New York Law Review

Tag: Administrative Code Violation

  • Cusumano v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010): Predicate for Firefighter’s Rule Liability

    15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010)

    To recover under General Municipal Law § 205-a, a firefighter must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties.

    Summary

    A firefighter, Nocenzo Cusumano, was injured in a fall on stairs in a City-owned building during a training session. He sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a, alleging violations of the NYC Administrative Code relating to safe building maintenance and handrail requirements. The jury found the City liable. The Appellate Division reversed in part, finding one code section inapplicable. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the improper jury instruction on an inapplicable code provision tainted the entire verdict, even though there was a finding of a violation of a separate code section.

    Facts

    Nocenzo Cusumano, a New York City firefighter, fell down a flight of stairs while attending a training session in a building owned by the City. He claimed he slipped on debris and was unable to grasp the handrail, which he alleged was improperly constructed. He based his claim on several sections of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, including sections concerning safe building maintenance generally and a specific section on interior stair handrail dimensions.

    Procedural History

    Cusumano sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a in Supreme Court. The jury found the City liable. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the section of the Administrative Code concerning handrail dimensions did not apply to the stairs in question. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the damages award but agreed that the handrail section was inapplicable. However, the Appellate Division majority found sufficient evidence to support liability based on other code sections. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s error in submitting an inapplicable section of the Administrative Code to the jury requires a new trial, even where the jury also found a violation of other, more general, code sections.

    Holding

    Yes, because the erroneous jury instruction, coupled with expert testimony linking the general code sections to the specific, inapplicable section, made it impossible to determine the basis of the jury’s verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Administrative Code section concerning handrail dimensions for “interior stairs” did not apply to the stairs where the firefighter fell, as those stairs did not serve as a required exit. The court reasoned that because expert testimony had linked the violation of the general maintenance code sections to the violation of the specific handrail dimension code, it could not be assumed that the jury viewed the handrail testimony in a vacuum. The court noted testimony that the City violated the general code sections because it violated the specific handrail section. The Court stated that Supreme Court’s erroneous submission of section 27-375 (f) to the jury, coupled with the expert testimony, renders it impossible to discern the basis of the jury’s verdict. The Court declined to address whether the general maintenance sections could form an independent basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a, as the City had only objected to the applicability of those sections to the extent they were interwoven with the inapplicable handrail section. Chief Judge Lippman, in concurrence, argued the court should have addressed whether section 27-127 was a sufficient independent predicate, arguing that Appellate Division case law and legislative intent favored a broader interpretation of section 205-a to protect firefighters. He stated, “a plaintiff need only establish a `practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury”.

  • Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000): Violation of City Administrative Code as Evidence of Negligence

    Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000)

    Violation of a New York City Administrative Code provision constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision originates from state law.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the City of New York for negligence after falling from bleachers at a public school athletic field, alleging a violation of the New York City Building Code regarding protective guards on bleachers. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on liability, finding negligence per se. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a violation of the City’s Administrative Code is only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the code provision originates from state law. This distinction is rooted in the principle that only state statutes can alter the common law of negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff fell from bleachers at a public school athletic field owned by the City of New York after a softball game. The bleachers lacked handrails, and the plaintiff alleged the city violated section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code, which mandates protective guards on bleachers. The plaintiff claimed the absence of these guards caused his fall and subsequent injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence based on a violation of the City’s Building Code. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, finding negligence per se. The jury found the defendants 100% liable. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding future lost earnings but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the defendants leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a violation of section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code constitutes negligence per se or merely some evidence of negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because a violation of a municipal ordinance or administrative rule constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision has its origin in State Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state statutes and local ordinances or administrative rules for establishing negligence. Violations of state statutes imposing specific duties constitute negligence per se, while violations of municipal ordinances are merely evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that elevating a violation of a city ordinance to negligence per se would substantially alter the state’s common law, a change more appropriately left to the Legislature. The Administrative Code itself states that its recodification should not be construed as validating any provision to state law. The court emphasized the City’s retained authority to amend or repeal its Administrative Code provisions without state legislative action, reinforcing its status as a local enactment. Quoting from Major v. Waverly & Ogden, Inc., the court stated that ” ‘has the force and effect of law does not make it so, if by that is meant that it is the equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment. The Constitution of the State commits to the Legislature alone the power to enact a statute’…It is only to such an enactment that liability without regard to negligence may attach”. The court acknowledged that some Administrative Code sections originate in state law and might warrant statutory treatment but declined to extend statutory status to all City ordinances, as it would create uncertainty in the application of the common law. This holding aligns with Smulczeski v. City Ctr. of Music & Drama, where a violation of a lighting ordinance was deemed evidence of negligence.