other evidence that Santi administered anesthesia, and Corines aided and abetted her.
    3. Yes, because rereading the original instruction was a meaningful response in this specific context.
    4. No, because the juror’s participation did not rise to the level of misconduct; she gave lay opinions based on her life experiences and the trial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that a literal reading of Education Law § 6512(1) to exempt licensed individuals would lead to absurd results, undermining the statute’s intent to protect the public. The Court emphasized that legislative intent should guide statutory interpretation. The statute was designed to regulate professions and ensure public safety, which would be undermined by allowing licensed professionals to assist unlicensed individuals. The Court stated, “[i]n implementing a statute, the courts must of necessity examine the purpose of the statute and determine the intention of the Legislature.”

    Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court held expert testimony wasn’t required because the effects of anesthesia are within the common knowledge of jurors. Patient testimony describing sensations and loss of consciousness, combined with Corines’s own admissions, provided sufficient evidence. As the court stated, “modern juries are not bereft of education and intelligent persons who can be expected to apply their ordinary judgment and practical experience.”

    On the jury inquiry, the court found rereading the original instruction adequate because the jury didn’t express confusion about the meaning of the relevant elements. Finally, the court rejected the juror misconduct claim because the juror’s opinions were based on her life experiences and the trial evidence, not specialized expertise outside the record. The court noted, “Jurors are not, however, required to ‘check their life experiences at the courtroom door’.”

  • People v. Llanos, 77 N.Y.2d 866 (1991): Criminal Facilitation Requires Actual Aid in Committing the Underlying Crime

    People v. Llanos, 77 N.Y.2d 866 (1991)

    To be guilty of criminal facilitation, a defendant must provide the means or opportunity for the commission of a felony and, in fact, aid another person in committing that felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal of the defendant’s conviction for criminal facilitation in the fourth degree. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the defendant’s actions provided the means or opportunity for the commission of the underlying crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The defendant, upon seeing police officers, yelled “Police, Police” and knocked on the door of an apartment where drugs were subsequently found. The court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct did not enable the apartment’s occupants to possess the contraband for any longer than they would have without her actions, and therefore, she did not facilitate the crime.

    Facts

    Police officers arrived at an apartment building to execute a search warrant. As the officers walked up the stairs, the defendant saw them and yelled “Police, Police,” while also knocking on the door of apartment 14. The officers immediately arrested the defendant. After entering apartment 14, police found a large quantity of cocaine, a gun, and drug paraphernalia. The occupants of the apartment were then arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree after a bench trial. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of criminal facilitation as a matter of law. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of yelling “Police, Police” and knocking on a door provided the means or opportunity for others to commit the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance, thus constituting criminal facilitation.

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence that the defendant’s conduct enabled the occupants of the apartment to possess the contraband for any longer than they would have if she had done nothing. Thus, she did not provide the “means or opportunity” for the commission of the crime, nor did she in fact aid the occupants in committing the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the elements of Penal Law § 115.00 (1), which defines criminal facilitation in the fourth degree. The statute requires that the defendant renders aid that provides the means or opportunity to commit the crime and, in fact, aids a person in committing a felony. The court distinguished the facts from cases where the defendant’s actions directly furthered the underlying crime. The court stated, “Here, there is no evidence that defendant’s conduct enabled the occupants of apartment 14 to possess the contraband for any period longer than they would have had defendant done nothing. Thus, it cannot be said that defendant provided the ‘means or opportunity’ for commission of the object felony.” The court cited examples of criminal facilitation such as receiving currency which initiated a drug transaction (People v. Streeter) and transporting “buy” money (People v. Schoen) to illustrate how a defendant must actively assist in the commission of the underlying crime.

  • Marine Midland Bank v. Murkoff, 504 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1986): No Cause of Action for Assisting Debtor Absent Transfer or Benefit

    Marine Midland Bank v. Murkoff, 504 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1986)

    Under New York law, a creditor has no cause of action against a party who merely assists a debtor in transferring assets if the assisting party did not receive the assets or benefit from the transfer, and the creditor lacked a lien or judgment on the debt at the time of the transfer.

    Summary

    Marine Midland Bank, as a creditor, sought damages from two bank officials (defendants) who allegedly assisted a debtor in transferring assets to Switzerland to avoid a judgment. The bank had previously obtained a $6 million judgment against the debtor in federal court. The bank did not claim that the defendants received any of the transferred funds or otherwise benefitted from the transfer. The New York Court of Appeals held that the bank had no cause of action against the defendants because they were mere participants in the transfer, and the bank had no lien or judgment on the assets when the transfer occurred. The court clarified that Sections 278 and 279 of the Debtor and Creditor Law did not create a new remedy against non-transferees.

    Facts

    Marine Midland Bank obtained a $6 million judgment in federal court against a director of a bank’s parent corporation for losses suffered by the bank due to the director’s financial dealings.

    During the pendency of the federal suit, two officials of the bank (defendants) allegedly assisted the director in transferring funds to an account in Switzerland.

    The bank did not allege that the defendants received any of the funds or benefitted in any way from the transfer.

    Procedural History

    The bank brought an action against the two officials, alleging they fraudulently deprived the bank of funds by assisting the director’s transfer.

    The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that no cause of action existed under New York law for merely assisting a debtor in transferring assets without a lien or judgment.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under New York law and the Debtor and Creditor Law, a creditor has a cause of action against a party who merely assists a debtor in transferring assets, when the assisting party does not receive the assets or benefit from the transfer, and the creditor did not have a lien or judgment on the assets at the time of the transfer.

    Holding

    No, because under longstanding New York law, a creditor has no cause of action against a party who merely assists a debtor in transferring assets where there was neither a lien on those assets nor a judgment on the debt, and Sections 278 and 279 of the Debtor and Creditor Law did not explicitly or implicitly create such a remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the traditional New York rule that a creditor cannot sue a party for merely participating in the transfer of a debtor’s property before obtaining a judgment or lien. The court cited Braem v. Merchants’ Natl. Bank, 127 N.Y. 508, 515, stating that plaintiff conceded to this traditional rule. The court rejected the argument that Sections 278 and 279 of the Debtor and Creditor Law changed this rule. These sections allow a creditor to seek nullification of the conveyance or secure the assets to satisfy the debt, but do not create a remedy for money damages against non-transferees who did not benefit from the transfer.

    Regarding Section 273-a of the Debtor and Creditor Law, the court clarified that it defines a fraudulent conveyance but does not create a cause of action for conspiracy against non-transferees who assist in the conveyance. The court emphasized that it is not within its power to create a new remedy through judicial construction where the statute does not provide one. The court stated, “It is not for us to write such a remedy into the statute by judicial construction.”

  • National Organization for Women v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 406 (1976): Aiding and Abetting Sex Discrimination Through Classified Ads

    National Organization for Women v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 406 (1976)

    A newspaper that publishes classified advertisements under separate “Male” and “Female” headings aids and abets sex discrimination, violating state human rights laws.

    Summary

    The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued Gannett, a newspaper publisher, alleging that maintaining separate “Male” and “Female” columns in classified advertising violated New York’s anti-discrimination laws. The New York Court of Appeals held that Gannett aided and abetted sex discrimination by publishing these separate listings, reinforcing discriminatory practices even though the newspaper itself wasn’t directly discriminating nor was it an “employer” or “employment agency”. The court emphasized that such practices perpetuate wage disparities and limit opportunities based on gender stereotypes.

    Facts

    Gannett Publishing Co., Inc. published a newspaper with classified advertisement sections. These sections included separate columns labeled “Help Wanted – Male” and “Help Wanted – Female.” NOW filed a complaint alleging this practice violated New York State’s anti-discrimination laws, arguing it aided and abetted sex discrimination.

    Procedural History

    The State Division of Human Rights initially determined the separate listings were discriminatory, but this was overruled by the Division itself, dismissing the complaint. The State Human Rights Appeal Board upheld the dismissal. The Appellate Division confirmed the Division’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for further appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NOW has standing to bring suit as a representative organization.

    2. Whether a newspaper aids and abets sex discrimination by publishing classified advertisements under separate “Male” and “Female” headings, in violation of Executive Law § 296(6).

    Holding

    1. Yes, NOW has standing because it is a bona fide organization dedicated to eliminating discriminatory practices against women.

    2. Yes, Gannett aided and abetted sex discrimination because designating separate want ad column listings as “Help Wanted – Male” and/or “Help Wanted – Female” reinforces discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that unlawful discrimination against women is widespread and often subtle. Although Gannett argued the separate listings were for the convenience of readers, the court found that such a practice perpetuates sex discrimination. The court highlighted that jobs listed in the “female” column often have lower pay than those in the “male” column, reinforcing wage disparities. The court cited Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm., noting similar findings of wage disparities between male and female job listings. Although Gannett was not directly discriminating as an employer or employment agency, it was culpable for aiding and abetting discrimination under Executive Law § 296(6). The court stated, “We hold only that to designate separate want ad column listings as ‘Help Wanted – Male’ and/or ‘Help Wanted – Female’ reinforces the very discriminatory practices which the Federal and State antidiscrimination laws were meant to eliminate.” The court emphasized that the separate listings reinforce discriminatory practices that the law seeks to eliminate and rejected the argument that such listings are merely for reader convenience, stating that such policies can become self-fulfilling prophecies that perpetuate gender stereotypes in employment opportunities.

  • People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Establishing Aider and Abettor Liability

    People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

    To be liable as an aider and abettor, a defendant must share the intent of the principal actor and take actions that encourage or induce the commission of the crime.

    Summary

    Morhouse, a political leader, was convicted of bribery and taking unlawful fees for his role in securing a liquor license for the New York Playboy Club by bribing Martin Epstein, Chairman of the State Liquor Authority. The prosecution argued Morhouse aided and abetted both the Playboy people in bribing Epstein and Epstein in taking unlawful fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show Morhouse knew Epstein was to be bribed and that he encouraged the bribers, establishing a sufficient identity of interest between Morhouse and Epstein. The court remanded for a hearing on potential eavesdropping violations.

    Facts

    Playboy representatives initially agreed to bribe Epstein for a liquor license. This deal stalled. Epstein suggested involving Morhouse to resolve the issues. Morhouse agreed to help secure the license for $100,000, indicating knowledge of the prior corrupt arrangement with Epstein. After Morhouse’s involvement, Epstein told Berger, a Playboy representative, that he and Morhouse had discussed the deal and instructed Berger to pay Epstein his $50,000. Epstein eventually received half of his bribe.

    Procedural History

    Morhouse was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County, of bribery and taking unlawful fees. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove Morhouse’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Whether the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated.
    3. Whether the court orders authorizing eavesdropping were properly issued and executed and, if not, whether the evidence presented at trial was tainted by any improper eavesdropping.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Morhouse knew of the corrupt agreement and encouraged the bribers to continue, satisfying the requirements for aider and abettor liability.
    2. Yes, because there was non-accomplice evidence fairly tending to connect Morhouse with the commission of the crime.
    3. Remanded for a hearing to determine whether the court orders authorizing eavesdropping were properly issued and executed under the law as it was understood at the time and to determine if the People’s evidence was tainted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Morhouse could be held liable as an aider and abettor because he knew Epstein was to be bribed and attached himself to the bribers’ cause, encouraging them to continue with the corrupt agreement. Morhouse’s representation that he could handle Epstein induced them to consummate the agreement. The court distinguished this case from others where the defendant had no personal interest in the crime’s commission. Here, Morhouse’s payment depended on the Playboy Club getting the license, requiring Epstein to fulfill his bargain. The court found sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony. Non-accomplice testimony showed Morhouse’s arrangement for payment by Playboy through its publishing affiliate and his efforts to shift the payment on the books after the Grand Jury investigation began. Regarding the eavesdropping, the court held that Morhouse had standing to object to bugs and wiretaps of his own business office and phone calls. The court remanded for a hearing to determine the propriety of these eavesdrops and whether they tainted the evidence. The court noted that the prosecution’s conduct in maintaining electronic surveillance of Morhouse’s office after he became a suspect and was known to confer with his attorney raised concerns about potential interference with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.