New York Law Review

Tag: Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal

  • In the Matter of Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d 593 (1996): Due Process Requirements for Vacating an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal

    88 N.Y.2d 593 (1996)

    Procedural due process is satisfied when a Family Court determines, after an inquiry and opportunity for the juvenile to respond, that there is a legitimate basis for concluding that a juvenile violated a condition of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and states the reasons on the record.

    Summary

    This case addresses the due process requirements for vacating an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that a full evidentiary hearing with confrontation of witnesses is not always required. Instead, due process is satisfied if the Family Court conducts an inquiry, allows the juvenile to respond, and determines there is a legitimate basis for concluding a violation occurred. This determination balances the juvenile’s liberty interest against the State’s interest in swift resolution of juvenile cases. The dissent argued for stricter procedural safeguards, akin to parole revocation hearings.

    Facts

    A 13-year-old, Edwin L., was charged with acts that would constitute crimes if committed by an adult. Based on Edwin’s admissions, the Family Court issued fact-finding orders. At the dispositional hearing, with the presentment agency’s agreement, Edwin sought an ACD, which the court granted. The ACD order required Edwin to attend school, reside at a residential facility unless adopted, and avoid further contact with the court. A violation petition was later filed, alleging Edwin had failed to comply with the residence and “no further contact with court” conditions. This petition stated he had been AWOL from the facility and arrested.

    Procedural History

    The presentment agency filed a violation petition alleging violations of the ACD. The Family Court held a hearing where a caseworker testified about Edwin’s AWOL status, arrests, and fights with other residents, largely based on hearsay. Edwin’s motion to strike the testimony as hearsay was denied, and the court vacated the ACD order. Edwin waived his right to a dispositional hearing and was placed with the Division for Youth. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Edwin appealed to the Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether procedural due process requires Family Court to conduct a hearing, at which hearsay evidence may be considered only after a finding of good cause, before finding that a juvenile has violated the conditions of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD)?

    Holding

    No, because neither the Family Court Act nor the requirements of procedural due process impose such restrictions upon the discretion of the Family Court to vacate an ACD order, provided the court conducts an inquiry, allows the juvenile to respond, and finds a legitimate basis for concluding a violation occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing the private interest at stake (the juvenile’s liberty), the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the state’s interest. The Court distinguished an ACD from dispositional orders like probation, noting that an ACD is granted before a delinquency adjudication and offers a chance to clear the record. The Court reasoned that vacating an ACD merely brings the juvenile back to the pre-disposition stage, entitling them to a dispositional hearing. It analogized the situation to People v. Outley, where a legitimate basis for an arrest justified modifying a plea agreement. The Court held that due process requires an inquiry where the juvenile can respond, and the court states its reasons for finding a violation. While the form of the inquiry varies, a more detailed inquiry is needed if the juvenile denies the violation. The Court emphasized the State’s interest in swiftly addressing juvenile delinquency. The dissent argued that a post-fact-finding ACD release is functionally equivalent to parole or probation, requiring the procedural protections outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses unless good cause is shown to dispense with confrontation.

  • Matter of Marie B., 62 N.Y.2d 352 (1984): Statute Cannot Conclusively Presume Parental Neglect Based on Violation of an ACD Order

    Matter of Marie B., 62 N.Y.2d 352 (1984)

    A state statute that conclusively presumes parental neglect based solely on a parent’s failure to adhere to the terms of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) order, without requiring a factual determination of actual neglect or abuse, violates fundamental due process rights.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a New York statute that allowed a finding of parental neglect to be automatically deemed to exist if a parent violated the terms of a previously ordered adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) in a child neglect proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional because it permitted the removal of a child from parental custody without a factual determination that the child was actually neglected or abused, thereby infringing on fundamental parental rights to due process.

    Facts

    The Oneida County Department of Social Services filed a neglect petition against Marie B.’s mother, alleging chronic intoxication and failure to provide for the child’s necessities. The court granted temporary custody of the child to the agency. Subsequently, an ACD was ordered, allowing the child to reside with the mother under specific conditions, including abstaining from alcohol, accepting treatment, and cooperating with a social worker. The mother was warned that violating these conditions would result in an automatic admission of neglect. Two months later, the mother was found intoxicated, and the child was placed in foster care. The agency then petitioned for revocation of the ACD and removal of the child, based on violations of the ACD terms, citing the statute that such violations are “deemed” neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the agency’s petition, finding the statute unconstitutional as it allowed interference with parental rights based on a constructive finding of neglect. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the statute gave the same force to an ACD violation as a factual finding of abuse or neglect. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a state statute (specifically, the last sentence of subdivision (e) of section 1039 of the Family Court Act) is constitutional when it mandates that parental neglect “shall be deemed to exist” solely upon a finding that a parent violated the terms of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) order, thus allowing removal of the child without an actual finding of neglect or abuse.

    Holding

    No, because fundamental constitutional principles of due process and protected privacy prohibit governmental interference with the liberty of a parent to supervise and rear a child except upon a showing of overriding necessity and a factual determination of neglect or abuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute violated fundamental due process rights. It emphasized that the state cannot deprive a natural parent of the care and custody of a child without demonstrating abandonment, surrender, persisting neglect, unfitness, or similar behavior indicating utter indifference to the child’s well-being. The court found the statute deficient because it authorized the removal of a child based solely on the violation of the ACD terms, without requiring a determination of whether the failure actually constituted neglect or abuse. The court noted that under the statute, circumstances of neglect are simply “deemed to exist” without presenting evidence. The Court stated, “Such a constructive finding is a constitutionally inadequate justification for the drastic interference with parental rights permitted under the statute.” The court also clarified that the parent’s consent to the ACD did not validate the statute’s unconstitutionality, as an ACD is not a determination on the merits but merely an adjournment of the proceedings. The case emphasizes the crucial distinction between violating an ACD order and a formal adjudication of parental neglect, requiring a formal hearing and clear demonstration of actual neglect or abuse. The court also observed that this ruling did not preclude the agency from bringing another petition alleging actual facts of parental neglect. “Upon the parent’s violation of the conditions of the ACD order within the established time period, the child protective proceedings formerly adjourned may again be commenced. But the violation per se may not summarily be transformed into an adjudication of parental neglect. Rather, there must first be a finding of actual neglect, whether before or after the violation.”

  • Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 420 (1983): Effect of Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal on Subsequent Civil Suits

    Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 420 (1983)

    An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) in a criminal case does not bar a subsequent civil suit for false imprisonment but does bar a suit for malicious prosecution.

    Summary

    This case concerns the impact of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) on subsequent civil actions for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Joanne Hollender, arrested for criminal trespass at the insistence of a security guard, accepted an ACD. She then sued the cooperative and the guard, alleging false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that while an ACD doesn’t preclude a false imprisonment claim (where the defendant bears the burden of proving privilege), it does bar a malicious prosecution claim because an ACD is not a termination indicative of innocence, which is required to sustain a claim of malicious prosecution.

    Facts

    Joanne Hollender, a 17-year-old resident of Trump Village, was arrested for criminal trespass after being ordered to disperse from an outdoor area between buildings in the complex. Despite the arresting officer’s reservations about the basis for the arrest, Hollender was searched, booked, and detained. Ultimately, she accepted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) to resolve the criminal charges.

    Procedural History

    Hollender sued Trump Village Co-op and the security guard for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The jury awarded her compensatory and punitive damages on both claims. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the ACD precluded both suits. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the verdict on the false imprisonment claim but upholding the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) bars a subsequent civil action for false imprisonment.

    2. Whether an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) bars a subsequent civil action for malicious prosecution.

    Holding

    1. No, because in an action for false imprisonment, the burden of establishing that the detention was privileged is on the defendant, and the ACD is not legally decisive on this issue.

    2. Yes, because a malicious prosecution action requires the underlying criminal proceeding to have terminated in a manner indicative of the accused’s innocence, and an ACD is neither an adjudication of guilt nor innocence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an ACD, authorized by CPL 170.55, is a “non-merits adjudicatory basis” for resolving minor charges, keeping them in suspense for six months. It is neither a conviction nor an admission of guilt and is treated as though the charge never existed. Because an ACD is not a determination of guilt or innocence, it affects civil actions differently. In false imprisonment cases, the defendant has the burden to prove the detention was privileged. The ACD does not establish this privilege. Conversely, in malicious prosecution cases, the plaintiff must prove the criminal proceeding terminated in their favor, indicating innocence. The court stated, “[I]t is ‘only when [the] * * * final disposition is such as to indicate * * * innocence’ that this burden is met”. Because an ACD is neutral regarding guilt or innocence, it cannot satisfy this requirement, thus barring a malicious prosecution claim. The court distinguished between the two torts, emphasizing the differing burdens of proof and the requirement of favorable termination in malicious prosecution. The court highlighted that CPL 170.55(6) states that a dismissal after an ACOD is not to connote either a conviction or an admission of guilt. The court quoted that after dismissal, “the arrest and the prosecution are rendered a ‘nullity’.”