New York Law Review

Tag: age discrimination

  • Stephenson v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Local 100, 6 N.Y.3d 265 (2005): Establishing Pretext in Age Discrimination Claims

    6 N.Y.3d 265 (2005)

    In age discrimination cases, after the employer provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs Stephenson and Hodge sued their former union employer, alleging age discrimination after their termination. The employer argued they were terminated due to involvement in corruption. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, holding that while the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of age discrimination, they failed to prove that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their termination (corruption) was a pretext for age discrimination. The court emphasized that the burden of proving pretext remains with the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Stephenson, 63, and Hodge, 55, were terminated from their positions as union organizers and business agents. The union was under investigation for corruption and RICO violations. The union entered a consent decree with the federal government allowing a takeover and investigation. The union claimed the plaintiffs were terminated due to their involvement in corruption, acting as “bag men” for the mob. Plaintiffs argued they were fired due to their age and replaced, or intended to be replaced, by younger workers. Stephenson alleged a union official made ageist comments prior to his firing. Defendants argued the plaintiffs were not qualified, as evidenced by the federal probe into their activities that resulted in a recommendation that they be terminated.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs filed separate complaints, which were consolidated. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the defendant’s motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to prove the non-discriminatory reason for firing was pretextual. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in setting aside the jury verdict and dismissing the complaint, determining that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants’ valid reasons for termination were pretextual for age discrimination.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their termination was a pretext for age discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied a three-part analysis, similar to federal Title VII standards, for age discrimination claims under New York’s Human Rights Law. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.

    The court found that while the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the employer presented sufficient evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination – their alleged involvement in corruption, based on an FBI informant’s information and recommendation from an investigating company.

    Crucially, the court noted the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination. They simply denied the allegations of corruption, which was deemed insufficient to overcome the evidence presented by the employer. The court emphasized that “the burden of persuasion of the ultimate issue of discrimination always remains with the plaintiffs.”

    The court rejected the argument that the Appellate Division improperly substituted its factual findings for those of the jury. The court concluded that there was “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could have lead rational jurors to the conclusion they reached” based on the evidence presented. The court noted the Appellate Division’s point that younger employees implicated in corruption were also terminated, and older employees not implicated were retained which further undermined the pretext argument.

  • Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997): Establishing Pretext in Age Discrimination Claims

    Ferrante v. American Lung Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 623 (1997)

    In an age discrimination claim under New York’s Human Rights Law, summary judgment for the employer is inappropriate where the employee raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s stated reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination.

    Summary

    Ferrante sued the American Lung Association (ALA), alleging he was terminated due to age discrimination. ALA claimed Ferrante’s termination was performance-based. Ferrante argued that ALA’s reasons were pretextual and pointed to his supervisor’s ageist remarks and irregularities in the termination process. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to ALA, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Ferrante had raised a factual issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether ALA’s reasons were a pretext for age discrimination, thus precluding summary judgment.

    Facts

    Ferrante, 58, was terminated from his position as controller at ALA after nearly 10 years of employment. He received merit-based salary increases until a new Chief Financial Officer (CFO) became his supervisor. Ferrante alleged the CFO made disparaging remarks about his age, referring to him as “the old man.” ALA claimed Ferrante was terminated for poor performance, citing errors in financial reporting and failure to adapt to a new computer system. However, the primary evidence of poor performance was a memorandum written by the CFO after Ferrante’s termination, which Ferrante argued deviated from ALA’s standard procedure.

    Procedural History

    Ferrante sued ALA, claiming age discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted ALA’s motion for summary judgment, finding Ferrante failed to prove ALA’s reasons were pretextual. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Ferrante only needed to identify a disputed material issue of fact regarding pretext. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly reversed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the American Lung Association, based on the plaintiff raising a question of fact as to whether the employer’s articulated basis for the dismissal was merely a pretext for discriminatory action?

    Holding

    Yes, because Ferrante presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether ALA’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for age discrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals aligned New York’s Human Rights Law standards with federal Title VII standards. The court reiterated the burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden shifts to the employer to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s reasons are pretextual.

    The court emphasized that while the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination, to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff only needs to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the employer’s asserted reason is false or unworthy of belief, and that more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason. “To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment in an age discrimination case, plaintiffs must ‘show that there is a material issue of fact as to whether (1) the employer’s asserted reason for [the challenged action] is false or unworthy of belief and (2) more likely than not the employee’s age was the real reason.”

    The court found several factors that raised credibility issues and supported a finding of pretext, including the supervisor’s alleged ageist remarks, the timing of the performance memorandum (written after the termination), the deviation from standard termination procedures, and the contested evidence about other employees over 50 who were fired. The court noted that assessing credibility is not the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment. Because Ferrante successfully raised a question of fact concerning the falsity of ALA’s proffered basis for the termination, summary judgment was inappropriate.

  • People v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 84 N.Y.2d 560 (1994): Interpreting “Available” Insurance Under Anti-Age Discrimination Law

    People v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 84 N.Y.2d 560 (1994)

    When a statute prohibits age discrimination in car rentals contingent on insurance coverage being “available,” the statute does not require that the available insurance fully protect rental companies from all risks, but only that insurance can be obtained, even if it requires using an assigned risk plan.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether the New York Automobile Insurance Plan (NYAIP) constitutes “available” insurance under General Business Law § 391-g, which prohibits car rental companies from discriminating against drivers 18 and older based solely on age, provided insurance coverage is available. The Attorney General sued car rental companies refusing to rent to drivers under 25, arguing NYAIP made insurance “available.” The rental companies argued NYAIP’s coverage limits were too low and didn’t cover physical damage to vehicles. The court held that NYAIP does constitute “available” insurance under the statute, emphasizing the statute’s focus on preventing age discrimination rather than protecting rental companies from added costs.

    Facts

    Several car rental companies in New York refused to rent cars to drivers under the age of 25, and some refused to rent to those under 21. New York General Business Law § 391-g prohibits such discrimination based on age, provided that insurance coverage for such persons is “available.” The NYAIP is the assigned risk plan in New York, offering insurance to those unable to obtain it in the voluntary market. NYAIP provides bodily injury, property damage, personal injury protection, and uninsured motorist coverage but does not cover physical damage to the rental vehicles.

    Procedural History

    The Attorney General brought suit against the rental companies, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and penalties for violating General Business Law § 391-g. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the People. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the order of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by the Appellate Division, was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the NYAIP constitutes “available” insurance coverage within the meaning of General Business Law § 391-g, considering that it does not provide coverage for physical damage to the rented vehicles and may have coverage limitations the rental companies deem insufficient.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute only requires that insurance coverage is obtainable, not that it fully protects rental companies from all potential risks associated with renting to younger drivers. The statute allows companies to pass on the extra cost for insurance related to the age of the person renting the motor vehicle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of General Business Law § 391-g, noting that it only requires insurance coverage to be “available,” not that rental companies be fully insured against all risks of renting to young drivers. The court found no statutory requirement for a specific minimum amount of insurance coverage or coverage for physical damage to vehicles. The court referenced legislative history, indicating the law’s intent was to prevent age discrimination and allow rental companies to pass on increased insurance costs to younger renters. The Court stated that the legislative history did not evince a legislative intent to provide shelter for the rental companies from the kind of economic disadvantage they tender in the argument of this case. The court noted that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370, which sets minimum insurance standards for vehicles in New York, does not require coverage for physical damage. The court observed that some rental companies already rent to drivers between 21 and 25, presumably without NYAIP coverage and still maintain a profit. The Court dismissed arguments about prohibitively high rental costs, citing evidence that other companies rent to young drivers with only minimal surcharges. The Court emphasized the statute’s antidiscriminatory purpose, stating: “[i]n many circumstances, companies which rent motor vehicles refuse to rent to individuals between 18 and 21 years of age. This can result in severe hardship to competent drivers who are as safe and reliable as drivers over age 21.”

  • Matter of Laverack & Haines, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 88 N.Y.2d 734 (1996): Employer’s Burden in Age Discrimination Cases Involving Downsizing

    Matter of Laverack & Haines, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 88 N.Y.2d 734 (1996)

    In age discrimination cases stemming from a company downsizing, an employer satisfies its burden of rebuttal by presenting a non-discriminatory, non-pretextual explanation, such as demonstrable economic hardship necessitating workforce reduction, and is not legally obligated to create new positions or displace other employees to accommodate the terminated employee.

    Summary

    Laverack & Haines, Inc. was found by the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) to have discriminated against George Burns based on age when it eliminated his position as Claims Manager during a company-wide downsizing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the SDHR’s determination, holding that while Burns established a prima facie case of age discrimination, Laverack successfully rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that the job elimination was due to genuine economic difficulties and was not a pretext for discrimination. The court emphasized that Laverack had no legal obligation to create a new position for Burns or displace other employees.

    Facts

    George Burns, in his early 60s, was the Claims Manager for Laverack & Haines’ Syracuse office. Due to economic downturns, Laverack began downsizing its operations, including eliminating senior-level positions. The Claims Manager position was eliminated company-wide, including Burns’ position in Syracuse and a similar position in Buffalo. Burns was offered a part-time, lower-paying consultant position, which he declined. Another Claims Manager in Albany accepted a similar readjustment. Later, a younger employee, Jack Syracuse, who had assisted Burns, was also terminated.

    Procedural History

    Burns filed a complaint with the SDHR, alleging age discrimination. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found in favor of Burns. The SDHR Commissioner, however, ultimately adopted the ALJ’s report, finding unlawful discrimination. The Appellate Division agreed that a prima facie case was established but the Court of Appeals reversed, annulling the SDHR determination and dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employer, in response to a prima facie case of age discrimination stemming from a company downsizing, adequately rebuts the presumption of discrimination by presenting evidence of economic hardship and eliminating the employee’s job title company-wide.

    Holding

    No, because the employer presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (economic hardship leading to a company-wide downsizing that eliminated the position) for the termination and was not obligated to create a new position or displace another employee to accommodate the plaintiff.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its precedent in Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937, which established that satisfying the prima facie component of an age discrimination case shifts the burden to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by presenting legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons. The court found that Laverack met this burden by demonstrating that the downsizing was due to business failings and economic setbacks. The court noted that Burns was not replaced by a younger employee, and the Claims Manager position was eliminated entirely across all branch offices. The court emphasized that the employer was “under no legal obligation to create a new or additional job or to bump or displace lower classified employees as a way to forestall or obviate an unlawful age discrimination complaint.” To require such actions would create a “Hobson’s choice for the employer.” The court distinguished the case from situations involving disparate treatment, finding no evidence that Burns was treated differently from similarly situated employees, especially considering the distinct operational circumstances of the Buffalo and Syracuse offices. The court further cited Kipper v Doron Precision Sys., 194 AD2d 855, noting that the fact that some of Burns’ responsibilities were assumed by a younger employee is insufficient to establish that Laverack’s proffered reason for terminating Burns’ employment was pretextual. The court reasoned that the company’s actions were a result of business distress, not age discrimination, highlighting that it was not “playing musical chairs” but struggling to survive. This aligns with the general principle that “the discharge of employees as a result of a city fiscal crisis does not constitute a discriminatory act” (Steele v Board of Educ., 40 NY2d 456). The court also drew support from U.S. Supreme Court precedents such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248; and St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v Hicks, 509 US 502.

  • Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v. State Division of Human Rights, 66 N.Y.2d 93 (1985): Burden Shifting in Age Discrimination Claims

    Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v. State Division of Human Rights, 66 N.Y.2d 93 (1985)

    In age discrimination cases, once a complainant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decision; the complainant then has the opportunity to prove these reasons are pretextual.

    Summary

    Former employees of Better Brands, Inc. filed discrimination complaints against Miller Brewing Co., alleging age discrimination in hiring. The Appellate Division agreed the employees established a prima facie case, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding Miller successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination by providing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its hiring decisions. The court remitted the case to allow the complainants to prove Miller’s reasons were pretext for discrimination. The court emphasized the importance of weighing the employer’s articulated business reasons against the employee’s prima facie case.

    Facts

    Complainants, former employees of Better Brands, Inc., sought employment with Miller Brewing Co. after Miller acquired Better Brands. They were not hired. The complainants then filed claims with the State Division of Human Rights, alleging that Miller discriminated against them based on their age during the hiring process.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division found the complainants had established a prima facie case of age discrimination. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter back to the Division of Human Rights for further proceedings, directing that the complainants be given an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons offered by Miller were pretextual.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Miller, after complainants established a prima facie case of age discrimination, successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination by articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring the complainants.

    Holding

    Yes, because Miller, through the testimony of its general sales manager, presented admissible evidence articulating legitimate, independent, and non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions, specifically focusing on candidates with strong merchandising skills, aggressiveness, and experience.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established burden-shifting frameworks in employment discrimination cases, citing Matter of Pace Coll. v Commission of Human Rights, 38 NY2d 28, 38 and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 254-256. The Court emphasized that once the complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The Court found that Miller met this burden by providing evidence that its hiring decisions were based on lawful business considerations, such as merchandising proficiency and experience.

    The court quoted the general sales manager’s testimony, highlighting the criteria used for selecting employees: “The only directive that I received was to pick the strongest proficient people with * * * merchandising skills and techniques * * * I utilized my personal knowledge and the knowledge of my sales managers on those that were aggressive and ambitious, strong merchandisers that had demonstrated their ability to merchandise over the last twelve, fourteen months.”

    The Court noted the Division of Human Rights improperly declined to weigh Miller’s articulated business reasons against the prima facie case of discrimination. The court then directed the Division to provide complainants the opportunity to demonstrate that Miller’s reasons were pretextual, referencing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 253 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 804.

    This case is significant because it clarifies the burden an employer must meet to rebut a presumption of age discrimination and emphasizes the importance of considering the employer’s legitimate business reasons in discrimination cases. It provides a practical framework for analyzing age discrimination claims, reminding practitioners that the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the complainant to prove that the employer’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

  • Baker v. Board of Education, 68 N.Y.2d 924 (1986): Age as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

    Baker v. Board of Education, 68 N.Y.2d 924 (1986)

    An employer may terminate employment based on age if age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the performance of the employee’s duties.

    Summary

    This case concerns a school bus driver who was forced to retire at age 65 due to a state regulation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case. The central issue was whether the age restriction for school bus drivers constituted a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The court held that amendments to New York law during the appeal necessitated a determination of whether the age limit was a BFOQ reasonably necessary for the job, impacting the plaintiff’s entitlement to back pay and benefits.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a school bus driver, was compelled to retire at age 65. This retirement was mandated by a New York regulation (8 NYCRR 156.3[b]) that set the maximum age for school bus drivers at 65. The regulation was established by the Commissioner of Education under the authority of Education Law § 3624. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the regulation following his mandatory retirement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled the regulation unconstitutional and ordered the plaintiff’s reinstatement. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the regulation constitutional based on federal precedent (Vance v. Bradley). However, the Appellate Division also found a conflict with the then-existing Retirement and Social Security Law § 501(15), which set the mandatory retirement age at 70. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order to grant partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, stating that the regulation violated the plaintiff’s statutory rights unless alternative employment was offered. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the age limit of 65 for school bus drivers constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the performance of their duties, according to amended New York law.

    Holding

    1. No, a determination must be made by the Supreme Court as to whether being under 65 years old is a bona fide occupational qualification because amendments to the Retirement and Social Security Law and Executive Law now permit termination of employment based on age if it is a BFOQ.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the impact of intervening legislation. Specifically, the Laws of 1984 (ch 296) amended the Retirement and Social Security Law and Executive Law § 296 (3-a). These amendments allowed for termination of employment based on age if age is a bona fide occupational qualification “reasonably necessary” to the performance of the employee’s duties. The court cited Post v. 120 E. End Ave. Corp. and Mayer v. City Rent Agency to support the application of these amendments to the ongoing litigation. Because of these changes, the court reasoned that it was necessary to remit the case to the Supreme Court to determine whether the age restriction for school bus drivers met the BFOQ standard. The court emphasized that the determination of whether age is a bona fide occupational qualification is critical for assessing the plaintiff’s entitlement to back pay and other benefits resulting from his involuntary retirement. The court did not delve into specific arguments related to the BFOQ, but rather focused on the procedural necessity of applying the amended law.

  • In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83 (1972): Constitutionality of Gender-Based Age Differences in PINS Statute

    In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83 (1972)

    A statute that treats males and females differently based on age for Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) status violates the Equal Protection Clause if the classification lacks a reasonable basis related to the statute’s purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a PINS statute that applied to females aged 16-18 but only to males under 16. Patricia A., a 16-year-old female, challenged her PINS adjudication, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. The court found the terms in the PINS statute were not unconstitutionally vague, but the age-sex distinction violated equal protection because there was no reasonable basis for treating 16 and 17-year-old females differently from males of the same age. The court reversed the order and dismissed the petition.

    Facts

    Patricia A., a 16-year-old, was adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) under Section 712(b) of the Family Court Act. This section defined a PINS as a male under 16 or a female under 18 who is a truant, incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of a parent or other lawful authority.

    Procedural History

    Patricia A. appealed her PINS adjudication, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Equal Protection Clause. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Family Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the PINS statute, defining “person in need of supervision,” is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process?

    2. Whether the PINS statute’s different age thresholds for males and females (under 16 for males, under 18 for females) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions?

    Holding

    1. No, because the terms used in the PINS statute such as “habitual truant,” “incorrigible,” “ungovernable,” and “habitually disobedient” are easily understood and provide sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct.

    2. Yes, because there is no reasonable basis for differentiating between males and females over 16 and under 18 in the context of the PINS statute, and therefore the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the vagueness challenge first, stating that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.” The court found that the terms in the PINS statute were easily understood, and the potential for overly restrictive application by Family Court judges was unrealistic, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, stating that “a statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.” The court also noted that similar language had been used in prior juvenile delinquency statutes.

    Turning to the equal protection challenge, the court stated that discrimination between classes of citizens must have “some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made” citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111. The purpose of the PINS statute is to provide rehabilitation and treatment for young persons. However, the court reasoned that there was no reasonable ground for differentiating between males and females over 16 and under 18 for this purpose. “Girls in that age bracket are no more prone than boys to truancy, disobedience, incorrigible conduct and the like, nor are they more in need of rehabilitation and treatment by reason of such conduct.”

    The court rejected the argument that the age-sex distinction was justified by the danger of pregnancy in immature girls and the potential for out-of-wedlock births. The court stated that the statute covered far more than acts of sexual misconduct and that there was no rational basis for exempting the 16 and 17-year-old boy responsible for the girl’s pregnancy. The court implied that the discrimination was based on a moral presumption that females engaging in misconduct ought to be censured and controlled more than males. The court concluded that “a girl of 16 or 17 may not be subject to a possible loss of liberty for conduct which would be entirely licit for 16 and 17-year-old boys.”

    The dissenting judges argued that there was a rational basis for the distinction, finding the additional protection afforded females as provided for in the statute realistic and reasonable. They said that since the age differential applied to all females alike, there was no denial of equal protection.