New York Law Review

Tag: affirmative defense

  • Ibhawa v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 2024 NY Slip Op 05872: Ministerial Exception is an Affirmative Defense, Not a Jurisdictional Bar

    Matter of Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights

    The ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws, stemming from the First Amendment, is an affirmative defense and does not strip a government agency of jurisdiction over a complaint.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) dismissed a complaint filed by Victor Ibhawa, a priest, alleging a hostile work environment against the Diocese of Buffalo, finding the ministerial exception deprived it of jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. The Court determined that the DHR’s decision was based on an error of law and remanded the case back to the DHR to review the other defenses presented by the Diocese.

    Facts

    Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo to serve as a Parish Administrator. After incidents of racial and xenophobic discrimination, culminating in termination of employment, Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR alleging a hostile work environment and unlawful termination. The Diocese raised several defenses, including the ministerial exception, which argued that DHR lacked jurisdiction because Ibhawa was a minister. DHR dismissed the complaint on the basis of the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional matter, without considering other defenses.

    Procedural History

    Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR. DHR dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked jurisdiction due to the ministerial exception. The New York Supreme Court reversed DHR’s dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, finding that the ministerial exception did not definitively bar review. The Appellate Division reinstated DHR’s dismissal, giving deference to the agency’s expertise. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ministerial exception to employment discrimination law acts as a jurisdictional bar or as an affirmative defense.

    Holding

    1. No, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, (565 U.S. 171 (2012)) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (591 U.S. 732 (2020)). The Court emphasized that Hosanna-Tabor specifically held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limitation. The Court noted that “the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar” (Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US at 195 4). The court explained that the DHR erred by treating the exception as a jurisdictional matter. The issue was not whether the agency had the power to hear the case, but whether any of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, including any statutory defenses, would prevent the case from proceeding. DHR’s determination was therefore affected by an error of law, requiring reversal.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the legal nature of the ministerial exception in New York. It forces the DHR to reconsider its decision. The most important implications are that the ministerial exception does not, on its own, prevent a state agency from hearing a case. This decision confirms that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, which means that the employer bears the burden of proving that the ministerial exception applies. The court also emphasizes that the DHR must fully adjudicate a case, considering all defenses raised by the employer, not just the ministerial exception. Moreover, this ruling underscores that state agencies must correctly apply federal constitutional law when evaluating employment discrimination claims in religious contexts, and this is not a matter for agency deference.

  • People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense Doesn’t Require Proof of Mental Infirmity

    People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013)

    The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder, but rather a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for fatally stabbing his fiancée. He requested the jury be charged on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED), which would allow for a verdict of first-degree manslaughter. The trial court denied the request, believing proof of a “mental infirmity” was required. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the EED defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court found that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, presented a triable question as to whether the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance.

    Facts

    The defendant and his fiancée, Tyffany Porter, had a heated argument. Porter refused to have sex with the defendant and disclosed she had been unfaithful with one of his friends. During the argument, the defendant retrieved a knife and stabbed Porter 47 times, killing her. The defendant then drove to a friend’s house, admitting he “just snapped” and appeared “spaced out.” He later called 911, stating he “just lost it” and “blacked out.” He confessed to the stabbing, explaining he was scared and panicked and that Porter had previously been abusive towards him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court, which refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant’s conduct inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance because the defendant failed to prove he suffered from a mental infirmity.

    Holding

    No, because the extreme emotional disturbance defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder; it requires a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when judging whether to charge an affirmative defense. The charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence that would negate it. The court stated that the sheer number of knife wounds was indicative of the defendant’s loss of control. The court clarified that the term “mental infirmity,” as used in prior cases, does not tether the defense to proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court noted that the subjective element of EED may be inferred from circumstances indicative of a loss of control and established without psychiatric evidence. The court found the defendant’s statements that he “snapped” and his demeanor after the event, along with the circumstances of the crime, sufficient to warrant the charge. Regarding the objective element (reasonableness of the explanation), the court stated that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, the jury should have determined whether the victim’s rejection and disclosure of infidelity precipitated an onrush of emotion leaving the defendant bereft of self-control. The court emphasized that its role is limited to excluding claims that are patently insufficient due to a lack of evidence or a speculative relation between the disturbance and the triggering circumstance or homicidal acts. The court stated, “The purpose [of the extreme emotional disturbance defense] was explicitly to give full scope to what amounts to a plea in mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant dimensions.”

  • People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282 (2008): Preservation of Error for Affirmative Defenses

    People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282 (2008)

    A defendant must specifically request a jury instruction on an affirmative defense to preserve the issue for appellate review; a general discussion during a charge conference is insufficient.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary, assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed the assault convictions due to the trial court’s failure to provide a self-defense charge, reduced the burglary conviction to second degree due to an indictment deficiency, but rejected the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a new trial on the burglary charge based on the lack of a “choice of evils” instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to properly preserve the “choice of evils” defense for appellate review because he did not specifically request the instruction. The Court further held that the Appellate Division properly declined to reverse the burglary conviction after reversing the assault convictions.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with burglary in the first degree, two counts of assault in the third degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. The charges stemmed from an incident involving an altercation. At trial, the defendant requested a self-defense charge. After his conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to give a “choice of evils” instruction regarding the burglary charge.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the assault convictions and reduced the burglary conviction. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that he was entitled to a “choice of evils” instruction for the burglary offense, and that reversal of the assault convictions should have led to reversal of the burglary conviction as well. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved the argument that he was entitled to a Penal Law § 35.05 “choice of evils” charge for the burglary offense.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in failing to reverse the burglary conviction after reversing the assault convictions based on a charging error.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the admission of photographs of an injury suffered by a person not present during the altercation.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to alert the trial court that he was seeking a “choice of evils” instruction in addition to the self-defense instruction.

    2. No, because the burglary conviction was not “contaminated” by the charging error associated with the assault counts.

    3. No, because the court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the proffered evidence was collateral and that its prejudicial effect would outweigh any potential probative value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the “choice of evils” defense because he did not specifically request a jury instruction on that defense. The Court noted that a general discussion during the charge conference regarding self-defense was insufficient to preserve the distinct “choice of evils” defense. The Court cited People v. Craig, 78 NY2d 616 (1991). The Court emphasized that the defendant needed to alert the trial court that he was seeking the choice of evils instruction in addition to the self-defense instruction. Failing to do so forfeited the argument on appeal. As for the argument that the reversal of the assault convictions should have led to reversal of the burglary conviction, the Court summarily rejected this claim. Regarding the exclusion of photographs, the Court held that the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, citing People v. Pavao, 59 NY2d 282 (1983), and found no abuse of discretion here.

  • People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002): Establishing Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002)

    A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance unless sufficient evidence is presented to support both the subjective element (that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance) and the objective element (that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance).

    Summary

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder for the stabbing death of his common-law wife. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant an EED charge. The Court clarified that both subjective (defendant’s mental state) and objective (reasonableness of the disturbance) elements must be supported by sufficient evidence, and the brutal nature of the crime alone is insufficient to establish EED. Defendant’s actions and statements before, during, and after the crime did not demonstrate the required loss of self-control or mental infirmity.

    Facts

    Lillian Rivera was found stabbed to death in her apartment, which she shared with Roche. Roche told neighbors Rivera had killed herself. He also told another acquaintance, Bell, that he killed Rivera because she was “going crazy.” Roche changed his story multiple times, initially claiming his wife had committed suicide. At no point did he claim to have lost control or been mentally disturbed at the time of the killing. The defense focused on the theory that someone else committed the murder.

    Procedural History

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder in the first trial; this was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. At the second trial, Roche requested the judge instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied this request. The jury again convicted Roche of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court should have instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder in connection with the stabbing death of his wife.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support either the subjective or objective elements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant is entitled to an extreme emotional disturbance charge only when sufficient evidence supports both elements of the defense. The subjective element requires evidence that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, typically shown by a loss of self-control due to a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity. The objective element requires a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance, viewed from the defendant’s perspective at the time. The Court found no evidence that Roche suffered from a mental infirmity or loss of self-control during the stabbing. His actions after the crime (attempting to conceal evidence, fabricating a suicide story) indicated a calculated effort to avoid responsibility, not a disturbed state of mind. The Court stated, “Defendant cannot rely on his statements to the police to establish the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance since he asserted that he had not harmed his wife in any respect.” The Court rejected the argument that the brutality of the crime, alone, indicated an extreme emotional disturbance. While the nature of the wounds can be relevant, it must be linked to other compelling evidence of emotional disturbance. “Where we have referenced the nature or severity of the wounds, the probative value of such evidence has been linked to other compelling evidence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The Court concluded that the arguments and errands cited by the defense were insufficient to constitute a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance.

  • People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Control Their Defense Strategy

    People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (1996)

    A defendant has the right to control their defense strategy, and it is prejudicial error for a trial court to submit an affirmative defense to the jury over the defendant’s objection when it undermines their chosen defense.

    Summary

    Bradley was charged with second-degree murder. He asserted a defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, arguing a progressive mental illness prevented him from appreciating his actions’ moral and legal import. The prosecution requested the court submit first-degree manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. Over the defense’s objection, the court instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter if they found Bradley legally sane but acting under extreme emotional disturbance. The jury convicted Bradley of first-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that imposing the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance over Bradley’s objection was prejudicial error because it undermined his chosen defense strategy and shifted the burden of proof.

    Facts

    Bradley was charged with second-degree murder. His defense strategy centered on demonstrating that he was not responsible for his actions due to a mental disease or defect. The core of his defense was that he suffered from a progressive mental illness that had worsened in the months leading up to the shooting. Bradley argued that, at the time of the shooting, his paranoid thought processes prevented him from understanding the moral and legal implications of his actions. At trial, the prosecution requested that the court also submit to the jury the option of finding Bradley guilty of first-degree manslaughter, arguing that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Bradley objected to the inclusion of this affirmative defense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, over the defendant’s objection, instructed the jury on first-degree manslaughter as an alternative to second-degree murder, based on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The jury found Bradley guilty of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury over the objection of the defendant.
    2. Whether the submission of such an affirmative defense prejudiced the defendant’s chosen defense strategy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant has the right to chart their own defense, and that right is infringed when an affirmative defense is submitted over defense objection.
    2. Yes, because the interposition of an inconsistent defense creates a risk of juror confusion and may taint a defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, it increases the danger of prejudice because of the resulting shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. DeGina, which established that “a defendant… has the right to chart his own defense.” The Court reasoned that Bradley’s defense of not being responsible due to mental disease or defect was inherently incompatible with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court explained that extreme emotional disturbance would require a temporary loss of control by someone otherwise capable of appreciating the nature of their actions, whereas Bradley’s defense hinged on a lack of appreciation due to a progressive mental illness.

    The court emphasized the prejudice suffered by Bradley: “[W]hen the defensive theory that the court interjects constitutes an affirmative defense there is an increased danger of prejudice because of the resulting shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense and the attendant risk that the jury will believe that the defendant has assumed a burden beyond the defense.” Although defendants are generally entitled to present inconsistent defenses, the court held that the strategic risks associated with such a choice should not be imposed on a defendant against their will. The court concluded that the imposition of an affirmative burden of proof and the undermining of Bradley’s chosen defense strategy constituted serious prejudice, warranting reversal.

  • People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Decide Jury Instructions Over Counsel’s Objection

    People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996)

    A defendant, represented by counsel, has the ultimate authority to make fundamental decisions regarding the case, including whether to request submission of an affirmative defense to the jury, even over the objections of counsel.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murdering his parents. At trial, he asserted an insanity defense. The trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which would reduce the charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed, but later changed his mind, against his counsel’s advice, fearing it would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, after a colloquy with the defendant, honored the defendant’s wishes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the decision to submit the affirmative defense rested with the defendant, not counsel, as it was a fundamental decision about the case’s presentation.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murdering his parents. His defense was that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal consequences of his actions due to a mental disease or defect.
    After both sides rested, the court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the murder charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed to the instruction. The next day, the defendant changed his mind and informed the court that he only wanted three possible verdicts submitted to the jury: guilty of murder, not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. The defendant believed that submitting the extreme emotional disturbance defense would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing him to override his counsel’s advice regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense without conducting a “searching inquiry.” The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, represented by counsel, has the right to decide whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury, even when counsel advises against it.

    Holding

    Yes, because the decision of whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance rests with the defendant, as it concerns a fundamental decision regarding the case that impacts the potential verdict and the defendant’s fate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant retains the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding their case, even when represented by counsel. These decisions include whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on their own behalf, or take an appeal. The court analogized the decision of whether to submit the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to these fundamental decisions, emphasizing its potential impact on the verdict.
    The court noted that the defendant’s decision was not simply a matter of trial strategy or tactics. Rather, the defendant perceived that charging the jury on both murder and manslaughter provided two opportunities for the jury to convict, and he calculated that eliminating consideration of manslaughter increased his chance for an acquittal. The court found that the trial court was under no obligation to conduct a “searching inquiry” because the defendant was not forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right. The trial court’s inquiry was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the nature of his request to limit the charges submitted to the jury. The court stated, “Manifestly, a verdict is dispositive of a defendant’s fate and, as this defendant recognized, the submission of the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the jury could indeed be determinative of the verdict.”
    The court cited Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, noting that a defendant retains ultimate authority over certain fundamental decisions. The court concluded that the defendant could not later complain that his miscalculation translated into a forced relinquishment of his right to counsel, especially since counsel repeatedly voiced disagreement and continued to actively represent the defendant throughout the trial. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722, 730-731, highlighting that no “searching inquiry” was required under these circumstances. Ultimately, because the defendant understood the ramifications of his request, the trial court properly acceded to it.

  • People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Failure to Request Affirmative Defense Instruction

    People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996)

    A defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on an affirmative defense does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; the determination depends on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    DeFreitas was convicted of felony murder for his role in a robbery where two employees were killed. His appeal centered on his lawyer’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the failure to request the instruction, in itself, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that the determination of ineffective assistance is based on the entire context of the case, not on a single error or omission. The court also found the defendant’s claims regarding sentencing unpreserved.

    Facts

    DeFreitas participated in a robbery during which another individual shot and killed two shop employees. He was subsequently convicted of two counts of felony murder. During the trial, his defense counsel did not explicitly request a jury instruction regarding the affirmative defense to felony murder, as outlined in Penal Law § 125.25[3].

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted DeFreitas. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on his lawyer’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, rejecting the ineffective assistance claim. DeFreitas then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder, in and of itself, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the totality of the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because under the entire circumstances of the case, the defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not, in itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior precedent, citing People v. Hobot, People v. Flores, and People v. Baldi, to support its decision that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. The court explicitly stated, “We agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, in and of itself, under the entire circumstances of this case.” The court explicitly stated it was only assuming, but not deciding, whether the defendant would have been entitled to the instruction even if it had been requested. This suggests the court considered the strength of a potential affirmative defense in its analysis, even without directly ruling on its applicability. The court also found that DeFreitas’s arguments regarding the sentencing court’s actions were not properly preserved for appellate review, meaning he didn’t raise them appropriately in the lower courts. This highlights the importance of raising objections and arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appeal.

  • People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638 (1993): Extreme Emotional Disturbance and Depraved Indifference Murder

    82 N.Y.2d 638 (1993)

    The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cannot be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder in New York.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder for killing his acquaintance. He argued that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance should apply to mitigate the charge, similar to intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the Penal Law does not allow for this defense in cases of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that while historically, “heat of passion” could mitigate both intentional and depraved mind murder, the modern statute explicitly limits the extreme emotional disturbance defense to intentional murder charges. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no basis to extend the defense beyond the statute’s clear language.

    Facts

    Delphi Cox was found murdered in her apartment. The defendant, after spending the afternoon and evening smoking crack cocaine and drinking beer with Cox, stabbed and strangled her. He then stole and sold her belongings for more drugs. He was charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried in a New York State court. The trial court instructed the jury that extreme emotional disturbance could mitigate intentional murder to manslaughter but refused to extend the instruction to the depraved indifference murder charge. The jury acquitted the defendant of intentional murder and manslaughter but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance can be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2).

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of Penal Law § 125.25 only allows the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate a charge of intentional murder, not depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the explicit wording of Penal Law § 125.25, which defines different types of murder but only includes the extreme emotional disturbance defense in the section concerning intentional murder. The court rejected the defendant’s historical argument that “heat of passion” had always been a mitigating defense to depraved indifference murder, clarifying that under prior New York statutes, heat of passion was an element of manslaughter, not a defense to murder. The court also distinguished between “heat of passion” and “extreme emotional disturbance,” noting that the latter embodies a more sophisticated understanding of mental trauma and does not negate intent, unlike the former. The court stated, “The opportunity opened for mitigation [by the extreme emotional disturbance defense] differs significantly from the traditional heat of passion defense.” The court emphasized that extending the defense to depraved indifference murder would require a policy choice by the Legislature, which had not been made. Finally, the court found that not including the affirmative defense in the depraved mind murder statute did not raise concerns about due process, because the People remain responsible for proving the fundamental elements of mens rea and actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

  • People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900 (1992): Sufficiency of Evidence for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900 (1992)

    To be entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a defendant must present sufficient credible evidence for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, both an objective element (reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance) and a subjective element (conduct influenced by the disturbance at the time of the crime).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. While the defendant presented evidence of a tumultuous relationship with his wife (satisfying the objective element), he failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The Court emphasized that post-homicide conduct alone is insufficient to establish the necessary subjective element, especially when the defendant maintains his innocence.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of killing his wife. He had a history of a violent and tumultuous relationship with her, marked by repeated humiliation. After his wife’s death, he washed her body, wrapped it in a bedspread, and concealed it in a closet in their apartment. The body remained there for a week while the defendant continued his daily routines, including cleaning and cooking for his stepchildren. The defendant steadfastly maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted of a crime related to his wife’s death. At trial, the defendant requested that the jury be instructed on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court refused this request. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant presented sufficient credible evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, specifically regarding whether his conduct at the time of the homicide was influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The evidence presented related solely to post-homicide conduct and was insufficient to establish the necessary element of the affirmative defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance has two components: an objective element (reasonable explanation or excuse) and a subjective element (conduct influenced by the disturbance at the time of the crime). The court stated, “In order for defendant to be entitled to such an instruction, a court must determine that sufficient credible evidence has been presented for the jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the affirmative defense have been established.” While the defendant presented sufficient evidence of a tumultuous relationship to establish the objective element, he failed to demonstrate that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The court noted that the “second element of this defense cannot be inferred from the provocative act itself, which occurred weeks before the homicide.” The court distinguished this case from People v. Moye, where the defendant’s statements about his state of mind and the events immediately preceding the killing provided sufficient evidence. Here, the evidence relied upon by the defendant pertained exclusively to his post-homicide conduct. Instructing the jury on the defense, under these circumstances, would have “invite[d] impermissible speculation as to defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing.” The court emphasized the absence of any evidence regarding the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing itself, making any findings on this point purely speculative. The Court made clear that circumstantial evidence of post-homicide conduct is insufficient to establish the required mens rea at the time of the crime.

  • People v. Lockwood, 73 N.Y.2d 758 (1988): Entitlement to Affirmative Defense Charge in Robbery Cases

    People v. Lockwood, 73 N.Y.2d 758 (1988)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense to first-degree robbery if sufficient evidence is presented for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or serious physical injury.

    Summary

    Lockwood was convicted of first-degree robbery. The victim claimed Lockwood motioned as if he had a gun while demanding money on a subway train. Lockwood never removed his hand from his pocket, and the victim never saw a gun. After Lockwood exited the train, the victim alerted police, who apprehended him nearby with dollar bills but no weapon. The trial court denied Lockwood’s request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense that the displayed object was not a loaded weapon. The Appellate Division reversed, reducing the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence presented a factual question for the jury regarding whether the object displayed was a firearm, and therefore, the affirmative defense charge should have been given.

    Facts

    The complainant was riding alone on a subway train when Lockwood approached her. Lockwood motioned with his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun and demanded money. Believing Lockwood had a gun, the complainant surrendered money. Lockwood never removed his hand from his pocket, and the complainant never saw a gun. Lockwood exited the train and walked to an underpass. The complainant immediately told police she had been robbed. Police apprehended Lockwood nearby with dollar bills, but no weapon was found on his person or along his route.

    Procedural History

    Lockwood was convicted of first-degree robbery in the trial court. The trial court refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and reduced it to second-degree robbery, holding that the failure to give the requested charge was error. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree, specifically, that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, was sufficient to present a factual question for the jury as to whether the object displayed was a firearm capable of causing death or serious physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 160.15(4), which provides an affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree if the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of causing death or serious physical injury. The court cited prior cases, including People v. Moye and People v. Baskerville, to emphasize that a defendant is entitled to a charge on this affirmative defense when there is sufficient evidence to support it.

    The court noted that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Lockwood, created a factual question for the jury. The police officer retraced Lockwood’s path but found no weapon. The complainant never saw a gun or its outline, and no gun was ever recovered. The Court stated, “Given these undisputed facts, the jury could have concluded that the object displayed in the course of the robbery was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, and defendant’s request to so charge should therefore have been granted.” The court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh the evidence and determine whether the affirmative defense is established by a preponderance of the evidence.