New York Law Review

Tag: adverse possession

  • Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228 (2006): Adverse Possession Claim Not Defeated by Knowledge of True Owner

    Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228 (2006)

    An adverse possession claim is not automatically defeated simply because the adverse possessor knows that someone else holds legal title to the property.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an adverse possession claim can succeed even if the adverse possessor knows that another party holds legal title to the land. The Wallings sued to quiet title, claiming adverse possession of a strip of land on the border of their property with the Przybylos. The Wallings had openly and continuously maintained the land for over ten years, treating it as their own. The Przybylos argued that the Wallings’ knowledge of their ownership defeated the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating that the Wallings’ actions demonstrating a claim of right were sufficient, despite their knowledge of the Przybylos’ title. This case clarifies that actions demonstrating a claim of right prevail over mere knowledge in adverse possession claims.

    Facts

    The Wallings purchased lot 22 in 1986. The Przybylos purchased adjacent lot 23 in 1989 but did not move in until 1994. Starting in 1987, the Wallings bulldozed, deposited fill, and topsoil on a portion of the Przybylos’ lot. They installed a PVC pipe to carry water onto the disputed parcel and constructed an underground dog fence. The Wallings continuously mowed, graded, raked, planted, and watered the disputed grassy area. In 1992, they erected a post with a birdhouse on the land. In 2004, a survey revealed the disputed land belonged to the Przybylos, prompting the Wallings to file a quiet title action.

    Procedural History

    The Warren County Court initially granted summary judgment to the Wallings, quieting title in their favor. The court then modified its decision, denying summary judgment based on new evidence suggesting the Wallings knew the true owners before making improvements. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Wallings, holding that knowledge of legal title does not defeat an adverse possession claim. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adverse possession claim fails as a matter of law when the adverse possessor has actual knowledge of the true owner’s legal title at the time of possession.

    Holding

    No, because an adverse possessor’s actions demonstrating a claim of right can establish adverse possession even if the possessor knows of another’s legal title; conduct prevails over mere knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to establish adverse possession, possession must be: (1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) continuous for the statutory period (at least 10 years in this case). The court found that the Wallings possessed the disputed parcel openly, notoriously, and continuously for 20 years, hostile to the Przybylos’ interests. The court stated, “The ultimate element in the rise of a title through adverse possession is the acquiescence of the real owner in the exercise of an obvious adverse or hostile ownership through the statutory period.” The Przybylos failed to assert their rights for nearly 10 years after moving in and almost 15 years after purchasing the property. The court clarified that while a claim of right is adverse to the title owner, longstanding precedent dictates that knowledge of the true owner does not automatically defeat the claim. The court distinguished Van Valkenburgh v Lutz, noting that any inconsistent language in that case was non-binding dictum and did not overturn the established principle that conduct prevails over knowledge. The court quoted Humbert v Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of Trinity Church: “Possession by the defendant with a claim of title for twenty years, can no more be answered by averring that he knew he was wrong…”

  • Guariglia v. Blima Homes, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996): Adverse Possession Requires Hostile, Not Permissive, Use

    Guariglia v. Blima Homes, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996)

    To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant’s possession must be hostile and under a claim of right; permissive use, even if prolonged, defeats such a claim.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, the Guariglias, sought to establish legal title to a strip of land adjoining their property through adverse possession. The defendant, Blima Homes, Inc., held the record title to the land. The Court of Appeals held that the Guariglias’ claim failed because their use of the land was initially permissive, stemming from an agreement concerning the acquisition of the adjoining parcel. This permissive use negated the element of hostility required for adverse possession. The court emphasized that while a predecessor’s adverse possession could overcome this, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof of such prior adverse use.

    Facts

    The Guariglias acquired their property in 1977. They claimed adverse possession over a 10-foot by 40-foot strip of land bordering their property on the west. Blima Homes, Inc. had held legal title to the entire adjoining parcel since 1984. In 1982, Concetta Guariglia entered into an agreement regarding the acquisition of the westerly adjoining parcel (now owned by Blima) from the State of New York.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought an action to establish title by adverse possession. The lower court granted summary judgment dismissing their cause of action against Blima Homes, Inc. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs established adverse possession of the disputed strip of land, considering their permissive use stemming from the 1982 agreement.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs’ initial use of the disputed strip was permissive, not hostile, due to the 1982 agreement acknowledging ownership by others, and they failed to adequately prove adverse possession by their predecessors in interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by stating that Blima Homes, Inc., as the record holder of legal title, was presumed to be in possession of the disputed strip, and the Guariglias’ occupancy was presumed to be subordinate, not hostile. The court highlighted the significance of the 1982 agreement, stating it “constituted an acknowledgement that actual ownership rested in others.” The court reasoned that this acknowledgement negated the “essential element” of hostility necessary for an adverse possession claim. The court cited Van Gorder v. Masterplanned, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 1106, 1108, reinforcing this principle. The court acknowledged that the effect of this acknowledgement could be overcome by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ predecessors had adversely possessed the strip for the statutory period. However, the plaintiffs “failed to submit proof in admissible form to substantiate that contention.” The court cited Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 505, 514, and City of Tonawanda v. Ellicott Cr. Homeowners Assn., 86 A.D.2d 118, 124, to support the principle of tacking a predecessor’s adverse possession. The court found no admissible evidence to support tacking. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the adverse possession claim.

  • Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989): Extinguishment of Easement by Adverse Possession

    Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989)

    An easement, once definitively located and developed through use, can be extinguished by adverse possession without a prior demand for the removal of obstructions, provided the adverse use is exclusive, open, notoriously hostile, and continuous for the prescriptive period.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extinguishment of a granted easement by adverse possession. Spiegel sued to enjoin Ferraro’s tenant, Ernie’s Auto Body (Ernie’s), from obstructing an easement on Ferraro’s property that benefitted Spiegel’s land. Ernie’s had fenced off and used the easement for parking wrecked cars for over ten years. The Court of Appeals held that Ernie’s adverse use of the easement, which was open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than ten years, extinguished the easement, even without a prior demand from Spiegel to remove the obstructions. The Court distinguished easements definitively located and used from ‘paper’ easements, where a demand might be required.

    Facts

    In 1954, the Masone brothers sold a parcel of land with a non-exclusive easement for access to Broadway. In 1970, Jerry Spiegel acquired this parcel along with the easement. In 1964, Frank Boni and Michael Pavone bought the servient parcel and later sold it to Nicholas and Stephan Ferraro in 1982. In 1966, Boni and Pavone leased the servient premises to Ernie’s Auto Body, Inc. Ernie’s erected gates, regraded and paved the easement, installed lights, used guard dogs, and parked wrecked cars on the easement, effectively blocking Spiegel’s access. Spiegel did not use the easement after Ernie’s tenancy began.

    Procedural History

    In 1977, Spiegel demanded Ernie’s remove the obstructions. In 1982, Spiegel sued to enjoin Ernie’s from obstructing the easement. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding the easement extinguished by Ernie’s adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the prescriptive period did not begin to run until Spiegel demanded the easement be opened in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an easement that has been definitively located and developed through use must have a demand for removal of obstructions before it may be extinguished by adverse possession?

    Holding

    No, because where an easement has been definitively located and developed through use, there is no requirement that its owner demand the removal of obstructions blocking the easement before it may be extinguished by adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an easement created by grant can be extinguished by adverse possession if the use is adverse, under a claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for 10 years. The court distinguished this case from situations involving “paper” easements (easements not definitively located or used), where a demand to open the easement might be required before adverse possession can begin. Here, the easement was definitively located and had been used prior to Ernie’s obstruction. Ernie’s actions (erecting gates, parking cars, etc.) were sufficient to put Spiegel on notice of the adverse claim. The court emphasized that Ernie’s exclusive use of the easement, affirmed by lower courts and supported by the record, demonstrated a claim of right that was open and notoriously adverse to Spiegel’s interest for over 10 years. The court stated that “an easement may be lost by adverse possession if the owner or possessor of the servient estate claims to own it free from the private right of another, and excludes the owner of the easement, who acquiesces in the exclusion for [the prescriptive period]”. Finally, the Court stated that Ernie’s use of the easement was not an assertion of an interest hostile to its landlord. By statute such a use could not be deemed adverse (see, RPAPL 531). Rather, Ernie’s use is adverse only to plaintiff and that use satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and operated to extinguish that easement.

  • Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986): Easement by Adverse Possession Cannot Be Relocated to Further Restrict Use

    Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986)

    An easement obtained by adverse possession at a specific location cannot be relocated to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s right of way, especially when the easement holder promptly objects to the relocation.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute between neighbors over an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, Radigan, had maintained a barrier on Flower Hill Road, arguably establishing rights to the easement by adverse possession at that location. However, they moved the barrier to a new location, further restricting Anzalone’s use of the road. Anzalone sought an injunction to restore the barrier to its original location. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the defendants had acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Facts

    Anzalone’s deed granted her a right of ingress and egress over Flower Hill Road, which abutted both properties. Radigan moved a barrier on Flower Hill Road to a new location, which further restricted Anzalone’s access. Anzalone promptly objected to the relocation of the barrier. Radigan argued that removing the relocated barrier would require trespassing on a non-party’s property.

    Procedural History

    Anzalone sued Radigan, seeking an injunction to compel the removal of the barrier from its new location and restore it to its original location. The lower courts ruled in favor of Anzalone, ordering the removal of the barrier. Radigan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party who may have acquired rights to an easement by adverse possession based on the existence of a barrier at one location can move that barrier to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s use of the road, over the easement holder’s objection.

    Holding

    No, because even if the defendants acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the defendants might have acquired rights to the easement by adverse possession based on the barrier’s long-standing presence at the original location (citing Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636; Belotti v Bickhardt, 228 NY 296, 302), those rights were limited to that specific location. The court emphasized that the defendants could not extend their adverse possession rights to a new location that further burdened the plaintiff’s easement. The court stated, “Whatever rights defendants may have acquired to the easement by adverse possession, based on the long-continued existence of a barrier at one location on Flower Hill Road, defendants obtained no right to move that barrier to a new location on Flower Hill Road so as to further restrict plaintiff’s use of the road, a move which was promptly objected to by plaintiff.” The court further noted that Anzalone’s property interest in ingress and egress permitted removal of the barrier, even if it meant entering the right of way. The court explicitly stated that it was not reaching any other issue.

  • Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sullivan, 59 N.Y.2d 418 (1983): Sufficiency of Notice in Tax Sale Proceedings

    Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. County of Sullivan, 59 N.Y.2d 418 (1983)

    Due process requires that notice of a tax sale be provided to parties with readily ascertainable substantial property interests, but an assessor is not required to make extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of the owner.

    Summary

    Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. (plaintiff) claimed ownership of a six-acre parcel of land through adverse possession. Sullivan County (defendant) had acquired the land through a tax sale due to unpaid taxes and subsequently sold it to Carnesi & Son, Inc. The plaintiff argued the tax sale was unconstitutional due to lack of proper notice. The Court of Appeals held that the assessor acted reasonably in providing notice based on the available records, and the plaintiff’s interest was not readily ascertainable, thus the tax deed was valid. The court emphasized that assessors are not required to make extraordinary efforts to identify owners beyond diligent inquiry of readily available records.

    Facts

    Plaintiff owned a 21-acre parcel adjacent to a six-acre parcel. Plaintiff purchased its land in 1971 from White Lake Sanruth Corporation, with the six-acre parcel explicitly excepted from the deed. The six-acre parcel was landlocked within the 21-acre parcel. Until 1973, both parcels were assessed as one. In 1973, the assessor listed them separately, assessing the six-acre parcel to White Lake Sanruth Corporation. The 1973 taxes on the six-acre parcel were not paid, leading to a tax sale to Sullivan County in 1974. The county then sold the six-acre parcel to Carnesi & Son, Inc. Plaintiff claimed ownership of the six-acre parcel by adverse possession.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term found in favor of the defendants, holding that Frances Ettinger held record title, the plaintiff had not acquired ownership by adverse possession, and the plaintiff failed to prove the tax proceedings were irregular. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the plaintiff had acquired ownership by adverse possession and that the tax proceedings were constitutionally defective because of lack of personal notice to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the tax sale was unconstitutional because the County failed to provide adequate notice to the plaintiff, who claimed ownership of the property through adverse possession, given that the County relied on record information indicating ownership by another party.

    Holding

    No, because the assessor made diligent inquiry based on available records, and the plaintiff’s claim of ownership through adverse possession was not readily ascertainable through those records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of pending actions, but does not mandate personal notice in all circumstances. Relying on Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., the Court acknowledged the balancing act between the State’s interests and the individual’s rights. The Court distinguished Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, emphasizing that the assessor is charged with knowledge of facts revealed by property and tax records, and must make “diligent inquiry” to ascertain property owners, as per Real Property Tax Law § 500.

    The Court found the assessor acted reasonably by relying on the recorded deed, which excepted the six-acre parcel from the conveyance to the plaintiff, indicating the corporation retained ownership. This inference was consistent with the tax history. Mailing notice to the corporation at its listed address satisfied due process requirements. The court stated, “The assessor was not required to make extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of the owner”.

    The court rejected the argument for mandatory notice to the occupant, stating occupancy alone does not create a constitutional right to personal notice absent a substantial and readily identifiable property interest. The court held that the assessor’s procedures aligned with available information, meeting constitutional standards, and the plaintiff’s claim was not “readily ascertainable”. The court also noted the plaintiff’s knowledge of tax levies and the parcel’s subdivision for tax purposes.

    The Court concluded that the tax deed was conclusive evidence of a regular tax sale, given that more than two years had elapsed before the action was initiated, citing Real Property Tax Law § 1020, subd. 3.

  • Brand v. Prince, 35 N.Y.2d 634 (1974): Establishing Title Through Adverse Possession by Tacking

    Brand v. Prince, 35 N.Y.2d 634 (1974)

    Successive periods of adverse possession of property omitted from a deed description may be combined (“tacked”) to establish the statutory period for adverse possession, provided the adverse possessor intended to transfer possession of the undescribed part along with the deeded portion.

    Summary

    Brand and Prince owned adjacent farmland. A dispute arose over a 10-acre parcel lying between their properties. Brand sued to establish title by adverse possession. The County Court found neither party had title by deed and Brand failed to prove adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Brand had established title by adverse possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Brand could tack his period of possession onto that of his predecessors, even though the 10-acre parcel was not included in Brand’s deed, because there was evidence that Brand’s predecessors intended to transfer possession of the disputed parcel.

    Facts

    Brand and Prince owned adjoining farmlands in Delaware County. A 10-acre vacant parcel lay between their properties. From approximately 1945 or 1946 to 1961, Brand’s predecessors in title used the 10-acre parcel for farming in conjunction with their tenancy and later ownership of the adjoining parcel. When Brand’s predecessors purchased their parcel in 1956, the boundary lines pointed out to them included the disputed 10 acres. After Brand purchased the adjoining parcel in 1961, he posted the land, rented it to a hunting club, and leased part of it for pasturage and haying. There was evidence of fencing and substantial enclosure related to these uses.

    Procedural History

    Brand brought an action in County Court to establish title to the 10-acre parcel under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. The County Court ruled against Brand, finding that neither party had established title by deed, and that Brand failed to establish title by adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, directing judgment for Brand based on adverse possession. Prince appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Brand, who possessed the property for less than the statutory period, could tack his adverse possession to that of his predecessors in title, even though the parcel was not within the description of the deed to Brand.

    Holding

    Yes, because successive adverse possessions of property omitted from a deed description, especially contiguous property, may be tacked if it appears that the adverse possessor intended to and actually turned over possession of the undescribed part with the portion of the land included in the deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court noted that to acquire title by adverse possession, the possession must be “hostile and under claim of right, actual, open and notorious, exclusive and continuous.” This amounts to “possession in fact of a type that would give the owner a cause of action in ejectment against the occupier throughout the prescriptive period.” Since Brand was in possession for less than the statutory period, he needed to tack his possession to that of his predecessors. The court cited Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296 (1920), stating that successive adverse possessions of property omitted from a deed description may be tacked if it appears that the adverse possessor intended to and actually turned over possession of the undescribed part with the portion of the land included in the deed. The court reasoned, “Because the possessory title is entirely an incident of the adverse holder’s possession, transfer of that possession, even by parol, effects a transfer of the possessory interest.” The court found sufficient evidence to support the finding that Brand’s predecessors intended to and actually turned over their possessory interest in the 10-acre parcel, making tacking proper.

  • George v. Shultis, 24 N.Y.2d 240 (1969): Sufficiency of Tax Deed Description for Identification and Adverse Possession

    George v. Shultis, 24 N.Y.2d 240 (1969)

    A tax deed with an imperfect property description is valid if the land can be identified with reasonable certainty, and such a deed can form the basis for a claim of adverse possession if the claimant’s use of the land is consistent with ownership under a written instrument.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of a tax deed with errors in the property description and whether it can serve as a basis for adverse possession. The Court of Appeals held that even with inaccuracies, the tax deed was sufficient because the property could be identified with reasonable certainty due to its unique location bounded by town lines. Furthermore, the court found that the tax deed could support a claim of adverse possession because the purchaser demonstrated use of the land consistent with ownership under a written instrument, despite imperfections in the deed’s description.

    Facts

    In 1931, Defendant George purchased tax liens on a property based on a 1930 assessment. In 1933, he received a tax deed from the Ulster County Treasurer. The assessment contained errors in the compass directions of boundary lines and the quantity of land. The property was wild forest land in the Town of Olive, uniquely bounded on the west by the Town of Denning and touching the Town of Shandaken. Plaintiff’s predecessors had not paid taxes on the land after 1929, and in 1963, Plaintiff bought their interests. Defendant Shultis was a contract purchaser from George.

    Procedural History

    The trial court (Special Term) upheld the tax deed’s validity, finding the land identifiable. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming the description patently erroneous. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tax assessment with errors in the property description is valid if the property can be identified and located with reasonable certainty.
    2. Whether a tax deed with an imperfect description can serve as a valid written instrument for a claim of adverse possession.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Real Property Tax Law § 504(4) states that errors do not invalidate enforcement if the parcel can be identified with reasonable certainty.
    2. Yes, because the tax deed provides a written instrument upon which the claimant relied for possession, and the claimant’s use of the land was consistent with ownership under that instrument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (Real Property Tax Law § 504, subd. 4) provides that an error or omission “shall not prevent” the enforcement of the tax “if the parcel can be identified and located with reasonable certainty.” The court emphasized that the location of the land, bounded by specific town lines, made it uniquely identifiable, despite errors in compass directions and acreage. The court noted that the description had been used since 1921, and the prior owner had paid taxes based on this assessment, suggesting they knew which property was being assessed. The court contrasted older cases with a stricter view of assessment roll descriptions with the modern view expressed in McCoun v. Pierpont, which favors a common-sense approach. Quoting Judge Cardozo, the court stated, “The verdict of common sense in such a situation is the verdict also of the law. That verdict, we think, must be that misconception is impossible”. Regarding adverse possession, the court noted that Defendant George used the land for recreation, hunting, and timber, consistent with ownership. The court cited Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 512(3), stating that land is possessed where, not enclosed, “it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, either for the purposes of husbandry or for the ordinary use of the occupant.” The court emphasized that the tax deed, though imperfect, was a “written instrument” that George relied upon, satisfying the statutory requirements for adverse possession, differentiating this case from a claim for possession without such an instrument.

  • Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253 (1910): Adverse Possession Against Original Owner Insufficient to Bar Occupant’s Right to Notice of Tax Sale

    Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253 (1910)

    A party in adverse possession against the original owner of land is nonetheless an ‘occupant’ entitled to statutory notice of a tax sale, and failure to provide such notice renders the tax deed invalid and incapable of triggering statutes of limitations.

    Summary

    This ejectment action concerns title to an island claimed by the plaintiff through tax deeds and by the defendant through adverse possession. The court held that the plaintiff’s tax deeds were invalid because the statutory notice to redeem was not served on the defendant’s predecessor, who was an occupant of the land through adverse possession at the time of the tax sales. The court reasoned that the requirement of notice to occupants is mandatory and that recording the tax deeds without evidence of such notice was a nullity, and thus, not subject to the statute of limitations. This case clarifies that adverse possession against the original owner does not negate the occupant’s right to statutory notice of tax sales, emphasizing the importance of strict compliance with notice requirements to ensure valid tax titles.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sought to eject the defendant from Osprey Island, basing their claim on three tax deeds from 1875, 1881, and 1884. The defendant claimed title through adverse possession, initiated by Alva Dunning in 1869, who occupied the island under claim of title. Dunning transferred the property to Charles Durant in 1881, and Durant conveyed it to the defendant, Joseph Ladew, in 1891, who then took possession.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found that the defendant had established title by adverse possession against the original owner. However, it ruled in favor of the plaintiff, asserting that the tax deeds were valid despite jurisdictional defects because the defendant was considered a stranger without standing to challenge the tax title. The defendant appealed, arguing the failure to serve notice to redeem invalidated the tax deeds.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a party in adverse possession of land is considered an ‘occupant’ entitled to notice of a tax sale under the relevant statutes.

    2. Whether the failure to serve the required notice to redeem on the occupant invalidates a tax deed.

    3. Whether a curative act or statute of limitations can validate a tax deed that was recorded without evidence of the required notice to the occupant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a party in adverse possession is an occupant entitled to notice of tax sale.

    2. Yes, because the statute requires notice to the occupant before the tax deed can be validly recorded.

    3. No, because the recording of a tax deed without evidence of the required notice is a nullity and cannot be validated by curative acts or statutes of limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statutory requirement of serving notice to redeem on the occupant of land sold for taxes is mandatory. Since Alva Dunning and Charles Durant were occupants in adverse possession during the relevant periods, they were entitled to notice. The statute expressly forbade recording the tax conveyances until the expiration of the notice period and required evidence of service to be recorded with the conveyance. The court found that because no notice was served and no evidence of service was recorded, the tax deeds were effectively not recorded at all. The court stated, “Therefore, in the case of occupied land, such as this was, the record, without evidence of service of the notice, was absolutely void. Hence it seems to me that the tax deeds from the comptroller are to be regarded as though they had not been placed upon the record books at all.”

    The Court further held that the curative acts (Laws of 1885, chapter 448; Laws of 1896, chapter 908) did not remedy this defect. While these acts provided that a recorded comptroller’s conveyance becomes conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings after two years, this did not apply to a record that was wholly void from the outset. Citing Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, the Court emphasized that such acts are essentially statutes of limitations and do not validate fundamentally defective records. The Court distinguished People v. Turner, 145 N.Y. 451, noting that in that case, the referee’s finding negated any actual occupancy requiring notice. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment, ordering a new trial.

  • Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N.Y. 348 (1882): Partition Action Allowed Despite Co-Tenant’s Adverse Possession

    Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N.Y. 348 (1882)

    A co-tenant can maintain a partition action even if another co-tenant is in adverse possession of the property, provided the plaintiff has a present right to possession; the court can resolve title disputes within the partition action itself.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a co-tenant can bring a partition action when another co-tenant is in adverse possession of the property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the action can be maintained. The court reasoned that Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorized the court to resolve all disputes involving the parties’ respective titles and rights of possession within the partition action. This effectively abrogated the prior rule requiring a tenant out of possession to regain possession via ejectment before seeking partition. The court emphasized the importance of avoiding circuity of action and resolving all issues in one proceeding. The decision clarifies that a present right to possession, rather than strict physical possession, is sufficient to maintain the action.

    Facts

    The appellants (defendants) owned an undivided three-fourths interest in the property. They claimed to have been in actual and exclusive possession of the entire property for over twenty years, asserting ownership and holding it adversely to the plaintiff and all others. The plaintiff claimed title to the remaining one-fourth interest. The trial court found that the appellants were in possession, holding adversely to the plaintiff, but that such adverse possession began less than nine years before the commencement of the action.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a partition action. The trial court found that the appellants’ adverse possession was not sufficient to establish title to the entire property, but held that the adverse possession, even if not long enough to ripen into title, did not bar the partition action. The General Term affirmed, holding that under Section 1543 of the Code, an adverse holding insufficient to presume a grant could not defeat the action. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adverse possession by a co-tenant for a period less than that required to bar a possessory action is a valid defense to an action for partition.

    Holding

    No, because Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to try and determine all disputes which may arise between the plaintiff and their co-tenants involving their respective titles and rights of possession to the property, thus allowing the partition action to proceed despite the adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the prior rule that a plaintiff whose title or right to possession was disputed or who had been ousted by a co-tenant could not maintain a partition action until regaining possession in an ejectment action. However, the court found that Section 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure changed this rule. The court reasoned that this section was intended to confer authority on the court to try and determine all disputes between the plaintiff and co-tenants regarding their titles and rights of possession. The court stated that “[t]heretofore nothing could be tried, if the bare fact of the common holding or tenancy was disputed.” The court emphasized the legislative intent to effect a “radical change” in the existing law, allowing for the resolution of all title issues within the partition action itself. The court also noted that Section 1544, which is new, provided the option of trial by jury, thus preserving constitutional guarantees. The court interpreted Section 1532, requiring tenants to “hold and be in possession,” to mean a present right to possession, not strict physical possession. The court held that this interpretation aligns with the overall purpose of the Code to avoid circuity of action and multiplicity of suits. The court quotes *Parker v. Kane* to illustrate how other states with combined law and equity courts handle such cases. The court mentions that the commissioners wanted to extend the principle embodied in section 1537 (dealing with heirs and devisees) to all cases through the provisions of section 1543.

  • Codd v. Codd, 40 N.Y. 315 (1882): Adverse Possession Against Trustees Bars Beneficiaries

    40 N.Y. 315 (1882)

    Adverse possession against trustees holding legal title also bars the equitable claims of beneficiaries when the trustees fail to assert their rights within the statutory period.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether adverse possession against trustees bars the rights of the trust beneficiaries. Matthew and Martha Codd conveyed land to trustees to pay debts, manage the land for their benefit, and then hold it for their heirs. The defendant claimed title through adverse possession. The court held that because the trustees, who held legal title, were barred by adverse possession, the plaintiff (a beneficiary) was also barred. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s rights derived from the trustees’ title, and their failure to protect the title bound the beneficiary.

    Facts

    Matthew and Martha Codd executed a deed on May 24, 1808, conveying land to Breese and Varick as trustees. The trusts included selling land to pay debts, managing the remaining land for the benefit of Matthew and Martha Codd, and holding the residue for their heirs. The deed reserved a power of appointment to the grantors. On March 26, 1842, someone under whom the defendant claimed entered into possession of the land under a claim of title based on a written instrument. The defendant and their predecessors continuously occupied the land for more than twenty years.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found for the defendant based on adverse possession. The General Term reversed, holding that the plaintiff’s right of entry did not accrue until 1871, so the statute of limitations had not run. The Court of Appeals reversed the General Term and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether adverse possession against trustees, who hold legal title to property, also bars the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust.

    Holding

    Yes, because the beneficiaries’ rights are dependent on the trustees’ title, and adverse possession that bars the trustees also bars the beneficiaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the trustees were granted a fee simple interest in the land, with the power to sell and lease the property. This required them to hold the title. The trust deed gave the trustees all legal and equitable rights. Because the trustees had neglected to assert their title, the defendant had acquired a good title by adverse possession against them. The plaintiff’s estate was equitable, and her rights derived from the trustees’ legal title. Because the trustees were barred by adverse possession, the plaintiff was also barred. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s rights were no greater than the trustees’. The court stated, “Whatever way it was conveyed to her, by the trustees themselves or by force of the statute, she took subject to the acts of the trustees and became bound and affected by their affirmative acts, and by their neglects.” The court explicitly rejects the idea that the plaintiff took a vested legal remainder that was not affected by the trustee’s actions. To allow the beneficiary to recover where the trustees could not would undermine the purpose of having a trust and incentivize beneficiaries to delay asserting their rights while the trustees’ position deteriorated. The Court stated that “if cestui que trust and trustee are both out of possession for the time limited, the party in possession has a good bar against both.”