New York Law Review

Tag: admissions

  • People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987): Corroboration of Admissions in DWI Cases

    People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987)

    In New York, a conviction cannot be based solely on a defendant’s admission without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed, though the corroborating evidence need not prove the entire case independently.

    Summary

    Batterson was convicted of driving while impaired. His conviction stemmed from an incident where his father’s car was found in a ditch. Batterson admitted to driving and swerving to avoid a deer. The officer noted signs of intoxication. The County Court reversed, finding insufficient corroboration of Batterson’s admission. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence, namely the car in the ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s behavior, to support an inference that a crime had been committed.

    Facts

    At approximately 3:00 a.m., a vehicle owned by Batterson’s father was found in a ditch, facing the wrong direction. Batterson and two companions were standing beside the vehicle. Batterson stated he was driving, swerved to avoid a deer, and ended up in the ditch. The officer smelled alcohol on Batterson’s breath and observed signs of intoxication. A breathalyzer test revealed a blood alcohol level of .08%.

    Procedural History

    Batterson was convicted in the Walworth Town Court. The Wayne County Court reversed the judgment, dismissing the information due to insufficient corroboration. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the Town Court’s judgment and remitting the case to Wayne County Court for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired, as required by CPL 60.50.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired. This evidence included the location of the vehicle in a ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s demeanor at the scene.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 60.50 requires “some proof, of whatever weight,” that the offense charged has been committed. The purpose of the statute is to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. The court emphasized that the corroborating evidence need not be substantial on its own, noting that “sufficient corroboration exists when the confession is ‘supported’ by independent evidence of the corpus delicti.” The court cited the presence of Batterson at the scene and the circumstances of the accident as supporting an inference of guilt. The court noted the vehicle was in a ditch, facing the wrong way, the pavement was dry, and Batterson exhibited signs of intoxication. The Court stated that, “Defendant’s admission was the ‘key’ that explained those circumstances and established defendant’s connection to the criminal act”.

  • Spett v. Levine, 16 N.Y.2d 16 (1965): Admissibility of Agent’s Statements as Evidence Against Principal

    Spett v. Levine, 16 N.Y.2d 16 (1965)

    Circumstantial evidence can establish a prima facie case of negligence, and an agent’s statements made within the scope of their authority are admissible as evidence against the principal, especially when the agent has broad managerial responsibilities.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Spett, tripped over a skid in a hallway outside his office and sued Rose Levine, doing business as Harvey Printing Co., alleging negligence. The trial court set aside a jury verdict for Spett, finding insufficient evidence linking Harvey to the skid’s placement. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that circumstantial evidence supported Harvey’s responsibility. The Court also held that an alleged admission by Albert Levine, Harvey’s “general foreman” and Rose’s husband, regarding the skid was improperly excluded and should be admitted in a new trial, as his managerial role made his statements admissible against the principal, Rose Levine.

    Facts

    Spett tripped over a skid (a wooden platform) in the hallway outside his office, sustaining injuries. The skid was located between Spett’s office door and Harvey Printing Co.’s door, approximately 6 to 8 feet apart. Testimony indicated the skid contained cardboard used by Harvey but not by other tenants on the floor. Deliveries were typically left on a loading platform downstairs, and tenants were responsible for moving them to their premises. Albert Levine, Rose Levine’s husband and Harvey’s “general foreman,” allegedly made an admission of responsibility for placing the skid after the accident.

    Procedural History

    Spett sued Rose Levine (Harvey Printing Co.) in Supreme Court. The jury initially found in favor of Spett. The trial court set aside the jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Levine. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for review on the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Harvey Printing Co. was responsible for placing the skid in the hallway.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony concerning an alleged admission of responsibility made by Albert Levine, the “general foreman” of Harvey Printing Co., shortly after the plaintiff’s accident.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the skid’s location, the type of cardboard on it, and the usual delivery procedures, was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer Harvey’s responsibility.

    2. Yes, because Albert Levine’s broad managerial role and apparent authority to act on behalf of Harvey Printing Co. made his alleged admission of responsibility admissible against his wife, Rose Levine, the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it reasonably infers causation or negligence, even if it doesn’t eliminate remote possibilities. The court cited prior cases such as Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., stating, “It is enough that he [plaintiff] shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred.” Here, the skid’s location, its contents, and the usual delivery practices created a reasonable inference that Harvey was responsible for its placement. The court also determined that Albert Levine’s alleged admission of responsibility was improperly excluded. The court stated that “Where an agent’s responsibilities include making statements on his principal’s behalf, the agent’s statements within the scope of his authority are receivable against the principal.” The court emphasized Levine’s broad managerial responsibilities, stating that he “ran” Harvey and was its “representative to the trade, others in the building, and the landlord.” Because Levine appeared to be more than just a general foreman, but rather the key decision-maker for the company, his statements about the skid’s placement should have been heard as evidence.