New York Law Review

Tag: Adverse Inference Charge

  • People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 551 (2014): Adverse Inference Charge for Lost Evidence

    People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 551 (2014)

    When Rosario material is lost or destroyed, a sanction is not mandated unless the defendant establishes prejudice; if prejudice is shown, the choice of the proper sanction is left to the trial judge’s discretion.

    Summary

    Defendants Selbin and Christopher Martinez were convicted of attempted robbery. The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declining to give an adverse inference charge to the jury after a police officer’s handwritten complaint report (scratch 61) was lost. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because the defendants failed to demonstrate they were prejudiced by the missing document. The court emphasized that the defense must establish prejudice before a sanction is required for lost Rosario material, and the choice of sanction lies within the trial court’s discretion.

    Facts

    Armando Irizarry, Sr., a resident of a public housing building, was accosted in the hallway outside his apartment by two men dressed in black, one with a baseball bat (Selbin) and one with a gun (Christopher). Irizarry recognized Selbin by his walk and Christopher by his movements, which were similar to how he reacted to Irizarry’s dog. Irizarry fought them off, and he and his son fled. Police Officer Franco responded to the scene and interviewed Irizarry. Franco prepared a handwritten complaint report (scratch 61). Selbin was found hiding in a closet in his apartment with a head injury consistent with Irizarry’s account that he struck Selbin with a billiard ball. Christopher was arrested the next day.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were jointly tried and convicted of attempted robbery. During trial, it was revealed that the police officer’s handwritten complaint report (scratch 61) was missing. The defense requested an adverse inference charge, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to give an adverse inference charge to the jury after a police officer’s handwritten complaint report, considered Rosario material, was lost, when the defense failed to demonstrate prejudice from the loss.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants failed to establish that they were prejudiced by the loss of the scratch 61. The choice of a proper sanction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed its prior case law regarding the loss or destruction of Rosario material (statements of a witness that the prosecution must disclose to the defense). The Court emphasized that the per se reversal rule (requiring automatic reversal of a conviction if Rosario material was not disclosed) does not apply when Rosario material is lost or destroyed; rather, a showing of prejudice is required. The Court cited People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937 (1988), stating that if the People fail to preserve Rosario material and the defendant is prejudiced, the court must impose an appropriate sanction, focusing primarily on eliminating prejudice. The Court distinguished cases such as People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990) and People v. Joseph, 86 N.Y.2d 565 (1995), where sanctions were called for due to deliberate destruction of Rosario material and demonstrated prejudice.

    In this case, the Court found that the defendants failed to establish prejudice. The defense attorneys requested an adverse inference charge simply because the scratch 61 could not be produced, without articulating any specific potential prejudice. The Court noted the speculative nature of the defendants’ arguments, such as suggesting the scratch 61 might have contained an inconsistent statement from Irizarry. The Court highlighted the legislative intent behind CPL § 240.75, which signals an aversion to per se rules leading to reversal of convictions for Rosario violations.

    The Court concluded that because the defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue an adverse inference charge. The Court also rejected the defendants’ other claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the identification charge.

  • People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013): Entitlement to Adverse Inference Charge for Destroyed Evidence

    People v. Handy, 20 N.Y.3d 663 (2013)

    When a defendant in a criminal case, acting with due diligence, demands evidence that is reasonably likely to be of material importance, and that evidence has been destroyed by the State, the defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge.

    Summary

    Handy, a jail inmate, was convicted of assaulting a deputy sheriff. A video camera recorded part of the initial altercation leading to the assault, but the video was destroyed before trial pursuant to jail policy. Handy requested an adverse inference charge, arguing the video’s destruction prejudiced his defense. The trial court denied the request for the counts related to the initial altercation, but granted it for a later count. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Handy was entitled to an adverse inference charge because he requested potentially material evidence with reasonable diligence, and the State destroyed it. This decision emphasizes the State’s responsibility to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and provides a remedy when that duty is breached.

    Facts

    Handy, an inmate, was involved in an altercation with Deputy Saeva after refusing to hand over non-regulation sandals and boxer shorts. Saeva claimed Handy initiated the fight, injuring Saeva’s hand. Deputy Schliff intervened to escort Handy away, and Schliff alleges that Handy kicked him, resulting in a thumb injury. A video camera recorded a portion of the initial altercation with Saeva. The video was destroyed per jail policy after 30 days, before Handy was indicted. Handy requested the video’s preservation, but the request was not specifically focused on video of the November incidents until trial.

    Procedural History

    Handy was charged with three counts of assault. He was acquitted of assaulting Saeva but convicted of assaulting Schliff. The trial court granted an adverse inference charge for one count, but not for the counts related to the initial altercation with Saeva. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating Handy’s claim that the video was exculpatory was speculative. The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to an adverse inference charge when they requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and that evidence was destroyed by the State?

    Holding

    Yes, because under New York law of evidence, a permissive adverse inference charge should be given where a defendant, using reasonable diligence, has requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and where that evidence has been destroyed by agents of the State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues or align itself directly with Arizona v. Youngblood, focusing instead on the evidentiary question of whether an adverse inference charge was warranted. The court adopted the approach taken in Cost v. State, emphasizing that such a charge is appropriate when the defendant diligently requests material evidence that the State destroys. The court reasoned that an adverse inference charge mitigates the harm to the defendant caused by the loss of evidence, without necessarily terminating the prosecution. Moreover, the rule incentivizes the State to preserve evidence. The court stated, “[A]t least as important, the rule gives the State an incentive to avoid the destruction of evidence. It is surely desirable to raise the consciousness of State employees on this subject.” The Court analogized the adverse inference charge to a “missing witness” instruction. The Court found that the video, though directly relevant to the assault on Saeva (count one), was also relevant to the subsequent assault on Schliff (count two) because it would shed light on whether Handy was a violent aggressor. Therefore, the court concluded that Handy was entitled to the adverse inference charge for all counts. The dissent is not noted because there was none.