New York Law Review

Tag: Adoption law

  • Matter of Snowden, 39 N.Y.2d 322 (1976): Adoptees’ Inheritance Rights Under Trust Agreements

    Matter of Snowden, 39 N.Y.2d 322 (1976)

    When a trust agreement grants beneficiaries a broad power of appointment, indicating a lack of strict adherence to bloodlines, adopted children may be included in the term “issue” for inheritance purposes, even under former Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether adopted children can inherit from a trust established in 1922, based on the interpretation of “issue” in the trust agreement and the application of former Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law. The court held that because the trust agreement gave beneficiaries a broad power to appoint the trust corpus to anyone they chose, the settlor demonstrated a lack of strict adherence to bloodlines, implying an intent to include adopted children within the definition of “issue.” Thus, the adopted children were entitled to their deceased father’s share of the trust.

    Facts

    James and Marian Snowden created a separation and trust agreement in 1922, funding a trust for the benefit of Marian and their children. Upon Marian’s death, the trust corpus was to be divided per stirpes among the surviving children and the “issue” of any deceased child. Each child’s share was held in trust with distributions at ages 30, 35, and 40. If a child died before the trust terminated, their share would be paid to appointees by will, or lacking that, to their living “issue,” or lacking that, to their next of kin. James Snowden died in 1930, Marian in 1969. One daughter died in 1943 survived by natural children. The son died in 1964 survived by two adopted children. Another daughter, childless, survived her mother.

    Procedural History

    The case began as a proceeding to settle the trustee’s account after Marian Snowden’s death. The lower court ruled against the adopted children, denying them their father’s share of the trust. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a divided court. The dissenting justices in the Appellate Division disagreed, leading to this appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the terms of the 1922 trust agreement and considering former Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law, the term “issue” includes adopted children, thereby entitling them to inherit their deceased father’s share of the trust corpus.

    Holding

    Yes, because the settlor granted his children a broad power of appointment, demonstrating an intent not to limit inheritance strictly to blood relatives, which implies that adopted children should be included within the meaning of “issue.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “precautionary addendum” of former Section 114, which restricted adopted children’s inheritance rights to protect remaindermen, should be narrowly construed. The court cited Matter of Rockefeller (12 N.Y.2d 124) stating it did not apply if it “affirmatively” appeared from the context of the trust instrument or from extraneous facts “that the grantor intended to include adopted children”. The court emphasized that the key consideration is the settlor’s intent. Here, the settlor’s grant of a broad power of appointment to his children indicated he was not solely concerned with preserving the trust corpus for his bloodline. As the court stated, “Since the settlor had authorized his child to appoint those not of his blood, it is difficult to believe that he did not intend adopted, as well as natural, children to be included in the word, ‘issue,’ wherever used in the trust instrument.” The court distinguished cases like Matter of Carll, where the trust explicitly limited the remainder to the grantor’s bloodlines. The court also noted the 1963 amendment to the Domestic Relations Law, which favored including adopted children in generic terms like “issue,” unless the instrument specifically provided otherwise, reflecting a public policy of integrating adopted children into their new families for inheritance purposes.

  • Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972): Religious Matching in Adoption and the Establishment Clause

    Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972)

    Religious matching in adoption proceedings, giving preference to adoptive parents of the same religion as the child, does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as long as the child’s best interests remain the primary consideration.

    Summary

    Robert and Anne Dickens, a non-religious couple, were denied the opportunity to apply for adoption by the Erie County Department of Social Services solely because they lacked a religious affiliation. They challenged New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions favoring religious matching in adoption, arguing violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the religious matching provisions, when considered in the context of the child’s best interests, do not create an establishment of religion, infringe upon religious freedom, or deny equal protection under the law. The court emphasized that religion is one of many factors and the child’s welfare is paramount.

    Facts

    Robert and Anne Dickens, with no religious affiliation, attempted to file an adoption application with the Erie County Department of Social Services.

    The Department refused to accept their application based solely on their lack of religious affiliation, citing New York laws favoring religious matching in adoptions.

    The Dickens initiated legal proceedings, arguing that the religious matching requirements violated their constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners, Robert and Anne Dickens, filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment declaring the religious affiliation requirements unconstitutional and directing the Department to process their application.

    The lower courts found no constitutional violation but directed the Department to accept and process the application.

    The petitioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions requiring religious matching in adoption proceedings create an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment?

    2. Whether these provisions violate the petitioners’ right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment?

    3. Whether these provisions deny the petitioners equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?

    Holding

    1. No, because the religious matching provisions serve a secular legislative purpose and do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, nor do they foster excessive government entanglement with religion.

    2. No, because the religious matching provisions, when balanced with the child’s best interests, do not discriminate against or penalize the petitioners for lacking a religious affiliation.

    3. No, because the religious matching provisions reasonably allow surrendering parents to express a religious preference and do not create an arbitrary classification denying the petitioners equal protection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Establishment Clause test derived from Abington School District v. Schempp and Lemon v. Kurtzman, requiring a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and no excessive government entanglement with religion.

    The court reasoned that the religious matching provisions fulfill a secular legislative purpose by ensuring the child’s best interests while respecting the religious preferences of the natural parents. The provisions reflect a “benevolent neutrality” toward religion, as stated in Walz v. Tax Commission.

    The court highlighted that religion is not an exclusive or controlling factor in adoption proceedings; the “best interests of the child” standard provides flexibility and broad discretion to the court.

    The court noted that amendments to the Family Court Act and Social Services Law eliminated any mandatory requirement for religious matching, emphasizing the child’s welfare as the primary consideration.

    Regarding the Free Exercise Clause, the court found no coercion or penalty imposed on the petitioners for their lack of religious affiliation. The court suggested the Dickens could adopt children whose parents expressed indifference to religion or whose religious background was unknown.

    Addressing the Equal Protection argument, the court stated the issue was not with the religious matching provisions themselves, but with the scarcity of adoptive children whose parents lack religious preferences.

    The court quoted the statutes, underscoring that the religious wishes of parents must be given effect “so far as consistent with the best interests of the child.” The court emphasized that even within the religious matching framework, parents can express indifference to religion or make it a subordinate consideration.

  • People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185 (1971): Parental Rights vs. Agency Surrender in Adoption

    People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185 (1971)

    A natural parent’s right to the care and custody of their child is superior to that of all others unless that right has been abandoned or the parent is proven unfit, and a surrender to an authorized adoption agency does not automatically constitute abandonment.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a natural mother can regain custody of her child after surrendering the child to an authorized adoption agency. Olga Scarpetta, an unmarried woman, surrendered her child to Spence-Chapin shortly after birth but sought to regain custody days later. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mother could regain custody because the surrender was improvident, and the child’s best interests would be served by returning to her, emphasizing the primacy of parental rights unless unfitness is proven. The court also held that prospective adoptive parents do not have an automatic right to intervene in such proceedings.

    Facts

    Olga Scarpetta, a 32-year-old unmarried woman from Colombia, came to New York to give birth to her child. Four days after the child’s birth on May 18, 1970, she placed the infant with Spence-Chapin Adoption Service. Ten days later, she executed a surrender document. Five days after the baby was placed with a family for adoption, Scarpetta requested the child’s return, influenced by her family’s support for her raising the child herself.

    Procedural History

    Scarpetta commenced a habeas corpus proceeding after unsuccessful attempts to regain her child. Special Term ruled that the child should be returned to the mother. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a mother who has surrendered her child to an authorized adoption agency may regain custody of the child.
    2. Whether the prospective adoptive parents were entitled to intervene in this proceeding as a matter of law.
    3. Whether the failure to allow the prospective adoptive parents to intervene deprived them of due process.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the surrender was improvident and the child’s best interests would be promoted by returning to the natural mother.
    2. No, because the public policy of New York is against disclosing the identities of natural and prospective adoptive parents to each other.
    3. No, because the prospective adoptive parents did not have legal custody of the child and thus were not deprived of a protected interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law sanctions surrenders to authorized adoption agencies (Social Services Law § 384), it does not render them irrevocable. Judicial supervision is inherent to surrenders, recognizing they are unilateral and often executed under circumstances casting doubt on voluntariness. However, courts should not undo surrenders except for the weightiest reasons. Citing People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption Committee, 194 Misc. 332, 336, the court emphasized the legislature’s careful circumscription of parental rights in adoption. The court should exercise its power to direct a change of custody only when the child’s interest will be promoted and the parent is fit, competent, and able to care for the child (Social Services Law, § 383, subd. 1). The court reaffirmed the principle that a parent has a superior right to custody unless they have abandoned that right or are proven unfit, quoting People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468. The court found the mother was motivated by concern for the child, had stabilized her relationships, and was financially secure. Regarding intervention by prospective adoptive parents, the court held that allowing intervention would violate the state’s public policy against disclosure of identities, as reflected in Social Services Law §§ 383 and 384. Finally, the court determined that the prospective adoptive parents lacked legal custody and therefore were not deprived of due process by being denied intervention.

  • Matter of Silberman, 23 N.Y.2d 98 (1968): Adoptee Inclusion in Will Interpretation

    Matter of Silberman, 23 N.Y.2d 98 (1968)

    In the absence of an explicit expression in a will to exclude adopted children, a presumption arises that the testator intended to include them as beneficiaries, even when the will uses terms like “grandchildren” or establishes a class closing mechanism.

    Summary

    This case concerns the construction of a will to determine whether adopted children should be included as beneficiaries under two trust provisions. The testatrix, Dorothy Silberman, created trusts benefiting her sons and their children. Her son, Samuel, adopted two sets of children from his wives’ prior marriages. The Surrogate’s Court held that the adopted children were excluded from both trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that absent a clear exclusionary intent in the will, adopted children should be included, according to established New York policy. The Court found no such explicit intent, particularly given the broad “parent-child relationship” language used in the will.

    Facts

    Dorothy Silberman executed her will in 1950 and died in 1951, survived by two sons and three natural grandchildren. Her will established two trusts: Article Twenty-Sixth, a trust for her son Samuel, with the principal to be divided among his children upon his death, and Article Twenty-Seventh, a trust benefiting her sons’ “lawful children” until the youngest reached 21, at which point the class would close. Samuel had two children, Douglas and Rita Frates, from his first wife’s prior marriage, whom he adopted in 1956. After divorcing his first wife, Samuel remarried and adopted his second wife’s two children, Allen and Jane Herskovitz, in 1965.

    Procedural History

    The trustees of Dorothy Silberman’s will initially construed the will to benefit only natural grandchildren. Following the precedent set in Matter of Park, a supplemental petition was filed to determine the rights of the adopted children. The Surrogate’s Court, New York County, held that the adopted children were excluded from the trusts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the adopted children of Samuel J. Silberman are entitled to share in the principal and income of the trusts created under Articles Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh of Dorothy Silberman’s will, considering the will’s language and New York’s public policy regarding adopted children.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because, absent an explicit purpose stated in the will to exclude adopted children, they are presumed to be included as beneficiaries, as per the established New York policy.

    2. No, the Herskovits children could not benefit under Article Twenty-Seventh because they were adopted after the class of beneficiaries had closed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decision in Matter of Park, which established a strong presumption in favor of including adopted children in testamentary gifts unless the will contains an explicit expression to the contrary. The Court rejected the Surrogate’s reasoning that the use of the term “grandchildren” in Article Twenty-Seventh, combined with the provision for closing the class of beneficiaries when the youngest grandchild reached 21, demonstrated an intent to exclude adopted children.

    The court reasoned that the term “lawful children” also appeared and would encompass adopted children. Furthermore, the Court noted that the presumption in Park applied regardless of whether the will used the word “heir,” “child,” “issue,” or any other generic term expressing the parent-child relationship. The court directly quoted Park, emphasizing that “[i]n the absence of an explicit purpose stated in the will or a trust instrument to exclude such a child, he must be deemed included.”

    The Court dismissed the argument that the class-closing provision evidenced an intent to exclude adopted children, stating that “the possibility of an inequity, especially one so remote…should not cause such provision to be read as an expression of an explicit purpose to exclude adopted children from such class.”

    The court also held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because there was no ambiguity within the four corners of the will. The court distinguished Matter of Ricks, where extrinsic evidence was admitted to explain an ambiguity created by alterations on the face of the will itself.

    Finally, the Court held that the Herskovits children, who were adopted after the class closed under Article Twenty-Seventh, were not entitled to benefit under that article. The Court reasoned that the legal effect of adoption is to make the adopted child a natural child from the time of adoption, but not retroactively. The court stated, “The mere happenstance that a child who is adopted after January 8, 1964 may have been born before that date cannot bring such child within the class of beneficiaries of the trust under article Twenty-Seventh.”

  • Matter of Neilson, 19 N.Y.2d 77 (1967): Adopted Children Inherit Equally with Natural Children Absent Explicit Exclusion

    Matter of Neilson, 19 N.Y.2d 77 (1967)

    In the absence of explicit language in a will or trust instrument to the contrary, an adopted child has the same inheritance rights as a natural child, and should be treated equally as “issue” of the parent, based on New York’s public policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns the inheritance rights of an adopted child versus a natural child under a trust established by a will. The testator’s will created trusts for his children, with the principal to be distributed to their surviving issue. One of the testator’s children, Mary Park Neilson, had a son who predeceased her, leaving a natural daughter and an adopted son. The Surrogate ruled that only the natural daughter could inherit. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the adopted child should be treated equally with the natural child as “issue” under the will, unless the will explicitly excludes adopted children. The court emphasized the strong public policy of New York to treat adopted and natural children alike.

    Facts

    The testator died in 1909, creating trusts for his surviving children, with the principal to be distributed to their surviving issue upon their death.

    Mary Park Neilson, one of the testator’s children and a trust beneficiary, died in 1961.

    Raymond P.R. Neilson, Jr., Mary’s son, predeceased her; he had a natural daughter, Anne Neilson Conrad, and an adopted son, Raymond P.R. Neilson, III.

    The dispute arose over the distribution of the trust principal that would have gone to Raymond P.R. Neilson, Jr., had he survived Mary.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court ruled that the natural child, Anne Neilson Conrad, was entitled to the entire share of the trust principal, excluding the adopted child, Raymond P.R. Neilson, III.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the terms of a will directing distribution to “issue,” an adopted child has the same rights as a natural child to inherit, absent explicit language in the will excluding adopted children?

    Holding

    Yes, because in the absence of an explicit purpose stated in the will or a trust instrument to exclude an adopted child, he must be deemed included whether the word “heir,” “child,” “issue,” or other generic term expressing the parent-child relationship is used.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized New York’s long-standing public policy of treating adopted and natural children equally, as codified in the Domestic Relations Law. The court stated that the statute mandates that a foster child “shall have all the rights” of the relation of “parent and child.” This means that both the natural child and the adopted child must be treated as “his issue” within the terms of the will.

    The court addressed a precautionary addendum to the statute, which stated that an adopted child should not be considered the child of the foster parent “so as to defeat the rights” of remaindermen if the foster parent died without heirs. However, the court clarified that this addendum was intended to prevent adoption from being used to cut off remainders, not to discriminate between natural and adopted children when both exist.

    The court distinguished New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. 11, noting that it predated the 1887 statute that directed legal equality between children. It cited Matter of Horn, 256 N.Y. 294, stating the “only instance” in which an adopted child is not deemed the child of the parent is where future estates “may be cut off” by “such adoption.”

    The court referenced the Second Report of the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, which led to more explicit language in the statute applicable to future instruments.

    Quoting from Matter of Upjohn, 304 N.Y. 366, the court noted that the knowledge by the testator of the adoption justifies the conclusion that he intended to treat such a child as issue of the beneficiary, against the backdrop of the general state policy to treat adopted and natural children alike. The court concluded that absent an explicit purpose stated in the will or trust instrument to exclude an adopted child, they should be deemed included as “issue.”