Tag: AED

  • Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness, 20 N.Y.3d 342 (2013): No Duty to Use AED Under General Business Law § 627-a

    Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 342 (2013)

    General Business Law § 627-a, which requires certain health clubs to maintain an Automated External Defibrillator (AED) on premises, does not create an affirmative duty for the health club to use the AED, and therefore, the club cannot be held liable for failing to do so.

    Summary

    Gregory Miglino, Sr. collapsed at a Bally Total Fitness health club. Although a Bally employee certified in CPR and AED operation was present and an AED was available, the employee did not use the AED because Miglino was breathing and had a pulse. Miglino later died. His estate sued Bally, alleging negligence in failing to use the AED. The New York Court of Appeals held that General Business Law § 627-a does not impose a duty on health clubs to use AEDs, clarifying that the statute primarily aims to ensure AED availability and trained personnel, not to mandate AED usage under threat of liability.

    Facts

    Gregory Miglino, Sr. collapsed at a Bally Total Fitness health club. Kenneth LaGrega, a Bally personal trainer certified in CPR and AED operation, responded to the emergency. LaGrega observed that Miglino was breathing and had a faint pulse, so he did not administer CPR or use the AED, believing such measures inappropriate. Two other club members, a doctor and medical student, began administering CPR. LaGrega assisted them until paramedics arrived, who then used an AED but could not revive Miglino.

    Procedural History

    Miglino’s estate sued Bally for wrongful death, alleging negligence for failure to use the AED. The trial court denied Bally’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the claim against Bally Total Fitness Corporation but upholding the claim against Bally, reasoning that General Business Law § 627-a created a duty to use the AED and that LaGrega assumed a common-law duty of care by assisting Miglino. The Court of Appeals certified a question regarding the validity of the cause of action against Bally.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Business Law § 627-a imposes an affirmative duty on health clubs to use an AED when a member experiences a medical emergency.

    Holding

    No, because General Business Law § 627-a, when read in conjunction with Public Health Law §§ 3000-a and 3000-b, aims to protect health clubs and their employees from liability for ordinary negligence related to AED use, rather than to mandate its use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that General Business Law § 627-a, when read in conjunction with Public Health Law §§ 3000-a and 3000-b, intends to protect health clubs and their employees from liability for ordinary negligence related to AED use, rather than mandate its use. The court noted that the statute uses terms like “volunteer” and “voluntarily,” indicating an intent to encourage, not compel, AED use. The Court referenced Digiulio v. Gran, Inc., 74 AD3d 450 (2010), stating that a health club had no duty at common law to use an AED. The Court stated, “to interpret section 627-a as implicitly creating a new duty would conflict with the rule that legislative enactments in derogation of common law, and especially those creating liability where none previously existed, must be strictly construed. The statute’s limitation of the liability of health clubs and their agents when ‘voluntarily’ using AEDs to aid stricken persons indicates that its use is not obligatory. While the Legislature meant to require health clubs to make AEDs available and encourage their use in medical emergencies, it did not intend to impose liability on clubs for usage failures”. The court also emphasized that imposing such a duty would lead to uncertainty and increased litigation. Despite finding no statutory duty, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order on procedural grounds, holding that the plaintiff had pleaded a viable common-law negligence claim because the defendant’s motion was one to dismiss and not for summary judgement.