New York Law Review

Tag: Adjournment

  • People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Choice of Counsel

    People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014)

    A trial court is not obligated to inquire whether a defendant seeks new counsel when newly retained counsel requests an adjournment for more preparation time, unless the defendant communicates a desire to obtain new counsel.

    Summary

    Espinal was convicted of rape and related charges. He argued the trial court violated his right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment requests made by his newly retained attorney, Bruno, who stepped in for Espinal’s original attorney, Martineau, due to Martineau’s illness. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had no obligation to inquire if Espinal wanted to retain new counsel because Espinal only requested more time for Bruno to prepare, not to seek a different attorney. The Court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and can be limited by the need for efficient administration of justice.

    Facts

    Espinal was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child.
    He initially retained attorney Martineau, who suffered a debilitating medical condition.
    Martineau requested and received an adjournment of Espinal’s trial due to his health.
    After another adjournment request, Martineau suggested that Espinal might need to find substitute counsel. Attorney Bruno was identified as a potential replacement.
    Bruno took over the case shortly before trial as Martineau’s health worsened.

    Procedural History

    County Court initially granted adjournments due to Martineau’s health.
    After Bruno took over, the County Court denied further adjournment requests.
    Espinal was convicted on all charges in County Court.
    Espinal moved to set aside the verdict, arguing a violation of his right to counsel of choice; the motion was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s judgment.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment motions without inquiring whether the defendant sought to retain new counsel.

    Holding

    No, because no communication was made to the County Court that the defendant was asking for the opportunity to retain new counsel. The defendant simply sought an adjournment to give Bruno more time to prepare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental right to counsel of one’s choosing under both the Federal and State Constitutions, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144 (2006) and People v. Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 (1980). However, the Court emphasized that this right is qualified and can be subordinate to the efficient administration of justice, referencing People v. Griffin, 20 NY3d 626, 630 (2013).

    The Court reasoned that a defendant cannot use the right to counsel of choice as a delaying tactic, quoting Arroyave: “the efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical concern to society as a whole, and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of permitting a defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt court dockets, interfere with the right of other criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing counsel” (Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271).

    The Court highlighted that Espinal never explicitly requested new counsel. Bruno’s requests for adjournment were framed as needing more time for preparation, not as a desire to find a different attorney. The Court noted that while it is “the better practice” for a court to inquire about a defendant’s intentions when new counsel requests an adjournment, there was no constitutional violation in this case because there was no indication that Espinal wanted to replace Bruno.

  • In the Matter of Steven B., 6 N.Y.3d 888 (2006): Discretionary Adjournments Based on Due Diligence

    In the Matter of Steven B., 6 N.Y.3d 888 (2006)

    A trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying adjournments, and a denial is not an abuse of discretion where the need for an adjournment arises from a lack of due diligence in preparing for a hearing.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of a trial court’s discretion in granting or denying a request for an adjournment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s request for an adjournment. The need for the adjournment stemmed from the mother’s failure to diligently prepare for the hearing. Furthermore, the witnesses she intended to call were either unidentified or would provide cumulative testimony. This decision reinforces the principle that parties must diligently prepare their cases and that courts are not obligated to grant adjournments to remedy a party’s lack of preparation. The court emphasized that adjournments are a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion.

    Facts

    The Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) was involved in a case concerning Steven B. The mother, Makeba S., sought an adjournment during a hearing to call additional witnesses. The Family Court denied the adjournment request. The mother appealed, arguing that the denial was an abuse of discretion.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied the mother’s request for an adjournment. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court abused its discretion by denying the mother’s request for an adjournment to call additional witnesses.

    Holding

    No, because the mother’s need for an adjournment was a result of her lack of due diligence in preparing for the hearing, and the witnesses she wished to call were either unidentified or would provide cumulative testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that granting or denying an adjournment is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion, citing Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283 (1984). The Court found no abuse of discretion in this case. The court emphasized that the mother’s need for the adjournment was directly linked to her failure to diligently prepare for the hearing. This lack of preparation was not a sufficient basis to compel the court to grant an adjournment. Furthermore, the court noted that the mother had not identified the specific witnesses she wished to call or demonstrated that their testimony would be anything other than cumulative. The court implicitly weighed the potential prejudice to the other parties and the efficient administration of justice against the mother’s request. The decision underscores the importance of attorneys adequately preparing their cases. The court stated: “the grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court.”

  • People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999): Effect of Stayed Bench Warrant on Bail Jumping Charges

    People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999)

    A court’s decision to stay the issuance of a bench warrant for a defendant’s failure to appear on a scheduled court date effectively nullifies that date as a “required date” for the purpose of a bail jumping charge, provided the defendant appears (voluntarily or involuntarily) within 30 days of a subsequent unexcused failure to appear.

    Summary

    David Coppez, charged with felony assault, failed to appear in court on May 31, 1996. The court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution, adjourning the matter to June 11, 1996. Coppez again failed to appear, and a warrant was issued. He was returned on July 5, 1996. He was then charged with bail jumping. The court dismissed the indictment, reasoning the “required date” was June 11, and Coppez was returned within 30 days. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stay of the initial warrant nullified May 31 as the “required date” for bail jumping purposes, as the court has the discretion to amend its requirements. The 30-day grace period started on June 11, and Coppez appeared within that time.

    Facts

    David Coppez was released on bail on October 6, 1995, on a felony assault charge, conditioned on his appearance in court on scheduled dates.

    Coppez failed to appear on May 31, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution and adjourned the matter to June 11, 1996, for Coppez’s appearance.

    Coppez failed to appear on June 11, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

    Coppez was returned to court on the warrant on July 5, 1996.

    Procedural History

    Coppez was indicted for bail jumping in the second degree.

    He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to establish failure to appear on a “required date.”

    The trial court initially denied the motion but, on reargument, dismissed the indictment, concluding the “required date” was June 11, not May 31.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a scheduled court date for a defendant’s appearance ceases to be a “required date” under the bail-jumping statutes when the court stays the issuance of a warrant for nonappearance and adjourns the matter to a future date.

    Holding

    No, because the court retains discretion in scheduling, and can excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and set a new date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “required date” in Penal Law § 215.56 implicitly recognizes the calendar court’s discretion in scheduling criminal litigation. The court stated, “Implicit in defining criminal liability under the bail-jumping statutes by utilizing the term “required date” is a legislative recognition of the calendar court’s discretion in the over-all scheduling of a criminal litigation.”

    The Court emphasized the court’s inherent authority to amend its requirements, quoting Judge Cardozo: “To this end, the power to adjourn is a necessary incident to the power to determine.” They highlighted numerous precedents acknowledging a calendar court’s discretionary authority to adjourn matters.

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Eiffel, emphasizing that while a defendant can purge a nonappearance by appearing within 30 days, a court can also excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and fix a new date. The Court stated that Coppez’s nonappearance on May 31, 1996, was excused by judicial stay before the passage of the date, it was not a failure to appear on a “required date.” The 30-day grace period started after his failure to appear on June 11, 1996.

    The Court clarified that an unexcused failure to appear is a minimum requirement for a bail-jumping prosecution. Here, Coppez’s appearance on July 5, 1996, was within 30 days of his unexcused failure to appear on June 11, negating the “required date” element of the bail-jumping offense.

  • Hynes v. George, 76 N.Y.2d 502 (1990): Upholding Trial Court’s Authority to Proceed Despite Prosecutor’s Unreadiness

    Hynes v. George, 76 N.Y.2d 502 (1990)

    A trial court has the power to deny a prosecutor’s request for an adjournment and to proceed with jury selection, even when the prosecutor claims they are not ready due to the unavailability of a witness, as long as the court does not enter an order of dismissal that would improperly terminate the criminal proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of a trial court’s authority when a prosecutor declares unreadiness on the day of trial. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court, after denying the People’s request for an adjournment due to the complaining witness’s failure to appear, could proceed with jury selection. The Court emphasized that this action did not constitute an unauthorized dismissal of the case, distinguishing it from situations where a court prematurely terminates proceedings. The decision underscores the trial court’s discretion in managing its calendar and preventing undue delays, provided the defendant’s speedy trial rights are not violated.

    Facts

    Daniel Ruso was indicted for robbery and harassment for allegedly stealing $5 from his grandmother, Maria Ruso. On the day of the trial, the prosecutor requested an adjournment because Maria Ruso failed to appear for a pre-trial meeting and could not be reached. The prosecutor knew the complainant was the defendant’s grandmother and reluctant to testify but did not subpoena her. The trial court denied the request, noting the People’s awareness of the complainant’s reluctance and their failure to secure her presence through a subpoena.

    Procedural History

    The case reached trial after multiple announcements of readiness by the prosecution and adjournments for various reasons. The trial court denied the People’s request for an adjournment and ordered jury selection to proceed. The People sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division, which was granted, staying the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court acted within its authority.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court, after denying the People’s request for an adjournment due to the unavailability of a complaining witness, has the power to proceed with jury selection.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court has the inherent power to control its calendar and prevent unnecessary delays, and ordering jury selection does not equate to an improper dismissal of the case, as long as the People are not prevented from presenting their case within statutory speedy trial limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. The court acknowledged the trial court’s undisputed power to deny the People’s adjournment request. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, where a trial court improperly terminated a criminal proceeding by issuing a trial order of dismissal before any evidence was presented. The Court clarified that the trial court’s order to proceed with jury selection did not constitute a dismissal, nor did it prevent the People from attempting to locate the witness during the jury selection process or from making a subsequent adjournment request. The Court also rejected the People’s argument that their time to prepare under CPL 30.30 had not yet lapsed, stating that People v. Anderson does not grant the People immunity from a post-readiness order requiring them to go to trial before the expiration of the CPL 30.30 readiness period. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to halt the trial proceedings through a collateral proceeding would effectively nullify the trial court’s power to deny adjournment requests, stating that “To hold that prohibition lies in this situation would nullify the trial court’s power to deny prosecutors’ requests for adjournments and enable prosecutors, displeased with the denial of their adjournment requests, to override the trial court’s ruling by simply commencing a collateral proceeding.”

  • People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (1984): Right to Counsel and Adjournment for Consultation

    People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (1984)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a defendant a brief adjournment to consult with counsel about whether to testify, especially when the codefendant’s unexpected resting of their case necessitates such consultation.

    Summary

    Spears was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. After the prosecution rested and the co-defendant rested unexpectedly, Spears’s attorney requested a brief adjournment to consult with his client about whether Spears should testify. The trial court denied the request and directed Spears to proceed immediately. Spears rested without presenting evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the brief adjournment, thereby violating Spears’s right to counsel.

    Facts

    Spears was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance and tried jointly with a co-defendant.

    After the prosecution presented its case and rested, the co-defendant testified and then rested unexpectedly when their final witness did not appear.

    Spears’s counsel requested an adjournment until the following morning to decide how to proceed, emphasizing the unexpected turn of events. The court denied the request.

    The court only allowed Spears’s counsel a few seconds to confer with his client before demanding that Spears proceed, leading Spears to rest without presenting evidence.

    Procedural History

    Spears was convicted of criminal possession in the fourth degree.

    Spears moved for a mistrial, arguing that he was compelled to decide whether to testify without proper consultation with counsel; the motion was denied.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a brief adjournment to consult with his attorney regarding his decision to testify, thereby violating the defendant’s right to counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the circumstances, the court’s conduct in denying even “a few minutes” delay was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that granting adjournments is generally within the trial court’s discretion. However, this discretion is more narrowly construed when fundamental rights are at stake.

    The court emphasized that Spears’s request for a brief delay implicated his fundamental right to effectively confer with counsel, guaranteed by the New York Constitution.

    “Here, counsel requested a brief delay, after the codefendant testified and rested unexpectedly, to consult with his client about taking the stand, implicating defendant’s fundamental right effectively to confer with his counsel (see NY Const, art I, § 6; People v Narayan, 54 NY2d 106,112). In these circumstances, the court’s conduct in denying even ‘a few minutes’ delay was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.”

    The court rejected the argument that Spears’s failure to renew the request to reopen his case after an overnight recess waived the issue, noting that Spears should not be faulted for electing not to risk further prejudice after the court’s repeated and sharp injunctions to proceed.

  • People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 56 N.Y.2d 95 (1982): Adjournment of Parole Revocation Hearings and Due Process

    People ex rel. Maiello v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 56 N.Y.2d 95 (1982)

    A parole revocation hearing adjournment is not required unless the parolee demonstrates that a pending criminal case implicates their constitutional rights or raises an issue that, if resolved in their favor in the criminal proceeding, would necessarily preclude a finding of parole violation.

    Summary

    Maiello, a parolee arrested on new criminal charges, sought an adjournment of his parole revocation hearing pending the outcome of the criminal case, arguing collateral estoppel. The New York Court of Appeals held that the hearing officer did not abuse discretion in denying the adjournment. The Court clarified that an adjournment is only required when the parolee shows that the criminal case involves issues (like affirmative defenses or suppression motions) that, if resolved in their favor, would preclude a parole violation finding. Maiello failed to raise such issues, relying solely on a general collateral estoppel argument. The court emphasized the parolee’s responsibility to alert the hearing officer to potential conflicts between the proceedings.

    Facts

    Maiello was paroled in July 1980 after serving part of a robbery sentence. In September 1980, he was arrested and charged with assault, resisting arrest, and marijuana possession. A parole violation warrant was issued based on these charges and for leaving New Jersey without permission. At the parole revocation hearing, Maiello’s counsel requested an adjournment pending the outcome of the criminal charges, arguing that an acquittal would collaterally estop the parole board from proceeding. The hearing officer denied the request, and ultimately found Maiello guilty of violating parole based on the assault and resisting arrest charges. Subsequently, the criminal charges were dismissed.

    Procedural History

    After the parole revocation, Maiello filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Maiello was not denied due process. Maiello then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of Maiello’s request to adjourn his final parole revocation hearing until the disposition of pending criminal charges was an abuse of discretion or a violation of his right to due process.

    Holding

    No, because Maiello failed to demonstrate that the pending criminal case implicated his constitutional rights or raised an issue that, if resolved in his favor, would preclude a finding of parole violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the decision to grant an adjournment is within the hearing officer’s discretion. The court clarified its prior holding in People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, stating that collateral estoppel only applies when a defendant successfully raises an affirmative defense in the criminal trial. In such a case, the defendant has already proven by a preponderance of the evidence an issue that would preclude a finding of parole violation. The Court reasoned that a general acquittal, where the defendant does not bear a burden of proof, only means the prosecution failed to meet the higher burden of proof required in a criminal trial. The court noted, “[i]f, however, the defendant raises an affirmative defense, the burden is on the defendant either at trial or at the hearing to establish that affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”

    The Court extended this principle to other situations where a defendant affirmatively raises an issue, such as a suppression motion. If a parolee seeks to suppress evidence that is the subject of a motion before a criminal court, an adjournment may be proper. “The underlying rationale is, of course, to insure that the parolee’s constitutional rights are protected… the revocation of parole has the effect of depriving a person of his liberty, albeit a restricted form of liberty, he has a substantial enough interest to justify some form of due process although not the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

    Here, Maiello only argued that a dismissal or acquittal would automatically estop the parole board. He did not raise any other constitutional claims or indicate that the criminal case would resolve any issue that would necessarily preclude a finding of parole violation. Thus, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in denying the adjournment. The court emphasized that the parolee has the obligation to alert the hearing officer to potential conflicts between the parole revocation hearing and the criminal proceeding.

  • People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 471 (1973): When Denial of Adjournment to Secure Alibi Witnesses Violates Defendant’s Rights

    People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 471 (1973)

    When a material alibi witness is identified and within the court’s jurisdiction, denying a short adjournment to secure their attendance, after a showing of diligence and good faith, is an abuse of discretion, especially when it effectively deprives the defendant of their defense and casts doubt on their credibility.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary. Prior to the trial, the defense notified the prosecution of their intent to call alibi witnesses. On the last day of the prosecution’s case, the defense requested an adjournment to secure the attendance of two alibi witnesses: a friend, Lopez, and a building superintendent, DeJesus. Lopez had appeared the previous day but could not stay away from work another day. The defense had been unable to serve DeJesus. The trial court denied the adjournment due to a prior commitment in another county. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the denial of the adjournment was an abuse of discretion because it deprived the defendant of the fundamental right to present witnesses in his defense.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of committing a burglary. The defense informed the prosecution of intent to use alibi witnesses. During opening statements, the defense told the jury the defendant would rely on an alibi defense, claiming he was at his apartment during the crime. On the last day of the prosecution’s case, the defense requested an adjournment to secure the attendance of Martin Lopez, a friend, and Mrs. Anna DeJesus, the building superintendent. Lopez had appeared the day before but could not afford to miss another day of work. The defense was unable to serve DeJesus despite living in the same building.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s request for an adjournment. The defendant testified in his own defense, stating he was at his apartment with two friends during the crime. The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment to secure the attendance of his alibi witnesses.

    Holding

    Yes, because the denial deprived the defendant of the fundamental right to present witnesses in his defense, and the witness was identified, within the jurisdiction, and the defense had shown some diligence and good faith in attempting to secure their presence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule that granting or denying an adjournment is within the trial court’s discretion, citing People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 117. However, the court emphasized a more liberal policy favoring short adjournments when a fundamental right is at stake. The court cited cases involving requests for transcripts of prior testimony, such as People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 604-605, where the court stated, “He had a fundamental right to the testimony of the witnesses who were to testify against him and, surely, one who is attempting to pay for such testimony should be given every reasonable opportunity to do so.”

    The court reasoned that the right to present witnesses is a fundamental right, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, which stated, “Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.” The court distinguished the case from situations where the witness is unknown or outside the jurisdiction. In those situations, the court is not required to grant an adjournment.

    The court found that Lopez’s testimony was material to the alibi defense. While the defendant’s efforts to secure Lopez’s presence were unsubstantiated, they were uncontested, and there was no suggestion of bad faith. The denial was based solely on the court’s prior commitment, not on the merits of the request. The court concluded that “when the witness is identified to the court, and is to be found within the jurisdiction, a request for a short adjournment after a showing of some diligence and good faith should not be denied merely because of possible inconvenience to the court or others.”

    The court emphasized that denying the adjournment effectively deprived the defendant of his defense and cast doubt on his credibility. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion, and the conviction was reversed.