New York Law Review

Tag: Actual Bias

  • People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984): Actual Bias and Juror Impartiality Based on Defendant’s Reputation

    People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984)

    A prospective juror’s unfavorable impression of a defendant, stemming from hearing or reading about the defendant’s reputation apart from the specific crimes charged, can create actual bias and warrant a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    Thomas Torpey was convicted of criminal mischief, coercion, attempted assault, and conspiracy. The central issue on appeal was the trial court’s refusal to grant a challenge for cause against a prospective juror, Mrs. Raleigh, who had prior knowledge of Torpey’s alleged involvement with the Mafia and had formed a negative opinion of him based on media reports and information from her husband, a sheriff’s department investigator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Mrs. Raleigh’s statements indicated a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that a juror’s bias can stem from a defendant’s reputation, not just opinions about the charged crime, and that general assurances of impartiality may not overcome such bias.

    Facts

    Thomas Torpey was indicted for crimes stemming from an incident at a bar, allegedly part of a conspiracy to extort money. During jury selection, Mrs. Raleigh revealed she had heard of Torpey before the incident, both through media reports linking him to organized crime and through her husband’s work as a sheriff’s department investigator. She admitted to forming a negative opinion of Torpey, associating him with the Mafia and hearing that he might be a “hit man.” She also conceded that it would “probably not” be fair to have someone with her frame of mind judging him.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Torpey was convicted of several charges. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause against Mrs. Raleigh. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Torpey appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the denial of his challenge for cause and exhaustion of peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted to having a negative impression of the defendant based on prior media reports and information linking him to organized crime, thus creating a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Raleigh’s statements demonstrated a state of mind likely to prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence. Her declarations aimed at purging her expressed bias revealed uncertainty and did not overcome the bias.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.20(1)(b) allows a challenge for cause when a prospective juror has a state of mind likely to preclude an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that this provision reflects the fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury. While prior cases often involved jurors expressing opinions on the defendant’s guilt for the charged crimes, the court clarified that actual bias isn’t limited to such situations, citing People v. Blyden, where a juror’s prejudice against minorities was grounds for a challenge for cause.

    The court found that Mrs. Raleigh’s association of Torpey with the Mafia and her impression that he was a “hit man” indicated a substantial risk that her predispositions would affect her ability to discharge her responsibilities. Even though the expurgatory oath is not automatically available under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), the court stated that a trial judge should require a prospective juror with a prima facie showing of actual bias to “expressly state that his prior state of mind * * * will not influence his verdict, and * * * that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” (People v Biondo, 41 NY2d 483, 485).

    The court distinguished between jurors holding opinions about the charged crime (which might be addressed by trial evidence) and jurors holding negative impressions of the defendant’s overall reputation (which trial evidence might not alter). In the latter case, the court stated, “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions of the defendant might influence his verdict.” Because Mrs. Raleigh’s declarations revealed uncertainty and did not overcome her expressed bias, the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. The court reiterated the importance of erring on the side of disqualification to ensure impartiality.

  • People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90 (1973): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Bias

    People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90 (1973)

    A prospective juror should be excused for cause if their statements or background demonstrate a state of mind that would prevent them from impartially trying the case, and the statutory oath designed to address potential bias must be administered completely and unequivocally.

    Summary

    Culhane and McGivern were convicted of felony murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions due to the trial court’s erroneous refusal to excuse four prospective jurors for cause after they expressed bias or demonstrated a background that suggested partiality. The court emphasized that when a defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted, an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error. The court found that the expurgatory oath, designed to remove bias, was either not properly administered or was contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Culhane, Bowerman, and McGivern, prisoners, were being transported when an incident occurred resulting in the death of Deputy Sheriff Fitzgerald and prisoner Bowerman. Culhane and McGivern were subsequently charged with felony murder. Prior to and during the trial, the case received extensive local media coverage. During jury selection, many prospective jurors admitted to having knowledge of the case and forming opinions about the defendants’ guilt. Several potential jurors were also correction officers, as were the victim and a key witness.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in Ulster County Court after a second trial, the first having resulted in a hung jury. They appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals because the death penalty was imposed. The Appellate Division had previously denied their motions for a change of venue. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to excuse certain prospective jurors for cause, thereby violating the defendants’ right to an impartial jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prospective jurors demonstrated actual bias or a background suggesting partiality, and the expurgatory oath was either not properly administered or was contradicted by subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse four prospective jurors for cause. The court noted that under the law at the time (Code Crim. Pro., § 376), a juror could be challenged for “actual bias,” defined as a state of mind that would prevent them from trying the issue impartially. While prior opinions were not automatically disqualifying if the juror declared on oath that the opinion would not influence their verdict and the court was satisfied, the court found these jurors demonstrated bias that was not properly addressed.

    Specifically, the court examined the voir dire of each juror. Some jurors openly admitted to having formed opinions about the defendants’ guilt, while others, like corrections officer Davis, expressed views suggesting they would be less likely to believe testimony from prisoners. Regarding the expurgatory oath, the court emphasized that it must be administered completely and unequivocally. “It is not enough to be able to point to detached language which, alone considered, would seem to meet the statute requirement, if, on construing the whole declaration together, it is apparent that the juror is not able to express an absolute belief that his opinion will not influence his verdict”. In this case, the oath was either not administered at all, administered incompletely, or contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements. As an example, “Venireman Davis, the corrections officer who found it ‘rather difficult’ to believe prisoners or to accept the possibility that the defendants had not attempted to escape, was never given an oath whatsoever, either in whole or in part.” Because the trial court failed to ensure an impartial jury, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court also suggested that a change of venue might be advisable for the new trial, given the extensive pre-trial publicity.