New York Law Review

Tag: accrual date

  • LaBello v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 85 N.Y.2d 701 (1995): Accrual Date for Prenatal Injury Claims

    LaBello v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 85 N.Y.2d 701 (1995)

    A medical malpractice cause of action based on prenatal care accrues on the date of the infant’s live birth, not the date of the negligent act or omission.

    Summary

    This case addresses when a medical malpractice claim accrues for injuries allegedly caused by negligent prenatal care. The plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued the hospital for failing to properly assess ultrasound and amniocentesis reports, leading to the child’s birth with severe injuries. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began running from the date of the negligent act or from the child’s birth. The Court of Appeals held that the cause of action accrues at live birth because, prior to birth, the infant has no legal right to sue. This decision ensures the infant benefits from the infancy disability tolling period.

    Facts

    Between November 9 and 11, 1982, the Albany Medical Center Hospital allegedly provided negligent prenatal care to Tina LaBello. Specifically, the hospital allegedly failed to properly assess an ultrasound report and an amniocentesis test, allowing the pregnancy to continue beyond full term. As a result, Donald LaBello was born on November 30, 1982, with severe and permanent injuries.

    Procedural History

    The lawsuit was filed on November 23, 1992, more than ten years after the alleged negligence, but less than ten years after Donald’s birth. The hospital raised a statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court struck the hospital’s statute of limitations defense, holding that the claim accrued at birth. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the claim accrued at the time of the negligent act. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an infant’s medical malpractice cause of action, premised on prenatal injuries, accrues at the time of the negligent act or omission, or at the date of the infant’s live birth?

    Holding

    Yes, because an infant plaintiff’s medical malpractice cause of action, premised on alleged injurious acts or omissions occurring prior to birth, accrues on the earliest date the injured infant plaintiff could juridically assert the claim and sue for relief, that is, the date of being born alive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a cause of action cannot accrue until the plaintiff has a legal right to relief. Before birth, the fetus has no legal identity and cannot bring a lawsuit. The Court relied on Woods v. Lancet, which recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries, and Endresz v. Friedberg, which clarified that such liability is conditional upon live birth. The Court stated that, “Translated into tort law, this means that there is but a ‘conditional prospective liability * * * created when an unborn child * * * is injured’ through the wrongful act of the defendant, and such liability attaches only upon fulfillment of the condition that the child be born alive.” The court harmonized CPLR 214-a with the common law principle that a cause of action accrues when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint. Since a fetus cannot bring a lawsuit, the cause of action is incomplete until birth. The court also addressed CPLR 208, the infancy tolling statute, noting that applying the statute of limitations from the date of the negligent act would effectively eliminate the tolling benefit for prenatally injured infants, a result the legislature could not have intended. The Court emphasized that the right to sue is intrinsically linked to the existence of the cause of action itself. “A cause of action is the right to prosecute an action with effect…It is not possible for one at the same time to have a cause of action and not to have the right to sue”.

  • Cabrini Medical Center v. Humphreys & Harding, 66 N.Y.2d 948 (1985): Accrual Date for Construction Defect Claims

    66 N.Y.2d 948 (1985)

    A cause of action against a contractor for defects in construction accrues upon completion of the actual physical work, and subsequent incidental repairs do not extend the accrual date for statute of limitations purposes.

    Summary

    Cabrini Medical Center sued Humphreys & Harding for breach of contract due to alleged construction defects, nearly a decade after final payment and occupancy of the building. The New York Court of Appeals held that the claim was time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations because the cause of action accrued upon completion of the actual physical work, signaled by final payment, issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and full occupancy, not by subsequent incidental repair work. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order compelling arbitration and directed a permanent stay of arbitration.

    Facts

    In July 1971, Cabrini Medical Center (plaintiff) hired Humphreys & Harding (defendants) as contractor and construction manager for a 16-story addition. The contract stipulated final payment was due 20 days after substantial completion, provided the work was completed, the contract fully performed, and the architect issued a final certificate. The architect certified substantial completion on December 20, 1973, and final payment was made. By November 22, 1974, a permanent certificate of occupancy was issued, and Cabrini fully occupied the building. Funds retained for punch-list items were released on January 28, 1975. In March 1977 and October 1981, masonry repair work was performed.

    Procedural History

    On May 25, 1983, Cabrini sued Humphreys & Harding for breach of contract, alleging fraud and negligence in construction. Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to stay arbitration and dismiss the complaint, compelling arbitration instead. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claim was time-barred and directing a permanent stay of arbitration.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations for a construction defect claim begins to run from the date of substantial completion of the project or from the date of subsequent repair work.

    Holding

    No, because a cause of action against a contractor for defects in construction generally accrues upon completion of the actual physical work, and subsequent incidental repairs do not extend the accrual date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Cabrini’s claim accrued prior to May 25, 1977, making the 1983 lawsuit time-barred. The court emphasized that completion of work was signaled when Cabrini instructed its architect to release all payable funds. "By itself instructing its architect to release all funds payable to defendants, plaintiff here signaled the completion of work under the terms of the contract." The issuance of a final certificate of payment and Cabrini’s complete occupancy of the building further indicated completion before May 25, 1977. The court deemed the 1981 repair work (installation of eight square feet of concrete block) "at most incidental" and insufficient to extend the accrual date. "The repair work performed by defendants’ masonry subcontractor in October 1981 — installation of some eight square feet of back-up concrete block — was at most incidental to construction of the building and cannot serve to extend the accrual date of plaintiff’s cause of action." The court also rejected Cabrini’s arguments that fraud or negligence extended the statute of limitations, finding such allegations incidental to the breach of contract claim. The continuous treatment doctrine and equitable estoppel were deemed inapplicable due to the absence of a continuous professional relationship or a fiduciary relationship, respectively. The court distinguished between the completion of the project and later, minor repairs. To hold otherwise would create uncertainty for contractors and potentially extend liability indefinitely based on minor subsequent work.