New York Law Review

Tag: Act of State Doctrine

  • Matter of Doe, 13 N.Y.3d 101 (2009): Enforceability of Foreign Adoption Decrees and Parental Rights in New York

    Matter of Doe, 13 N.Y.3d 101 (2009)

    Once parental rights have been validly established under New York law, between an adoptive parent and child who continue to live in New York, the choice of law governing the parental relationship is New York law, ensuring stability and certainty for families.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute between two former lovers, LMB and ERJ, over the adoption of a Cambodian child, John Doe, whom they jointly brought to the United States. After their relationship ended, ERJ sought to adopt John Doe without notice to LMB, who had previously obtained an adoption certificate from Cambodian authorities. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the Cambodian adoption, the enforceability of a relinquishment letter signed by LMB, and the application of the Act of State Doctrine. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to vacate ERJ’s adoption decree, emphasizing the importance of adhering to New York law in matters concerning parental rights of New York residents.

    Facts

    LMB and ERJ, while romantically involved, brought John Doe, a Cambodian child with a heart ailment, to New York for medical treatment with the intention of jointly adopting him. To circumvent perceived restrictions on adoptions from Cambodia, LMB, a U.S. citizen born in Trinidad and Tobago, reclaimed his Trinidadian citizenship to adopt John Doe in Trinidad, followed by ERJ adopting him in New York. LMB obtained an adoption certificate from Cambodian authorities in June 2004. The couple’s relationship ended in August 2004. ERJ, after being advised she could adopt John Doe in New York, obtained a similar certificate in October 2005. LMB signed a letter in March 2005 relinquishing his adoption permission. ERJ filed for adoption in New York in January 2006 without notifying LMB, leading to the ensuing legal battle.

    Procedural History

    ERJ was granted an adoption decree by the New York County Surrogate on April 12, 2006. Upon learning of the adoption, LMB initiated proceedings to vacate it. The Surrogate Court granted LMB’s petition, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. ERJ appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Cambodian adoption certificate issued to LMB in June 2004 should be given comity under New York law, thereby establishing LMB as John Doe’s legal parent.

    2. Whether LMB’s March 2005 letter relinquishing his permission to adopt John Doe effectively constituted a valid consent to ERJ’s adoption under New York law.

    3. Whether the Cambodian government’s documents issued in 2006 constituted “acts of state” that nullified LMB’s parental rights.

    4. Whether the lower courts erred in failing to consider the best interests of the child in deciding whether to vacate ERJ’s adoption.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court determined that ERJ should not have been allowed to adopt John Doe without notice to the person who was John Doe’s father under Cambodian law.

    2. No, because the relinquishment letter did not comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

    3. No, because the Act of State Doctrine does not apply to acts affecting individuals residing outside the acting state’s territory.

    4. No, because the best interests of a child do not automatically validate an otherwise illegal adoption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that LMB became John Doe’s father under Cambodian law in June 2004, and the June 2004 adoption was entitled to more respect than ERJ afforded it. The court emphasized that once parental rights are validly established under New York law, the law of New York governs the parental relationship, ensuring certainty for New York residents raising adopted children. The court rejected ERJ’s argument that Cambodian law should govern the validity of the relinquishment letter, holding that New York law applied because the child and adoptive parent resided in New York. The Court found that the letter failed to comply with Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. Regarding the Act of State Doctrine, the Court held that it did not apply because the Cambodian documents were issued while LMB, ERJ, and John Doe resided in New York. The Court emphasized that New York parents should not be at risk of having adoptions nullified by foreign decrees. Finally, the Court stated that while the child’s best interests are important, they do not validate an otherwise illegal adoption. The Court stated that the parental rights of a child’s father cannot simply be ignored because a court thinks it would be in the child’s best interests to be adopted by someone else. The court noted LMB’s assurance that he would not remove the child from ERJ’s home, expressing hope the issue of his parental rights would remain academic. “Under established conflict of laws principles, the applicable law should be that of ‘the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation’ (Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 481 [1963]).”

  • French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46 (1968): Act of State Doctrine and Currency Regulations

    23 N.Y.2d 46 (1968)

    The act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from examining the validity of acts by a foreign government within its own territory, especially regarding currency regulations, unless the Hickenlooper Amendment applies, which requires a claim of title or right to specific property taken in violation of international law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of Cuban currency stabilization certificates issued before the Castro regime. When Cuba suspended redemption of these certificates in U.S. dollars, an American investor’s assignee sued Banco Nacional de Cuba. The court addressed sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court found the act of state doctrine applicable, barring inquiry into Cuba’s currency regulations, as the Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply since there was no confiscation of specific property. Therefore, the complaint was dismissed.

    Facts

    Alexander Bitter, an American citizen, invested in a Cuban farm in 1957. In 1959, he acquired eight currency stabilization certificates from Banco Nacional de Cuba, guaranteeing payment in U.S. dollars in exchange for Cuban pesos. In July 1959, Cuba issued Decision No. 346, suspending redemption of these certificates to protect its dollar reserves. Bitter tendered his certificates in December 1959, but payment in dollars was refused.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff, Bitter’s assignee, sued Banco Nacional de Cuba in the New York Supreme Court, obtaining a judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting Banco Nacional’s sovereign immunity and act of state defenses. The New York Court of Appeals granted reargument to consider the Hickenlooper Amendment, ultimately reversing the lower court’s decision and dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Banco Nacional de Cuba is entitled to sovereign immunity.

    2. Whether the act of state doctrine bars the plaintiff’s claim.

    3. Whether the Hickenlooper Amendment applies to bar the act of state doctrine in this case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the State Department concluded the activities were commercial (jure gestionis) in nature and did not warrant immunity.

    2. Yes, because the act of state doctrine generally prevents U.S. courts from questioning the validity of a foreign government’s acts within its own territory.

    3. No, because the Hickenlooper Amendment applies only to cases involving a claim of title or right to specific property that has been confiscated, and this case involves a breach of contract due to currency regulations, not a taking of property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the State Department’s position on sovereign immunity was controlling. Regarding the act of state doctrine, the court cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, emphasizing that U.S. courts should not sit in judgment of foreign government acts within their own territory. The court determined that Cuba’s Decision No. 346 was an act of state, regardless of whether it complied with internal Cuban law.

    The court held the Hickenlooper Amendment inapplicable because it requires a claim of title or right to specific property that has been confiscated. Here, Bitter had a contract right governed by Cuban law, which was altered by currency regulations. The court emphasized that the amendment was designed to address expropriation of specific assets, not mere breach of contract due to currency controls. Citing the legislative history, the court noted that the amendment was aimed at cases where “expropriated property comes within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”.

    The court further reasoned that currency regulations are a normal exercise of governmental power, not a “confiscation” or “taking.” It cited the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, stating that applying currency exchange requirements to aliens is not wrongful under international law, even if the local currency is less valuable. The court concluded that even if the Hickenlooper Amendment applied, the Cuban action did not violate international law.

    In conclusion, the court stated: “It is plain enough upon the face of the statute — and abundantly clear from its legislative history—that Congress was not attempting to assure a remedy in American courts for every kind of monetary loss resulting from actions, even unjust actions, of foreign governments.”