New York Law Review

Tag: Affirmative Action

  • Under 21 v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 374 (1982): Executive Authority and Affirmative Action Programs

    Under 21 v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 374 (1982)

    The executive branch does not have the authority to initiate affirmative action mandates in hiring practices without explicit legislative authorization.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the executive branch in New York City can mandate affirmative action programs for hiring practices without legislative authorization. The Court of Appeals held that while the executive branch has the power to implement programs prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices, it cannot mandate affirmative action without explicit legislative approval. The court emphasized the separation of powers, stating that mandating affirmative action is a policy decision reserved for the legislative branch. The decision clarifies the distinction between prohibiting discrimination and actively mandating specific hiring practices based on affirmative action principles.

    Facts

    The Mayor of New York City issued an executive order mandating affirmative action in hiring practices. The order went beyond prohibiting discriminatory practices and required employers to take specific actions to increase minority representation. The plaintiffs, “Under 21,” challenged the executive order, arguing that it exceeded the Mayor’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a challenge to the Mayor’s executive order. The lower courts did not explicitly address the core issue of executive authority but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address this fundamental question concerning the distribution of powers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the executive branch has the authority to mandate affirmative action in hiring practices without legislative authorization, when existing legislation only prohibits discriminatory hiring practices?

    Holding

    No, because mandating affirmative action in hiring practices is a policy decision that falls within the purview of the legislative branch, and the executive branch cannot impose such mandates without explicit legislative authorization.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the executive branch has the power and obligation to implement programs designed to prohibit discriminatory hiring practices, mandating affirmative action is a different matter. The court distinguished between prohibiting discrimination and mandating specific actions to achieve certain hiring percentages or quotas. According to the court, the latter constitutes a policy decision that must be made by the legislative branch. The court referenced its prior decision in Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, emphasizing that there is a “dramatic distinction between the expressed legislative policy of prohibiting employment discrimination and the mayoral policy of mandating employment ‘percentages.’”. The court further stated that while voluntary affirmative action plans are permissible, mandating such plans under threat of legal sanctions is an overreach of executive authority. The court noted, “The difference between obligations that require the taking of certain steps, and those that merely require one to refrain from others, is, in this sensitive area of racial relations, not merely one of degree, but of kind.” The court clarified that its holding does not prevent the executive branch from implementing measures that enlarge the pool of eligible candidates based on discrimination-free merit selection; instead, the limitation applies specifically to mandating affirmative action hiring practices.

  • Citibank, N. A. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 426 (1973): “Affirmative Action” and Taxation of National Banks

    Citibank, N. A. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 426 (1973)

    A state legislature’s amendment to a tax law, resulting in meaningful increases in tax rates, constitutes “affirmative action” permitting the imposition of the tax on national banks under federal law; furthermore, a commercial rent tax is considered a tax on tangible personal property, which is exempt from the “affirmative action” requirement.

    Summary

    Citibank and Chase, national banking associations, challenged the imposition of New York City’s commercial rent tax for the period of June 1, 1970, through May 31, 1972, arguing that they were immune under federal law. The banks contended that the city had not taken the “affirmative action” required by United States Public Law No. 91-156 to subject them to the tax. The Court of Appeals held that the state legislature’s amendment to the tax law, which significantly increased the rates, constituted the required “affirmative action.” Furthermore, the court determined the commercial rent tax to be a tax on tangible personal property, exempting it from the “affirmative action” requirement altogether. Thus, the tax was properly levied.

    Facts

    Citibank and Chase, national banks with principal places of business in New York City, were subjected to the city’s commercial rent tax. This tax had been in place since 1963. In 1969, Congress enacted United States Public Law No. 91-156, which affected the ability of states to tax national banks. New York State amended its commercial rent tax law in 1970 (L 1970, ch 166), significantly increasing tax rates. The banks challenged the tax, asserting that the 1970 amendment did not constitute the “affirmative action” required by federal law to subject them to the tax during the period in question.

    Procedural History

    Citibank and Chase separately initiated Article 78 proceedings challenging the tax assessments. The cases were consolidated. The Appellate Division confirmed the New York City Finance Administration’s determinations against the banks and dismissed their petitions. The banks then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendment to the New York City commercial rent tax law in 1970, which increased the tax rates, constituted “affirmative action” by the state legislature as required by United States Public Law No. 91-156, thereby permitting the imposition of the tax on national banks.
    2. Whether the New York City commercial rent tax is a tax on tangible personal property, thus exempting it from the “affirmative action” requirement under United States Public Law No. 91-156.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the amendment, which brought about meaningful increases in the rates of the revenue measure, is permeated with “action.”
    2. Yes, because New York courts have consistently regarded a leasehold interest as tangible personal property for tax purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the 1970 amendment to the commercial rent tax law constituted “affirmative action” because it significantly increased tax rates. The court rejected the banks’ argument that the federal statute required an explicit decision to subject national banks to the tax, finding no such requirement in the statute itself. Citing Lyon v Manhattan Ry. Co., the court stated that an amendment is a re-enactment of the statute amended, thus the amendment necessarily involved “affirmative” conduct. The court further reasoned that the concern of Congress was the possiblity of inequitable taxation, and the saving provision in the federal statute was designed to avoid upsetting delicately balanced State statutes enacted to equalize taxation.

    Independently, the court held that the commercial rent tax qualifies as a tax on tangible personal property, as established in Ampco Printing-Advertisers’ Offset Corp. v City of New York. Judge Fuld in Ampco described the tax as one “imposed on a tenant of taxable premises according to his base rent for the tax year” and noted that “ ‘It is significant to note that nowhere in the Tax Law has the Legislature characterized a leasehold as taxable real property…A leasehold has consistently been regarded as tangible”. Because United States Public Law No. 91-156 expressly exempts taxes on tangible personal property from the “affirmative action” requirement, the city was permitted to impose the commercial rent tax on the banks without further legislative action. The court also noted that the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated the taxes listed in the new section were not considered to be taxes on intangible personal property and they could be imposed on national banks by the States.

  • Citibank, N. A. v. City of New York Finance Administration, 43 N.Y.2d 425 (1977): State Taxation of National Banks

    43 N.Y.2d 425 (1977)

    A state’s amendment of its tax laws, even if not explicitly referring to national banks, constitutes “affirmative action” allowing the state to tax national banks under federal law; commercial rent tax is considered a tax on tangible personal property, permitting taxation of national banks without further legislative action.

    Summary

    Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank challenged the City of New York’s commercial rent tax for the period of 1970-1972, arguing that as national banks, they were immune under federal law (Public Law 91-156). This law allowed states to tax national banks equally with state banks but included a “saving provision” requiring “affirmative action” by the state legislature to impose such taxes. The banks argued that the 1970 amendment to the city’s rent tax, which increased rates but did not expressly mention national banks, did not constitute affirmative action. The court held that the amendment was affirmative action and that the commercial rent tax was a tax on tangible personal property, thus not requiring affirmative action under the federal statute.

    Facts

    Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank, national banking associations with principal places of business in New York City, were assessed commercial rent tax by the city for the period of June 1, 1970, through May 31, 1972. The banks challenged the tax, asserting immunity under federal law, specifically Public Law No. 91-156, which governed state taxation of national banks. The city’s commercial rent tax had been in effect since 1963. In 1970, the New York State Legislature amended the law to increase the rates of the tax. The banks argued this amendment did not constitute the “affirmative action” required by the federal law to subject them to the tax.

    Procedural History

    The banks initiated separate CPLR article 78 proceedings challenging the Finance Administration’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Finance Administration’s determinations and dismissed the banks’ petitions. The banks appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the New York State Legislature’s amendment to the city’s commercial rent tax, which increased rates but did not explicitly mention national banks, constituted “affirmative action” as required by Public Law No. 91-156, thus allowing the city to tax national banks.
    2. Whether the New York City commercial rent tax is a tax on tangible personal property, which under federal law does not require “affirmative action” by the state legislature to be imposed on national banks.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the amendment, even without explicitly mentioning national banks, constituted “affirmative action” since it was a conscious decision to increase tax rates, and amendments are considered re-enactments of the amended statute.
    2. Yes, because the New York City commercial rent tax has been consistently regarded as a tax on tangible personal property, and such taxes are expressly excepted from the “affirmative action” requirement under federal law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the 1970 amendment to the commercial rent tax law constituted “affirmative action” because it involved a conscious legislative decision to increase tax rates. The court noted that amendments are considered re-enactments of the statutes they amend. The court stated, “From the point of view of Congress, it was the possibility that inequitable or double taxation might be imposed immediately on national banks that was the crux of its concern.”

    Furthermore, the court held that the commercial rent tax was a tax on tangible personal property, specifically a leasehold interest. Quoting Ampco Printing-Advertisers’ Offset Corp. v City of New York, the court emphasized that a leasehold is deemed personalty and tangible. Because Public Law No. 91-156 explicitly exempts taxes on tangible personal property from the “affirmative action” requirement, the city was permitted to levy the tax on national banks without further legislative input. The court noted, “* * * [P]rior to January 1, [1973], no tax may be imposed on any class of banks by or under authority of any State legislation in effect prior to the enactment of this Act unless (1) the tax was imposed on that class of banks prior to the enactment of this Act, or (2) the imposition of the tax is authorized by affirmative action of the State legislature after the enactment of this Act.”

    The dissenting judge argued that the 1970 amendment was merely an increase in rates and did not demonstrate a conscious decision to subject national banks to the tax. The dissent also contested the majority’s characterization of the commercial rent tax as a tax on tangible personal property in the context of federal law.