People v. Hawkins, 68 N.Y.2d 157 (1986)

Penal Law § 70.30(3) provides jail time credit only for time spent in actual custody awaiting disposition of a charge, not for time spent on parole, and the dismissal of a charge envisioned by the statute refers to pre-sentence dismissals, not dismissals resulting from a successful appeal after conviction.

Summary

Hawkins was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 2 ½ to 7 ½ years. After serving 3 ½ years, he was paroled. While on parole, he was arrested for sodomy and sentenced as a second felony offender based on the robbery conviction. The robbery conviction was later overturned as unconstitutional. Hawkins sought credit for the 3 ½ years served on the robbery conviction against his sodomy sentence. The New York Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 70.30(3) does not authorize credit for time served on an invalid conviction when the defendant was on parole when the second charge was lodged and the dismissal occurred after the original sentence was imposed.

Facts

Hawkins was convicted of first-degree robbery in 1975 and sentenced to 5 to 15 years, later reduced to 2 ½ to 7 ½ years. He was paroled in 1978 after serving 3 ½ years. In 1980, while on parole, he was arrested for sodomy. In 1981, he pleaded guilty to sodomy and was sentenced as a second felony offender based on the 1975 robbery conviction. Later in 1981, a federal court determined the robbery conviction was unconstitutional. The state court then vacated the robbery conviction and resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction as a first felony offender to 4 to 12 years.

Procedural History

The United States District Court initially denied Hawkins’ habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, but the Second Circuit reversed. After the District Court again denied the petition, the Second Circuit reversed and directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the state resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction as a first felony offender. The state court vacated the robbery conviction and resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction. Hawkins then sought credit for time served on the robbery conviction, which was denied. The Supreme Court denied Hawkins’s Article 78 petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, overruling its prior decision in Henderson v Reid. The appeal reached the Court of Appeals as of right due to a dissent on a question of law.

Issue(s)

Whether Penal Law § 70.30(3) authorizes credit against a sentence for time served on a prior conviction that was later determined to be unconstitutionally obtained when (1) the defendant was on parole when the second charge was lodged and (2) the dismissal of the first charge occurred after a successful appeal from the original conviction.

Holding

No, because the term “custody” in Penal Law § 70.30(3) refers to actual confinement or detention, not constructive custody such as parole, and the “dismissal” envisioned by the statute contemplates a dismissal before sentencing on the initial charge, not a dismissal resulting from a successful appeal after conviction.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the legislative history of Penal Law § 70.30 indicates that “custody” was intended to mean confinement or detention under guard, not release on parole. The Court noted that the Commission Staff Notes indicated the statute’s purpose was to give credit for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of a charge. The Court emphasized, quoting Matter of Kalamis v Smith, 42 NY2d 191, 197, that the purpose was to give credit to a person who has spent time in custody “prior to the formal commencement of his sentence.” The Court also pointed to the Commission Staff Notes illustration of the statute’s intent: granting jail time credit “where a defendant is arrested for crime A and while he is under detention for that crime a warrant or commitment is lodged for crime B.” The Court further reasoned that the “dismissal or acquittal” contemplated by the statute refers to the dismissal of a charge before a sentence has been imposed, as indicated by the language providing credit for time spent in custody “prior to the commencement of such sentence.” The Court distinguished the case from situations where parole is considered custody for other purposes, such as parole revocation proceedings, stating those contexts are different from the specific intent of Penal Law § 70.30(3). The court affirmed the order denying the petitioner’s request for jail time credit.