New York Law Review

Tag: affirmative defense

  • People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191 (1988): Constitutionality of Affirmative Defense of Mental Disease

    People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191 (1988)

    Placing the burden of proving the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect on the defendant does not violate the New York State Constitution’s Due Process Clause if the prosecution retains the burden of proving all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the culpable mental state.

    Summary

    Kohl was convicted of intentional murder, depraved mind murder, and depraved mind assault. He asserted the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Penal Law § 40.15, which places the burden of proving this affirmative defense on the defendant, violates the State Constitution’s Due Process Clause. The Court held that it does not because the prosecution must still prove every element of the crime, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden on the defendant to prove insanity does not negate the prosecution’s primary burden.

    Facts

    Kohl, residing on a dairy farm, shot Peter Schütz and his two sons with a shotgun. He killed one son and wounded the other and Schütz. Kohl reloaded the gun and fatally shot Schütz, who was pleading for his life. Before the police arrived, Kohl made statements indicating he believed he was from another planet.

    Procedural History

    Kohl was charged with multiple counts of intentional and depraved mind murder and assault. He waived his right to a jury trial and asserted the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. The trial court found Kohl guilty on several counts, finding that the prosecution proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt and that Kohl failed to prove his insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Kohl appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 40.15, defining the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect and placing the burden of proof on the defendant, violates the New York State Constitution’s Due Process Clause.

    Holding

    No, because placing the burden of proof on the defendant for the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove all elements of the crime, including the culpable mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court analyzed prior Supreme Court cases, including Leland v. Oregon, Mullaney v. Wilbur, and Patterson v. New York, which addressed the burden of proof in affirmative defenses. The court distinguished Mullaney, where the defendant was required to disprove an element of the crime (malice), from Leland and Patterson, where the affirmative defense (insanity or extreme emotional disturbance) did not negate any element the prosecution had to prove.

    The court stated, “[The] prosecution is at all times required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts bearing [on] the defendant’s intent. That the defendant acted because of an extreme emotional disturbance does not negate intent. The influence of an extreme emotional disturbance explains the defendant’s intentional action, but does not make the action any less intentional.”

    The court emphasized that New York’s statutory scheme requires the prosecution to prove the defendant’s culpable mental state (intent or recklessness) beyond a reasonable doubt. The affirmative defense of mental disease or defect does not negate the element of intent; rather, it provides an excuse for otherwise criminal conduct. The court acknowledged that in some cases, the inability to appreciate the nature and consequences of one’s conduct could impact the finding of intent. The court suggested jury instructions should emphasize the People’s burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt and that evidence of insanity relating to whether the defendant knew what he was doing must be considered in evaluating whether the People have satisfied their burden to prove intent.

    The court held that the presumption of sanity does not relieve the People of their burden to establish the defendant’s culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that the Legislature has the power to define legal insanity and ascribe the burden of proof for this defense, within constitutional limits.

  • Sheldon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 984 (1984): Pleading Requirements for Affirmative Defenses

    Sheldon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 984 (1984)

    A party must plead all matters which, if not pleaded, would likely surprise the adverse party or raise factual issues not appearing on the face of a prior pleading; failure to do so results in a waiver of the defense.

    Summary

    A bean farmer, Sheldon, sued Kimberly-Clark for breach of contract related to defective seed. Kimberly-Clark counterclaimed for the balance due on the seed. Sheldon attempted to introduce evidence of the seed’s inferior quality and his attempt to reject it, despite not pleading these issues in his reply. The court directed a verdict for Kimberly-Clark on its counterclaim. The Court of Appeals held that Sheldon waived the defense of breach of warranty by failing to plead it, even though Kimberly-Clark was aware of Sheldon’s complaints about the seed’s quality, because the unpleaded allegations raised new factual issues.

    Facts

    Sheldon, a bean farmer, contracted to purchase “foundation seed” from Kimberly-Clark in 1981 for delivery in spring 1982, tendering a $5,000 deposit.

    In spring 1982, Kimberly-Clark informed Sheldon they couldn’t deliver the “foundation seed” but offered “registered seed” at a reduced price, which Sheldon accepted.

    Sheldon picked up the “registered seed” and allegedly discovered it was defective, attempting unsuccessfully to return it.

    Procedural History

    Sheldon sued Kimberly-Clark for breach of contract, seeking damages for loss of customer goodwill.

    Kimberly-Clark counterclaimed for $9,500, the balance due on the “registered seed.”

    Sheldon replied with a general denial.

    At trial, Sheldon offered proof of the seed’s inferior quality and attempted rejection, which weren’t pleaded.

    The trial court dismissed Sheldon’s complaint and directed a verdict for Kimberly-Clark on its counterclaim, denying Sheldon’s motion to amend the pleadings.

    The Appellate Division modified, reversing the verdict on the counterclaim, but otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the counterclaim and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the offer of proof was sufficient to raise a defense as to the quality of the seed and the attempted rejection where these claims were not otherwise raised in the pleadings.

    Holding

    No, because the failure to plead these matters results in a waiver which entitles the defendant to summary judgment on its counterclaim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPLR 3018(b) requires a party to plead matters that would surprise the adverse party or raise new factual issues.

    While Kimberly-Clark knew about Sheldon’s complaints, the allegations of inferior quality and attempted rejection raised new factual issues not in the pleadings.

    The Court cited Surlak v. Surlak, 95 A.D.2d 371, stating that failing to plead these matters results in a waiver.

    Sheldon’s general denial was insufficient because it only puts in issue matters Kimberly-Clark had to prove on its counterclaim. The court referenced Hoffstaedter v. Carlton Auto Supplies Co., 203 App. Div. 494, 496 to support this principle.

    The court reasoned that permitting Sheldon to introduce these unpleaded defenses would unfairly prejudice Kimberly-Clark by requiring them to defend against claims they were not properly notified of.

    This case highlights the importance of proper pleading in litigation. Failing to raise affirmative defenses in the pleadings can result in the waiver of those defenses, even if the opposing party is aware of the underlying facts. The decision reinforces the purpose of pleading requirements, which is to provide notice to the opposing party of the claims and defenses that will be litigated, preventing surprise and ensuring a fair opportunity to respond.

  • People v. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 741 (1984): Entitlement to Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    64 N.Y.2d 741 (1984)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance only when sufficient evidence is presented for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the defense are established.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court was not obligated to charge the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a second-degree murder trial. The defendant shot and killed the victim after an argument over money and the victim touching the defendant’s food. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the evidence presented at trial, at most, indicated anger or embarrassment, which are not equivalent to the loss of self-control associated with extreme emotional disturbance. Without such evidence, charging the defense would invite impermissible jury speculation.

    Facts

    The defendant shot and killed the victim in a bar. This act was the culmination of a long-standing disagreement between the two men. The shooting occurred after an argument about money that the victim claimed the defendant owed him. Immediately before the shooting, the victim placed his hand on the defendant’s plate of food.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried for murder in the second degree. At trial, the defendant requested that the court charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court declined to give the requested charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was obligated to charge the affirmative defense to murder in the second degree that the defendant “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance” (Penal Law, § 125.25, subd 1, par [a]).

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence presented which suggested the presence of “extreme emotional disturbance”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a charge on extreme emotional disturbance only when there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the elements of this affirmative defense were established by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court found that the evidence presented only showed that the defendant acted out of anger or embarrassment. While these emotions might sometimes serve as the “reasonable explanation” for the presence of extreme emotional disturbance, they are not equivalent to the loss of self-control generally associated with that defense and are not necessarily indicative of the “mental infirmity”, not rising to the level of insanity.

    The court emphasized that charging the affirmative defense without sufficient evidence would invite the jury to impermissibly speculate about the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. The court cited People v Patterson, noting that extreme emotional disturbance involves a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity and People v Casassa.

    The court observed that the evidence failed to demonstrate the type of significant loss of control associated with the extreme emotional disturbance defense, thus making the charge inappropriate in this case.

  • People v. Baskerville, 60 N.Y.2d 374 (1983): When Failure to Charge Affirmative Defense is Reversible Error

    People v. Baskerville, 60 N.Y.2d 374 (1983)

    When the evidence presented at trial reasonably supports a jury finding that the defendant committed robbery while displaying an object that appeared to be a firearm but was not, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense to first-degree robbery constitutes reversible error.

    Summary

    Baskerville was convicted of first-degree robbery for allegedly using a weapon to rob a gas station attendant. The evidence regarding the use of a weapon was not conclusive; the attendant didn’t see a gun, and other witnesses described a cylindrical or metallic object. Baskerville claimed he used a toothbrush and a toothbrush was found on him. The trial court denied Baskerville’s request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense that the displayed object was not a loaded weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the denial was reversible error because the jury could have believed Baskerville used a toothbrush that appeared to be a pistol, and thus, without the instruction, felt obligated to convict him of first-degree robbery.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours of November 14, 1977, Baskerville allegedly robbed a gas station attendant by holding an object to the attendant’s neck and threatening to shoot him.

    Police arrived during the commission of the crime, and Baskerville fled in a car, pursued by police gunfire.

    New Jersey State Troopers apprehended Baskerville approximately 25 minutes after the robbery.

    When asked by police where the gun was, Baskerville stated that he did not have a gun and that he had used a toothbrush.

    No gun was found, but a white toothbrush was discovered in Baskerville’s coat pocket.

    The gas station attendant did not see the alleged gun, and another attendant could not identify Baskerville as the perpetrator.

    Two police officers testified that Baskerville had a cylindrical object in his hand.

    Another witness testified that the perpetrator held a sharp metallic object.

    An officer testified that Baskerville stated he used a toothbrush, not a gun.

    Procedural History

    Baskerville was convicted of robbery in the first degree in a New York trial court.

    Baskerville appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree and on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree, where the evidence suggested the object displayed may not have been a firearm.

    Holding

    Yes, because, under the circumstances of this case, it was reversible error for the court to refuse defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the affirmative defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on the affirmative defense prejudiced Baskerville because the jury might have believed he used a toothbrush that appeared to be a pistol and, without the instruction on the affirmative defense, felt compelled to find him guilty of first-degree robbery.

    New York Penal Law § 160.15 defines robbery in the first degree as forcibly stealing property while displaying what appears to be a pistol or other firearm. However, it also provides an affirmative defense if the displayed weapon was not a loaded weapon from which a shot could be discharged.

    The court emphasized that the testimony regarding the use of a weapon was not overwhelming, and Baskerville claimed he used a toothbrush. The prosecutor even acknowledged this argument during summation, stating, “It’s for you to decide whether the defendant used a toothbrush or a shotgun or a handgun or a weapon”.

    The court noted that if Baskerville successfully proved his affirmative defense, he could still be found guilty of robbery in the second degree, which only requires displaying what appears to be a firearm, regardless of whether it is actually a firearm. “If, of course, a defendant successfully proves his affirmative defense, he may still be found guilty of robbery in the second degree, which requires only that the defendant forcibly steal property while displaying what appears to be a firearm (Penal Law, § 160.10, subd 2, par [b] ; Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, § 160.15, p 206).”

  • People v. Illardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408 (1979): Constitutionality of Obscenity Statute’s Affirmative Defenses

    People v. Illardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408 (1979)

    An obscenity statute’s affirmative defenses, which allow for exceptions based on the dissemination of material to scientific, educational, or governmental institutions, or for certain non-managerial employees, are constitutional under due process and equal protection clauses.

    Summary

    Joseph Illardo was charged with promoting obscene material for selling a magazine. He challenged the constitutionality of New York’s obscenity statute, specifically the affirmative defenses in Penal Law § 235.15. He argued that the terms used in the defenses were vague and violated due process, and that the exclusion of bookstore employees from certain defenses violated equal protection. The Buffalo City Court agreed with Illardo, but the Erie County Court reversed. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute, finding the affirmative defenses constitutional because the language was sufficiently definite and the classifications had a rational basis.

    Facts

    Illardo sold a magazine deemed obscene to an undercover police officer. He was charged with violating Penal Law § 235.05(1), which prohibits the promotion of obscene material. Illardo did not contest that the magazine was obscene. His defense rested solely on the argument that the affirmative defenses in § 235.15 were unconstitutional, rendering the entire statute invalid.

    Procedural History

    The Buffalo City Court granted Illardo’s motion to dismiss, declaring subsections 1 and 2 of § 235.15 unconstitutional. The People appealed to the Erie County Court, which reversed the City Court’s order. Illardo then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the language of Penal Law § 235.15(1), specifically the terms “scientific,” “educational,” “governmental,” and “other similar justification,” is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process?

    2. Whether Penal Law § 235.15(2), which provides an affirmative defense to certain non-managerial employees of motion picture theaters but not to bookstore employees, violates the equal protection clause?

    Holding

    1. No, because the terms used are within the compass of the ordinary citizen and the phrase “other similar justification” is limited by the specific words preceding it, thus providing sufficient definiteness.

    2. No, because the legislative classification is not arbitrary and bears a fair and substantial relation to a manifest evil reasonably perceived by the Legislature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the vagueness challenge, stating that while statutes must be informative on their face, they need not achieve mathematical certainty. The Court noted that the language of the section was taken almost verbatim from the Model Penal Code. It found the terms “scientific”, “educational”, and “governmental” to be within the understanding of the ordinary citizen. The Court applied the principle of ejusdem generis to the phrase “other similar justification,” stating that it is limited by the preceding specific words and does not expand the scope of the section beyond those terms. As the court stated, “Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language”.

    Regarding the equal protection challenge, the Court stated that legislative classifications must only have a reasonable basis and bear a fair and substantial relation to some manifest evil reasonably perceived by the Legislature. The Court reasoned that the Legislature could have viewed the risk of further dissemination of obscene material by bookstore purchasers as indicative of aggravated culpability, or it may have thought that motion picture theaters employ a larger percentage of non-managerial personnel than bookstores. Therefore, there was a rational basis for the distinction, and the classification did not violate equal protection. The court stated, “the statute might thus permissibly be seen as ‘addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind’”.

  • People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288 (1976): Affirmative Defenses and Due Process in Murder Cases

    People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288 (1976)

    A state may require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense, such as extreme emotional disturbance, to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter without violating due process, provided the state has already proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of murder.

    Summary

    Gordon Patterson was convicted of murder. He argued that New York’s law, requiring him to prove he acted under extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the charge to manslaughter, violated due process under Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, distinguishing New York law from the Maine law in Mullaney. The Court reasoned that New York requires the prosecution to prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, including intent, and the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not negate intent but offers a mitigating circumstance.

    Facts

    Gordon Patterson killed his wife’s lover, John Northrup, after finding them together in a state of undress. Patterson confessed to the killing. At trial, his defense was that the gun went off accidentally and, alternatively, that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance due to his unstable marriage and his wife’s infidelity.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, but Patterson had to prove his affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. Patterson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Mullaney v. Wilbur required the prosecution to disprove extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s homicide statutes, which require a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because New York law requires the prosecution to prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not negate any of those elements but rather offers a mitigating circumstance that justifies a lesser punishment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished New York law from the Maine law struck down in Mullaney v. Wilbur. In Maine, malice aforethought was an element of murder, and the absence of heat of passion negated malice. Therefore, the state had to prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, New York requires the prosecution to prove intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, and extreme emotional disturbance does not negate intent. Instead, it is a mitigating factor that explains the intentional act, rendering the defendant less culpable. The Court emphasized that New York has always defined murder and manslaughter as distinct offenses, with the prosecution bearing the burden to prove the elements of murder. “So long as the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to kill his victim, it is not a violation of due process to permit the defendant to establish he formulated his intent while ‘under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.’” The court noted the evolution of the extreme emotional disturbance defense from the traditional “heat of passion” defense, explaining that the modern approach acknowledges that significant mental trauma can affect a defendant’s mind over a substantial period. The Court also stated, “Judicial opinions are not written and rendered in the abstract. Language is given its meaning by the context which compels its writing. It is basic to our common-law system that a court decides only the case before it.” Therefore, Mullaney, which dealt with Maine law, did not automatically invalidate New York’s distinct statutory scheme.

  • People v. Victory, 33 N.Y.2d 75 (1973): Affirmative Defense in Felony Murder and Witness Impeachment

    People v. Victory, 33 N.Y.2d 75 (1973)

    In felony murder cases, the burden of proving an affirmative defense rests on the defendant, and a witness’s prior omission of a fact can only be used for impeachment if their attention was specifically drawn to that fact during the prior statement.

    Summary

    Albert Victory and Robert Bornholdt were convicted of felony murder after Bornholdt shot and killed a police officer during an altercation following a traffic stop. The New York Court of Appeals upheld Victory’s conviction, ruling that the affirmative defense in the felony murder statute did not violate his constitutional rights and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the use of a witness’s prior statements for impeachment. The court emphasized that the burden of proving an affirmative defense lies with the defendant and that prior omissions can only impeach a witness if they were specifically asked about the omitted fact previously.

    Facts

    Patrolman Varecha pursued a speeding car driven by Victory with Bornholdt as a passenger. He stopped them near a discotheque. An altercation ensued when Varecha asked for Victory’s license and registration. Victory kneed Varecha in the groin, and both Victory and Bornholdt physically assaulted him. Varecha announced their arrest. As Victory backed away, Bornholdt shot Varecha multiple times, resulting in his death. Both were apprehended shortly after.

    Procedural History

    Victory and Bornholdt were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder and intentional murder respectively. Victory was sentenced to 25 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of an Associate Judge.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Victory’s guilt of felony murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Whether the affirmative defense provision in the felony murder statute is constitutional.
    3. Whether the trial court properly denied Victory’s motion for severance.
    4. Whether the court’s rulings limiting the use of prior statements on cross-examination were proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient eyewitness testimony to prove all elements of felony murder, including Victory’s participation in the underlying felony of escape.
    2. Yes, because due process does not prevent shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant for affirmative defenses, especially when the relevant facts are within the defendant’s knowledge.
    3. No, because Victory did not adequately show the need for his co-defendant’s testimony or that it would exculpate him, and the motion was untimely.
    4. No, because Victory failed to show that the witness’s attention was specifically called to the omitted facts during prior statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found ample evidence to support Victory’s felony murder conviction, stating that Victory participated in the assault and subsequent escape attempt during which Bornholdt killed the officer. The court rejected the constitutional challenge to the affirmative defense, stating that “the components of the statutory defense before us are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and are matters upon which he may be fairly required to adduce supporting evidence.” The court reasoned that requiring the prosecution to disprove these elements would unduly enlarge the scope of their proof. Regarding the severance motion, the court stated that Victory failed to show how Bornholdt’s testimony would aid his defense and that the motion was untimely. “A motion for a separate trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review only for an abuse thereof.”

    Finally, the court addressed the limitation on cross-examination, stating that while prior inconsistent statements can be used to impeach a witness, “a witness may not be impeached simply by showing that he omitted to state a fact, or to state it more fully at a prior time. It need also be shown that at the prior time the witness’ attention was called to the matter and that he was specifically asked about the facts embraced in the question propounded at trial.” The court reasoned that unless specifically asked, a person may naturally omit facts from a narrative description. Victory failed to meet this requirement.