Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 420 (1983)

An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) in a criminal case does not bar a subsequent civil suit for false imprisonment but does bar a suit for malicious prosecution.

Summary

This case concerns the impact of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) on subsequent civil actions for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Joanne Hollender, arrested for criminal trespass at the insistence of a security guard, accepted an ACD. She then sued the cooperative and the guard, alleging false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that while an ACD doesn’t preclude a false imprisonment claim (where the defendant bears the burden of proving privilege), it does bar a malicious prosecution claim because an ACD is not a termination indicative of innocence, which is required to sustain a claim of malicious prosecution.

Facts

Joanne Hollender, a 17-year-old resident of Trump Village, was arrested for criminal trespass after being ordered to disperse from an outdoor area between buildings in the complex. Despite the arresting officer’s reservations about the basis for the arrest, Hollender was searched, booked, and detained. Ultimately, she accepted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) to resolve the criminal charges.

Procedural History

Hollender sued Trump Village Co-op and the security guard for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The jury awarded her compensatory and punitive damages on both claims. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the ACD precluded both suits. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the verdict on the false imprisonment claim but upholding the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) bars a subsequent civil action for false imprisonment.

2. Whether an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) bars a subsequent civil action for malicious prosecution.

Holding

1. No, because in an action for false imprisonment, the burden of establishing that the detention was privileged is on the defendant, and the ACD is not legally decisive on this issue.

2. Yes, because a malicious prosecution action requires the underlying criminal proceeding to have terminated in a manner indicative of the accused’s innocence, and an ACD is neither an adjudication of guilt nor innocence.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that an ACD, authorized by CPL 170.55, is a “non-merits adjudicatory basis” for resolving minor charges, keeping them in suspense for six months. It is neither a conviction nor an admission of guilt and is treated as though the charge never existed. Because an ACD is not a determination of guilt or innocence, it affects civil actions differently. In false imprisonment cases, the defendant has the burden to prove the detention was privileged. The ACD does not establish this privilege. Conversely, in malicious prosecution cases, the plaintiff must prove the criminal proceeding terminated in their favor, indicating innocence. The court stated, “[I]t is ‘only when [the] * * * final disposition is such as to indicate * * * innocence’ that this burden is met”. Because an ACD is neutral regarding guilt or innocence, it cannot satisfy this requirement, thus barring a malicious prosecution claim. The court distinguished between the two torts, emphasizing the differing burdens of proof and the requirement of favorable termination in malicious prosecution. The court highlighted that CPL 170.55(6) states that a dismissal after an ACOD is not to connote either a conviction or an admission of guilt. The court quoted that after dismissal, “the arrest and the prosecution are rendered a ‘nullity’.”