New York Law Review

Tag: Aguilar-Spinelli

  • People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014): Anonymous Tips and Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014)

    An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability under the totality of the circumstances or satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for police stops based on anonymous tips. The Court of Appeals considered three separate cases with similar fact patterns. In Argyris and DiSalvo, the Court upheld the vehicle stops based on a 911 call reporting a gun in a car. In Johnson, the court suppressed evidence from a stop initiated by a 911 call about a possible intoxicated driver. The key issue was whether the anonymous tips provided reasonable suspicion for the stops. The majority found the Argyris/DiSalvo tip reliable but the Johnson tip unreliable, though different justices disagreed on the appropriate standard to apply (totality of the circumstances vs. Aguilar-Spinelli). The decision underscores the complexities of relying on anonymous tips for law enforcement action and the ongoing debate in New York regarding the proper legal framework for assessing the reliability of such tips.

    Facts

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: An anonymous 911 caller reported seeing men put a gun in a black Mustang. Police located the car and stopped it, finding weapons. </p>
    <p>Johnson: An anonymous 911 caller reported a possible intoxicated driver in a blue BMW. A deputy stopped the car after observing a minor traffic violation outside his jurisdiction.</p>

    Procedural History

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: The trial court initially granted a motion to suppress but reversed itself on reargument. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
    <p>Johnson: The Town Court denied a motion to suppress. County Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the accusatory instrument.</p>

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop.

    2. What standard should be used to determine the reliability of an anonymous tip: totality of the circumstances or the Aguilar-Spinelli test?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the tip had sufficient indicia of reliability (Argyris/DiSalvo) but no, because the tip was unreliable (Johnson).

    2. The court did not come to a consensus. Four judges found reasonable suspicion, agreeing that the tip in Argyris/DiSalvo was reliable and the tip in Johnson was not; Smith and Pigott, JJ., favored the totality of the circumstances test and Abdus-Salaam and Graffeo, JJ., favored the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Read, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion stating, essentially, the anonymous tips must contain “predictive information”. Rivera, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion emphasizing that predictive information must be provided in the tip.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority memorandum opinion stated that regardless of whether they apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, record support exists for the lower courts’ findings that the stops were lawful in Argyris and DiSalvo. They stated that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants’ vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. The absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability under these circumstances.

    Smith, J., concurring, argued that the Aguilar-Spinelli test needlessly complicates reasonable suspicion analysis and that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable.

    Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring, advocated for the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, suggesting that hearsay information cannot provide an officer with probable cause unless the hearsay report reveals a reliable basis for the informant’s knowledge and shows that the informant is generally credible. Furthermore, the determination of whether a tip provides the police with probable cause or reasonable suspicion depends on the quality of the tip’s description of the crime itself, as opposed to its statements regarding the suspect’s physical appearance and non-criminal conduct.

    Read, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, emphasized the importance of predictive information in anonymous tips. She stated, “We have held that an anonymous tip supplies reasonable suspicion only if it ‘contains predictive information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’ (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]; see generally Rivera dissenting op at 14-18 [discussing Moore]).”

    Rivera, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, argued that anonymous tips must contain predictive information to justify forcible stops and that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring the informant is reliable and there is a basis for the knowledge of the informant’s tip, should be used. "[A]n anonymous tip must ‘contain[] predictive information — such as information of criminal behavior — so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’" (

  • People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985): Establishes Stricter Probable Cause Standard Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985)

    Under the New York State Constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply; evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued without probable cause must be suppressed, even if police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant.

    Summary

    Bigelow was arrested and his car seized without a warrant based on information from an informant and a police investigation. A subsequent search warrant was issued, and a search revealed contraband. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression of the evidence. The Court held that neither the arrest nor the search warrant were supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates. Further, the court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the New York State Constitution, finding that allowing the evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the evidence was suppressed.

    Facts

    Police suspected Bigelow of drug trafficking based on the following facts: he telegraphed almost $25,000 to a Florida resident over four months; the address was near an area known for drug activity; he rented post office boxes in two New York towns; he received two packages from Florida at one post office box in August and September 1981 and another at another post office box in December 1981; and he frequented the apartment of a known drug user and dealer.

    On December 24, 1981, police observed Bigelow attempt to pick up a package from Florida, but the post office was closed. On December 26, they saw him pick up a package and drive to the drug user’s apartment. Police interviewed an informant who stated that Bigelow was a “drugger” dealing cocaine shipped from Florida and had conducted drug transactions as recently as “Christmas week of 1981.” However, the informant had not seen Bigelow sell or possess drugs at any time.

    Bigelow was later stopped, frisked, and taken to the police station. A search warrant was obtained, and a search of his person and vehicle revealed amphetamines, hypodermic needles, and over $4,500 in cash, but no cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Bigelow was charged with and convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance and hypodermic needles. He moved to suppress the evidence, which was denied by the suppression court, which found probable cause for the arrest and search. The Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion to suppress, and remitted the matter, finding a lack of probable cause. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the arrest of Bigelow was supported by probable cause.

    2. Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test.

    3. Whether the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police lacked sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that Bigelow had committed or was committing a crime.

    2. No, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, and the police investigation did not sufficiently corroborate the hearsay information to establish probable cause under either test.

    3. No, because the New York State Constitution does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that probable cause requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed, or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place. The Court reiterated New York’s adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli rule for evaluating hearsay information, requiring the establishment of both the informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability.

    The Court found that the informant’s statement lacked any indication of personal observation and did not describe Bigelow’s activities with sufficient particularity to infer personal knowledge. The informant’s conclusory assertion that Bigelow was a “drugger” was insufficient. The police investigation, while corroborating some details, was susceptible to innocent interpretation and did not establish probable cause. The Court then considered the totality of circumstances test articulated in Illinois v. Gates but determined that even under that more relaxed standard, probable cause was lacking, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, nor was the informant’s reliability demonstrated given the prior acquittal of charges resulting from his tips.

    Finally, the Court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, reasoning that allowing the seized evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. The Court emphasized that permitting the use of illegally seized evidence would place a premium on illegal police action and provide a positive incentive for similar lawless acts in the future, which is unacceptable under the New York State Constitution.

    The court stated, “[I]f the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, the exclusionary rule’s purpose is completely frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal police action and a positive incentive is provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future.”

  • People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985): Hearsay and Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrests

    People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985)

    Under New York State constitutional law, the Aguilar-Spinelli test remains the standard for evaluating probable cause based on hearsay for warrantless arrests, requiring both a basis of knowledge and reliability of the informant.

    Summary

    Bigelow was convicted of felony murder based on statements he made after an arrest. The arrest was based solely on hearsay information from a suspect, Abreu. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the arrest was unlawful because Abreu’s information did not meet the reliability requirements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test from Illinois v. Gates does not apply to warrantless arrests under the New York State Constitution. Because there was no attenuation between the illegal arrest and Bigelow’s statements, the statements were suppressed.

    Facts

    Raymundo Alcantara was killed during a store robbery. Joseph Di Prospro told police that Bolivar Abreu was the shooter. Detective Wieting questioned Abreu, who initially denied knowledge but then implicated Di Prospro and Bigelow. Abreu described a conversation where Di Prospro and Bigelow discussed the crime. Abreu also stated he and others traded a rifle for a .38 caliber revolver (likely the murder weapon). Based solely on Abreu’s statement, Detective Wieting arrested Bigelow, who had not been identified by any other means.

    Procedural History

    Bigelow moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, arguing his arrest lacked probable cause. The suppression court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether hearsay information from an informant provided probable cause for a warrantless arrest when the information’s reliability was not established under the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

    Holding

    No, because Abreu’s statement did not demonstrate reliability under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and the totality of the circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates does not apply to warrantless arrests under the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    A warrantless arrest requires probable cause, which can be based on hearsay. However, under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the hearsay must demonstrate both the informant’s basis of knowledge and the reliability of the information. While Abreu had a basis of knowledge, his reliability was not established. The Court reasoned that reliability can be shown through a track record, an oath, or admissions against penal interest. The People argued Abreu’s statement contained admissions against penal interest and was corroborated by police investigation. However, the Court found that Abreu’s statements did not clearly admit to criminal conduct. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that Abreu admitted to criminal facilitation because his assistance in procuring the revolver occurred before any intent to rob Alcantara’s store was formed. Further, the police corroboration (that Di Prospro had been picked up and released) was insufficient to establish reliability. The Court explicitly declined to apply the “totality of the circumstances” test articulated in Illinois v. Gates to warrantless arrests under the New York State Constitution, emphasizing the importance of a structured analysis to protect individual rights and provide clear guidance to law enforcement. The Court reasoned that Gates was primarily concerned with deference to a magistrate’s warrant determination, a factor absent in warrantless arrests. Because Bigelow’s statements were a direct result of the illegal arrest, and there was no intervening event to break the causal connection, the statements must be suppressed.