New York Law Review

Tag: accrual of action

  • Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000): Accrual of Criminal Legal Malpractice Claims

    Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000)

    A cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, i.e., on the date when the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed.

    Summary

    Danny Britt sued the Legal Aid Society and attorney Norman Bock for legal malpractice arising from Bock’s representation in a rape case. Britt alleged Bock coerced him into pleading guilty, which he later withdrew. The New York Court of Appeals addressed when the statute of limitations begins to run for criminal legal malpractice claims. The Court held the cause of action accrues when the criminal proceeding terminates with a dismissal of the indictment, not when the conviction is vacated. This allows the plaintiff to assert innocence, a required element of such claims. Britt’s action, commenced after the indictment was dismissed, was therefore timely.

    Facts

    Danny Britt was indicted for rape in 1990. Attorney Norman Bock of the Legal Aid Society was assigned to represent him. Britt claimed he wanted to go to trial because he was innocent and that Bock was unprepared. On the trial date in March 1991, Britt asked the court to replace Bock, but the request was denied. Britt then pleaded guilty to attempted rape. He subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, alleging coercion by Bock. New counsel was appointed for this motion. After the motion was denied and Britt was sentenced, the Appellate Division remanded for a hearing on the plea’s voluntariness.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied Britt’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division remanded for a hearing, after which the trial court found Bock’s ineffective assistance rendered Britt unable to consider the plea properly, vacating the guilty plea on September 30, 1994. Britt was released from prison in December 1994. On March 7, 1996, the indictment against him was dismissed. Britt sued for malpractice in September 1997. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, holding the claim accrued upon vacatur or reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed but clarified that accrual occurs upon dismissal of the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated by dismissal of the indictment, or at an earlier point such as when the underlying conviction is vacated?

    Holding

    Yes, because the cause of action accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, specifically on the date the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed. Only then can a plaintiff assert their innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, a necessary element of a criminal legal malpractice claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the unique nature of criminal legal malpractice claims, particularly the requirement that a plaintiff must allege innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, as established in Carmel v. Lunney. The Court reasoned that until the criminal proceeding is terminated without a conviction, a plaintiff cannot truly assert innocence, as the possibility of a renewed conviction remains. The court stated, “Accrual occurs ‘when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.’” Vacating the conviction alone isn’t enough, since retrial and conviction remain possible. Dismissal of the indictment is required for the cause of action to fully accrue.

    The Court also addressed the policy considerations, including the need to avoid conflicting determinations on the issue of guilt, citing Smith-Hunter v. Harvey and Heck v. Humphrey. Allowing a malpractice suit before the criminal charges are resolved could lead to a civil court indirectly challenging the validity of a potential or existing criminal judgment. The Court acknowledged the purpose of statutes of limitations—preventing stale claims—but balanced that against the injured party’s right to a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim. The court stated, “[C]ivil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”

  • Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429 (1993): Accrual of Action at Time of Injury in Toxic Tort Cases

    Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429 (1993)

    In New York, a cause of action for personal injury accrues when the injury is sustained, not necessarily when the last exposure to a substance occurs, even in so-called “toxic tort” cases.

    Summary

    Pauline and Richard Snyder sued Town Insulation, Inc. for personal injuries allegedly caused by ureaformaldehyde foam insulation installed in their home. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began to run from the date of injury or the date of last exposure to the substance. The New York Court of Appeals held that the cause of action accrued on the date of injury, which occurred shortly after the installation of the insulation in 1977, and therefore, the lawsuit filed in 1986 was time-barred. The court clarified that, generally, a cause of action accrues when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint, and this occurs when the injury is sustained. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument for a “last exposure” accrual rule.

    Facts

    In February 1977, Pauline Snyder contracted with Town Insulation to install Rapco brand ureaformaldehyde foam insulation in her home. The insulation was installed on March 29, 1977. Soon after installation, the Snyders began experiencing respiratory problems and other physical symptoms. In 1981, the federal government banned the sale of ureaformaldehyde foam insulation due to associated health hazards. The Snyders learned of the formaldehyde emissions and related health risks at this time. The insulation remained in the Snyders’ home.

    Procedural History

    On February 1, 1982, the Snyders joined a class-action lawsuit against the insulation manufacturers and installers. On July 19, 1985, the Supreme Court denied class certification. The Snyders filed their individual lawsuit on December 19, 1986. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Snyders appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for personal injuries resulting from exposure to a substance, specifically ureaformaldehyde foam insulation, accrues on the date of the initial injury or the date of last exposure to the substance, for statute of limitations purposes.

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, a cause of action accrues when the injury is sustained, and all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint. This usually occurs at the time of the initial injury, not necessarily at the point of last exposure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a cause of action accrues when the claim becomes enforceable; that is, when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint. The court emphasized the traditional rule that accrual occurs when the injury is sustained. The court rejected the argument that “toxic tort” cases involving injection, ingestion, or inhalation of a substance should be treated differently, accruing on the date of last exposure. The court distinguished prior cases cited by the plaintiffs, noting that those cases primarily concerned the discovery rule, addressing how accrual should be determined when an injury was latent and undiscovered until long after exposure.

    The court addressed the policy considerations, balancing the interests of injured parties with the defendants’ right to a fair opportunity to defend claims. The court expressed reluctance to modify the law governing limitations, stating that the responsibility for altering statutes of limitations lies with the Legislature. Quoting Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., the court reiterated that “[t]here can be no doubt that a cause of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury.” The court concluded that the Snyders alleged in their pleadings that the injuries resulting from the defendant’s conduct arose “about the date of installation,” which was the date of accrual because they could truthfully allege all the elements of the tort at that time. Therefore, the limitations period had expired before the class action suit commenced in 1982.