New York Law Review

Tag: Affiliate Transactions

  • New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 72 N.Y.2d 419 (1988): Defining ‘Management Contract’ Under Public Service Law

    72 N.Y.2d 419 (1988)

    A contract granting an affiliate total control over a utility’s directory business, including staff and systems, constitutes a ‘management contract’ under Public Service Law § 110(3), allowing the Public Service Commission (PSC) to disapprove it if not in the public interest.

    Summary

    New York Telephone Company (NYT) contracted with its affiliate, NYNEX IRC, to manage its directory business. The Public Service Commission (PSC) investigated and disapproved the contract (DPA), finding it not in the public interest under Public Service Law § 110(3). NYT challenged the PSC’s authority. The Court of Appeals held that the PSC had jurisdiction because the DPA was a ‘management contract,’ and that the PSC’s determination that the DPA was not in the public interest had a rational basis.

    Facts

    Prior to the Bell System restructuring, NYT managed its own directory operations, including White Page listings and Yellow Page advertising. After the restructuring, NYNEX created NYNEX IRC and transferred NYT’s directory staff to this new subsidiary. NYT and NYNEX IRC then entered into the Directory Publishing Agreement (DPA), giving NYNEX IRC control over NYT’s directory business for five years, with automatic renewals. NYNEX IRC paid NYT an annual fee based on 1983 advertising profits, adjusted for growth and inflation, retaining profits exceeding this amount.

    Procedural History

    The PSC initiated proceedings to investigate the DPA, concluding it had authority under Public Service Law § 110(3) and disapproving the DPA. NYT’s request for a rehearing was denied. NYT commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding, which Supreme Court transferred to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the PSC lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals granted the PSC’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Directory Publishing Agreement (DPA) between New York Telephone and NYNEX IRC constitutes a “management contract” under Public Service Law § 110(3), thereby granting the Public Service Commission (PSC) the authority to disapprove it if not in the public interest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the DPA grants NYNEX IRC total control over and responsibility for the management of New York Telephone Company’s directory business, and the PSC’s determination that the DPA is not in the public interest has a rational basis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court rejected NYT’s narrow interpretation of ‘management contract,’ stating that it isn’t limited to contracts delegating total control over an entire business. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind § 110(3): preventing utilities from insulating themselves from regulatory control through contractual devices to divert profits at the expense of ratepayers. The Court found that the DPA gave NYNEX IRC total control over NYT’s directory business, including staff, systems, and customer lists. NYNEX IRC assumed responsibility for providing directory services consistent with NYT’s policies. The payment structure, where NYT relinquished profits over a stipulated sum, was considered a payment for NYNEX IRC’s management services. The Court distinguished Matter of General Tel. Co. v. Lundy, clarifying that it didn’t preclude directory service contracts from being ‘management contracts’ under § 110(3); the key factor is the degree and nature of control delegated. The Court deferred to the PSC’s expertise in determining whether the DPA was in the public interest, finding substantial evidence to support the PSC’s findings that the base level earnings figure was understated, the growth and inflation factors were inaccurate, and the impact of competition was not properly considered. The Court stated, “Like the setting of utility rates, the question of whether a given contract is contrary to the public interest is a matter presenting ‘technical problems which have been left by the Legislature to the expertise of the PSC’.” Because the PSC’s determination had a rational basis and reasonable support in the record, it was upheld.

  • Matter of General Telephone Co. of Upstate New York, Inc. v. Lundy, 17 N.Y.2d 373 (1966): Authority to Scrutinize Affiliate Transactions in Rate-Making

    Matter of General Telephone Co. of Upstate New York, Inc. v. Lundy, 17 N.Y.2d 373 (1966)

    A public service commission, in determining just and reasonable rates for a utility, has the implied authority to scrutinize transactions between the utility and its affiliates to ensure that costs passed on to ratepayers are not inflated, even without explicit statutory authority to regulate all affiliate contracts.

    Summary

    General Telephone Co. of Upstate New York, a subsidiary of GT&E, challenged a Public Service Commission order that disallowed certain rate increases. The Commission determined that General Telephone was being overcharged by its affiliated suppliers, also GT&E subsidiaries, and excluded these overcharges from the rate base and operating expenses. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s decision, finding that the power to review affiliated transactions is implied in the Commission’s rate-making authority, despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization. The court reasoned that the Commission has a duty to protect ratepayers from excessive charges resulting from non-arm’s length transactions between affiliated entities.

    Facts

    General Telephone Co. of Upstate New York (GTC), a subsidiary of General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GT&E), filed for rate increases with the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC conducted hearings and approved some increases but disallowed others. The PSC determined that GTC was being overcharged for goods and services by other GT&E subsidiaries. These subsidiaries included Automatic Electric Company (AE), General Telephone Directory Company, and Leich Electric Company (Leich). AE was a major manufacturer of specialized telephone equipment, with a significant portion of its sales to GT&E affiliates. Leich supplied standard telephone supplies, mostly to GT&E affiliates. The Directory Company specialized in yellow page advertising and telephone directories, with a majority of its business from affiliates. The PSC found the prices charged by these affiliates to GTC were excessive.

    Procedural History

    GTC filed an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the PSC’s order. The case was transferred to the Appellate Division, which confirmed the PSC’s determination. GTC appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on constitutional grounds, arguing that the PSC should have credited the full amounts paid to its affiliated suppliers.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Public Service Commission has the authority to investigate the reasonableness of prices charged to a utility by its affiliated suppliers when setting rates, even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization to regulate all contracts between affiliates.

    2. Whether it was an error to determine the telephone company was being overcharged, because it paid no more, and sometimes less, than independent telephone companies.

    3. Whether the Commission erred in using the “historical book value” of the affiliate in determining the net returns on investment, rather than the “acquisition cost.”

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the power to conduct such an inquiry and ascertain whether the prices were excessive may be fairly implied from the rate-making powers already granted by the Legislature to the Commission.

    2. No, because there is no constitutional requirement that prevailing market prices must be accepted as the standard for testing the reasonableness of operating costs.

    3. No, because the Public Service Law places the burden on the telephone company to show that the proposed rate change is just and reasonable, and the telephone company’s own expert witness provided data based on historical book value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the PSC’s authority to determine “just and reasonable” telephone rates (Public Service Law, § 91, subd. 1; § 97, subd. 1) necessarily implies the power to scrutinize transactions between a utility and its affiliates. The Court cited Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 346, stating that the rate-making power cannot be “subservient to the discretion of [a utility] which may, by exorbitant and unreasonable salaries, or in some other improper way, transfer its earnings into what it is pleased to call operating expenses.” The Court emphasized the Commission’s duty to closely scrutinize transactions between affiliates, especially when those expenses arise out of dealings between affiliates. The court emphasized that in the absence of arms-length bargaining the commission must protect the utility’s rate payers.

    The Court rejected the argument that the prevailing market prices should be accepted as the standard, given the control GT&E had over its subsidiaries, stating “little, if any, weight can be accorded to price comparison.” The court stated, “comparative prices fixed in the * * * independent telephone market * * * as [a valid test] of the reasonableness of these affiliated transactions.”

    The Court dismissed the argument that the commission should have used “acquisition cost” instead of “historical book value” to determine the net returns on investment, stating that the petitioner failed to introduce comparable data. The Court stated, “In order to determine whether profits are fair rather than excessive, the commission must ascertain what similar enterprises are earning on a similar basis.”

    The Court held that there was no denial of equal protection because the Commission lacked the power to order a reduction in the prices charged by these suppliers to independent companies. If the same prices were charged to independent telephone companies, they could not be excluded from the rate base of independent companies. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to penalize a utility for a state of affairs over which it has no control, which would violate due process.