New York Law Review

Tag: Accomplice Testimony

  • People v. Dorta, 46 N.Y.2d 818 (1978): Defining ‘Accomplice’ in Perjury Cases for Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Dorta, 46 N.Y.2d 818 (1978)

    For the purposes of accomplice testimony requiring corroboration, individuals involved in a separate crime (bribery) related to the subject of a perjury charge are not considered accomplices to the perjury, unless they participated in the false swearing itself.

    Summary

    Dorta was convicted of perjury for lying to a grand jury about his involvement in payments for police protection related to illegal gambling. At trial, individuals who had made these bribery payments testified against him. Dorta argued that these individuals were accomplices, requiring corroboration of their testimony under CPL 60.22. The New York Court of Appeals held that the bribery participants were not accomplices to the perjury because they did not participate in the false swearing itself. The court affirmed Dorta’s conviction, finding any error in the prosecutor’s handling of other witness testimony to be harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Defendant Dorta was charged with perjury for providing false testimony before a grand jury.
    The perjury charge stemmed from Dorta’s denials regarding his involvement in making payments to police officers for protection of illegal gambling activities.
    At trial, several individuals who admitted to making these bribery payments testified against Dorta, detailing his role in the scheme.

    Procedural History

    Dorta was convicted of perjury.
    Dorta appealed, arguing that the testimony of the bribery participants required corroboration under CPL 60.22 because they were accomplices.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Dorta appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether individuals who participated in bribery, which was the subject of the defendant’s false testimony before a grand jury, are considered accomplices to the perjury under CPL 60.22, thus requiring corroboration of their testimony.

    Holding

    No, because the witnesses’ participation in the bribery scheme does not make them accomplices to the separate and distinct crime of perjury. The accomplices must be participants to the crime that the defendant is charged with.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the definition of “accomplice” in CPL 60.22 had been broadened to provide a more equitable and consistent standard, but the witnesses in this case did not fall within that definition.
    The court emphasized that the witnesses’ participation in bribery did not constitute participation in the crime of perjury.
    The court noted that if Dorta had been on trial for bribery, CPL 60.22 would have applied, but he was charged with the separate offense of perjury. The court stated that “[w]hile each may have been a participant in bribery, such activity constituted no part of the crime of perjury—false swearing.” The court further clarifies with an analogy, “[a]nalysis may be advanced by suggesting that had the perjury charge comprised allegations that defendant had given false testimony as to an entirely innocent conversation, his partner-conversationalist would not be thought of as an accomplice. Conceptually the situation here is no different.”
    To consider someone an accomplice, the court held, requires more than just being “in some way implicated” in the defendant’s criminal activity; there must be participation in the specific crime charged.
    The court addressed the prosecutor’s improper elicitation of testimony regarding Richard Ramos, but deemed the error harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of Dorta’s guilt. The court applied the Crimmins standard, noting that “[t]he quantum and nature of this proof are so logically compelling and forceful as to lead to the conclusion that a fair-minded jury would almost certainly have convicted defendant.”

  • People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154 (1975): Determining Accomplice Status When Inferences Differ

    People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154 (1975)

    When evidence regarding a witness’s potential involvement in a crime allows for different reasonable interpretations, the question of whether that witness is an accomplice is a factual determination for the jury, not a legal determination for the court.

    Summary

    Defendants Basch and Bruno were convicted of burglary and petit larceny. A key issue at trial was whether John Clee, who was present with the defendants, was an accomplice. Clee testified he was told to act as a “lookout” but claimed he did not participate in the burglary. The trial court instructed the jury that Joslyn (another participant) was an accomplice as a matter of law but left it to the jury to decide whether Clee was an accomplice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences about Clee’s involvement, the trial court properly submitted the accomplice question to the jury.

    Facts

    On January 9, 1972, Basch, Bruno, John Clee, and Tom Joslyn were snowmobiling. Joslyn testified that he and the defendants broke into the Kiwanis Club property and stole items. Clee testified that he was with the group but did not enter the clubhouse. Clee stated that he was told by one of the others to act as a “lookout” while the others went to “get some stuff.” He admitted that he waited with others at the top of a hill about 100 yards from the house, and that the others returned with stolen items, one of which Clee bought.

    Procedural History

    Basch and Bruno were indicted for burglary in the third degree and petit larceny. Joslyn, also indicted, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At trial, the court instructed the jury that Joslyn was an accomplice as a matter of law, but left the determination of Clee’s status as an accomplice to the jury. The defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in submitting the question of Clee’s accomplice status to the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, whether John Clee was an accomplice.

    Holding

    No, because different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the evidence regarding Clee’s complicity in the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced CPL 60.22 (subd. 2), which defines an “accomplice” as a witness who “may reasonably be considered to have participated in: (a) The offense charged; or (b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged.” The court clarified that if the undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the jury must be so instructed. However, if different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of complicity should be left to the jury. The court distinguished this case from situations where a “lookout” is, by prearrangement, keeping watch to avoid detection. Here, while Clee was told to act as a lookout, there was no proof he agreed to do so or actually acted in that capacity. The court noted the absence of proof that Clee aided in the preparation or execution of the crimes. The fact that Clee purchased one of the stolen items (the telephone) merely created “a question of whether he had participated in the burglary or larceny.” The court also considered whether Clee could be considered an accomplice as a matter of law for criminal facilitation or trespass, but found the evidence insufficient to establish either offense beyond dispute. Because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences regarding Clee’s role and level of involvement, the trial court properly submitted the question of his accomplice status to the jury. The court emphasized that the jury is best positioned to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses when different conclusions can be drawn from their testimony.

  • People v. Lo Monaco, 37 N.Y.2d 463 (1975): Thief and Receiver Are Not Accomplices Absent Prior Agreement

    People v. Lo Monaco, 37 N.Y.2d 463 (1975)

    Under New York law, a receiver of stolen goods is not automatically deemed an accomplice of the thief in the underlying larceny, unless there is evidence of a prior agreement or arrangement between them to commit the crime.

    Summary

    Lo Monaco was convicted of petit larceny for stealing jewelry. At trial, Lo Monaco, a receiver of stolen goods, testified against the defendant in exchange for immunity. Lo Monaco testified that he bought the jewelry from the defendant, who said it came from the “south shore.” The defense requested a jury instruction that Lo Monaco could be considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that Lo Monaco was not an accomplice because there was no evidence of a prior agreement or arrangement between him and the defendant, preserving the distinction between the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of stealing jewelry from a residence. Police were led to Lo Monaco, a known receiver of stolen goods, by a confidential informant. Lo Monaco testified that he bought jewelry from the defendant at the defendant’s apartment after receiving a phone call about stolen property. The defendant told Lo Monaco the jewelry came from the “south shore” near Woodmere or Lawrence. Lo Monaco admitted to buying jewelry from the defendant on multiple occasions, but stated there was no prior agreement regarding this particular theft.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of petit larceny after a jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that Lo Monaco could be considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under CPL 60.22, a receiver of stolen goods is automatically considered an accomplice of the thief in the underlying larceny, thus requiring corroboration of the receiver’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 60.22 was not intended to eliminate the distinction between the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property in the absence of a prior agreement or arrangement between the thief and the receiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the definition of “accomplice” under CPL 60.22(2), which states an accomplice is someone who participated in the offense charged or an offense based on the same facts or conduct. The court acknowledged that Lo Monaco could be viewed, in a literal sense, as participating in an offense (criminal possession of stolen property) based on the same facts as the larceny. However, the court emphasized that statutes should be interpreted in light of their purpose, not just their literal wording. Quoting Justice Learned Hand, the court stated, “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.” The court noted the unique relationship between a thief and a receiver, emphasizing that the crimes are typically separate in time and components. Historically, New York law had addressed this relationship specifically. Following People v. Kupperschmidt, which held a thief was an accomplice of the receiver, the legislature enacted section 1308-a of the Penal Law, explicitly stating a thief was not an accomplice of the receiver. This was carried over into section 165.65 of the new Penal Law. The court concluded that CPL 60.22 was not intended to eliminate this established separation between the crimes of theft and receiving. The court stated, “We cannot agree, therefore, with the proposition urged on us that CPL 60.22 (subd. 2, par. [b]) automatically makes every receiver an accomplice of the thief notwithstanding the absence of proof that the receiver procured or otherwise aided or abetted the thief in the commission of the larceny.” The court noted that had there been any evidence of a prior agreement between the defendant and Lo Monaco, the result would have been different.

  • People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371 (1973): Defining an Accomplice and the Need for Corroboration

    People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371 (1973)

    A witness is considered an accomplice as a matter of law if their undisputed actions demonstrate participation in the preparation or execution of a crime, with the intent to assist in its commission, requiring their testimony to be corroborated for a conviction.

    Summary

    Beaudet was convicted of felony murder for his role in a bank robbery. The key issue on appeal was whether a prosecution witness, Berube, should have been deemed an accomplice as a matter of law, which would necessitate corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that Berube was indeed an accomplice because his actions, including stealing the getaway car and handling weapons, demonstrated his intent to facilitate the crime. Failure to instruct the jury that Berube was an accomplice was reversible error, requiring a new trial.

    Facts

    Beaudet, along with Pilón, Dupuis, Couture, and Berube, planned to rob a bank in the U.S. Berube stole a car for $100, hid it, and later installed stolen license plates with Beaudet. Berube also transported sawed-off carbines and tested a pistol with Beaudet, knowing the plan involved firearms to overcome resistance. Although Berube declined to participate directly in the robbery, he expected a “gift” for his assistance. After the robbery, Beaudet was found with American currency, some of which matched serial numbers from the stolen bank funds.

    Procedural History

    Beaudet was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Beaudet appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that Berube was an accomplice as a matter of law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the prosecution witness, Berube, was an accomplice as a matter of law, requiring corroboration of his testimony for the defendant’s conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because Berube’s undisputed actions in preparing for the armed robbery—stealing a car, providing a place to store it, changing the license plates, handling weapons, and expecting payment—demonstrated his intent to facilitate the commission of the crime, thereby making him an accomplice as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction cannot be based solely on an accomplice’s testimony without corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. An accomplice is someone so connected to the crime that they could have been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact, meaning they participated in the crime’s preparation or execution with intent to assist. The court stated, “To be an accomplice the witness must have taken part in the preparation or perpetration of the crime, with intent to assist in the crime.” Even if Berube did not participate in the actual robbery, his actions facilitated the crime, demonstrating his intent to aid in its commission. The court distinguished this case from others where the witness’s involvement was less direct or their intent less clear. The court emphasized that Berube’s conduct was “not attenuated,” and his knowing participation in preparation was a “substantial factor” in effecting the ultimate crime. Since the evidence established Berube as an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error, requiring a new trial. The court noted that accomplices are inherently motivated to shift blame to others, making corroboration essential.

  • People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972): Defining Accomplice Status Based on Intent

    People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972)

    A witness is considered an accomplice only if they participated in the crime with the intent to assist, counsel, induce, or encourage its commission; the critical factor is intent.

    Summary

    Wheatman and others were convicted of conspiracy and bribery related to bid-rigging on New York City Housing Authority painting contracts. The prosecution relied heavily on accomplice testimony. A key issue arose regarding the status of Feldman, an employee who made payments to an official at his employer’s direction. The trial court left it to the jury to determine whether Feldman was an accomplice, instructing them to consider whether he acted with intent to further the conspiracy or merely as a conduit for his employer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on accomplice status, as Feldman’s intent was a question of fact. Independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Several painting contractors, including Jerome, Spector, and Marcus, conspired with New York City Housing Authority employees Wheatman and Lowell, and a union official, Rarback, to rig bids on painting contracts. Esrig, an unindicted accomplice, initiated the conspiracy to control bidding and increase profits. Wheatman and Lowell received bribes for providing confidential bid information. Feldman, an employee of one of the contractors, testified that he drove his employer to meetings and made payments to an Authority inspector at his direction.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the New York County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions of some defendants due to illegally seized evidence, but affirmed Wheatman’s conviction. The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the illegally seized evidence and then affirmed the remaining convictions after the Appellate Division determined there were no other grounds for reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplices’ testimony to satisfy the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine if witness Feldman was an accomplice.

    3. Whether evidence of assaults and threats against witnesses prejudiced the defendants.

    4. Whether the prosecutor’s calling of a witness who refused to testify prejudiced the defendants.

    5. Whether Wheatman’s statement to a security officer was inadmissible under Bruton v. United States.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because independent evidence, such as copies of bid estimates and handwritten lists found in the contractors’ offices, tended to connect the defendants to the crime and reasonably satisfied the jury that the accomplices were telling the truth.

    2. No, because the facts left Feldman’s intent in doubt, making his status as an accomplice a factual question for the jury to decide.

    3. No, because the evidence supported a finding that the assaults were arranged and inflicted in furtherance of the conspiracy.

    4. No, because the jury was instructed to disregard the incident, and there was no indication of the testimony the prosecutor expected or that the refusal was based on self-incrimination.

    5. No, because the rule in Bruton does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any of the declarant’s co-defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, emphasizing that sufficient independent evidence corroborated the accomplices’ testimony, satisfying the requirements of section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now CPL 60.22). The court cited People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, stating that corroborating evidence is sufficient “if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” The Court determined that it was proper for the trial judge to allow the jury to determine Feldman’s status as an accomplice because there was ambiguity regarding his intent. The court stated that “The generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been convicted * * * either as principal or accessory * * * The question of intent must always enter as an element of the crime.”, citing People v. Jackerson, 247 N.Y. 36, 42. The court also held that the evidence of assaults was admissible because it was part of the conspiracy, and the incident with the witness who refused to testify was harmless because the jury was instructed to disregard it. Finally, the court clarified that the Bruton rule does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any co-defendants.

  • People v. Rossi, 21 N.Y.2d 696 (1968): Jury Instruction on Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Rossi, 21 N.Y.2d 696 (1968)

    When a witness is named as a co-conspirator and defendant in the indictment, and evidence connects them to the conspiracy, the trial judge must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, requiring corroborating evidence for conviction.

    Summary

    Defendant Rossi was convicted of conspiracy to sell dangerous drugs to a minor based partly on testimony from co-defendants named in the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that the co-defendants were accomplices as a matter of law. The court reasoned that because the witnesses were named as co-conspirators and defendants, and evidence linked them to the conspiracy, their testimony required corroboration under Code of Criminal Procedure § 399. The dissent argued that sufficient corroborative evidence existed, thus the conviction should stand.

    Facts

    Defendant Rossi was convicted of conspiracy to sell dangerous drugs to a minor. The prosecution’s case relied, in part, on the testimony of co-defendants who were named in the same indictment as co-conspirators. Evidence presented at trial connected these co-defendants to the alleged conspiracy.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Rossi. The defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the co-defendants, who testified against Rossi, were accomplices as a matter of law, thus requiring their testimony to be corroborated before the jury could rely on it for conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because given the naming of the witnesses as co-conspirators and defendants in the indictment, and emphasized by the evidence in the record connecting the co-defendants with the conspiracy, the Trial Judge should have instructed the jury that the co-defendants were accomplices as a matter of law and that, therefore, the defendant could not be convicted on their testimony without corroborating evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Code of Criminal Procedure § 399 and established precedent (citing People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547, 549 and People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465), the trial judge had a duty to instruct the jury about the accomplice status of the co-defendants. The court emphasized that, “Given the naming of the witnesses as coconspirators and defendants in the indictment, and emphasized by the evidence in the record connecting the codefendants with the conspiracy,” the failure to issue this instruction was necessarily harmful error, as it potentially allowed the jury to convict Rossi based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The requirement of corroboration exists to ensure the reliability of accomplice testimony, which is inherently suspect due to the accomplice’s potential motives to shift blame or curry favor with the prosecution. The dissent argued that sufficient corroborative evidence existed to support the conviction, rendering the failure to instruct harmless. However, the majority held firm that the mandatory nature of the instruction, given the specific facts of the case, was not satisfied. This case underscores the critical importance of appropriate jury instructions, especially when dealing with potentially unreliable witness testimony such as that of accomplices. It clarifies that when a witness’s involvement is clearly established and they have a strong motive to testify in a certain way, the jury must be properly guided on how to evaluate that testimony. The key takeaway for legal professionals is that the Rossi case provides a clear precedent for requiring accomplice instructions where the witness’s status as an accomplice is evident from the indictment and the presented evidence. “Failure to so charge the jury was necessarily harmful error”.

  • People v. Valinoti, 26 N.Y.2d 553 (1970): Accomplice Testimony in Stolen Property Cases

    People v. Valinoti, 26 N.Y.2d 553 (1970)

    Under New York law, a person who sells or delivers stolen goods is not considered an accomplice of the buyer or receiver of those goods; therefore, their testimony does not require corroboration to convict the buyer.

    Summary

    Boceo and Anthony Valinoti were convicted of buying, receiving, and withholding stolen property. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of Scuoteguazza, who sold and delivered the stolen car to Boceo Valinoti. The central issue was whether Scuoteguazza was an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that under former Penal Law § 1308-a, Scuoteguazza was not an accomplice, and his testimony alone was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The court also addressed the sufficiency of evidence presented to the Grand Jury regarding the car’s value and the admissibility of Anthony Valinoti’s statements to the police.

    Facts

    Scuoteguazza informed Boceo Valinoti that he could acquire stolen cars. Scuoteguazza subsequently delivered a stolen 1964 Buick Riviera to Boceo. Anthony Valinoti, Boceo’s son, registered the car in his name and was found in possession of it by the police. The indictment alleged the stolen car was worth over $100. Anthony Valinoti stated to police that he bought the car for $3,200.

    Procedural History

    The Valinotis were convicted of receiving and concealing stolen property. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to inspect the Grand Jury minutes or dismiss the indictment due to insufficient proof of the car’s value, which was denied. After the guilty verdicts, the defendants moved to reargue the motion and renewed their motions to dismiss the indictment. The denial of reargument was not reviewable, and the motion to dismiss was deemed untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scuoteguazza was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration under New York law.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury to establish that the stolen car was worth more than $100, as alleged in the indictment.
    3. Whether Anthony Valinoti’s statements to the police were admissible, considering the absence of Miranda warnings.

    Holding

    1. No, because under former Penal Law § 1308-a, a person who sells or delivers stolen goods is not an accomplice of the buyer or receiver.
    2. Yes, because there was evidence before the Grand Jury, including testimony about the purchase price of the car, that supported a finding that the car’s value exceeded $100.
    3. Yes, because at the time of the trial, Miranda warnings were not required for the statements to be admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that former Penal Law § 1308-a explicitly stated that a seller of stolen goods is not an accomplice of the buyer. Therefore, Scuoteguazza’s testimony did not need corroboration to convict Boceo Valinoti. The court cited People v. Sparks, which differentiated between the need for corroboration in larceny cases versus receiving cases. Regarding the car’s value, the court found that the Grand Jury had sufficient evidence, including testimony about the purchase price, to establish a value exceeding $100. The court noted that the motion to dismiss based on insufficient grand jury evidence was untimely but addressed the merits anyway. As for Anthony Valinoti’s statements, the court determined that since the trial occurred before the full application of Miranda, the statements were admissible, especially after a Huntley hearing determined the statements were voluntary. The court referenced People v. McQueen to support the proposition that Miranda warnings were not required for trials conducted before the Miranda decision’s retroactive application. The court found that the jury could disbelieve Anthony’s explanation of purchasing a car for $3,200 from a stranger on the street.

  • People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970): When an Eyewitness is Considered an Accomplice Requiring Corroboration

    People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970)

    A witness is considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of their testimony, only if they participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or if they counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime.

    Summary

    Michael White appealed his conviction for robbery, grand larceny, and assault, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe, a witness, might be an accomplice. White contended that if Slowe was an accomplice, her testimony would require corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed White’s conviction, holding that there was no evidence to suggest Slowe was an accomplice. Her mere presence and asking the victim for carfare did not demonstrate participation or intent to assist in the crime.

    Facts

    William Lance, the victim, was attacked and robbed near a subway station. Prior to the attack, Ariel Alexis Slowe asked Lance for carfare, which he provided. They walked to the subway station together. Three men then attacked Lance. Police arrested William Leroy White at the scene. Michael White (the appellant) and another defendant were arrested later based on information from Slowe. Neither the officers nor Lance could identify Michael White as one of the attackers at trial. Slowe testified that she knew the defendants and was present during the attack, even telling the assailants to leave Lance alone. A defense witness testified that Slowe was seen drinking with the codefendants earlier that day.

    Procedural History

    Michael White, William Leroy White, and William Wallace Brown were convicted in a jury trial of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree, and assault in the second degree. White appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Slowe might be an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe might be an accomplice, requiring corroboration of her testimony to convict the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding that Ariel Alexis Slowe was an accomplice to the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the test for whether a witness is an accomplice is whether they could be indicted as a principal. This requires a showing that the witness participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or that the witness counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime. The court found no evidence in the record to suggest that Slowe was an accomplice. Her presence on the street, asking for carfare, and acquaintance with the perpetrators did not establish participation or intent to aid in the crime. The court emphasized that the token was borrowed a block away from the subway station and the victim was in no way distracted or misled by her for any purpose connected with the crime.

    The court stated, “Her mere presence on a public street alone or her borrowing of a token from the victim would not have allowed the jury to infer that she participated in the commission of the crime.” It further explained that the victim was not lured into a deserted area and there was no indication she forced him to go to the station. The fact that she knew the perpetrators was not probative of her involvement or intent to aid in the crime. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would require an accomplice charge whenever any eyewitness testified against the defendant. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, Slowe was not an accomplice.

  • People v. Degeorge, 739 N.E.2d 558 (N.Y. 1968): Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Degeorge, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1968)

    Under New York law, accomplice testimony must be corroborated by independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime, but this evidence need not prove the entire case or establish every element of the offense.

    Summary

    Degeorge, a police officer, was convicted of grand larceny based on accomplice testimony that he stole refrigerators. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient independent evidence corroborated the accomplice testimony and whether the use of Degeorge’s grand jury testimony violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that there was sufficient corroborating evidence to connect Degeorge to the crime and that the use of his grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes was harmless error.

    Facts

    247 new refrigerators were delivered to a New York City Housing Authority project. Shortly thereafter, 26 refrigerators were found missing. Degeorge, a police officer, was indicted with others for grand larceny. Two guards at the project pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At trial, Franz Schmitt testified that Degeorge offered to sell him a refrigerator for $85. Rudolph Schmidt, Franz’s son-in-law, testified he saw a taped refrigerator on Degeorge’s porch. Nuro, one of the accomplices, testified that Degeorge and Cuomo took nine refrigerators one night and nine more later in August, paying him for them.

    Procedural History

    Degeorge and Cuomo were convicted of grand larceny. The trial court set aside Cuomo’s verdict for lack of corroboration. Degeorge appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony and violation of his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the use of his grand jury testimony. The appellate division affirmed the conviction, and Degeorge appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the non-accomplice testimony was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony and connect Degeorge to the commission of the crime, as required by New York law.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s use of Degeorge’s Grand Jury testimony violated his Fifth Amendment rights, given that he testified under a waiver of immunity as a condition of his employment as a police officer.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the non-accomplice testimony placed Degeorge at the scene of the crime, in a vehicle similar to the one described by the accomplices, and in possession of a refrigerator similar to those stolen.
    2. No, because even if the use of the Grand Jury testimony was error, it was harmless, as it was used solely for impeachment, and Degeorge explained away the inconsistencies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that corroboration of accomplice testimony is sufficient if there is some non-accomplice evidence ‘fairly tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.’ The court emphasized that this corroboration need not, like circumstantial evidence, lead exclusively to the inference of the defendant’s guilt. “Matters in themselves of seeming indifference * * * may so harmonize with the accomplice’s narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between the defendant and the crime.”

    In this case, the non-accomplice testimony placed Degeorge at the scene of the crime around the time of the thefts, in a similar vehicle, and in possession of a similar refrigerator. This, the court reasoned, sufficiently connected Degeorge to the crime. Regarding the Grand Jury testimony, the court acknowledged Degeorge’s argument that, as a police officer, he was required to waive immunity or lose his job, potentially rendering his testimony involuntary under Garrity v. New Jersey. However, the court found it unnecessary to decide the retroactivity of Garrity because the use of the testimony for impeachment, coupled with Degeorge’s explanations, made any error harmless. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.

  • People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967): Standing to Challenge Search of Another’s Property

    People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252 (1967)

    A defendant does not have standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from another person’s property if the defendant’s own privacy rights were not violated during the search.

    Summary

    Defendants Cefaro, Josephs, and Russo were convicted of burglary and grand larceny. A key piece of evidence, a stolen camera, was found in the apartment of one Barth during a search for narcotics under a warrant. While the prosecution initially agreed to suppress the camera, they later successfully argued that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search of Barth’s apartment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since the search occurred on Barth’s property and not their own, and they were not present during the search. The Court also rejected the argument that Barth was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.

    Facts

    On February 29, 1964, a burglary occurred at the premises of William Mendolia, resulting in the theft of cash, jewelry, and a Polaroid camera. On the same evening, binoculars, two television sets, and liquor were stolen from Thomas Simonetti’s apartment at the same address.

    On March 2, 1964, police searched the apartment of Barth pursuant to a warrant for narcotics. During the search, the stolen Polaroid camera was found in a bureau drawer belonging to one of Barth’s children. Barth testified that the defendants brought the stolen items to his apartment and that Russo sold him the camera.

    Russo admitted that he was with the other defendants on the night of the burglary and that he and Cefaro entered a house and committed a burglary. Josephs admitted to being a lookout during the burglary. Cefaro denied participating in the burglary.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the first degree, and grand larceny in the second degree. Prior to trial, the assistant district attorney consented to the suppression of the camera, but later successfully moved to be relieved of this consent. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the camera from Barth’s apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge that Barth was an accomplice as a matter of law or, at least, that the jury could find Barth to have been an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony?

    2. Whether it was improper to revoke the order suppressing the camera and whether revoking it during the trial was unfair and deprived the defendants of a fair trial?

    3. Whether the refusal to charge that the jury must find the confessions were voluntary deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to trial by jury?

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence indicated Barth was a receiver of stolen property, not an accomplice to the burglary and larceny.

    2. No, because the defendants lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from Barth’s apartment.

    3. No, because there was no evidence presented that the confessions were involuntary, and no proper requests or exceptions were made regarding jury instructions on voluntariness (except for Josephs, whose request was declined).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Barth could not have been convicted of burglary or larceny based on the evidence presented. The court referenced People v. Foley, 307 N.Y. 490 and People v. Roman, 12 N.Y.2d 220, indicating that while possession of stolen goods can be evidence of larceny, the possession must be unexplained. In this case, Barth’s testimony and the statements of the defendants indicated that he was merely a receiver of stolen property, which is a mutually exclusive crime from larceny. The court cited People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating, “The crimes of larceny and receiving are mutually exclusive.” Thus, Barth could not have been an accomplice.

    Regarding the camera, the Court held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge its seizure because it was found in Barth’s apartment, not their own. The Court distinguished the case from People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y.2d 509, where a wiretap was installed in premises maintained for the defendant’s benefit. The Court clarified that the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, did not overrule prior precedent established in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261; and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471. These cases established that a defendant cannot assert that evidence seized unlawfully from another person’s property should be suppressed. The court emphasized that if the defendants had been present in Barth’s apartment and the camera had been taken from their possession, they might have had standing to challenge its use.

    The Court did not find any evidence presented demonstrating the involuntariness of the confessions and noted the appellants’ failure to properly request or except to the court’s failure to charge the jury concerning the voluntariness of these admissions.